BICOM

In a BICOM Podcast on 17 September, BICOM Senior Visiting Fellow Brig. Gen. (ret.) Michael Herzog assessed the US-Russia deal on Syria’s chemical weapons, including how it is being received in Israel, and its implications for attempts to curb Iran’s nuclear programme. The following is an edited transcript of his remarks. To listen to the interview click here.

Michael Herzog served as head of the Strategic Planning Division of the IDF and worked with four ministers of defence as senior military aide and advisor, and as chief of staff. He is also a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

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How is the US-Russia deal on Syrian chemical weapons being viewed in Israel?

There are mixed feelings in Israel about this deal. Israel sees the benefit of a deal where Syria is denied production and usage of chemical weapons. It would deny Syria a strategic capability, which is threatening to Israel and has also been used in the terrible humanitarian crisis inside Syria. So if this is implemented then Israel welcomes it. Israelis also know that if the deal goes through, then the analogy can be applied to Iran, that if you want a diplomatic deal, a credible military option has to be kept on the table.

On the other hand, there are a lot of question marks about the implementation of this deal which is highly complicated in an environment of civil war, and relies on the good will of Bashar al-Assad which many, myself included, are sceptical will be given.

How good a picture do Israel and Western intelligence have of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, in order to determine if Assad’s declarations are credible?

Israel has excellent intelligence coverage of Syria and it was an Israeli intelligence general who, back in March, revealed publicly that Assad was using chemical weapons against the rebels, which at the time was met with some denial and scepticism. Israel also closely shares its intelligence picture with the United States.

However based on what I hear from people in Washington, the US administration believes it has some gaps. Some of the capabilities have also been moved during the war. So in order to really monitor this properly, when the Syrians hand over their list of chemical sites, it has to be very carefully examined against all the existing intelligence data, to see that they are not cheating. Then throughout the process, all parties, Israel included, will monitor very closely to see if there are any other sites or capabilities which are not recorded by the Syrians.

Once inspectors get into Syria, given the chaotic situation, how realistic is it going to be that they are going to be able to conduct their work?

This is an extremely complicated process. For one thing you have to know about all the sites. Then, inspectors have to go to these sites to check them. Once they do that, they will have to start either taking out chemical agents or destroying them on site, while maintaining ongoing monitoring of all the sites. This requires at least one thousand inspectors but probably many more, and it is a long process which may take years. The Russian-American deal spoke about completing the process by sometime next year, but to destroy all the agents may take much longer. There are going to be tremendous difficulties in getting thousands of people into a scene of civil war. They will not be able to move freely inside Syria – between Government-held and rebel-held areas – and it might be very dangerous to move chemical agents throughout the country. The process will require the full cooperation of the Syrian regime, which is likely to be lacking. The rebels will also have to co-operate, and that is a challenge because not all of them are really controlled by outside forces, including Jabhat al-Nusra and other extreme Islamists.

How will the US judge that this is a credible process and at what point may it decide it has to resort to military force to get Syria to comply?

The US will judge based on reports from inspectors on the ground and its own intelligence, or intelligence from others, including Israel. There will have to be an accumulation of violations for them to decide that this is not working. I think they will be rather patient before they reach that conclusion. Even if they do, it is not clear what they are going to do.

The deal says that if this is violated, then the parties will go to the Security Council for a resolution under Article 7, which authorises the use of force, but we all assume that the Russians and the Chinese will veto it. So, I think the chances the US will decide this is not working, to the point that they have to use force, are quite slim for the foreseeable future.

Syrian opposition elements have claimed that Assad is already transferring chemical weapons to Iraq and Hezbollah in South Lebanon, which is one of Israel’s biggest fears. Is this credible?

There is no credible information that this is currently taking place. But the possibility of Syria transferring chemical weapons to Hezbollah is something that cannot be ruled out. Israel has said that one of its own red lines is Syria transferring strategic capabilities to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and this includes chemical weapons. Reportedly, Israel has already carried out, earlier in the year, several airstrikes against attempts to transfer strategic weapons to Hezbollah. So if such transfers are attempted and Israel finds out, we can expect another Israeli attempt to strike. The presence of international inspectors may make Israel think twice, but if there is an attempt to transfer chemical weapons to Hezbollah, we can assume it will be behind the back of the inspectors.

Is the way this is playing out going to help or hinder attempts to force Iran to stop its advance towards nuclear weapons capability.

Impacting the Iranian thinking on its nuclear program requires a combination of elements. One of those, though not necessarily the most important, is the question of whether this deal will work. If it does not, Iranians can draw the conclusion that they can get away with what they are doing and not be punished. Secondly, the pressure of sanctions has to continue. Recent reports about Iranian willingness to put new offers on the table are due to the economic pressure Iran feels, and that has to continue until the West is fully convinced that Iran is serious. Thirdly, Iran has to be convinced that if diplomacy fails and they do not co-operate, then there is a credible military option on the table.

It might be that US behaviour on Syria convinces them that the likelihood of an airstrike against them is low. This is despite the fact that the US is telling everybody that Iran is not Syria and, as President Obama said, that Iran is much closer to the nucleus of the US national security interests. However, I would be careful of drawing conclusions at this early point when implementation of the Syrian deal has not yet started.

Some have pointed out that Israel itself has not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, even though it has signed it, and accuse Israel of having a chemical weapons stockpile. What is Israel’s stance on this?

Israel has decided not to join conventions regulating non-conventional weapons’ production and usage, or to ratify them, before there is a genuine regional movement towards implementing such conventions. Israel does not want to be in a position where it legally and politically denies itself the right to go into these areas, where others are developing capabilities to threaten Israel. Though Israel signed the CWC, I don’t think Israel should be expected to ratify right now, just because Assad said he is signing the Convention. First let’s see what happens with the implementation.

Additionally, Israel feels a problem, and rightly so, with any analogy between Israel and Syria. Israel is not accused of employing chemical weapons against its own citizens. The Syrians are the criminals in this case and they should be dealt with independent of any outside actor. For Assad, it is an excuse to say, ‘Why doesn’t Israel ratify it?’, but the Syrian case has to be taken in its own merits.