BICOM

Key points

• Although the prospect of proximity talks is a positive development, it is effectively US Special Envoy George Mitchell’s ‘Plan B’. It is a necessary, albeit imperfect, compromise to re-launch the stalled diplomatic process. Indirect talks are a poor substitute for face-to-face discussions, and risk keeping the process stalled, rather than advancing towards an agreement.
• Each side has concerns that the other is not really serious about peace. The Israelis further fear that the Palestinians have adopted a strategy of stalling the peace process in order to try to isolate Israel internationally and improve their own diplomatic position.
• Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas anticipates criticism on the Palestinian street and from Hamas if he is seen as caving in to Western pressure, and wants Arab political cover for re-engaging in the peace process.
• The challenge for the US and the international community is to ensure that this process will create a political atmosphere more conducive to the resumption of substantial direct negotiations.

Introduction

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas last week expressed support for the idea of proximity talks between Israeli and Palestinian officials, but will not formally agree to them before receiving further “clarifications” from Washington. For over a year, the Palestinian president has refused international calls to renew direct discussions between the two sides. It is a sign of how troubled the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic track has become that negotiators from each side, many of whom have been well-acquainted for years, cannot sit down together at present. Resorting to indirect channels is effectively US Special Envoy George Mitchell’s ‘Plan B’ – a necessary, albeit imperfect, compromise to re-launch the stalled diplomatic process. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also asked Quartet representative Tony Blair to play a greater role in terms of the political negotiations. This analysis examines what proximity talks might entail and the possible benefits and pitfalls of entering into indirect negotiations at this time.

Why have talks stalled for so long?

The substantive terms of peace talks have been disputed between the parties over the past year. Unlike during previous negotiations, Abbas has blocked all attempts by Washington and the Israeli government to see a rapid resumption of direct talks. This remained the Palestinian position even after Netanyahu endorsed the two-state solution in his public address at Bar Ilan University in June 2009, and after the Israeli government agreed to a temporary freeze of new West Bank settlement construction last November.

Several issues lie behind the Palestinian refusal to renew direct negotiations. Internally, Abbas and his aides believe that renewing talks with Israel will have a detrimental impact on Fatah’s political position on the Palestinian street. Without a complete halt to settlement construction throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem – which Abbas has repeatedly demanded – negotiations are likely to be exploited by Hamas to portray Abbas as a weak ‘collaborator’ who capitulated to external pressure.

Furthermore, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) pays close attention to the difficulties Israel has faced in international forums in recent months, and has promoted the isolation of Israel in international forums. Israelis are increasingly concerned that the Palestinians have adopted a strategy of stalling the peace process in the belief that this damages Israel’s position internationally and improves their own. Senior Israeli officials have particular concerns that some of their senior Palestinian counterparts are inflexible in their approach, and are likely to try and prevent even the opening of discreet back channels between the leaders that could help move the process along.

However, in recent weeks there has been a growing sense that world leaders are less inclined to support the PA’s ongoing refusal, and that Palestinian success in directing international criticism at Israel has run its course. Abbas has reportedly come under increasing pressure from EU leaders to resume negotiations. With Western support dwindling, and growing pressure from Egypt to renew negotiations, Abbas has run the risk of being increasingly perceived as the one preventing progress.

Getting significant political cover from Arab capitals for re-engaging with the peace process is now believed to be central to Abbas’s thinking. The US is trying to help in this respect. It has, from the outset, sought active Arab participation in the process. On Monday whilst in Saudi Arabia Secretary of State Clinton called for a renewal of the ‘spirit’ of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Explicit Arab political support for the Palestinians will be even more important when it comes to making the necessary concessions to actually reach a deal.

 

Establishing the terms of talks

Both the Obama administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have explicitly called for a renewal of final status peace negotiations. This remains the objective vis-à-vis proximity talks. Netanyahu stated last week that he sees indirect negotiations “as a corridor that will lead to high-level talks”.

Abbas is reported to be seeking various assurances from the US up front on what its positions will be if common ground is not reached. The US wants to avoid giving any guarantees to either side, which would make either side feel there was more to be gained by falling back on US positions, rather than being forthcoming with compromises.

Palestinian officials have also signalled their desire to focus talks on the future borders of a Palestinian state. This is a view which appears to be broadly shared by the US. Speaking in November, Mitchell stressed the importance of reaching an agreement on borders, “so that there will no longer be any question about settlement construction, so that Israelis will be able to build what they want in Israel and Palestinians will be able to build what they want in Palestine”. Clinton has also made several recent references to the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps (sometimes referred to as the ‘1967 plus’ formula) as the appropriate basis for negotiations on permanent borders.

What are the problems and benefits of proximity talks?

If they transpire, these talks would mark a ‘formal’ renewal of diplomatic exchanges between Israelis and Palestinians. In reality, there is frequent contact between the sides. Two weeks ago, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad appeared alongside Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak at the high-profile Israel policy conference in the Israeli coastal city of Herzliya. Senior Fatah officials also participated in meetings and events with their Israeli counterparts over the last year. It has been reported that Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat has regular contact with Israeli President Shimon Peres.

However, through his repeated insistence on a complete construction freeze in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as a precondition for resumption of substantial negotiations, Abbas has made it politically difficult for himself to climb down from preconditions. The proposal for indirect talks is part of an effort to minimise the political backlash against Abbas, primarily from his rivals in Hamas, and prepare the Palestinian public for a resumption of direct contacts.

The goal of proximity talks for the US will be to create a political climate conducive to the renwewal of direct talks, as well as to resolve outstanding disagreements over the format and substance of those talks. Proximity talks have been usefully incorporated into negotiation processes in the past. Israel and Syria conducted indirect talks with Turkish mediation in 2008, which reportedly led to a closing of gaps between the sides to the point where direct negotiations were close. And it was the US’s role as broker which led to secret back-channel diplomacy and eventually the Hebron deal after Netanyahu became prime minister in 1996. Abbas played a key role for the Palestinian side at the time.

However, among Israeli officials who have been involved in the peace process for almost two decades, the idea of proximity talks has been received with some degree of disappointment. Direct Israeli-Palestinian talks have been held since the early 1990s. Israelis fear that if the Palestinians are not really interested in making a deal, proximity talks, rather than being a bridge to direct talks, will be another way to avoid them.

The challenge for the US and the international community is to ensure that this process is not used by either side to avoid difficult decisions, but to build trust and narrow gaps between the sides.

What can be expected next?

Consultations are currently taking place regarding the format for talks and, in particular, a framework and time ceiling. In a Dubai Al-Arabia Television show broadcast last Tuesday, the Israeli prime minister’s spokesman Mark Regev and Dr. Rafiq al-Husseini, who was Abbas’s chief of staff until his suspension this week (related to a corruption and sex scandal) both said they would support terms of reference based on key UN Security Council Resolutions and the April 2003 Quartet-backed Roadmap. Details are yet to fully materialise, and whether the US will mediate in Washington or locally in the region is also still undetermined.

Whilst one Palestinian official suggested 20 February as a possible launch date for the talks, it is also conceivable that Abbas will seek to delay talks until the Arab League meets in Libya in late March. Backing from the Arab League would provide him with additional political cover he desires for entering into talks.

Conclusion

For US diplomats, to be attempting to set up proximity talks is plainly not their preferred scenario. But following over a year of deadlocked negotiations, this would be a positive development. This course essentially offers a mechanism designed to enable Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to retake his seat at the negotiating table opposite the Israeli leadership. If proximity talks can create a political atmosphere more conducive to the resumption of substantial direct negotiations, they will be worth pursuing.

 

Further reading

• BICOM Analysis: Abbas’s dilemmas in returning to negotiations
• BICOM Analysis: US Special Envoy George Mitchell’s latest visit to the Middle East
• BICOM FAQs: What are the main issues at stake in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?