BICOM

Key Points

• It is clear to Israelis that Palestinian unity is a prerequisite for lasting peace, but there is broad consensus that there should be no engagement with Hamas except on the basis of the Quartet conditions: renouncing violence, accepting previous agreements and recognising Israel.
• Prime Minister Netanyahu has taken a very firm position against any involvement of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. He argues that it is impossible to negotiate with the PA, if part of it is calling for Israel’s destruction and attacking Israeli civilians.
• At the same time, some Israeli voices argue that Israel should wait and see how the agreement develops, before deciding how to relate to the new government, and that this could be a strategic opportunity to contain Hamas, whilst continuing to engage with the PA in the West Bank.
• The viability of such an approach would depend on how the agreement plays out in practice. Cooperation between Hamas and Fatah in the security sphere would make untenable the extensive ground level cooperation between Israel and the PA in the West Bank, as well as Western support for PA security forces.
• Many Israeli observers remain sceptical about the viability of the unity agreement, aware of the deep level of animosity that exists between Fatah and Hamas, and the many differences over which the agreement may yet founder.

Introduction

The revelation last week of an Egyptian-brokered Palestinian unity deal between Fatah and Hamas was greeted with surprise in Israel.  Whilst Palestinian reunification is the primary political concern for ordinary Palestinians, most observers assumed the ideological and political differences were too great to be overcome.

The reconciliation agreement is supposed to create a new ‘caretaker’ PA government consisting of ‘independents’. Its central terms are based on the Cairo agreement which was signed by PA President Mahmoud Abbas in 2009 but rejected at the time by Hamas. It includes the establishment of a government of technocrats instead of the two currently existing governments, the holding of elections to the parliament and presidency within a year, a merger of the security apparatuses, and the release of political prisoners. However, an annex has been added to the agreement which effects its terms, and the full details are not clear. Many difficult issues are yet to be resolved, including the identity of the new Prime Minister and cabinet.

Israeli government responses

It is understood in Israel, as elsewhere, that for a two-state solution to be concluded and fully implemented, Palestinian political unity is a necessity.  Until now, Hamas has remained outside of the political process because of its refusal to abide by conditions set by the Quartet, to abandon violence, accept existing agreements and accept Israel’s right to exist. The strategy of Israeli leaders and much of the international community has been to marginalise Hamas whilst seeking to continue the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority.

After the announcement of the deal, Hamas spokesmen were unequivocal in their continued rejection of negotiations.  Mahmoud al-Zahar, foreign minister for the Hamas government in Gaza, said that ‘Our programme does not include negotiations with Israel, or recognising it.  It will not be possible for the interim national government to participate or bet on or work on the peace process with Israel.’

Whilst Hamas has maintained a truce for most of the period since the end of Operation Cast Lead in January 2009, it has periodically engaged in terror attacks, including the recent rocket attack on an Israeli school bus that killed a 16 year old boy. Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh demonstrated his ongoing commitment to radical Islamist ideology this week, by condemning the killing of Osama Bin Laden, and describing him as a ‘holy warrior.’

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s response to news of the reconciliation deal has consequently been blunt and unambiguous, describing it as ‘a tremendous blow to peace and a great victory for terrorism.’ Netanyahu said last week that Fatah had to ‘choose between peace with Israel and peace with Hamas.’  He added that ‘There cannot be peace with both because Hamas strives to destroy the state of Israel and says so openly.’

President Shimon Peres also called on the PA leadership not to enter into an agreement with Hamas, saying, ‘The agreement between Fatah and the terrorist organisation of Hamas is a fatal mistake which will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and destroy the chances of achieving peace and stability in the region.’  Both Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman have also made clear their opposition to any political role for Hamas unless it recognises Israel. 

The Security Cabinet later confirmed the Israeli stance of refusal to engage in negotiations with any government that includes Hamas.  The Israeli Finance Ministry then suspended the transfer of tax revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the PA.  Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz said that it was now incumbent on the PA to clarify that none of the money would find its way to Hamas.

The policy debate in Israel

Other voices, both within the Israeli government and outside, have suggested alternative approaches.

Opposition leader Tzipi Livni’s response focused on the issue of the Quartet’s conditions as the key measure of whether Hamas could play a role in the diplomatic process, stressing that ‘A Palestinian government will have to accept the Quartet’s conditions if it intends to keep peace with Israel.’

Yuval Diskin, the outgoing chief of Israel’s internal Shin Bet security service, cautioned against a knee jerk response, saying, ‘At the moment, as long as the Palestinian Authority remains in status quo, there is no reason to change our policies toward them or the security arrangements we have with them.’ He echoed the sentiments of many, by responding to the agreement with scepticism. He assessed that Hamas had made a tactical move by accepting the agreement, under pressure following developments in the region.

Among officials within Israel foreign ministry, there have been those arguing that the unity agreement, whilst presenting a security threat, could be turned into a strategic opportunity. According to a policy planning paper leaked to the Ha’aretz newspaper, officials recommended ministers take a careful approach to public declarations, and that a ‘constructive approach that would sharpen the dilemma on the Palestinian side.’

Shlomo Brom, a Senior Research Fellow at the prestigious Institute for National Security Studies suggested that Hamas’s decision to sign the agreement could be a sign of weakness that could be exploited by Israel. He suggested, ‘examining whether it is possible to create a situation whereby the president of the Palestinian Authority and the government of technocrats continue to maintain their present relationship with Israel, and Hamas is forced to swallow this and cooperate with a process that is ultimately liable to threaten it.’

The number two in the centrist Kadima party, Former Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, has similarly suggested that the situation may present opportunities for Israel. In an interview with Yediot Ahronot he called on Netanyahu to take the initiative and recognise a Palestinian state, ‘pending negotiations and security arrangements’ and to try and reach an interim agreement while working toward a final status arrangement. At the same time he asserted that Israel should insist that any Palestinian government meet the three Quartet conditions.

Yossi Beilin, one of the architects of the Oslo Accords and the Israeli leader of the Geneva Accords initiative, agreed that Hamas is weakening. He has suggested the agreement could be positive as long as it does not give Hamas a foothold in the West Bank PA security forces, and allows Abbas to pursue an agreement with Israel. However, he also stressed that, ‘Hamas remains the same Hamas… and we can recognise it only if it recognises the terms set by the Quartet.’

Security and practical concerns

Perhaps the most sensitive element of the unity agreement from an Israeli perspective relates to security cooperation in the West Bank. The main target of the extensive cooperation between Israel and PA security forces is against Hamas activists, many of whom have been arrested and imprisoned by the PA in the last few years.

The security cooperation has been the basis for relaxations movement and access in the West Bank and considerable economic development. This has been made possible by the split between Fatah and Hamas in 2007.  The current cooperation would be unlikely to survive if Fatah allowed Hamas participation in the security organs of the PA, or released Hamas prisoners.

However, if Fatah avoids meeting these terms, and continues its current cooperation with Israel against Hamas, it is hard to see how the unity agreement will remain sustainable.   

There has also been extensive Western investment in the Palestinian security forces. The 8,000-strong Palestinian Security Force has been trained and funded by a team led by US General Keith Dayton, with British officers also playing a significant role. The future of international support for this mission will also be called into question, given the status of Hamas as a designated terror organisation in the US and EU. There are likely to be particularly strong calls in the US Congress to withdraw US funding if it appears that the PA security forces are cooperating with Hamas.

There are numerous other factors with the potential to strain the unity agreement, and the PA’s relations with both Israel and the wider international community, in particular the fate of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Israel, as well as the US and the EU, regard Fayyad’s presence as a crucial guarantor of responsible fiscal management and reliability.  However, he is unpopular among activists in both Hamas and Fatah, and may lose the post of Prime Minister.

Conclusion

Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians, largely backed by the US and Europe, has been based on the division between Fatah led PA in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza. This has led to a strategy of trying to strengthen the PA of Abbas and Fayyad and weaken Hamas. The unity deal throws this strategy into doubt. Dealing with Hamas is not only a problem for Israel, it creates very serious difficulties for the US and EU, for whom Hamas is a designated terrorist organisation.

So far the Israeli government has taken a very firm line against Hamas inclusion in the government. Indeed there is wide consensus in Israel that Hamas cannot a partner for peace, unless they meet the Quartet’s conditions by renouncing violence, accepting previous agreements, and recognising Israel.

However, some in Israel are counselling that Israel wait and see how the agreement develops in practice before deciding how to manage relations with the PA from now on. Much will depend on how the Palestinian factions cope with the many vexed differences which lie beneath the veneer of unity they have now created.