BICOM

Key Points 

• In recent weeks, there have been fears of renewed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Whilst renewed fighting remains a possibility, given the damage it suffered in 2006, and its current focus on building its political power in Lebanon, it is unlikely that Hezbollah will risk war in the immediate future.  Despite claims to the contrary circulating in the Arab media, for its part, Israel has no interest in renewed conflict.
• Hezbollah General-Secretary Hassan Nasrallah and other prominent movement figures have made incendiary statements over the last month, accompanied by provocative acts by supporters in south Lebanon which have raised tensions.  The movement is seeking to win back some of its damaged prestige by reminding Lebanese of the supposed urgent threat of Israel, and the role of Hezbollah in ‘defending’ Lebanon.
• Ongoing danger of renewed conflict derives from the possibility that Hezbollah may attempt to ‘avenge’ the killing of senior movement operative Imad Mughniyeh, by striking at a high prestige Israeli or Jewish target. A second danger is that Hezbollah might attempt to introduce anti-aircraft weaponry into southern Lebanon, thus inviting possible Israeli pre-emption. Either action could lead to a rapid deterioration. The choice of war and peace is therefore in Hezbollah’s hands.

Introduction

The border between Israel and Lebanon has been largely quiet since the conclusion of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. However, this masks an ongoing process of arms smuggling and re-building of military and civilian infrastructure by Hezbollah, in anticipation of expected further conflict at some stage. The movement has adopted a different modus operandi to since 2006 (See BICOM Analysis: Hezbollah’s growing military threat). Whereas before the movement used positions constructed in rural areas (so-called ‘nature reserves’), the evidence suggests that now, Hezbollah has constructed infrastructure in populated areas. UNIFIL forces tasked with ensuring that Hezbollah does not rearm, rarely enter populated areas. When they do so they are accompanied by Lebanese Army troops.  The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) itself has a deeply ambivalent attitude toward Hezbollah. Their rank and file consists mainly of Lebanese Shi’ites, and the army officially recognizes Hezbollah’s right of ‘resistance’ in order to ‘liberate’ the Mount Dov/Shaba Farms area (a small area of disputed land at the point at which the Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian borders meet.)[i] As a result of Hezbollah’s changed approach, the ambivalence of the LAF and the limited mandate of UNIFIL, Hezbollah is now though to control a more powerful military than in 2006.

The quiet backdrop against which this re-arming has taken place has begun to fray in recent weeks. A series of events have raised tension on the border between Israel and Lebanon and prompted fears of renewed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.  The analysis addresses whether renewed conflict is imminent and assesses the factors which could bring it about.

What has caused the renewed tension?

A number of factors have come together to cause the renewed tensions. Hezbollah has experienced a series of recent setbacks. Since 2006, in addition to engaging in rebuilding its severely damaged military and civilian infrastructures, the movement has been engaged mainly in the internal Lebanese political battle. Hezbollah appeared to have scored a success last summer, when it forced the Lebanese government to grant it veto power in the government. However, recent developments suggest that Hezbollah’s strategy of combining ‘resistance’ to Israel with growing internal political influence has backfired.

The Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition failed to achieve an expected parliamentary majority in elections on June 7 because of an inability to increase its support among Lebanese Christians.  Many analysts consider that the 2006 war and Hezbollah’s unleashing of its forces in Beirut in summer 2008 led to a decline in support for the movement’s Christian allies. The result has been political deadlock in Lebanon, which still has no new government nearly two months after the election. The departure of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s party from the victorious March 14 coalition has exacerbated this situation. 

Hezbollah’s difficulties were compounded with an explosion at an arms dump outside the village of Khirbet Silm in southern Lebanon in early July. The explosion highlighted Israeli concerns at Hezbollah re-armament in the south taking place under the noses of the LAF and UNIFIL. 

Against the backdrop of these difficulties, Hezbollah’s leadership appears to be refocusing attention on the ‘resistance’ against Israel. General-Secretary Hassan Nasrallah and other prominent movement figures have made inflammatory statements over the last month. In his speech on July 17, to mark the outbreak of the 2006 war, Nasrallah claimed that Israel is still holding Yihya Skaff, a Lebanese terrorist who took part in the Coastal Road Massacre in 1978. [ii] In fact, Skaff’s remains were returned to Lebanon in 2008 as part of the exchange which saw the terrorist Samir Kuntar freed and the bodies of IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser returned to Israel. But a rumor has persisted in Lebanon that he remains alive and in Israeli custody. The pretext for the attacks which led to the 2006 war was the desire to secure the release of Lebanese citizens held by Israel, so the claim that Lebanese prisoners remain in Israeli custody is significant. The speech on July 17 was followed by a series of public statements by Nasrallah and his deputy Sheikh Naim Qassem in which they have threatened to bomb Tel Aviv in the event of war, and boasted of their movement’s capabilities.

At the same time, in the Lebanese media, an inaccurate view has been promoted that Israel is deliberately provoking a crisis to avoid talking to the Palestinian Authority. Lebanese resentment of over flights by IAF planes on reconnaissance and the recent arrests of individuals suspected of spying for Israel have fed the atmosphere of resentment. This has led in the past few days to Israeli President Shimon Peres seeking to reassure the Lebanese with a speech emphasizing that Israel has no quarrel with Lebanon.[iii]

The provocative statements by Hezbollah leaders have been accompanied by Hezbollah members demonstrating along the border with Israel. A particular focus of discontent has been the presence of an unmanned Israeli observation post near the village of Kafr Shuba.  A group of 15 Hezbollah supporters even crossed the border into the Mt. Dov area to protest the presence of the outpost. Other somewhat trivial matters have been recruited to focus attention on supposed Israeli violations of resolution 1701. These include, for example, an official complaint from Lebanon to the UN that Israeli farmers were permitting cows to cross the border and drink from the waters of a pond belonging to the village of Kafr Shuba.

In all these efforts, Hezbollah has been keen to present itself as a national Lebanese force, operating in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, to build a strategy of ‘national deterrence’ against the supposed threat of Israeli invasion. The motivation for this is obvious. Hezbollah is seeking to win back some of its damaged prestige by reminding Lebanese of the supposed urgent threat of Israel, and the role of Hezbollah in ‘defending’ Lebanon.

Might the renewed tension lead to war?

While the provocations near the border and the statements by the Hezbollah leadership raise concerns, there are good reasons to believe Hezbollah will hesitate before making renewed conflict likely.  Their statements and acts are carefully calibrated to create an image of defiance, while stopping far short of anything which could lead to renewed fighting. Both Nasrallah and his deputy, Naim Qassem, are careful to make clear that they do not seek war. Rather, their statements convey a message that if Israel attacks southern Lebanon, then Hezbollah has the ability to respond. The caution behind Hezbollah’s bravado is well grounded in the movement’s needs and in reality. 

First of all, there is ample evidence to suggest that both the Lebanese public in general, and also Hezbollah’s core Shia constituency, have no desire for another round of fighting against Israel. The 2006 war led to great destruction in Lebanon.  Much of the damage has not yet been repaired. Large parts of the village of Maroun al Ras, for example, remained uninhabitable.  No one wants a repeat of this experience, and the Lebanese will be slow to forgive anyone who forces this upon them.

Secondly, Hezbollah wants to entrench itself as a political force in Lebanon.  Here, the movement’s ‘resistance’ credentials are important, but the movement has an interest in making use of them ‘symbolically’ as a badge of pride, while at the same time avoiding the consequences of an actual clash with Israel.  Hezbollah’s long-term goal is the political domination of Lebanon.  It is hard to see how this could be served by provoking war at the present time. 

Thirdly, while Hezbollah is busy re-arming, it is clear that the movement has not yet fully replenished its 2006 losses. This is particularly the case with regards to personnel.  Hezbollah lost somewhere between 600 and 1000 fighters killed in 2006.  Many of these were highly skilled operatives. Replacing them, and bringing the replacements to a similar level of competence, will take time. 

Fourthly, Hezbollah is aware that an IDF operation into southern Lebanon would be of broader and deeper scope than took place in 2006.  Israeli officials have repeatedly stated that if Hezbollah forms part of the Lebanese government, then the government as a whole will be held responsible. The dimensions of a future campaign would be wider than those of 2006, which saw only limited and sporadic ground action. This is particularly the case because Hezbollah’s main ‘defence line’ is now north of the Litani River. Hezbollah has no desire to provoke this. 

For all these reasons, despite the rise in tensions, war remains unlikely.  Israel has no desire for war and for the reasons outlined above, it is not in Hezbollah’s interest to provoke it.

Factors which could precipitate conflict

Hezbollah blames Israel for the killing of senior movement operative Imad Mughniyeh.  The movement has been attempting to avenge this killing by striking at an Israeli or Jewish target abroad. Already, a series of attempts by Hezbollah have been made to hit at Israeli targets abroad, including at Israel’s embassy in Baku in Azerbaijan. The real danger of renewed conflict lies in this area, rather than in recent events in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is believed to possess an extensive international infrastructure, particularly in South America. The movement has demonstrated its ability to carry out operations far overseas. Hezbollah is believed responsible, together with Iran, for blowing up a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, with the death of 85 people. [iv] If Hezbollah succeeds in killing a high level Israeli or in carrying out a large scale attack on an Israeli or Jewish facility, this could lead to a major Israeli response against the movement in Lebanon. This is currently the most realistic scenario for renewed conflict.

A number of journalists have recently reported statements by IDF officers suggesting that if Hezbollah were to introduce sophisticated anti-aircraft systems in the area south of the Litani, Israel might consider a pre-emptive attack. Hezbollah is thought to be training in Syria on the advanced SA-8 system, and Israel is concerned at the danger this could pose to Israeli aircraft. The introduction of such a system would of course also constitute a further violation of Resolution 1701. There is no official confirmation of these statements.

In either case it would take a miscalculated act by Hezbollah to trigger conflict. The decision for war or peace thus ultimately rests with the Hezbollah leadership.

Conclusion

Despite the bellicose rhetoric emerging from Hezbollah leaders, and the recent provocations in south Lebanon, the movement’s leaders are signaling to Israel that they do not want war at the present time. Nevertheless, the situation remains tense. Israel has no interest in renewed conflict, but Israeli planners consider that another round of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah is probably inevitable at a certain stage.  

The substantive dangers at the present time derive not from the statements by movement leaders and the actions by supporters in southern Lebanon. These are all within parameters understood by both sides and in fact signal a lack of desire for war, albeit combined with an ongoing hostility to Israel. The real dangers derive from the possibility that Hezbollah may make a miscalculated act triggering an Israeli response.  Hezbollah’s future actions also of course have a regional dimension.  The movement is a creation and client of Iran, and could be expected to play a prominent role in any Iranian response to a future strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.  

Prediction in Middle East affairs is a dangerous business, and predicting that war will not break out doubly so.  Nevertheless, given the current interests of Hezbollah, it is likely that the movement’s leadership will consider very carefully before risking renewed war with Israel in the immediate future. 

 

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[i] See Bicom analysis, ‘Hezbollah’s growing military threat,’ 21/7/2009. https://www.bicom.org.uk

[ii]  The coastal road massacre was an act of terror perpetrated by the Fatah organization in 1978.  It involved the hijacking by Palestinian terrorists of a bus carrying Israeli families and children. 38 Israeli civilians were murdered in the massacre. 

[iii] “Peres: Hope Lebanon will be Middle East’s Switzerland again,” Ynet, 13/8/2009. http://www.ynetnews.com

[iv] “Iran charged over Argentina bomb,”  BBC Online, 25/10/06.  http://news.bbc.co.uk