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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Israeli politics at the turn of the year

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 Key points

  • Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has maintained solid support in Israeli society since announcing a freeze in West Bank settlement construction.
  • Netanyahu’s coalition is stable at present but the diplomatic agenda to which he is committed is not without political risk. The Prime Minister wants as much political room for manoeuvre for himself in government as possible.
  • Maintaining the option of bringing some or all of the centrist Kadima MKs into the government offers him a powerful tool for keeping the right-wing of his coalition in check when pursuing diplomatic steps with the US and the Palestinians.

Introduction

Amid escalating rumours that a group of opposition Kadima MKs were preparing to defect to the government, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu invited Kadima’s leader, Tzipi Livni, to bring her party into his coalition. Netanyahu’s Likud-led government, with Labour and three right-wing parties, appears to be relatively stable, but Netanyahu has always sought as broad a coalition as possible. Netanyahu maintains that, since coming to power in March 2009, he has developed a diplomatic path which has won national consensus. A poll carried out on 16 December, a few weeks after Netanyahu’s announcement to halt new construction in West Bank settlements, appeared to justify his claim. Over 60% of Israelis gave Netanyahu positive approval ratings.[i] This analysis examines Netanyahu’s latest efforts to expand his room for manoeuvre in government.

Netanyahu’s pursuit of a centrist agenda

Netanyahu maintained in his campaign for the February 2009 general elections that, as prime minister, he wanted to build a wide coalition, broadly representative of Israeli society. Although he successfully brought Ehud Barak’s Labour party into his new government, he said last week that he seeks ‘wider margins’ in order to be able to act on ‘various fronts‘. The option of a broader coalition is politically advantageous to Netanyahu in terms of ongoing international efforts to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace track.

Netanyahu has sought to demonstrate to the Palestinians and the international community his commitment to reviving the peace process. He explicitly backed a Palestinian state in his June 2009 Bar Ilan University speech, he has eased restrictions on movement in the West Bank as part of a broader policy of facilitating Palestinian economic growth and, most recently, he has imposed a ten-month freeze on settlement construction.

These moves have not been without political risk for Netanyahu. Easing restrictions in the West Bank gives rise to specific security concerns. According to an IDF officer, shortly before an Israeli civilian was killed last week by Palestinian militants, the military had removed two nearby roadblocks. Israel recognises that the security situation in the PA has markedly improved, but the threat of such attacks puts pressure on Israeli politicians when it comes to removing roadblocks.

The settlement freeze has riled those on the right of his party, and sparked mass protests by the settler community and its supporters in recent weeks. It has also led to acts of violence by extreme elements. As noted above, the right has not forgotten the Gaza disengagement, and they feel now that Netanyahu is betraying them, as Sharon did with the pullout from Gaza in 2005. The debate is likely to intensify, with uncertain consequences, in the New Year.

Party politics

Despite his difficulties, the mainstream support Netanyahu enjoys within Israeli society at large is what enables him to speak of a ‘very broad national consensus‘ for his diplomatic approach. It is on this basis that he has attempted to tempt members of Kadima to join the government.

There are those in Likud who would revel in the opportunity to exact revenge on Kadima by causing it to split. Sharon’s creation of Kadima in late 2005, after he split from Likud, led to a major loss for his old party in general elections the following year. Kadima succeeded in identifying with the Israeli centre ground – keen to see progress towards a two-state solution but sceptical about the ability of the Palestinians to deliver on security. But Kadima was always intended to serve as a vehicle for continuing Sharon’s programme in government. It attracted individuals keen to serve in government. Now the loyalty of some of those individuals to the party is being strained by a spell in opposition.

Livni has struggled to create an identity for Kadima as the largest opposition party, and many of its members are restless. Former Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz – Livni’s main rival within Kadima – claims that at least 14 Kadima MKs are considering crossing the floor to Likud. Mofaz himself wants to replace Livni as party leader and is trying to pressure Livni to bring forward Kadima primaries.

It was easier for Livni to attack Netanyahu and maintain a distinct agenda before he consented to the two-state principle. But to a considerable extent, Netanyahu’s Bar Ilan speech pulled the rug from under her feet politically. Today, both the prime minister and the leader of the opposition are explicitly committed to a broadly similar diplomatic agenda.

Although Kadima rejected the terms of Netanyahu’s latest unity proposal, Livni has never ruled out supporting the coalition if there were a serious diplomatic process. The possibility of bringing some or all of the Kadima MKs into the government offers Netanyahu a powerful tool for keeping the right of his coalition in check when pursuing diplomatic initiates with the US and the Palestinians. Members of the Likud and other coalition partners are much less likely to rebel if they fear that Netanyahu has an alternative to whom he can turn.

Stable for now

Netanyahu’s aides maintain that his government has been ‘functioning harmoniously‘ and that he sees ‘no need to shock the system’. Clearly, he cannot bring Kadima – the largest party in the Knesset, with 28 seats – into his government without a major reshuffle, which he has not offered. His initial proposal offered only minister-without-portfolio positions to Livni and Mofaz. For a new Likud-Kadima coalition to be formed, the parties would first need to establish negotiating teams, a move to which other coalition partners would be very sensitive. Mofaz has already insisted that he be part of any Kadima team.

But with or without a new coalition, Netanyahu’s position as prime minister is stable for the time being. His administration is less than a year old. By handing out 30 cabinet posts and appointing nine deputy ministers, he formed the largest government in Israel’s history. Despite reservations by some of these individuals about the direction in which Netanyahu may be headed on the peace process, there is no mood to collapse his government at this stage of the electoral cycle. It was at a similar stage in his first term, in January 1997, after less than one year as prime minister, that Netanyahu signed the Hebron Agreement with the Palestinians and kept his coalition in one piece.

By keeping open the option of a coalition including Kadima, Netanyahu is giving himself as much room for manoeuvre as possible on the peace process this time round. However, with the Palestinians unwilling to come to the table, how far Netanyahu is willing to go in pursuit of a comprehensive peace agreement is yet to be tested. In the view of Labour minister Isaac Herzog, ‘[Netanyahu] is serious, perhaps more than people realise. He is saying, ‘Test me’, and I am afraid the world may be missing a golden opportunity.’ Former justice minister and prominent left-winger Yossi Beilin has indicated that Netanyahu is edging closer to a detailed plan to restart the peace talks.

Conclusion

The possibility of part or all of Kadima joining Netanyahu’s government at some point is politically advantageous to the prime minister. Though his coalition remains stable at present, his diplomatic agenda is very sensitive on the right of his coalition. Tensions are gravitating around the settlement freeze. Netanyahu knows that he must manoeuvre skilfully to keep his coalition intact. He is also keen to earn credibility in the eyes of Israel’s international allies by demonstrating his commitment to reviving the peace process. If Isaac Herzog and Yossi Beilin are right that Netanyahu is serious about the peace process, and if the US can persuade the Palestinians to enter negotiations, the Kadima option could yet prove important in allowing the prime minister the political space to act.

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[i] The question: What grade do you give to Binyamin Netanyahu for his performance as prime minister?

Very good 11.8% Good 49.0% Not so good 24.3% Bad 11.9% Don’t know/no reply 3.0%

Telephone poll of a representative sample of 486 adult Israelis (including Arab Israelis) carried out by Shvakim Panorama for Israel Radio’s Hakol Diburim (It’s All Talk) program 16 December and broadcast on 17 December 2009.