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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Netanyahu’s premiership six months in

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Key Points

  • In the first six months since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu came to power, a key challenge for him has been to formulate a stance on the peace process that meets US expectations whilst keeping his broad coalition intact.
  • Netanyahu’s priority remains ensuring that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are dealt with. But with regard to the Palestinian issue, he has changed his stance through his acceptance of the two-state solution and the need to advance the peace process in parallel to dealing with Iran.
  • However, as the US continues to push for a process that addresses the substantive issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the question remains open as to which of his predecessors Netanyahu is willing and able to emulate. Does he aspire to a major diplomatic initiative like Menachem Begin, or is he content to maintain a stable grip on power, like Yitzhak Shamir.

Introduction

There is a sense in some quarters, including among some of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political rivals, that the Prime Minister has changed.  Netanyahu talks in a way that implies he does not simply wish to mark time in office.  In a round of recent interviews, he frequently referred to the leaders who took bold decisions for genuine peace: Egypt’s Anwar Sadat with Likud’s Menachem Begin in 1978 and Jordan’s King Hussein with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994.[i]  He says that he has respect for Mahmoud Abbas, and that the Palestinian president has to decide: ‘If he’s an Anwar Sadat, he’ll find in me a partner for peace and we’ll make peace.’[ii]  But Netanyahu also faces difficult choices. Abbas could just as easily question, as some Israeli commentators have, whether Netanyahu seeks to be a leader like Menachem Begin or Yitzhak Rabin, who made bold diplomatic initiatives, or one like Yitzhak Shamir.[iii]  Shamir served as prime minister in the 1980s for longer than both Begin and Rabin, but left the legacy of neither.

Since returning to power, Netanyahu has so far worked from a difficult beginning to stabilise relations with the new US administration. He has also developed more pragmatic positions vis-à-vis the peace process, and maintained a stable coalition. This analysis reflects upon Netanyahu’s first six months in office, and assesses the ongoing question about what kind of premiership Netanyahu is willing and able to have.

Return to power

When tasked with forming a government following the February 2009 election, Benjamin Netanyahu worked hard to form a broad coalition. He wished to avoid the trappings of a narrow, right wing government, like that which cornered him when he served as prime minister in the late 1990s.  A decade on, he has formed an alliance with the left of centre Labour party, led by Defence Minister Ehud Barak.

Barak says he finds in Netanyahu ‘a more mature person’ today, adding that whilst they do not agree on every detail, there exists a ‘deep understanding’ between them.[iv]  Barak distinguishes between the rhetoric of prime ministers before being elected and their subsequent policies. He notes that all, himself included, have recalibrated their positions once in power.[v]  Netanyahu, he maintains, is no different.  Some would argue that the recent development concerning IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, in which Israel released twenty prisoners in return for a ‘sign of life’ video tape, is a demonstration of this.  Some Israeli commentators have argued that Netanyahu would have opposed such a move vociferously had he still been in opposition.[vi]

Netanyahu’s repositioning in government

In wider strategic terms, it is on the Palestinian issue where Netanyahu has demonstrated a marked shift in a short time.  Specifically, there has been a change in the fluidity and ease with which he discusses Palestinian sovereignty.  His party’s pre-election platform stated that it was ‘ready for concessions for peace’.[vii]  But whilst Netanyahu advocated peace talks with the Palestinians, he always remained ambiguous about his vision of an end-game.  Refusing to explicitly commit to the principle of two states for two peoples put him at odds with the international consensus about resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. US President Barack Obama’s clear commitment to advancing towards a Palestinian state guaranteed external pressure on Netanyahu from Israel’s closest ally.

At the White House in May, Netanyahu confined his remarks to stating that the Palestinians should be able to ‘govern themselves, absent a handful of powers that could endanger the state of Israel’.[viii]  This fell short of Obama’s expectations.  After returning from Washington, in his major policy speech at Bar Ilan University in June, Netanyahu expressed willingness to accept a ‘Palestinian state’ with Israeli security guarantees.[ix]  At the UN General Assembly in New York at the end of last month, he expanded: ‘As deeply connected as we are to this land, we recognize that the Palestinians also live there and want a home of their own.  We want to live side by side with them, two free peoples living in peace, prosperity and dignity.’[x] Netanyahu seems satisfied that his more pragmatic stance with regard to the Palestinians is being reciprocated in Washington.  He says that whilst differences remain with the US, they are learning from one another and that there is very high level of respectful contact almost daily.[xi] 

However, Obama’s recent call for Israeli ‘restraint’ in settlement activity and imminent bilateral negotiations is unpalatable to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who continues to demand a full Israeli settlement freeze before resuming peace talks.[xii] Construction in West Bank settlements will remain a sensitive issue, though Obama is anxious to see the pace of progress pick up on all fronts.  Perhaps had Obama seen some enthusiasm by leading pro-Western Arab states such as Saudi Arabia to take steps towards normalising relations with Israel, as he had hoped, he would have maintained the same degree of pressure on Israel in New York recently.  All sides are showing less room for manoeuvre than Washington would ideally like. Obama now wants substantive talks on permanent status issues taking place in the coming weeks.

Netanyahu agrees with restarting talks, adding that it will enable the West Bank economic growth he has promoted – up to 7 percent annually according to the IMF – to reach double digits.[xiii]  He has supported Palestinians economic development through easing mobility and access in the West Bank.  As of 16 September, 250 roadblocks had been removed or scheduled to be removed since Netanyahu came to office.[xiv]  He argues these measures will enable further Palestinian economic development which will, in turn, both support and be supported by the political dimension.[xv]

Netanyahu has also shown movement in terms of his broader regional thinking.  Dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat unquestionably remains Netanyahu’s overriding priority in government.  He has argued in the past that confronting Iranian backed radicalism is a pre-requisite for success in the peace process. Without progress on this internationally, it is difficult to imagine him focusing his attention elsewhere.  But here, too, Washington has had influence.  US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has explicitly linked Israeli engagement on the Palestinian issue to wider US relations with the Arab nations, whose support is important for isolating Iran.[xvi]  Subsequently, Netanyahu has accepted the need to pursue the peace process in parallel with US efforts to engage Iran and prevent it from acquiring atomic weapons.

But Netanyahu can credibly claim that whilst he has had to change his position, he has succeeding in forcing others in the international community to do likewise. Netanyahu welcomed the line in President Obama’s recent UN speech in which he referred to Israel’s Jewish character.[xvii]  The Palestinian leadership refuses to overtly recognise this. At the Labour Party Conference last week, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband also spoke explicitly about his vision of a ‘democratic Palestine and democratic Jewish Israel, living side by side.’[xviii]  Such remarks constitute diplomatic achievements for Netanyahu’s government.

Coalition and party politics

For Netanyahu, developing positions on the peace process that would meet the expectations of the Obama administration without upsetting his coalition was always going to be a difficult balancing act.  Netanyahu has taken considerable steps to satisfy his coalition partners. Authorising 30 cabinet posts and nine deputy ministers, he has formed the largest government in Israel’s history.  He is also involving his key coalition partners in diplomatic activities. He recently had head of the ultraorthodox Shas party, Eli Yishai, accompany him to Cairo to meet President Mubarak.[xix]  Both Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman went with him to the UN.[xx]

But because peace talks have not yet got off the ground, Netanyahu is yet to be really tested in relation to substantive and sensitive policy issues, such as the borders of a future Palestinian state and Palestinian demands for sovereignty in East Jerusalem.  He maintains that he is willing to talk about the issues,[xxi] but it is unclear how far he is willing to go and he will undoubtedly be constrained by his coalition partners on the right. 

It was reported in September that President Shimon Peres was trying to persuade Livni and other Kadima members to join Netanyahu.[xxii]  This would enable Netanyahu to maintain a majority if other coalition parties choose to defect over developments in the peace process.  Presently, there are no indications of movement in either direction.  As head of the opposition, Livni commented last week, ‘He [Netanyahu] is merely trying to survive, and this stalling might be good for Netanyahu, but it is not good for Israel.’ However she also said, ‘If he does the right things, Kadima will be there to support him, and ‘there’ can either be in the government or in the opposition.’ [xxiii]

Within his own Likud party, it is ironically the Iran threat that is providing Netanyahu with some political breathing space.  Yoav Blum, a member of the Likud central committee, recently wrote to all Likud politicians, stating that any efforts to undermine Netanyahu whilst he is preoccupied with this existential danger are ‘no less than a subversion of the national interest of the State of Israel, and certainly not the will of the Likud members.’[xxiv]  Nonetheless, Netanyahu does face internal rivals that are actively campaigning against him, including Vice Prime Minister Silvan Shalom. Shalom has harshly criticised Netanyahu’s efforts to reach a deal with the US on settlements.  He attended an anti-Netanyahu settler protest in Jerusalem last month.[xxv]  His Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon also toured West Bank outposts in the summer as a demonstration of support for the settler movement. Whilst he and other leading Likud MKs, such as Knesset speaker Reuven Rivlin and Minister without Portfolio Benny Begin, have been reserved of late, they all wish to keep Netanyahu on a short leash vis-à-vis political concessions. However, they will also be aware that Netanyahu could explore a fallback option of an alliance with Kadima. Those on the right remember all too well how former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon abandoned them after his Gaza withdrawal in 2005, in order to shake off the limitations they imposed on him as he sought to continue his political agenda.

Conclusion

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes he has chalked up some significant political-diplomatic achievements since taking office earlier this year.  He recently returned from what he viewed as a successful trip to the UN General Assembly in New York on 23 September.  He feels he is playing his part in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme is squarely on the international agenda of leading Western countries.  His administration is coordinating policy more closely with US President Barack Obama’s Middle East team than it was earlier in the year, and there is greater understanding between Washington and Jerusalem on regional issues. At home, despite Netanyahu’s acceptance of a Palestinian state, his broad coalition remains stable, though there are frictions within his Likud party.  However, Netanyahu will face greater challenges if and when his call for political negotiations with the Palestinians becomes a reality, or if he is forced to halt settlement construction. This will be the point at which Netanyahu is truly tested.

 

 


[i] Interview with PM Netanyahu on ABC News, 22 Sep 2009.

[ii] Interview with PM Netanyahu on ABC News, 22 September 2009; CNN interview with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 22 September 2009.

[iii] See, for instance, Aluf Benn, ‘Shamir or Rabin’, Haaretz, 24 September 2009.

[iv] Gidi Weitz, ‘Barak: Netanyahu more mature, Lieberman more balanced than he seems’, Haaretz, 2 May 2009.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] See, for instance, Amir Oren, ‘Hot Iron 2009’, Haaretz, 4 October 2009.

[vii] Oded Eran, ‘The Elections in Israel: Diplomatic Implications’, INSS Insight No. 93, 12 February 2009.

[viii] The White House, 18 May 2009; for further analysis, see BICOM Briefing, ‘Content and implications of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech’.

[ix] ‘Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’, Begin-Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University, Prime Minister’s Office, 14 June 2009.

[x] ‘Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United Nations General Assembly General Debate – 64th Session’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 September 2009.

[xi] CNN interview with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 22 September 2009.

[xii] Avi Issacharoff, ‘Abbas: Netanyahu’s government is a ‘real problem’; no ground for talks’, Haaretz, 27 September 2009.

[xiii] ‘NBC interview with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 September 2009.

[xiv] Herb Keinon and Yaakov Katz, ‘IDF to remove 100 West Bank roadblocks’, The Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2009; ‘IDF to remove one hundred roadblocks in Judea and Samaria’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2009.

[xv] ‘Interview with PM Netanyahu on Charlie Rose’, Charlie Rose, 24 September 2009.

[xvi] Sue Pleming, ‘Clinton says Israel risks losing support on Iran’, Reuters, 23 April 2009.

[xvii] ‘Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 23 September 2009 ; for Israeli reaction, see Natasha Mozgovaya, ‘Lieberman to Haaretz: Israel pleased by Obama mention of ‘Jewish state”, Haaretz, 23 September 2009.

[xviii] David Miliband’s speech at the 2009 Labour Party Annual Conference’, The Labour Party, September 2009.

[xix] Gil Hoffman, ‘Shas to help Netanyahu sell deal for Schalit’, The Jerusalem Post, 14 September 2009.

[xx] Yossi Verter, ‘Right-hand men’, Haaretz, 25 September 2009.

[xxi] CNN interview with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 22 September 2009.

[xxii] Yuval Azoulay, Barak Ravid and Akiva Eldar, ‘Netanyahu: We’re ready to compromise for sake of peace, but won’t be suckers’, Haaretz, 13 September 2009.

[xxiii] Gil Hoffman, ‘Livni knocks PM for invoking Holocaust at UN’, The Jerusalem Post, 27 September 2009.

[xxiv] Yossi Verter, ‘Right-hand men’, Haaretz, 25 September 2009.

[xxv] Gil Hoffman, ‘Shalom: PM is groveling to Abbas’, The Jerusalem Post, 7 September 2009.