BICOM

Key Points

 

• PM Netanyahu’s talks with President Mubarak likely reflected joint Israeli-Egyptian concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program. These shared concerns form part of a wider process of strategic re-alignment in the region, which is producing new and unfamiliar alliances.

 

• Egypt’s grave concerns regarding Iranian regional expansion reflect a wider mood across the Arab world. The Saudis, Jordan, the small Gulf emirates (with the exception of Qatar), Morocco, and pro-western elements in Lebanon are all equally worried at Iran’s attempt to expand its power and influence westward toward the Mediterranean and southward in the Persian Gulf area.

 

• Both Egypt and Israel are keen to ‘toughen’ the US stance re Iran, and are concerned that engagement be defined as limited in time and with clear expectations.

 

• In presenting a coherent and unified case in Washington, much will also depend on whether Egypt and Israel can find at least basic common ground on the way forward in negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.

 

Introduction

 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Egypt Monday and met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; his first meeting with an Arab leader since he took up the post of prime minister on March 31. National Infrastructures Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer accompanied Netanyahu. Ben-Eliezer is understood to be on good terms with the Egyptian leader, and he has been involved in recent weeks in liaising between the government of Israel and Cairo. Ben-Eliezer, a veteran and senior Labour politician, is Iraqi-born, and a native speaker of Arabic.   

 

In addition to the meeting in Cairo, Netanyahu is expected to meet with Jordanian King Abdullah II later in the week – prior to his scheduled trip to Washington the following week for talks with President Barack Obama.  The meeting with King Abdullah is expected to take place in the context of the Davos Forum discussions due to take place on the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea.

 

Netanyahu’s talks with Mubarak will have focused on joint Israeli-Egyptian concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program.  These shared concerns form part of a wider process of strategic re-alignment in the region, which is producing new and unfamiliar alliances. 

 

Concern over the Iranian nuclear program is not focused only on the nightmare scenario of an Iranian first use of a nuclear weapon. Rather, the nuclear program is considered by both Israeli and Egyptian strategists to form part of a larger Iranian attempt to emerge as the dominant power in the Middle East. The emergence of this challenge is creating a basis for the deepening of relations between Israel, Egypt and other moderate and pro-western regional states. In statements since his election, Netanyahu has stressed his desire to build relations with moderate Arab states and the prime minister is understood to believe that the Iranian challenge opens up unprecedented opportunities in this regard.  This analysis will look at the background of shared interest between these countries, the likely future direction of relations, and the wider regional implications of Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement. 

 

Israel and Egypt’s shared interests

 

The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, signed in 1979, forms the cornerstone of the Middle East peace process. The treaty has survived periods of great instability and the region, and moments of open conflict between Israel and other Arab forces. Yet relations between Cairo and Jerusalem have throughout been characterized by a certain distance.  Egypt, most powerful and populous of the Arab states, has sought to regain its leading position in Arab diplomacy, and hence has elected to avoid becoming too closely identified with a stance of friendship with Israel, in a region in which the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the great declared ’cause’ for Arab countries.

 

Recently, however, there has been more overt cooperation between Egypt and Israel. Iranian meddling in regional political processes is leading to a polarization, with Arab states aligning themselves with or against the Iran-led bloc. The Egyptian regime, long aligned with the US, has made its calculations and is increasing both its cooperation with Israel, and its measures against pro-Iranian forces in its locality.

 

This process first became apparent during Israel’s recent operation in Gaza. In December, 2008, against the background of the fighting in Gaza, relations between Cairo and Teheran reached their lowest point. Mubarak recalled Egypt’s diplomatic envoy from Iran, and told a meeting of the ruling National Democratic Party that ‘the Persians are trying to devour the Arab states.’  [i]

 

Because Egypt controls the southern entry and exit point from Gaza, Egypt found itself forced into a de facto involvement in the conflict between Israel and the Iran-supported Hamas enclave in Gaza. The Crossing has been sealed since the Hamas coup in Gaza in July 2007.  Iran and its client organizations across the region demanded that Egypt open the Crossing, allowing the entry and exit of Hamas fighters. Had Egypt done so, Hamas would have been able to use northern Sinai as a logistical hinterland. Egypt kept the Crossing closed, and Hamas suffered a significant military setback in Operation Cast Lead. 

 

During the course of the operation, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called on the Egyptian military and populace to bring down the Mubarak regime. Rhetoric of this type is highly unusual in the Arab world, and led to a furious response in the Egyptian media, in which Nasrallah was vilified for his statements and mocked for the fact that he has lived in hiding since the 2006 war with Israel.[ii]

 

Since the Gaza operation, evidence has emerged of a series of activities by Iran and Hezbollah designed to undermine the Egyptian regime and use Egyptian territory to supply and re-arm the Hamas enclave in Gaza. Firstly, an alleged IAF raid on an arms convoy in Sudan in January this year drew attention to an arms network running from Iran, via the Persian Gulf and Yemen to Sudan, Egypt, and finally, Hamas-ruled Gaza. [iii] The use of Egyptian soil and, allegedly, the bribing of Egyptian officials, constituted a grave violation of Egyptian sovereignty.

 

Then, in a yet more dramatic development in April, evidence emerged of a Hezbollah cell active in Egypt, which was planning attacks on targets within Egypt. The uncovering of the cell, which was led by an acknowledged Hezbollah operative, clearly displayed the growing regional polarization, and Egypt’s position as a key Arab target for Iran.[iv]

 

Shared concerns over engagement with Iran

 

These developments mean that Israel and Egypt have a key, shared interest in building a coherent policy to contain Iran. The most important and urgent issue facing the two countries now is building such a policy in cooperation with the United States. This is likely to have been the key item on the agenda of Netanyahu and Mubarak in Sharm al-Sheikh. President Mubarak is due to meet with President Obama later this month, following PM Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. Egyptian officials are known to be deeply concerned that the US policy of engagement with Iran may lead to a US failure to sufficiently take into account the interests of Washington’s regional allies. As one Egyptian diplomat quoted in the Al-Ahram newspaper put it, “We never said we are completely opposed to engaging Iran; what we are opposed to and what we will continue to combat is for Iran to attempt to control a predominantly Arab region…We told the Americans that if they can guarantee a change of Iran’s attitudes on matters related to the support of Islamist political movements in and around Egypt, and if they can secure an end to Tehran’s interference in the affairs of Arab countries, then we are on for the dialogue.”[v]

 

This statement accurately conveys Egypt’s chief concerns. At the same time, Egypt is determined not to be seen as abandoning the aspirations of the Palestinians in order to align with Israel against the Iranian threat. Mubarak will visit Washington together with PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, and their intention is to present a comprehensive, revived Arab stance on both the peace process and the Iranian threat, which can form the basis for renewed negotiations, and for a united stance to contain Iran. Since Egypt and Israel share similar perceptions regarding Iran, it would be in the interests of both if a similar stance could be reached vis-à-vis negotiations on the Palestinian issue. 

 

The difficulties being faced by the Palestinians to reach agreement on a unity government may paradoxically help this process. The continued separation of Hamas-led Gaza and the Fatah-led West Bank PA prevents any papering over of the split between pro and anti Iranian forces. Palestinian politics reflects this larger regional reality. The question is whether Egypt, Israel and the moderate Palestinians can find a framework acceptable to all sides for progress in negotiations. 

 

Conclusion

 

Egypt’s concerns regarding Iranian regional expansion reflect a wider mood across the Arab world.  The Saudis, Jordan, the small Gulf emirates (with the exception of Qatar), Morocco, and pro-western elements in Lebanon are all equally worried at Iran’s attempt to expand its power and influence westward toward the Mediterranean and southward in the Persian Gulf area. Pan-regional Saudi media outlets such as the Sharq al-Awsat newspaper have in recent weeks run an ongoing stream of articles which are fiercely critical of Iran and Hezbollah. One prominent Saudi columnist has taken to referring to Hassan Nasrallah as ‘Bin Nasrallah’ – a name intended to associate the Hezbollah chairman with Osama Bin Laden.  [vi]

 

These concerns make possible a far closer regional cooperation between Israel and moderate Arab states than was hitherto imaginable.  Much activity of this kind is already taking place behind the scenes. Egypt remains the most powerful Arab state and, along with Israel, the only regional power able to mount a real resistance to Iranian ambitions.  As such, Netanyahu’s meeting with President Mubarak is far more than a courtesy call.  Both Egypt and Israel are keen to ‘toughen’ the US stance re Iran, and are concerned that engagement be defined as limited in time and with clear expectations. In presenting a coherent case in Washington, much will also depend on whether Egypt and Israel can find at least basic common ground on the way forward in negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Bringing the already very considerable cooperation between the sides further into the open and cementing the emerging alliance between the two countries is likely to be dependent on progress in this regard.    

 

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[i] “Iran wants to devour the Arab world,” Jerusalem Post, 11/12/08.  http://www.jpost.com

[ii] “Nasrallah a ‘monkey sheikh'” Reuters, 12/4/09.  http://www.ynetnews.com

[iii]  “Report: IAF struck arms convoy in Sudan in January,” Ynet, 26/3/09.  http://www.ynetnews.com

[iv] “Hezbollah cell planned to attack 3 Egyptian sites,” Israel Today, 14/4/09. http://www.israeltoday.co.il

[v] Dina Ezzat, “Some give, some take,” Al-Ahram, 7/5/09.  http://weekly.ahram.org.eg

[vi] Tariq al-Homayed, “Bin Nasrallah,” Sharq al-Awsat, 12/4/09.  http://www.aawsat.com