BICOM

Key points

• The “new politics” of social protest is changing the focus of Israeli political debate. The protests enabled the silent majority of middle class Israelis to retake their place at the forefront of Israeli politics.
• The social movement’s momentum resulted from its ability to establish a broad coalition and its focus on socioeconomic issues that concern many Israelis.
• The demonstrators argue that their goal is not to topple the government but to see a deeper change in the country’s political priorities. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the first to feel the pressure of the protest.
• The resurgent interest in socioeconomic issues gave the Israeli left-wing a new platform on which it could rebuild mass appeal. The demonstrations also provide an opening for new political forces to enter public life.

Introduction

As the wave of social protest in Israel enters its fourth week, the focus is increasingly turning to its impact on the Israeli political arena. The mass appeal of the events dominated the media agenda and became the hottest political issue before the Knesset went into summer recess last week. How will these protests affect Israel’s political system? Who is likely to gain from the re-emergence of popular political zeal? Will these events impact the country’s political priorities, which have been dominated for decades by security and foreign affairs?

What have been the political repercussions of the protest so far?

Despite their rapidly growing popularity and the immense media attention they have generated, the social demonstrators have so far distanced themselves from traditional party-politics. In contemporary Israeli vocabulary, being “political” has become an offence, synonymous with narrow interests and intrigues. As an alternative, the protesters have sought a language of values and rights that would serve as a broad common denominator. There is a sense that the protesters are harking back to the more collectivist values present in Israel’s establishment, away from Israel’s individualist values that have dominated Israeli society in recent years. The issues raised in the mass demonstrations – affordable housing, social justice and equality – are diffuse and difficult to translate into a single policy agenda. Yet their power lies in their ambiguity, allowing many Israelis from different backgrounds and agendas a shared vision that has been absent from the divisive politics of recent decades.

The “new politics” promoted in the demonstrations is changing the focus of Israeli political debate. Most significantly, the protest enabled the silent majority of middle class Israelis to retake their place at the forefront of Israeli politics. In recent elections, many have become apathetic and voting rates among this group were in decline. Yair Lapid, a leading journalist with possible aspirations to enter politics, described this as “42% minority” of middle class Israelis. In recent decades the largest group in Israeli society was asked to bear most of the social and economic burden – participating in the workforce, paying taxes and serving in the army – partly as a result of the low participation rate of Israeli-Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews in the workforce. At the same time there was a growing sense that the needs of the middle class were not given priority by consecutive governments. The protests taking place in recent weeks may mark the reversal of this trend and a more assertive demand by the middle class that their political demands are met.

Whether the movement can keep up its current momentum will depend to some degree on its ability to maintain unity among a diverse coalition of organisations and agendas. So far, the leaders have adopted a broad-tent approach, enabling a wide range of groups to join in the struggle. The most contentious issues that have divided Israeli politics – questions of peace and security, tensions between the seculars and religious and between Jews and Arabs – are notably absent from the banners carried at rallies.

Have the protests changed Israel’s political agenda?

Although the protests’ direct political impact is still in question, the past few weeks have seen a dramatic shift of Israel’s political priorities. For the first time in three decades, the country’s conservative fiscal policy is being criticised and challenged. In addition, social and economic questions are no longer being overshadowed by security concerns or the pursuit of Israeli-Arab peace.

Since the economic crisis of the 1980s, consecutive Israeli governments on the left and the right have led a highly restrained fiscal policy, cutting public spending, keeping debts low and privatising government firms. This resulted in rapid economic growth and resilience at a time of global economic turmoil. Israel has often been referred to as an “economic miracle,” a “start-up nation” of hi-tech entrepreneurs and advanced industries. Yet recent decades have also seen the erosion of the country’s social safety net and widening social and economic gaps. Though both left- and right-wing governments adopted this policy, Benjamin Netanyahu became a leading advocate of fiscal-conservative policies and is therefore the target of much of the protesters’ criticism.

It was assumed that the relative calm in Israel’s security situation in the past two years meant that mainstream Israel was content. The common assumption among leading Israeli commentators was that a government that could ensure security and prosperity would not face a real political contest. Ironically, the absence of an immediate security threat and the sense that prosperity was enjoyed only by a small elite encouraged many Israelis to lift their head above the parapet and challenge the social and economic status-quo.

Similarly, the lack of a serious diplomatic peace process with the Palestinians has displaced one of the most divisive issues from the top of the political agenda. From the 1970s, the future of Israel’s presence in the West Bank was the central fault line in Israeli politics. Today, most Israelis support the two-state solution, in principle, but are sceptical about the possibility of realising it in the near future. Furthermore, since there is no agreement in the offing, the peace process is not a pressing issue that draws the same passionate arguments that used to divide the left and right. This is partly why the discussion of Israel’s decades’ long investment in West Bank settlement and its toll on Israel’s economy has yet to become a rallying cry in the demonstrations. Some on the left are arguing that the root problem is disproportionate resources spent on the settlements. So far the protesters have stuck to less divisive themes.

Social and economic grievances that have been overshadowed for decades are now centre stage in public debates. However, the Middle East’s volatility can bring about a rapidly reversal of this calm. The Palestinian Authorities planned approach to the UN, for example, may shift public attention away from social unrest. The collapse of stock markets around the world and fears of further financial instability may also lower the public expectations for rapid economic reforms.

What is the protest’s likely impact on Israel’s political future?

The ultimate outcome of this unexpected protest movement is extremely difficult to predict. So far the build-up of political energy is still gaining momentum, but it has yet to be channelled into a clear party-political direction. Though elections in Israel often come early, the next elections are only scheduled for early 2013 and the protest movement’s endurance will be tested over the long months ahead. Yet even at this very early stage, it is possible to speculate about the possible impact the social protests could have on Israel’s political future.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the first to feel the pressure of the protest. Though the economic strain on Israel’s middle class is the result of decade-old policies, the protest erupted on his watch. Many demonstrators would like to see a change of the country’s leadership. At this stage, partly to ensure the non-partisan appeal of the movement, protesters argue that their goal is not to topple the government but to see a deeper change in the country’s political priorities. Nonetheless, Netanyahu’s known support of free-market capitalism puts him at odds with the protesters’ demands for social justice and equality.

Netanyahu’s leadership challenge goes beyond the implementation of specific policies. In the early stages of the protest, Netanyahu offered extensive benefits to university students on housing and transport. Student union leaders described the government’s proposals as “historic,” but still declared that they will not abandon the broad struggle for full social justice. Under such circumstances of deep distrust, any government would struggle to address the demands of the demonstrators.

In recent days Netanyahu has set up a committee to address the underlying problems of housing, taxation and national priorities. Heading the committee will be Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg, an eminent economist. He will be aided by a team of social and economic experts. Protesters have so far remained sceptical about the committee, fearing its work will confine the discussion to the technicalities of taxation and fiscal policy, and it is unclear whether they will cooperate with its work. One of the committee’s most significant challenges will be a review of Israel’s national priorities and the respective allocation of resources. Sensitive political issues – like the participation of ultra-Orthodox men in the workforce and the funding of West Bank settlements – may arise at some point and potentially spark a coalition crisis.

Although the coalition seems stable at the moment, this may change in the coming months. Shas in particular appears as the most susceptible to public anger, particularly because of its historical affinity with social disenfranchisement and discontent. Since Shas’ iconic leader Arieh Deri was convicted and forced to give up his seat in 2000, the party has become increasingly associated with right-wing and ultra-Orthodox interests and less with combative socioeconomic advocacy. A potential expansion of the protest to poorer communities and the planned return of Deri to political life could reenergise Shas’ social platform and encourage it to reconsider its support for the coalition.

On the other hand, the current head of Shas, Eli Yishai, may prefer to keep his prominent ministerial role for a while longer and fend off a leadership challenge. The recent announcement by Yishai of the approval of several housing projects in East Jerusalem were linked by one Interior Ministry source to the housing shortage in the city. Despite its contentious nature, this link is dubious. The construction initiative is more likely an attempt by Yishai to score political points with Shas’ right-wing voters rather than an official government policy.

On the other side of the political spectrum the Israeli left and centre-left has certainly received a long needed boost by the demonstrations. As the Israel Labour party prepares for crucial leadership elections in September, the re-emerging social agenda has the potential to strengthened Shelly Yachimovich leadership bid. Since leaving a successful journalistic career and entering politics in 2006, Yachimovich has focused entirely on social and economic issues, seeking to re-establish Labour on a social-democratic platform. Recent polls show Yachimovich as the frontrunner in the leadership race, but other candidates like Isaac Hertzog, Amram Mitzna and Amir Peretz have also established their socioeconomic credentials and may benefit from the protest if elected to lead the party.

In comparison, Kadima leader Tzipi Livni, with her established record on foreign policy and a leading voice on Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, is not perceived as a natural advocate for the new socioeconomic agenda. However, Livni has positioned herself as a representative of ‘middle Israel’ by refusing to give in to Shas’ financial demands during her attempt to form a government in 2008. In the long run Livni could benefit from the political awakening of Israel’s educated middle class who have largely abstained from active political involvement in recent years, but may turn out in greater numbers in the next election in support of Kadima.

In addition to the possible shift of power between parties, new political forces may well emerge in response to the popular frustration with traditional party-politics. The success of the Pensioners’ Party in the 2006 elections indicates the volatility of Israeli politics. Political hopefuls like Yair Lapid or even Ariyeh Deri may seek to harness the popular unrest to form a new political force that could reshuffle Israel’s longstanding left-right political divide.

Conclusion

The political repercussions of Israel’s social protest may not be apparent for some time. A lot will depend on the protesters’ ability to sustain a broad coalition and a momentum in the months ahead. External events, like the global economic turmoil or an unforeseen security incident, may also shift media attention away from the protest. However, the unprecedented momentum built by ordinary Israelis over the past few weeks indicates that the Israeli political discourse is not passive or stagnate. The deep social currents that have risen to the surface in the past few weeks may inspire a new generation of political leaders and a transformation of Israel’s political and social priorities.