BICOM

Key points

• A new chapter in US-Syrian relations owes itself to President Barack Obama’s policy of engagement with President Bashar Assad’s regime.
• The thaw in bilateral relations has created an opportunity for the administration to pick up the mantle of the Israeli-Syrian peace track. US official Frederic Hof, author of a recent policy study on making peace between Israel and Syria[i], is this week meeting leaders in Jerusalem and Damascus.
• Syria has political and economic interests in rapprochement with the US and a long held desire to get back the Golan Heights. However, these interests are juxtaposed against long-standing links with Iran and various Islamist and radical regional elements.
• The key issue for Israel is about whether Syria can and will make the ‘strategic realignment’ which it and the US, as well as western-friendly Arab states, all seek of it: an abandonment of the Iranian-led anti-western bloc.

Introduction

In a Sky News interview on Sunday, when asked about an informal invitation issued by Syrian President Bashar Assad earlier this month, US President Barack Obama chose his words carefully: diplomatic contacts had just ‘started’, it was up to Syria to act now and respond to his outreach.  Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg was brusquer when speaking to the Lebanese press, asking how Obama could conceivably pay a visit whilst Syria was continuing to arm Hezbollah, Hamas and other radical groups, and interfering in Lebanese affairs.[ii]  Nonetheless, a new phase in US-Syrian relations has been on the cards ever since Obama was elected, given his desire to engage with countries that the US has been at odds with in recent years, especially in the Arab and Muslim world.[iii]

Consequently, key questions in Israeli discourse have been whether warmer US-Syria ties would facilitate a revival of Israeli-Syrian peace talks and whether this, in turn, will enable progress with the Palestinians. A  senior US diplomat, Frederic Hof, is meeting Israeli and Syrian leaders this week. An Israeli press report claims he presented to the Israelis an outline for a Syria-Israel peace deal based on a position paper he published for the United States Institute of Peace earlier this year.[iv]  This BICOM Analysis looks at the underlying interests in US-Syrian rapprochement, focusing on its implications in terms of Israel and the peace process.

US interests in reviving US-Syrian relations

From the moment Obama entered the Oval Office, US-Syria relations could only go one way.  The Bush administration had appended Syria to its ‘Axis of Evil’, along with Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and North Korea.  Bilateral ties reached rock bottom when the US recalled Ambassador Margaret Scobey, following widespread suspicions of Syrian complicity in Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri’s February 2005 assassination. Obama’s series of diplomatic overtures reflect the seriousness of his administration’s desire to change the approach.

Diplomatic moves began with the US Department of Commerce’s reversal of a long-standing policy to approve a license to sell Boeing 747 parts to Syria and authorisation by the US Treasury Department to transfer funds to a Syrian charity associated with Assad’s wife, Asma.[v]  Since then, Syria’s Ambassador to Washington Imad Mustapha has visited the State Department, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem shook hands and exchanged words in Sharm el-Sheikh, and senior US military commanders and political officials have travelled to Damascus for meetings with Syrian counterparts.  On 13 June, Obama’s Special Envoy for the Middle East George Mitchell became the most high ranking official to meet with Assad, and the US has subsequently announced that it will appoint a new ambassador (though Scobey’s successor is not expected to arrive until September).[vi]

American reengagement with Damascus fits into the strategic policy framework which President Obama is determined to pursue in the region, including exiting a stable Iraq, advancing the Middle East peace process, and engaging Iran.  The renewal of interest in the Israel-Syria peace track spotlights the debate about ‘linkage’ between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the region’s other multiple conflicts and tensions.[vii]  At present, many Israelis remains unconvinced that an aggressive regional approach will resolve the Palestinian issue.

Nonetheless, a US Embassy statement released in the wake of Mitchell’s meeting with Assad referred to Syria’s ‘integral role to play in reaching comprehensive peace.’[viii]  For some time, many observers have argued that owing to ongoing Palestinian disunity, the Israeli-Syrian track is more amenable to US mediation, following the four rounds of Turkish-brokered talks last year.[ix]  But Syria is also perceived as a key player on the Israeli-Palestinian front too, which the Obama administration wants to advance in parallel.  Assad has unique leverage over Hamas, whose political chief, Khaled Meshaal, resides in Damascus.  The US is keen for Syria to help facilitate Palestinian reconciliation, which has not emerged despite months of Egyptian efforts.  Washington hopes this would pave the way for Palestinian elections and, above all, help create ripeness for the comprehensive peace it wants to advance.

How the US approach to Syria unfolds will depend on how Syria responds and acts in practice.  In Obama’s words over the weekend, ‘[t]here are aspects of Syrian behaviour that trouble us and we think that there is a way that Syria can be much more constructive on a whole host of … issues.’[x]  Most pressingly, the US has a particular interest in Syrian cooperation as it tries to stabilise and pull out of Iraq, where Jihadist fighters have habitually been permitted access via the Syrian border. The US is also concerned by Syria’s ongoing support for Hezbollah and Hamas.[xi]  In addition administration officials express concern about Syria’s refusal to comply with IAEA inspections at al-Kibar (the clandestine nuclear facility destroyed in 2007), its undermining of Lebanese sovereignty and the worsening human rights situation within Syria itself.[xii]  Freedom House gives Syria its worst rating on political liberties, with dissidents routinely rounded up and the large Kurdish minority oppressed, often violently.[xiii]  But the overriding US goal is to coax Assad into a strategic reorientation that will help the US advance its goals in the region.

The Syrian interest: playing a double game

Syria has demonstrated its interest in rapprochement with the US through a number of accommodating moves vis-à-vis Lebanon and Iraq.  Significantly, it has appointed its first ambassador to Lebanon after having established formal diplomatic relations last year, and permitted parliamentary elections in June to proceed relatively free of intimidation of anti-Syrian ‘March 14’ coalition candidates.  It has also made some progress towards tightening the Syria-Iraq border.  Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem visited Baghdad and pledged ‘whatever help is necessary’ for a successful US withdrawal from Iraq.[xiv]  Washington will observe closely, given that Syria has served as a key ally of the Sunni insurgency since its beginnings.[xv]

Syria will likely show outward signs of cooperation with Washington in its efforts to re-launch peace talks, too.  Regaining the Golan Heights has been a key Syrian strategic goal for decades, but the negotiations process itself is an asset to Damascus as it seeks to enhance relations with Western powers.  In particular, engaging in peace talks might help Syria to withstand pressure over allegations of involvement in the Hariri assassination.  More generally, although Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in April 2005, it still seeks influence there as a national priority, and would like an arrangement that enables it to preserve its interests in Lebanon.

Syria also has economic incentives to respond favourably both to direct US engagement and the peace talks.  Even though other countries can help mitigate Syria’s fiscal crisis, only a massive injection of US aid and US-orchestrated investment could hope to set it on a firm path to recovery.[xvi]  Syria’s specific goals include the lifting of US sanctions and accession to the World Trade Organization, which the US blocked in 2001.  These could form part of a peace dividend that would help Syria develop its economy, but it needs to make profound strategic choices.

From Syria’s perspective, there is a considerable gulf between working with western countries for political and economic self-gain and turning its back on long-standing regional allies.  Assad’s primary objective, of course, is to keep his minority Alawite regime intact.  As Middle East analyst Mohamad Bazzi argues, ‘For decades, Syria has portrayed itself as the ‘beating heart of Arab nationalism – the torchbearer of resistance and defiance to the West.’[xvii]  This has lent legitimacy to the regime and granted it the inflated regional significance it enjoys.  Therefore, if the Israel-Syria peace track gets off the ground, Damascus will be keen to advance negotiations on recovering the territory it lost in 1967, whilst avoiding steps that would compromise its identity as a beacon of resistance, such as relinquishing support for Hamas or Hezbollah.

Israel and the Syrian track

There has for some time existed a debate within Israeli policy circles regarding the advisability and prospects of success in negotiating with Damascus. President Shimon Peres said last week that Israel would not hand over the Golan Heights to Syria on a ‘silver platter’ whilst it maintained its ties with Iran and Hezbollah.[xviii]  Peres’s remark reflects how, both in the US and Israel, the ‘land for peace’ discourse has been overtaken by that of ‘land for strategic realignment’ in terms of Syria’s regional affiliations.[xix]  Most Israelis recognise that Israel has to give up control of the Golan to make peace with Syria. A string of Israeli prime ministers since Yitzhak Rabin in the early 1990s have entering into serious negotiations with Damascus, broadly on this basis.[xx]  The key question is whether what Israel would get in return would be worth the deal: will Syria be willing to sever its ties with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas – the forces which most threaten the Jewish state?

Supporters include Amos Gilead, head of the Israeli Defence Ministry’s Political-Security Bureau. He believe that an agreement with Syria is possible, necessary to prevent ‘collision’, and desirable because it would stop the delivery of arms to Hezbollah, lead to the expulsion of terror headquarters from Damascus and weaken the hostile coalition in the region.[xxi]  Others, such as chair of the National Security Council Uzi Arad and former NSC head Giora Eiland, remain dubious of the strategic and security benefits of withdrawal.[xxii]  Sceptics tend to point to the long-standing alliance which has endured between Iran and Syria since the early 1980s, and are circumspect about whether it can be cracked.  Some Syria specialists doubt whether Assad could sever relations with forces of anti-Israel and anti-western resistance without losing control of his regime.[xxiii]

Beyond these concerns, however, US determination to advance peacemaking efforts will demand that both Israel and Syria prepare their negotiation portfolios. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has offered to resume peace talks between the two countries from ‘point zero,’ which is to say without preconditions. Assad has said they should resume from the point at which they froze with Netanyahu’s predecessor, Ehud Olmert. There is also the issue of whether to continue negotiations under Turkish auspices, as Syria demands, or to insist on US mediation.  The US appears now to be addressing these pre-negotiation hurdles.

Conclusion

If, when, and to what extent Syria will reconfigure its strategic alignment is impossible to know at this stage. Its ally Iran itself is in a state of some disarray following the botched presidential elections it held last month and the United States is still in the preliminary stages of its engagement policy. But the US-Syrian relationship and the opportunities which arise from it could prove a useful gauge for the Obama Middle East team on whether its regional approach to peacemaking is the optimal strategy.

The tempo and nature of US engagement with Syria will be contingent upon how Damascus chooses to act.  The US has a long list of grievances which it wants Syria to address, from its support for destabilising forces in Lebanon, to the Palestinian Territories and Iraq. It also has good leverage, in the form of both carrots and sticks, which it can deploy. Only when the US has created real policy dilemmas for Damascus, will it be clear whether Syria intends to make peace with Israel and realign itself away from the anti-western alliance in the region.

 

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[i] Frederic C. Hof, ‘Mapping Peace between Syria and Israel’, United States Institute of Peace, March 2009.

[ii] ‘U.S.: Cabinet Internal Matter, Obama’s Visit to Damascus Conditional on Non-interference in Lebanon’, Naharnet, 4 July 2009.

[iii] The Assad regime was explicit about its preference last November.  For a more detailed discussion, see David Schenker, ‘Decoupling Syria from Iran: Constraints on U.S.-Syrian Rapprochement’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem Issue Briefs, Vo., 8, No. 15, 3 December 2008.

[iv] ‘American Envoy Trying to Resume Negotiations with Syria’, Yediot Ahronot, 13 July 2009. [Hebrew]

[v] ‘Syria Says U.S. Permits Money Transfer to Charity,’ Associated Press, 15 February 2009; David Schenker, ‘The Obama Administration Reaches Out to Syria: Implications for Israel’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem Issue Briefs, Vol. 8, No. 23, 18 March 2009.

[vi] ‘U.S.: Cabinet Internal Matter, Obama’s Visit to Damascus Conditional on Non-interference in Lebanon’, Naharnet, 4 July 2009.

[vii] See Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, ‘Myths, Illusions, and Peace’, New York Times, 8 July 2009.

[viii] Statement by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Senator George Mitchell’, Embassy of the United States of America in Damascus, 13 June 2009.

[ix] See, for instance, Paul Salem, ‘Syrian-Israel Peace: A Possible Key to Regional Change’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2008.

[x] Obama Interview with Adam Boulton, Sky News, 12 July 2009.  Other comments by senior US figures echo these sentiments.  For instance, in March, Hillary Clinton stated, ‘We don’t engage in discussions for the sake of having a conversation.  There has to be a purpose to them, there has to be some perceived benefit accruing to the United States and our allies.’  Sue Pleming, ‘Clinton says two U.S. officials to hold talks in Syria’, Reuters, 3 March 2009.

[xi] Jonathan Spyer, ‘Analysis: Syria’s goose lays a golden egg’, Jerusalem Post, 28 June 2009.

[xii] ‘Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman’s Meeting With Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa’, US Department of State, 25 February 2009; Robert Burns, ‘US to prod Syrian envoy on terrorism, nukes’, Associated Press, 20 February 2009.

[xiii] David Schenker, ‘Opposition in Syria is dying with dissident’, Los Angeles Times, 10 March 2009; J. Scott Carpenter, ‘Can the al-Asad Regime Make Peace with Israel?’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 1508, 21 April 2009.

[xiv] Andrew J. Tabler, ‘Will Mitchell’s Trip Bypass Damascus’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 1506, 13 April 2009.

[xv] Jonathan Spyer, op. cit.

[xvi] Andrew J. Tabler, ‘Talking to Syria: An Important Test for Damascus’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 March 2009.

[xvii] Mohamad Bazzi, ‘Everyone gains if Syria returns to the centre of the Arab world’, The National, 18 June 2008.

[xviii] ‘Peres: Syria won’t get Golan on a ‘silver platter”, Haaretz, 6 July 2009; See also: ‘We want the Golan on a gold platter’, Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2009.

[xix] John Hannah, The Washington-Beirut-Damascus Triangle (Part I)’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 1493, 17 March 2009.

[xx] Former Israeli ambassador to Washington and head of the Israeli negotiating team with Syria, Itamar Rabinovitch, assesses that only Ariel Sharon adopted a divergent stance.  Itamar Rabinovitch, ‘On Golan ‘deposits’ and withdrawal’, Haaretz, 14 July 2009.

[xxi] Roni Sofer, ‘Amos Gilad: Only peace can avert collision with Syria’, YNet, 2 March 2009.

[xxii] Ibid.; Ari Shavit, ‘There is no Palestinian Sadat, no Palestinian Mandela’, Haaretz, 11 July 2009.

[xxiii] See J. Scott Carpenter, op. cit.; Eyal Zisser, ‘The Mouse and the Lion: Syria Between Passive Resistance and Active Resistance to Israel’, Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic Assessment, Volume 12, No. 1, June 2009.