BICOM

Key points

• Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s incendiary speech at the UN General Assembly last week, and the international response to it illustrate the tension surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme.

• The fourth round of United Nations Security Council sanctions and, in particular, the additional unilateral sanctions undertaken by the US are beginning to impact the Iranian regime. However, there is no indication that this will change Iran’s stance regarding its nuclear programme.

• Iranian defiance is in turn producing an unmistakably hardening attitude in the international community. US President Barack Obama’s and UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg’s response to Ahmadinejad’s remarks at the UN General Assembly reflect this.

• The crucial question is whether international positions will harden with sufficient speed in order to undertake the kind of measures which may prevent a nuclear Iran.

Introduction

The 65^th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which took place last week, was marked by an escalation in rhetoric from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Iranian president delivered a speech in which he accused ‘sections of the American government’ of involvement in the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.  Ahmadinejad’s speech prompted a walk out from the representatives of a number of countries, including the US and UK. President Barack Obama later responded to Ahmadinejad’s speech, calling it ‘offensive’ and ‘hateful.’  Do the events at the General Assembly indicate growing tensions between Iran and the West; and what is the current ‘state of play’ in the ongoing attempt by the international community to prevent a nuclear Iran?

Placing events from the General Assembly in context

Ahmadinejad’s incendiary speech at the General Assembly has served to dampen cautious hopes that Iran might be beginning to soften its stance regarding its nuclear programme, in response to difficulties caused by the fourth round of international sanctions.

Earlier in the week, Teheran announced that it was prepared to revive talks based on the idea of a fuel swap. This idea – whereby Iran would export its enriched uranium, and in-return would receive it back converted in a form suitable for nonmilitary use only – has surfaced periodically in the diplomacy surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue. On two previous occasions, Iran has appeared to endorse the idea, only to backtrack from it at a later stage. As a result, there was considerable wariness among US and Western officials following the latest Iranian statement.

However, wariness was tempered this time around by evidence that indicated sanctions have begun to affect economic and social realities in Iran – leading to hopes that perhaps these were beginning to soften the Iranian stance. This month, the Iranian government announced a decision to turn a number of petrochemical plants over to the domestic production of petrol. This decision indicated the extent to which the measures announced by Congress in June – threatening penalties against companies which sold refined petroleum products to Iran – have affected the amount of refined petroleum reaching Iran from abroad. Iran depends on imported petrol for about a third of its domestic needs. 

Similarly, US threats against banks and financial institutions dealing with blacklisted Iranian firms have led to a steady increase in the number of companies ending their economic ties with Iran. More fundamentally, Iran’s ability to sell its own crude oil on international markets is being affected by the sanctions. As insurers become less willing to cover cargo, and banks more wary about extending credit. As a result, this vital element of the Iranian economy is also suffering the consequences of Iran’s growing international isolation.

The sanctions, and the reverberations from them, are also affecting the internal balance of power within the Iranian regime itself. While the opposition ‘Green Movement’ has somewhat stagnated in recent months, there is evidence of strains within the ruling elite. Growing discontent between conservative clerics and the clique of militants and Revolutionary Guardsmen, of which Ahmadinejad is a part, have led to the increasing involvement of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in daily decision-making.

Thus, as the General Assembly approached, there were some guarded hopes that the effects of the sanctions might begin to bear fruit in Iran’s diplomatic stance regarding its nuclear programme. While the impact of sanctions is not in serious dispute, the key question is not whether sanctions are having an effect, but whether that effect is producing or will produce results that bring about a change in Iran’s attitude toward its nuclear programme. The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports show that Iran has not yet begun to do so. Iran has also continued to enrich uranium, and has reduced cooperation with IAEA inspectors.

On the morning of Ahmadinejad’s speech, US President Barack Obama reiterated his invitation to Iran to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis over its nuclear programme. However, the speech given by Ahmadinejad later in the day served to dampen hopes of any imminent change in the Iranian position. While the Iranian president’s attacks on the US, the West and Israel are by now familiar, this speech was the first occasion in which Ahmadinejad ventured into the territory of 9/11 conspiracy theories. His remarks were undoubtedly calculated to produce a response from the US and its allies. Presumably, the walk out by US and Western diplomats was what Ahmadinejad desired. His speech contained no reference to the offer of talks, nor to the professed revived Iranian interest in a fuel swap. Rather, the Iranian president reiterated his litany of accusations and threats.

Ahmadinejad’s speech appears to indicate that sanctions have not yet produced a recognisable shift or softening in the Iranian position. Despite their undoubted effect, it appears that the Iranian regime is prepared to weather the storm, to pursue its goal of nuclear capability.  

Response of Western leaders to Ahmadinejad’s speech

Iran’s continued defiance in the face of sanctions, as demonstrated at the General Assembly, raises further crucial questions: is the West prepared to increase its pressure on Iran, and is Iranian behavior leading to a slow, incremental hardening of attitudes in the West?

There is evidence that such a hardening of attitudes is taking place. One of the major, though rarely discussed factors influencing the western stance is the current atmosphere in Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, where fear of Iranian political and military activity is growing. Gulf and Saudi fears of Iran have long been communicated behind the scenes to Western countries. In recent months, there has been an increasing willingness among representatives of Gulf countries to go public with their fears.

UAE Ambassador in Washington, Yusuf al-Ottawa, in July went public with his view that a US military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities was essential. Statements of this kind, as well as huge Saudi and Gulf investment in improving the capabilities of their armed forces, combined with continued Iranian recalcitrance are serving to bring home to Western leaders the urgency of the situation. 

Russia’s decision to cancel the sale of advanced S-300 antiaircraft missile systems to Iran offers an additional very significant example of the new mood towards Iran. During the fourth UN round of sanctions Russian support was seen as an important breakthrough. This latest Russian move is no less significant, since possession of the S-300 system by Iran would vastly complicate any possible future military strikes against its nuclear facilities.  

This new mood was also reflected in President Obama’s uncompromising stance during an interview with BBC Persia, where he described Ahmadinejad’s remarks regarding 9/11 as ‘offensive,’ ‘inexcusable’ and ‘hateful.’ British Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg was also clear in his description of the Iranian president’s claims as ‘bizarre and offensive.’ Clegg noted that while he had hoped to ‘welcome the progress’ made in the meeting of the EU 3+3 group on Iran (referring to Iran’s professed willingness to again consider a fuel swap deal), this had now been ‘overshadowed’ by the Iranian leader’s General Assembly statement.

Conclusion

The events at the General Assembly this week highlight the current state of play regarding the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. The crucial question at this juncture is whether the international stance will harden with sufficient speed to undertake the kind of measures – whether economic sanctions or military action – necessary to prevent a nuclear Iran. As yet, this remains to be seen, but the tones now emerging from Washington and European capitals indicate that Iranian extremism and recalcitrance are serving to concentrate international attention on the danger that a nuclear regime professing the kind of opinions proclaimed by Ahmadinejad at the UN General Assembly would represent.