BICOM

Key Points

• Syria presents a paradox. It says it wants peace with Israel and a new relationship with regional and world powers including the US. Yet, as discussed in BICOM’s recent analysis, transfers sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah, supports “resistance” as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, and remains integral to the radical Iran-led alliance.
• There are divergent views in Israel with regard to Syria. There are many in the defence establishment and political figures who believe peace with Syria could turn the strategic balance of the region in favour of pro-Western, moderate forces. Sceptics fear that conceding the Golan Heights would hand a prize to Syria that might embolden the radical bloc and endanger Israel, whilst bringing few tangible strategic benefits. 
• The revival of the Israel-Syria peace track could serve as a catalyst for a shift in the balance of regional power. But Israel wants to avoid a situation in which Syria reaps the benefits of the diplomatic path without paying the price of ending its support for hostile forces in the region.

Introduction

A number of recent developments and declarations do not bode well for the tense situation on Israel’s northern border. US Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman recently said that there will be serious repercussions for Syria if claims that it supplied Hezbollah with advanced Scud missiles are true and that “all options are going to be on the table” for dealing with it. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last week that Iran is attempting to initiate a military conflict involving Israel and Syria. He and other senior Israeli leaders including President Shimon Peres and Defence Minister Ehud Barak have each stressed that Israel does not want a confrontation and has no intention of attacking Syria. Still, Syrian President Bashar Assad accuses Israel of “continuing to threaten war”. Visiting Damascus last week, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev warned of a looming regional “catastrophe”.

Against this backdrop, a debate within Israeli policy circles is resurfacing about the need to recommence the Israeli-Syrian track of the Middle East peace process, which was broken off towards the end of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s tenure in office. Olmert himself weighed in last week, saying that without negotiations with Syria, Israel is likely to soon face a deteriorating security situation in the north. This analysis examines current thinking in Israel on this issue, how it could relate to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace track and Syria’s regional significance in this context.

The Syrian paradox

Disagreement in Israel about the merits and risks of pursuing the peace track with Syria is rooted in considerable uncertainty about the Assad regime’s true intentions. Assad has said on a number of occasions that he is prepared to engage in peace negotiations, and yet he also openly declares support for “resistance” as a cornerstone of Syrian foreign policy. At the last Arab League summit in Libya, he reportedly urged Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to reject US-mediated peace talks and to “take up arms against Israel”.

This paradox may be understood through Syria’s straddling of two different policy paths simultaneously. On the one hand, Damascus seeks to emerge from international isolation and develop closer ties with the US and Europe, as well as regional powers like Turkey and (to a lesser extent) Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Syria remains integral to the region’s radical, Iran-led bloc. It provides Hezbollah with sophisticated weapons in Lebanon, allows Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other militant groups to maintain offices in its capital, and has abetted the insurgency in Iraq. The economically weak, secular regime’s long alliance with militant Islamist organisations has enabled it to punch above its weight diplomatically in the region, gaining legitimacy by appealing to anti-American and anti-Israel sentiment on the Arab street.

Divergent views in Israel on the Syrian track

Significant parts of the Israeli defence establishment and some senior Israeli politicians have for some years spoken in favour of actively pursuing peace with Syria. Both Israeli President Shimon Peres and Defence Minister Ehud Barak are known to support a Syrian track. Major General Uri Saguy, who headed negotiations when Barak served as prime minister a decade ago, said in a recent interview that not reaching an agreement with Syria in 1999 and 2000 was “a strategic diplomatic failure of the first order”. It would, he argues, have fundamentally changed the regional security situation and prevented the conflicts of recent years. Those in Israel who believe peace with Syria is still achievable think it would provide a much-needed boost to moderate forces in the region and turn the strategic balance in Israel’s favour. The fear otherwise is that Syria will remain entrenched in the radical bloc, promoting greater instability and contributing to the threat of a future war.

This view was supported in a briefing last week to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, given by Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, who heads Israel’s military intelligence research department. Baidaitz believes that Assad is prepared to make a deal, but only on his terms:  a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and an American aid package to restore growth in the Syrian economy. In exchange, Israel wants Syria to stop its support for militia groups, including expelling Hamas’s leadership from Damascus, to end all arms shipments to Hezbollah, and to distance itself from Iran. Notably, Syria’s SANA state news quoted Assad last week saying that whilst Syria would never give up its claim to the Golan, “compromise could be made as far as other aspects [are concerned]…like relations, security arrangements and all other details.”

But the question as to whether and when the Assad regime would make the required trade-off is a matter of dispute. In contrast to many in the defence establishment, others in positions of power within the Israeli political echelon are sceptical about pursuing Israel-Syria talks at this time.

Netanyahu’s National Security Adviser Uzi Arad recently voiced his doubts about a deal that would involve returning the Golan Heights to Syria. From his perspective, as long as Damascus is allied to Tehran, such a concession “would just bring Iran closer to us”. Israel is not willing to risk the presence of Iranian backed militants on the Golan Heights. Furthermore, for Israel, engaging in peace talks with Syria runs the risk of enabling Syria to reset its relations with the US and Europe without paying the costs of cutting off support for extremist militias.

Netanyahu’s primary regional focus remains the Iranian nuclear threat. Arad’s advice to him on Syria appears to be that Iran must be dealt with first. Only when Iran has been reined in might Syria be inclined to make a strategic shift away from regime in Tehran. Those who doubt Syria’s intentions point the fact that Assad has openly mocked at US efforts to split the Iranian-Syrian alliance, and of course to Syria’s continuing supply of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.

From the Syrian track to the Palestinian track

Although US-brokered indirect talks between Israelis and Palestinians commenced last week, expectations on all sides remain limited. Some argue that movement on the Syrian track could give impetus to the Palestinian track.

There has in the past been a constructively ‘competitive’ dynamic to these two tracks of the peace process. Martin Indyk, who worked in President Clinton’s Middle East team in the 1990s, recalls in his recent book ‘Innocent Abroad’ that former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin saw the potential of a “Syria first” approach remarking, “If the Palestinians see Syria moving, it might encourage them.” Indyk believes that the Clinton administration’s focus on Damascus may inadvertently have helped push the Palestinians to do a deal with the Israelis ahead of Syria, for fear of being sidelined diplomatically.

The other direct link to the Palestinian track is through Hamas. If Syria could be enticed to shift its strategic alliance, this would isolate Hamas, which bases itself in Damascus. Hamas would be denied an important Arab state supporter.

The broader strategic picture

It is also important to bear in mind how the Syrian track links to broader strategic currents in the Middle East. US President Barack Obama has been seeking to engage the Syrian regime to try to persuade it to abandon the radical bloc. This is important for redressing the regional balance in favour of moderate, pro-Western Arab states. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states all fear Iranian regional hegemony. Obama nominated Robert Ford as ambassador-designate to Syria in February, though the posting has been stalled since the Scud affair emerged. Obama has also recently renewed ongoing US sanctions against Syria. The administration cited the regime’s “continuing support for terrorist organizations and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs [that] continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.”

Yet Washington’s efforts to pressure Assad to make a decisive policy choice appear threatened by the role other key actors, especially Turkey and Russia, are increasingly playing. They are reaching out to Syria politically, economically and militarily. A Foreign Policy article last week reports that Syria is actively seeking to build up what it dubs a “northern alliance” with Turkey, Iran and Iraq, as a means of countering Israeli military superiority. The regime was given a boost last week by a new Russian arms deal to provide Syria with fighter jets, surface to air missiles and anti-tank weapons. Medvedev’s visit last week, the first by a Russian head of state in modern times, is testimony to Moscow’s own desire to play a more influential role in the region and to work more closely with actors it perceives as significant.

Conclusion

The debate playing out in Israel over the Syrian track of the peace process is resurfacing in the context of a growing security threat on Israel’s northern front and a sense among many observers that the status quo with Syria is no longer sustainable. But there remains a great deal of uncertainty about Syrian intentions. Whilst peace with Syria remains a high strategic objective for Israel, there are fears that President Assad wants a peace process only to advance his own regional interests, rather than to achieve a historic agreement with Israel. Assad has sought to build better relations with Washington whilst retaining close strategic ties to Tehran, Hezbollah and other militia groups that are dedicated to Israel’s destruction. Israel wants to avoid a situation in which Syria reaps the international benefits of the diplomatic path without ending its support for violent forces committed to destabilising the region.