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Analysis

BICOM Focus: Wider Implications of the Gaza Flotilla Incident

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Key Points

  • The latest events surrounding the Gaza flotilla will have an effect on broader regional and international issues, from the Middle East peace process to the Iranian nuclear threat.
  • The incident highlights the need for an open eyed approach to dealing with the situation in Gaza, the containment of Hamas’s threat and the political ramifications of any radical change of policy.
  • The existing diplomatic emphasis, which prioritises progress in the West Bank while leaving Gaza to later stages of the negotiations is under question, not least because of Turkey’s insistence on the matter and Ankara’s growing regional role.

Will the latest events affect the renewed peace process?

This incident comes at a delicate time, with indirect talks just underway there is inevitable pressure on the Palestinian Authority to withdraw from talks with Israel. So far, however, it is notable that the Palestinian Authority, whilst condemning the Israeli operation in the harshest terms, has not made any moves to withdraw from the nascent peace talks. Mahmoud Abbas is due to visit Washington next week for a meeting with US President Barack Obama, and it remains to be seen how the two leaders reconcile their positions in light of the latest events. A lot will also depend on Israeli steps to empower Abbas against those who are likely to call for a Palestinian withdrawal from the talks.  

In this context, it is notable that the US has reacted with caution to yesterday’s events. Whilst expressing concern, and calling for an investigation, they have stopped short of condemning Israel outright. This reflects a recent effort on the part of the US to smooth over relations with Israel, and avoid any more tensions which could disrupt the peace process.

This week’s events will raise doubts whether the approach of focusing the diplomatic effort on dealing with the West Bank whilst containing Hamas in Gaza is sustainable. So far the reaction of the US appears to reflect a desire to remain focussed on their current strategy of proximity talks with the hope of progressing toward direct negotiations in approximately four months. However, the situation in Gaza is likely to become harder to sideline.

What will be the diplomatic fallout of the latest events?

The latest events have exacerbated the tensions between Jerusalem and key players in the region and internationally. Significantly, the incident exacerbates the already tense relations between Israel and Turkey, which has positioned itself as a vocal critic of Israel in the region. Ankara, which played an important mediating role in negotiations between Israel and Syria until December 2006, has gradually distanced itself from Jerusalem after Operation Cast Lead and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government shortly thereafter. Seeking to establish itself as an independent regional power, Turkey has also distanced itself from US foreign policy, and enhanced its ties with its neighbours. The latest incident, which involved a Turkish ship and a radical Turkish Islamic group, will further highlight the deep gaps between Israel and Turkey.

The growing Israeli-Turkish rift comes at a sensitive time when the US Administration is pushing for a fourth round of sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council. Turkey is a non-permanent member of the UNSC and a recent uranium-swap agreement between Iran, Turkey and Brazil was seen as an attempt to derail US efforts to garner unanimous support for additional sanctions. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met yesterday with her Turkish counterpart in an effort to mend relations between the countries. It is possible that the US will agree to some of Turkey’s demands to review the situation in Gaza and support an investigation into the flotilla raid as a way of garnering some Turkish support on the Iranian issue. Although there is no assurance that this support will be achieved, diplomatic negotiations are likely to see a growing link between the Israel-Gaza situation and broader geo-strategic questions.

Meanwhile, responses from Israel’s Arab neighbours remain relatively subdued. Egypt’s announcement yesterday that the Rafah border crossing between northern Sinai and Gaza will be opened for 12 hours a day until further notice signals a dual effort by the Egyptians to show solidarity with the residents of Gaza and at the same time deflect criticism of its own participation in the blockade of the Hamas-ruled strip.

However, Egypt’s longstanding stance is to avoid any step that could interpreted as a de-facto acceptance of responsibility for the situation in Gaza; Egypt does not want to take over Israel’s thorny problem. Periodical opening of the Rafah crossing alleviates some of the criticism within Egypt against the regime’s relatively passive position. However, a substantive policy change will only take place alongside an Israeli agreement to a broader change in the regime governing Gaza’s borders, or an acceptance by Hamas of the Palestinian unity agreement that Egypt has long been attempting to broker.

Will the incident change the existing border regime in Gaza?

This week’s events have led to widespread calls on Israel to lift its restrictions on access Gaza. However, the underlying strategic challenge remains unchanged. Israel, along with Egypt, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and much of the international community, faces an acute dilemma over how to contain the Hamas regime in Gaza and this remains the case after the Gaza flotilla incident. There is an international consensus that the situation in Gaza ought to be addressed as a matter of urgency. At the same time, it is impossible to isolate the humanitarian assistance to Gaza residents from the need to fully address several key issues, first and foremost Hamas’s efforts to smuggle weapons into the strip and rebuild its military capacities. 

Many have called for the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) to be implemented as a way of easing the Israeli restrictions. However, it is necessary to take into account the political reality that has changed significantly since 2005. The AMA was signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas as part of Israel’s withdrawal from the strip and the hope of transferring control over it to the Palestinian Authority. Since it was signed, forces loyal to Abbas were violently ousted from Gaza in a coup, after which Hamas took sole control of the strip. Without a credible force that takes part in the monitoring of the border crossing to and from Israel and Egypt, it is hard to see how the AMA can be re-implemented.

Any future easing of the naval access into Gaza will have to ensure that these new routes of access are not abused by Hamas. One option that has been raised is for Israel to shift its policy from a blockade to a quarantine, in which it would allow ships to pass after boarding and searching them. This would have the dual benefit of allowing critical goods into Gaza while relieving some of the international pressure to completely lift all restrictions. However, this still leaves open the concern that Hamas will be empowered and claim the concession as a victory. 

Is international policy toward Hamas likely to change?

The policy of the international Quartet since 2007 has been to isolate Hamas and strengthen the West Bank Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. This is why most Western diplomats refuse to have contact with Hamas officials, without Hamas first moderating its position by recognising Israel, renouncing violence, and adhering to previous peace agreements. Israeli officials have repeatedly stated that under these conditions Israel will not object to Hamas’s participation in the diplomatic process. However, legitimisation of Hamas at this point, when the movement continues to call for Israel’s destruction and opposes Fatah’s policies in the West Bank, threatens to reward Hamas’s intransigence. In the past, among the first to object to calls for the international community to engage with Hamas have been Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah. They have been waiting for months for Hamas to sign a unity agreement to bring new Palestinian elections. They fear any international measure that will boost Hamas’s domestic popularity.

Repeated polls indicate that Hamas’s popularity has waned significantly. Any international engagement with Hamas is likely to significantly energise the movement and its supporters in the Palestinian street. Furthermore, the significant effort taken by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to curb Hamas activity and ensure security and stability on the ground will lose much of its momentum if Hamas is legitimised internationally.

An unconditional u-turn in international policy toward Hamas will also invigorate radical elements across the region, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At a time when there is growing recognition of Iran’s effort to expand its influence in the region through proxy organisations like Hamas in Gaza, an acceptance of Hamas runs the risk of emboldening Iran’s status.

Conclusion

The regrettable deaths aboard the Turkish ship on Monday will spark a debate about the future of the Gaza Strip and its impact on broader regional and international issues. To avoid the mistakes that prevailed in the past, policymakers will need to seriously consider a number of interrelated issues as they determine long term development. These include specifically the potential effect it may have on the Middle East peace process, the moderate Palestinian leadership and the Iranian efforts to establish its influence in the region.