The current balance of power in Syria is influenced by the three-pronged constellation in the Middle East, marked by the Iranian-led Shiite axis; the Saudi-led Sunni axis; and the Salafi jihadi elements, which constitute a third pole in the equation. Syria today is the primary battleground, and all the interested parties are represented there, including groups belonging to the Shiite axis; groups belonging to the Sunni camp – among them global jihadi elements such as the Islamic State; world powers such as Russia and the United States; minority groups fighting for their lives, such as the Kurds, the Druze, and the Alawites; and the countries sharing common borders with Syria. Given the difficulty in envisioning the final outcome of the campaign in Syria, and under the assumption that Syria will not return to the situation that existed there prior to the outbreak of the civil war, analysts tend to highlight three principal future scenarios: (a) Syria dominated by Iran, in cooperation with Hizbollah and the Alawite minority, which will retain control of the major urban centers and the area of the Mediterranean coast; (b) Syria toppled by Salafi forces and the domination of the Islamic State; and (c) ongoing chaos without a clear outcome, with a  multitude of parties fighting one another.

The Israeli Policy of Non-intervention

The Israeli government has singled out Iran as the major threat facing Israel today, whether directly or by means of its proxies, Hizbollah, the forces of Bashar al-Assad, and rogue elements. The struggle among regional forces manifested in the fighting in Syria – coupled with the inability to foresee the end state of Syria and the limited ability to influence the developments on the ground, as well as Israel’s reluctance to become embroiled in the current regional turbulence and assume responsibility for its outcome – has prompted an Israeli policy of non-intervention. At the same time, Israel’s strategic situation has ostensibly improved as a result of the weakened Syrian link in the Iranian axis, without any investment of additional resources or significant risk taking.

Another prevalent assessment holds that Israel’s field of shared interests with the functioning Sunni states has expanded, yielding a basis of cooperation focused on striving to neutralize Iran’s influence in the region and shaping the face of Syria following the end of the Assad regime. Against this background, Israel has not jumped the gun and refrained from choosing a favored scenario from among the three bad options: Iranian domination, Islamic domination, and ongoing chaos in Syria. This policy has been based on the reasonable conclusion that in the present reality, it is pointless to rely on any one party, and that it would be impossible to influence the shaping of Syria without putting boots on the ground, i.e., without massive military intervention.

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