BICOM

Key points

• The decision of Britain, Germany and France to vote for the UN Security Council resolution on settlements reflects the deep frustration in European capitals at the lack of progress in the peace process in general and towards Israel in particular.
• In vetoing the resolution, the US argued that addressing the core issues outside the context of negotiations would entrench the positions of the two sides and make a return to talks harder to achieve.
• With both Palestinian and Israeli leaders facing heightened concern about their domestic political position, major concessions from either side seem less likely at this point, and the aspiration of a deal by September looks unrealistic.
• To move forward from here, the international community need to coordinate their push for a return to talks, and set realistic goals.

Introduction: Division in the Security Council

The outcome of the UN Security Council Resolution condemning settlements on Friday has revealed the extent of international discord on the peace process. The Palestinians pushed forward with the resolution despite intensive US efforts, from President Obama down, to dissuade them, and knowing the US would veto. The UK, Germany and France, meanwhile, moved unanimously to back the Palestinian position.

Given the instability in the region, this was particularly uncomfortable moment for the US to be depicted as the lone voice defending Israel. The US offered Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas a substantial package of incentives in place of the resolution. These included a toughly worded Security Council statement condemning settlements, a Security Council visit to the region, and a Quartet statement in March that would be more specific in prescribing the terms of reference on the core issues. This would most likely have meant backing the PLO demand for a territorial deal based on 1967 borders.

But having set out their stall by pushing for a resolution at the UN, and having received international support, the Palestinians found themselves, not for the first time, in a position where they could not back down. They have to create the impression they are achieving something through diplomacy, even whilst they refuse to enter negotiations. Given the unrest in the region, domestic legitimacy has increased in importance relative to good relations with the Americans. The Palestinians therefore pursued their strategy even to the point of rejecting potentially significant US incentives, and embarrassing the Obama administration.

Why did the EU back a resolution which the US vetoed?

It is unusual for the UK to vote for a resolution the US is vetoing. The decision of Britain, Germany and France to vote ‘yes’ is indicative of their frustration at Israel for its actions, and at the US for their handling of the peace process.

They believe settlement construction is undermining a two-state solution on the ground, and is a sign of bad faith on Israel’s part. This is combined with a widespread view that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict poisons the West’s relations with the Arab and wider Islamic world. Britain is working hard to improve its standing in the Arab world. It is placing increasingly high value on its trade relations with the Gulf States – important for Britain’s economic recovery – and Britain is the largest foreign investor in Egypt. Sensitivity to Arab public opinion, which is extremely hostile to Israel, will be heightened by the regional instability, and the possible emergence of more democratic societies.

Many European leaders feel that for too long the EU has been kept on the sidelines in the US-led peace process, whilst simultaneously being asked to bankroll it through financial support for the Palestinian Authority. The EU powers have, in varying degrees, reluctantly accepted that the US is the only external power with the credibility and leverage against Israel, the Palestinians, and the wider Arab world, to broker a deal. But their patience has worn thin. Sources indicate that European diplomats are reacting to the situation by looking for ways to increase their own direct pressure on the Netanyahu’s government. 

In their statements over the past few days, the Americans have expressed no less that the Europeans there view that settlement construction is an obstacle to peace, but they reject the effort to address it at the UN. The increased Republican strength on Capitol Hill may be a factor in determining their approach. But the Obama administration has been arguing for some time that referring the issue to the UN undermines the central goal of getting the parties to negotiate directly.

Their efforts in 2009 to press for an Israeli settlement freeze proved counter-productive. Rather than paving the way for talks, the US demand emboldened the Palestinians and caused them to toughen their position. When Israel finally conceded a partial, but nonetheless unprecedented, ten month freeze in October 2009, the Palestinians still prevaricated for nine months before coming to the table.

US ambassador to the UN Susan Rice told reporters after the vote, ‘every potential action, including action in the Security Council, has to be measured against one test, and that’s whether it will move the parties closer to negotiations and agreement or take them further apart. And our judgment was that this resolution would not have advanced the goal of getting the parties closer to negotiations and agreement. On the contrary, it would have hardened the positions of one or both sides.’

A state by September?

Foreign Secretary William Hague said after the UN Security Council vote on Friday that, ‘Our goal remains an agreement on all final status issues and the welcoming of Palestine as a full member [of the UN] by September 2011.’ In contrast US officials made no mention of the September date in their recent statements. Given the political realities in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, this aspiration looks unrealistic.

So long as the Palestinians continue to receive international diplomatic gestures, in spite of their refusal to negotiate with Israel, there is no incentive for them to come to the negotiating table. They do not believe Netanyahu is serious, and are not keen to face the controversial compromises that come from entering final status talks. Having just called internal Palestinian elections for September, they are even more sensitive than before to issue of their domestic legitimacy. The recent call by Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad for a unity government with Hamas moves them even further away from prospect of renewed talks with Israel.

On the Israeli side, whilst Netanyahu seeks direct talks, he faces domestic political constraints. No matter what the rights and wrongs of the settlements, no Israeli leader can stop settlement construction completely, and this demand has led the peace process down a cul-de-sac. Now the Israeli electoral cycle has passed its half way stage, there is increased likelihood of his right-wing coalition partners, particularly Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beitenu party looking for an opportunity to collapse the coalition and outflank him to the right. There is also a decreased chance that Kadima will provide a ‘safety net’ if that happens.

Israeli policy makers value Israel’s international relations, and Netanyahu may seek to improve Israel’s position with some form of diplomatic initiative. He announced a package of bottom-up gestures negotiated with Tony Blair two weeks ago. But even if Netanyahu offers more substantial incentives, that alone seems unlikely to bring the Palestinians back to the table as long as the weight of international pressure falls only on Israel. Isolating Israel, therefore, seems unlikely to produce the desired result of a return to negotiations.

Even if the parties can be brought back to the table, the September date still looks overly ambitious to say the least. The experience of the Annapolis Process in 2008 and the Camp David talks in 2000 indicates that closing the gaps in the negotiating room is difficult and complex. Important compromises cannot be hammered out quickly or without preparation. In the current context there is no trust between the sides. The US is attempting to close the gaps by drawing out the positions of the two sides in separate talks with the two parties. There is no indication that this is succeeding.

If a negotiated deal by September is not realistic, can progress be made towards a Palestinian state without an agreement between the parties? There was an expectation that the planned Quartet summit in mid-March would result in a statement spelling out in more detail the international position on the core issues, possibly backing 1967-borders as the basis for the territorial question. But Susan Rice indicated on Friday that after the Palestinians rejected the US request to withdraw the motion, this was off the table. It is not clear what the Quartet’s next step will now be. In any case, final status positions set out by the international community as a whole, or by the US, have very limited utility, unless they are accepted by the parties themselves.

Neither can unilateral steps by the Palestinians, or declarations by individual states or the UN as a whole, bring closer the reality of a Palestinian state. They may increase support for the Palestinian negotiating position, but will not change the situation on the ground or close the gaps between Israel and the Palestinians on final status issues. The relevant steps which will give Palestinian’s greater sovereignty in the West Bank can only be taken with Israel’s cooperation and in line with Israel’s legitimate concerns.  

What can realistically be achieved from here?

The US and the Europeans agree that the best way forward is to get the sides back to direct talks. If the US lacks the ability to force the sides together, a coordinated US and EU position is required which brings the parties back to the table by denying them diplomatic alternatives. Further diplomatic isolation of Israel, and one-sided diplomatic gestures to the Palestinians, undermines this process.

Even under renewed talks, agreement on all the core issues by September, given the political circumstances within Israel and the Palestinian Territories, is unlikely. Building expectation for goals that cannot be realised risks further eroding confidence in the process. Perhaps more realistic is a series of agreed steps by both sides which advance the mutually agreed goal of a two state solution, but do not attempt a complete final status deal at this stage.

There is increasingly widespread support in Israel, as indicated by discussions at the recent Herzliya Conference, for proactive steps to move towards a Palestinian state in interim borders. Possible interim steps include giving the Palestinians greater authority over more parts of the West Bank territory, including ‘Area C’ which is currently under full Israeli control. This would increase Israeli legitimacy and Palestinian sovereignty incrementally without making all progress dependent on a comprehensive agreement. The main problem with that approach is that the Palestinians object on the basis that a state in temporary borders would be used by Israel to permanently defer final status issues. To get this approach to work would require the international community to back it, along with guarantees for the Palestinians about what the end game will look like and what the time frame for final status would be.

In addition, the vital but undervalued long term work of building support for a negotiated agreement with Israeli and Palestinian societies, and in the wider region, must be enhanced.

Conclusion

Despite the US veto at the Security Council, Israel’s diplomatic isolation over the issue of settlements is clear. Britain and its EU partners may yet seek other ways to express their displeasure at Israel’s position. But whilst diplomatic isolation may weaken Israel’s ability to prosper, it is unlikely to improve the chances of a negotiated end to the conflict. In justifying its veto on Friday, the US argued that one-sided measures by the international community would in fact make things harder.

However much the international community wills the creation of a Palestinian state by September, it cannot talk it into existence without a process that has the buy-in of both parties. There cannot be a fair resolution for the Palestinians without a negotiated settlement with Israel which addresses Israel’s legitimate concerns. To bring a genuine end to the conflict, and not a false dawn, this is the reality that cannot be avoided.

If the route to progress is negotiations, the international community needs to focus on getting the parties to talk to each other, and set goals that are achievable. Diplomatic gestures to the Palestinians should be an incentive to the Palestinians for entering talks, not a reward for avoiding them.