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Key points

• Despite tendencies to portray settlers in monolithic terms, the settler movement is undergoing noteworthy changes and facing internal divisions.
• Some groups among the younger generation of settlers are increasingly disillusioned from the traditional settler leadership and challenge the authority of the Israeli security forces in enforcing restrictions on new construction.
• A large ultra-orthodox community also changes the demographics of the settler population, though it is primarily concerned with pragmatic needs like housing and employment, as opposed to the more ideologically motivated religious-Zionist settlers.
• In curbing settlement construction, the Israeli government faces a complex challenge to avoid exacerbating existing tensions between the settlers and the state.  

Introduction

Last month, when Israelis celebrated the country’s 62^nd Independence Day with ceremonies, fireworks and traditional barbecues, a group of young settlers clashed with soldiers who were patrolling near the West Bank settlement of Yitzhar. According to the IDF, the settlers intended to make their way to a neighbouring Palestinian village to allegedly damage Palestinian property. The settlers claim that the group was heading to a picnic in a nearby spring. In the ensuing clash at least two soldiers were injured by stones and several settlers were arrested. An IDF spokesperson strongly condemned the incident, saying that “the violence towards soldiers was an inexcusable crossing of the lines, especially on Independence Day.”

International criticism levelled at the Israeli government often overlooks the immense difficulties of reining in some of the more radical settlers without vilifying and alienating the entire settler community. In a recent lecture, one of the key figures of the traditional settler leadership, Pinchas Wallerstein, warned that extreme groups among the settlers are a risk to the entire community and should be denunciated. Wallerstein’s comments illustrate the dramatic changes that are taking place within the settler community and its gradual fragmentation. This analysis examines the deep currents that are significantly changing the settler community in the West Bank, the internal dynamics within it and its relation to the state.

The roots of the rift

After their emergence in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War, the settler leadership saw themselves as the descendents of Zionist pioneers who settled peripheral regions in the pre-state era. At a time when Israel’s political leadership was still debating the future of the new areas that were captured during the war – the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights – groups affiliated with the religious-Zionist movement sought to create facts on the ground. Some of the early endeavours carried out by settler groups in the West Bank were at odds with official government policy that opposed Jewish settlements at the heart of Palestinian population centres. This was the case, for example, with efforts to restore a Jewish presence in Hebron in 1968 and the establishment of Elon More’ near Nablus in 1974.

However, even when settlement activity took place without the official endorsement of the political establishment, the settler leadership maintained a close, even intimate relation with key figures in Israeli political and military echelons. Through intensive political lobbying, the settlers succeeded in ensuring that the authorities often accepted settlement activity and provided necessary resources like defence and infrastructure, once facts were created on the ground. In the decades that followed, the settlers increased their close relation with the country’s leadership, specifically after the victory of the secular, right wing Likud party in the 1977 elections. Ariel Sharon became a pivotal figure in this relationship and used his resources in various government ministries to significantly boost settlement activity.

It is possible to identify three crucial steps in the gradual unravelling of the close relationship between the settlers and the state. The first followed the 1978 Israel-Egypt peace treaty and the consequent Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. The 1982 evacuation by force of the town Yamit, one of the largest Israeli settlements in Sinai, became a landmark in the widening rift between the settler movement and Israeli mainstream. While the public enthusiastically supported the land-for-peace formula that paved the way for the historic agreement, the settlers saw this as a betrayal by the establishment that sent them to settle these areas in the first place.

The Oslo period in the early 1990s, when Yitzhak Rabin’s government launched a diplomatic process with the Palestinian leadership, was another important moment that positioned the settler movement in stark opposition to the government. For religious and ideological reasons, the settlers vehemently opposed the government’s effort to negotiate an agreement based on territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a national-religious student, though not a settler himself, prompted some in the settler leadership to seek to bridge the deep ideological and political split between the settler movement and the Israeli public.

While both the withdrawal from Sinai and the Oslo years exposed a clear conflict between the government’s policies and the agenda of the settler movement, the fundamental bond between the settlers and the state remained strong. For example, settlers serve in growing numbers in the Israeli Defence Forces and many go on to serve in commanding roles. However, the events that surrounded Israel’s 2005 disengagement from the northern West Bank and the Gaza Strip marked a new stage in the rift between some of the settlers and the country’s leadership.

Disengagement and disillusion

The 2005 disengagement plan saw Israel unilaterally pull out its entire military and civilian presence from the Gaza Strip. It was a historic moment, in which key figures who supported and promoted the settlement movement for three decades led the most significant Israeli territorial concession since 1982. Then prime minister Ariel Sharon embodied this transition. In breaking away from his role as the ‘father of the settlement project’, Sharon symbolised the realisation of many in the centre-right that Israel cannot sustain its control over the Palestinians. Polls conducted at the time consistently showed that a majority of Israelis supported the disengagement and illustrated a clear willingness to dismantle settlements.

In the months and weeks leading up to the disengagement, the settlers launched an unprecedented public campaign to prevent the execution of the plan, with thousands of settlers mobilised to rallies across the country. While the traditional settler leadership sought to win the hearts and minds of the general public and operate through traditional political routes, some in the younger generation endorsed an uncompromising line. Using the summer school break in the months that preceded the evacuation deadline, hundreds of youths relocated to Gaza to physically prevent the evictions. Prompted by a small group of religious leaders, protesters began explicitly calling on soldiers not to carry out eviction orders, hoping that the threat of mutiny could deter policymakers from going ahead with the plan. Eventually, only 67 sporadic incidents of soldiers refusing to carry out orders were recorded, but additional incidents have occurred since among a small minority of soldiers. This is a trend that reflects the growing distrust by some in the settler movement toward the mainstream political establishment in Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s settlement freeze has added another point of friction.

The rapid completion of the disengagement plan was viewed with satisfaction by many in Israel and around the world, but for many in the settler movement the event marked a clear tipping point. First, the younger generation directed their frustration and anger toward the traditional leadership of the settler movement, which failed to stop the disengagement. Radical leaders were significantly emboldened. From their new position of popular authority, they began challenging the leadership’s policy that sought, even behind closed doors, to ensure the long term support of the political establishment for the settlements.

Another shift took place in the attitude toward the security forces. Many in the settlements serve in the army and a significant portion continues to serve in commanding roles and in some of the IDF’s elite unites. However, the participation of soldiers and policemen in the disengagement increasingly placed the security forces and the settlers in opposition to one another. Military commanders have increasingly encountered confrontational and even violent behaviour by young settlers in remote outposts. The Independence Day clash near Yitzhar was just another expression of this trend.

The third trend regards a deep disillusion some settlers feel toward the State of Israel and its government. Specifically, there is a refusal to accept the authority of the state in imposing limitations on construction, the removal of illegal outposts and the decision to order further removal of settlements. More than 50% of settlers said in a recent poll that neither the government nor the Knesset have the authority to order such restrictions, compared to approximately 70% among the general public who accept the government’s authority. According to the same poll, one in five settlers think that additional eviction of settlements in the West Bank should be resisted by all means. Conversely, among the general population in Israel, numerous polls show that majority of Israeli agree to the evacuation of at least some settlements as part of a future agreement with the Palestinians.

It is a fact that the radical youths that often seize the headlines remain at the margins of the settler community in the West Bank, with the majority of settlers condemning the violence against soldiers and Palestinians. However, a senior IDF officer was quoted as saying recently, the problem is that while most settlers do not go against the army, “the radical margins are steadily widening”.

Beyond the radicals

Another important trend in recent years is the rapid growth of the ultra-orthodox community in the West Bank. This is the fastest growing sector in the settlements and comprises, according to varying estimates, approximately 35% of the Jewish population in the West Bank. The ultra-orthodox community is more concerned with maintaining the strictures of Jewish law and their communal traditions than with the nationalist ideals of the modern orthodox. Politically, it is affiliated with parties like orthodox-Sephardic Shas and the Ashkenazi United Torah Judaism.

The rapid demographic growth of this community, where very large families is the norm, made the problem of housing one of its most pressing issues. Shas’s vocal support for further construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is partly the result of increasing pressure by their constituency to provide immediate solutions to the severe housing shortage. This represents a shift by Shas’s leadership, which was known for its centrist and pragmatic agenda during the 1990s and the Oslo Accords period.

The traditional settler leadership is increasingly confronted by conflicting trends that challenge its dominance and authority. The ultra-orthodox community, for example, maintains an independent religious and political leadership and operates separately from the national-religious movement that dominates many of the West Bank older settlements. One ultra-orthodox settler illustrated this point recently when he toldHaaretz, “We don’t identify with the settlers. You won’t see us demonstrating alongside them. We’ve nothing in common with the `hilltop youth,'” referring to the extreme group of young settlers who live in secluded outposts.

Nonetheless, the size of this community will undoubtedly influence political support for a future agreement with the Palestinians. Modiin Illit and Beitar Illit, the two fastest growing towns in the West Bank, comprise of 22,000 residents each. Most Israelis want and expect these settlements to stay part of Israel in a future peace agreement. While the ultra-orthodox community is traditionally less involved in diplomatic and security issues, the new demographic change in the West Bank makes the fate of the settlements a key concern for these constituencies. Any future agreement will have to take this new reality into consideration.

Conclusion

For ordinary Israelis, the reality of West Bank settlements is increasingly unrelated to their daily routines.  According to a Peace Now poll from the end of 2009, over 70% of Israelis said they have not visited a settlement in recent years. With consistent Israeli support for a two-state solution and the renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinians, the settler movement faces tough decisions about its future.

International criticism levelled at the Israeli government often overlooks the difficulties of reining in some of the more radical settlers on the fringes, without vilifying and alienating the entire settler community. Despite tendencies to portray the settlers in monolithic terms, changes in population and new political currents present a complex picture. The future of the settlers, not just the settlements, creates considerable challenges for leaders inside the settler community and policymakers in Israel in general.