BICOM

Key points

• Whilst the current impasse over settlements is holding up the return to direct talks, Palestinian internal division is one of the long-term barriers to the implementation a two-state solution. It is difficult to see Palestinian reconciliation coming about in the near future.
• However, the clamp down by the Palestinian Authority against Hamas in the West Bank is one of the factors that have contributed to greatly improved security and economic conditions there, as part of the PA’s state building programme.
• If Abbas and Israel were to make progress in peace talks, this could further draw support away from Hamas and undermine its case for rejecting negotiations.

Is Palestinian unity back on the agenda?

After a year with little movement towards Palestinian reconciliation, a resumed dialogue between the two main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, has been reported in the last few weeks. Fatah official Azzam al-Ahmed met with Hamas leader Khaled Meshal and representatives of other Palestinian factions in Syria at the end of September. This followed a reported meeting between Meshaal and Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman – who has long mediated Palestinian reconciliation efforts – in Saudi Arabia. A second meeting between Palestinian factions is reportedly scheduled to take place on 20 October.

The issue of Palestinian unity came up at the Arab League summit in Libya on 10 October. According to a report in Ha’aretz, there was an argument between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who hosts Hamas’s headquarters in Damascus, and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. The argument was fuelled by a Syrian attempt to invite Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal to the summit to foster Palestinian reconciliation, a move which Abbas rejected.  The Syrian President apparently criticized Abbas’s attitude to reconciliation and called on him to support the path of ‘resistance’.

Why does the split persist?

The Palestinian internal split has been in place since June 2007, when a short lived Palestinian unity government collapsed with a violent coup by Hamas against Fatah in Gaza. Since then, Hamas has run Gaza and the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas has controlled the West Bank. Abbas empowered Salam Fayyad, who is independent of the Fatah faction, to run a technocratic authority in the West Bank. Hamas and Fatah have engaged in numerous rounds of unity talks since their split.  These culminated in an Egyptian proposal in late 2009 for a unity arrangement that would pave the way for reform of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), reform of Palestinian security forces and new elections. Hamas ultimately rejected the deal. Many analysts were left with the impression that both sides were more interested in not appearing like the cause of Palestinian disunity, rather than actually resolving the split.

There remains a clear incentive for both sides to appear committed to the principle of reconciliation. A recent poll by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research confirmed that unity is one of the top priorities for the Palestinian public. Hamas have been hinting recently that they may be more inclined to sign the Egyptian brokered agreement. The stall in talks between Abbas and Netanyahu may also give the PA leader an incentive to project more openness to Palestinian unity. But there is little indication that either side is any more ready than before to compromise. 

Key Hamas demands remain extremely difficult for Fatah to contemplate. A deal would mean reform of the PLO, the internationally recognised representative body of the Palestinians, to allow Hamas inclusion. Even more sensitive is Hamas’s demand for security reform. Since the 2007 split, the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF), under the authority of the West Bank Palestinian Authority, have been trained by a US led mission with Israeli support. Since its deployment, this force has carried out mass arrests of Hamas activists and other rivals to Abbas’s authority.

The PSF have been progressively deployed in Palestinian population centres over the past three years, whilst Israeli forces have gradually lowered their profile. The PSF’s performance has been praised by Israeli security forces. Increased Israeli confidence in Palestinian security performance has led to a reduction of Israeli restrictions on Palestinian access and movement in the West Bank, one of the factors contributing to rapid economic growth. A report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs published in June 2010 noted that as a result of changes in 2008 and 2009, ‘large segments of the Palestinian population enjoy better access to services, places of work and markets.’

Abbas’s readiness to get tough on Hamas is motivated by the threat the Islamist movement poses to his own authority. A recent report by the International Crisis Group stated that, ‘For Ramallah’s leaders, Hamas continues to constitute a threat to the stability of their rule, just as they deem Hamas’s adherence to armed struggle inimical to the Palestinian national interest.’

Rivalry between the two groups is underpinned by clear differences about the future vision for Palestinian sovereignty and how to achieve it. Apart from the sharp distinctions between Islamist and secular nationalist visions for a Palestinian state, the use of violence as a political tool remains a clear difference between the sides. Hamas has opposed Abbas’s renewal of direct talks with Israel. In a recent interview, Khaled Meshaal reaffirmed his belief in the necessity of violent ‘resistance’ to maintain pressure on Israel. Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad have made clear they consider violence to be counter to the Palestinian national interest. If talks with Israel fail, Abbas appears more likely to put pressure on Israel by seeking to isolate Israel diplomatically, rather than by backing a violent campaign against Israel as Arafat did in the Second Intifada. Fayyad has made the argument that by building credible state institutions and maintaining security control, the Palestinians can prove their readiness for statehood. He has also promoted a model of non-violent resistance which has grown in popularity.

Given this context, Hamas and Fatah still look unlikely to find a unified agenda at this time. Neither side appears ready to risk its position. The PA in the West Bank would risk being cut off from its US and EU support network if it joined a shared platform with Hamas which did not meet Quartet requirements. There is no sign that Abbas and Fayyad are ready to relax the clamp down on Hamas in the West Bank. Hamas seem no keener to relax their grip on the Gaza Strip, despite the severe limitations placed on the territory by Israel, as a result of Hamas’s control.

Can the peace process move forward without Hamas?

Many question the utility of moving forward in the peace process without Hamas involvement, and for good reason. Hamas has the ability to undermine Israeli security with rocket attacks from Gaza. With two shooting attacks in early September, it also proved that its ability to attack Israeli civilians in the West Bank is not entirely removed, despite the efforts of Abbas and Fayyad to suppress their activities.

The fact that Hamas is not included in the talks undoubtedly constitutes a major weakness for the peace process. However, if Hamas and Fatah were to reunify, there may not be any process whatsoever. When Hamas formed a unity government for several months in 2007, it was based on a platform that failed to meet all the Quartet’s demands of renouncing violence, accepting previous agreements with Israel, or recognizing Israel. Without major reforms by Hamas, it remains extremely difficult for the Western powers to support a government in which it is participating, given its legal status as a proscribed terror group in both the EU and US. Any move by Western powers to warm relations with Hamas tend to raise objections from their Fatah rivals.

There are credible voices in Israel who make the case for opening dialogue with Hamas. But the dominant view, frequently articulated by Prime Minister Netanyahu, is that Hamas is part of a radical network in the region led by Iran which is working for Israel’s destruction.

It was the Hamas coup in Gaza and the establishment of a government without Hamas in the West Bank that allowed for the bottom up transformation seen in the last three years to take place there. The sharp division between Abbas and Hamas militancy also insulated the recent peace talks from Hamas violence. When four Israelis were killed in the West Bank by a Hamas cell on the eve of the Washington summit at the beginning of September, Abbas was able to credibly distance himself, and the PA as a whole. As such, the violence, rather than creating a pretext for Israel to pull out of talks, has created an added incentive to continue them.

That is not to say that internal Palestinian division has come without cost. Whilst the West Bank has made progress in security and economy, representative Palestinian political institutions have foundered. The Palestinian Legislative Council does not function, and elections for both the PLC and Presidency are suspended indefinitely. This has undermined the legitimacy of the PA in the West Bank.

The absence of forces loyal to PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Gaza has also left Israel with no Palestinian security partner there. This has contributed to the dire situation of a Hamas-Gaza entity committed to ongoing violence against Israel, and consequently facing severe restrictions on access which heavily impact the local population.

Is there a route from here to a two-state solution?

Internal Palestinian reconciliation currently looks unlikely. Given that context, clear progress in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would improve Abbas’s standing and could undermine Hamas’s objections to the peace process and a negotiated two-state solution. Any compromises Abbas makes to Israel currently risk being branded by Hamas as betrayal or capitulation. However, the claim of betrayal would be harder to sustain if the agreement had the support of the wider Arab world.

Hamas has always walked a fine line between seeking to represent Palestinian national and pan-Islamist goals. A credible peace process which offers to deliver Palestinian national goals – to end the occupation and create Palestinian sovereignty – as part of an agreed two-state solution, might force Hamas into an uncomfortable position where it has to choose its path. It would likely expose the gaps between more hard-line and more pragmatic wings. It would make the case for continuing the path of violence, and Hamas’s affiliation to Iran and other rejectionist forces in the region, harder to make.