BICOM

• The fifteenth anniversary of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin has once again focused Israelis on the opportunities for peace created during his second premiership.
• Although the memory may be fading, his political message of a just and secure peace seems to be as potent as ever.
• Despite their political differences, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was keen to assert that, on the critical issues, he is now more flexible than Rabin.

Introduction

The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on November 4^th 1995 was an iconic moment in Israeli political history. Whilst not the first incident of political violence in Israel, Rabin’s death remains a defining moment in the search for Middle East peace. 

Some in Israel now worry that Rabin’s memory is fading. In a speech to the IDF General Staff marking the assassination, Dalia Rabin noted that her father’s attempt to forge peace with the Palestinians was now “just a page in the history books”. Her concerns were echoed in reports that indicate young Israelis know less and less about the assassination and about Rabin’s attempt to make peace. It seems that falling interest, as well as the deep crisis of the Israeli political left, means this year’s annual rally in Rabin Square – the site of the assassination – will be the last one held in its current format.

Yet his message still has enough political resonance for leaders to wish to associate with it. Over a series of events marking the fifteenth anniversary of the assassination, Prime Minister Netanyahu referred several times to the similarities – and the differences – between the policies of his government and those of Rabin. At the official memorial ceremony, Netanyahu addressed a remark to Rabin himself.”We haven’t yet reached the desired peace, and I am not sure that this would have completely surprised you.”

If Rabin is a touchstone for current Israeli peace efforts, and as Israelis and Palestinians struggle to find a way to get back around the negotiating table, it is worth revisiting the question – what would Yitzhak Rabin do?

The Rabin doctrine – peace and security

Returning to power in 1992 after a long spell in the political wilderness, Rabin’s policy approach on the issue of peace comprised of two important principles. Although entirely consistent, they may have appeared to be taken from two ends of the political spectrum. Firstly, consistent with the ‘dovish’ outlook of elements of his Labor Party, Yitzhak Rabin believed that Israel could not, and should not, hold on to most of the territories captured in the 1967 Six-Day War. He firmly believed that ruling over several million Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza was incompatible with Israeli democracy. He believed that Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights could bring peace with Syria, and further normalisation with the Arab world. His long-term strategy, therefore, was to resolve Israel’s ongoing state of conflict through withdrawal from most – although probably not all – of those territories.

The second principle was just as important. A ‘hawkish’ tactical outlook – not unsurprising from a career military officer – determined that the peace process should not create the impression of Israeli weakness. His operative plan was a series of mutually reinforcing interim agreements that would keep up momentum but push the formal end of conflict some way off into the future. In each one of these stages, domestic public opinion had to be convinced that a deal was in its interest, primarily by ensuring that Israel enjoyed strong US backing. Such visible support for Israel would convince Palestinians, Syrians and other Arab states that they could no longer hope to pressure Israel into resolving the conflict. By waiting until the PLO moderated its position on armed resistance to Israel, and until Soviet patronage of both Palestinians and Syrians had evaporated, he hoped to find his interlocutors ready for real progress.

Together, according to Aaron Miller, a senior figure in American attempts to end the conflict in the Middle East over 25 years, this approach created a real chance for a major regional realignment in the 1990s. With the right kind of support from the United States, he assesses that Rabin “would have been able to persuade, induce, pressure, but ultimately attract Arafat on one hand or Assad on the other to an agreement”.

Netanyahu in the footsteps of Rabin?

Despite their political differences, Prime Minister Netanyahu seems comfortable with Rabin’s overall approach. Speaking at the official memorial ceremony for Rabin, he accentuated a convergence in Israeli politics: Israel is “no longer divided into two opposing camps, each of which was convinced that it was entirely right and just, and were it not for them, the country would be destroyed and disaster would be brought upon it.”

A domestic atmosphere of incitement and violence in the 1990s, ultimately responsible for the assassination, pushed back peace efforts by at least a decade. Understanding the immense political risks involved, Netanyahu has prioritised building and preserving a domestic consensus with the pursuit of a secure peace at its heart. His answer to the agonising destructiveness of Palestinian suicide terrorism is to create a clear political horizon for state-building efforts, and to ensure that real changes on the ground support this. And whilst he is formally committed to the pursuit of a full and final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Netanyahu may be more comfortable with an evolving process that implements a comprehensive peace deal with the Palestinians over an extensive timeframe.

And on three key issues – the establishment of a Palestinian state, the call for explicit endorsement as Israel as a Jewish state and the question of continued settlement construction during peace talks – Netanyahu positioned himself as even more flexible than Rabin.

• His speech to the Knesset’s special memorial session quoted Rabin’s final speech to the Knesset, a month before he was killed: “We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.” Quite unthinkable fifteen years ago, the Netanyahu government now openly endorses the principle of territorial compromise in the pursuit of peace. Indeed, unlike Rabin, Netanyahu – and his coalition partners from left and right – has explicitly endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state.

• Secondly, in a reference to his request for Palestinian endorsement the Jewish nature of the State of Israel, Netanyahu again quoted Rabin’s final speech to the Knesset. Speaking at the official memorial ceremony he noted Rabin’s call for “first and foremost, the State of Israel as a Jewish state.”

• On settlement construction, the speech to the Knesset special session quoted Rabin again: “I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Yet Netanyahu is far from being a Rabin clone, avoiding substantive talks with Syria that may simply strengthen a regime which is a key supporter of Hezbollah and Hamas. Netanyahu also faces a distinctly different regional dynamics in which Iran, not Palestinian issues, dominates his strategic thinking. Domestically, Netanyahu understands that progress toward a deal with the Palestinians comes with high political risks, but unlike Rabin, seeks to maintain a broad coalition and postpone an early conflict with the Israeli right.

Conclusions

Yitzhak Rabin’s overall strategy, the pursuit of a just peace whilst credibly maintaining Israel’s long-term security, has stood the test of several rounds of failed political talks and periods of agonising violence. His operative plan of a series of interim agreements may be a useful supplement, if not a replacement, for a comprehensive peace plan. Domestically, Rabin second premiership illustrates the immense challenge of ensuring a political that will allow progress toward peace. Rabin’s personal example of leadership in the face of intense opposition is a tragic reminder that the stakes are unbearably high.