BICOM

Key points

• The foreign secretary has an opportunity to enhance Britain’s influence by showing he appreciates the legitimate interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. In Israel’s case, this means understanding its concerns in the areas of security and legitimacy.

• To help get the peace talks moving again, it is important to encourage both sides to see a negotiated agreement as the best way to achieve their national goals.

• Given the importance of the Middle East and its challenges to Britain’s national security agenda, positioning the UK as a state with strong relationships with all parties in the region is in line with Britain’s strategic priorities.

Can the foreign secretary prosper on delicate ground?

William Hague, the British foreign secretary, will this week embark on his first official visit to Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Egypt. He will be aware that those who have gone before him have found this tricky ground. On more than one occasion in the past, British foreign secretaries have met with controversy on their first official visits and discovered that once they had developed a reputation in Israel as hostile, they struggled to regain credibility, regardless of whether or not that reputation was fair. There is wisdom, therefore, in a cautious approach. At the same time, the foreign secretary has an opportunity to enhance Britain’s role in the peace process and its regional influence. Important to achieving this is showing Israelis, Palestinians and the wider Arab world, that he understands and supports the legitimate core concerns of all parties in the region.

How can Britain maximise influence with Israel?

Approach to the peace process

In Israel’s case, its core concerns with regard to the peace process relate to security and legitimacy. The security concern stems primarily from the fact that after Israel’s withdrawals from southern Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2006), Iranian backed proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, established themselves as direct threats to Israeli security on its northern and southern borders. Iran and its influence is Prime Minister Netanyahu’s number one priority. He articulates a legitimate concern when he says that Israel cannot afford to have a ‘third Iranian base’ created in the West Bank. The fact that, according to reports in Haaretz, Hague will hold a roundtable discussion on Iran’s nuclear programme with senior Israeli officials indicates he wants to understand Israeli concerns.

The attitude taken by the British foreign secretary towards the situation in Gaza will be a significant test for Israelis of his attitude towards Israel’s security concerns.  If the Foreign Secretary calls for a lifting of Israel’s maritime blockade without any acknowledgement of why it is in place, he risks being interpreted in Israel as grandstanding, as opposed to being genuinely interested in solving problems. Despite international commitments to help stop the smuggling, the international community has been short on solutions for how to achieve this. Careful language on Gaza is important to show that affirming Israel’s right to security is not merely an empty platitude, but is actually respected in practice. This means balancing calls to change the situation for the people in Gaza, with parallel recognition of the need to address the smuggling issue, the firing of rockets at Israeli citizens and the ongoing captivity of Gilad Shalit. The foreign secretary’s planned meeting with the Shalit family will be welcomed by Israelis who are extremely concerned for his welfare.

The issue of legitimacy is also central to Israel’s concerns in the peace process. Most Israelis are ready to see the establishment of a Palestinian state, but what they want in return is not only internationally recognised boarders, but an end to Palestinian claims, including the ‘right of return’. This demand is perceived by Israelis as an attempt to threaten the Jewish majority and Israel’s status as a Jewish and democratic state. The very point of a two-state solution, for Israelis, is to secure a Jewish majority state in recognised borders, thereby preserving Israel’s legitimate identity as both Jewish and democratic. The foreign secretary would build trust with Israel by clearly acknowledging that a two-state solution should secure, and not threaten, the legitimate rights of national self-determination for both peoples. The fact that his trip coincides with the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration provides an opportune moment for this.

If the foreign secretary is able to convince Israelis that the current British government understands Israel’s core concerns, he can buy himself space to influence and persuade, and earn the right to be critical where appropriate without being easily branded as anti-Israel. The Palestinian Authority and the Arab world too are likely to see Britain as more significant if they believe the UK has leverage and trust with Israel and is working in coordination with US led diplomacy. A third party that appears to have no influence and trust with Israel or the US, is of limited use also to the Palestinian Authority.

Approach to bilateral relations

In addition to issues relating to the peace process, the foreign secretary has the opportunity to improve the tone in UK-Israel bilateral relations. Britain has earned something of a reputation as being a ‘central hub’ in the international campaign to delegitimise Israel. Israeli politicians, much less the public, do not always distinguish the actions of some parts of UK civil society, in their attempts to promote the international isolation of Israel, from the attitude of the British government. This creates a gap in trust that the foreign secretary has to bridge. But there are a number of ways in which the UK government can improve its standing in Israel, and as a result its influence on the peace process and in the wider region.

Israeli leaders are particularly keen to see concrete progress on the government’s commitment to change British universal jurisdiction legislation. The legislation has been abused by anti-Israel activists, who have been able to trigger arrest warrants on charges of war crimes, against Israeli leaders visiting the UK, without having to present substantial evidence for the accusations. This has prevented a number of Israeli leaders from having their voices heard in Britain. Most recently, Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor cancelled plans to speak at a BICOM function on 1 November for fear he may be targeted. Calls for arrests of Israeli leaders reinforces a public perception in Israel that the rest of the world does not understand or care about its genuine security concerns. The current situation undermines Britain’s reputation as an honest broker. The headline created by the arrest warrants being issued also unfairly promotes the impression among the British public that Israel and its leaders are illegitimate. Israeli leaders are keen to hear when legislation to change this situation, already promised by Justice Secretary Ken Clarke, will be enacted, so that they can once again engage in normal dialogue with Britain.

Also very valuable are gestures that illustrate the British government’s opposition to the boycott and divestment of Israel. Celebrating the scientific cooperation between Britain and Israel, as the foreign secretary will do on this trip, is exactly the right kind of gesture.

How can the UK help get the peace process moving?

The peace process faces a moment of uncertainty as the US tries to broker a compromise on a renewal of Israel’s settlement moratorium which will bring the Palestinians back to direct talks. The Palestinians have threatened to seek alternative avenues to advance their goals through the UN, outside the context of bilateral talks. Whilst it is important to reassure the Palestinians of British commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state, it is important at this moment to emphasise that the best route remains through negotiations. A negotiated solution, in which both leaderships affirm that the agreement is in their national interests, is by far preferable to attempts by any party to impose a solution without agreement.

It is important for Britain to support US efforts to find a compromise to the current impasse regarding the continuation of the West Bank settlement moratorium. Britain can contribute by encouraging both sides to show flexibility in order to give direct talks the best chance of succeeding. It could be counter-productive to propose alternative approaches that are not coordinated with both parties and the US. 

What’s in it for Britain on the regional agenda?

Looking at the wider issues facing the region, it is clear that Britain shares key interests with Israel, the West Bank Palestinian Authority, Egypt and other pro-Western Arab states in containing anti-Western extremism in the region. Britain’s National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, published two weeks ago, underlined this, as did the attempted terror attack foiled over the weekend. The National Security Strategy identified the principle threat to UK interests as coming from international terrorism, in particular from ‘Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and terrorists inspired by its ideology.’ The strategy also emphasised the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East, in particular on the part of Iran. In tackling both these threats, Israel is a valuable ally.  Given the commonality in interest between Israel and much of the Arab world in containing Iran, it is also worth noting that the government’s goal of improving bilateral trade relations with Gulf States need not come at the expense of improved relations with Israel.