BICOM

Key Points

• The IDF has made public several reports since the end of Operation Cast Lead, and this week released another five reports on its most serious ongoing internal investigation into its conduct during the operation.
• It is important to note that this is only a report on initial findings and is part of a much larger process of investigation. A general inquiry is to be concluded in June, with findings to be reviewed by the attorney general.
• The inquiries uncovered mistakes and shortcomings in a number of areas. In each case, the IDF chief of staff has issued orders to address these issues. However, the investigations have also shown that key allegations made against IDF conduct are unfounded.
• The inquiries have found that the conduct of the military in general was in accordance with international law and the IDF’s own ethical principles.

Background

• Between 2001 and 2008, over 8,000 rockets and mortars were fired from Gaza at Israeli towns and communities in southern Israel. The fire intensified after Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005.
• Following the construction of a tunnel by Gaza militants for the purpose of kidnapping Israelis and an IDF incursion to destroy it, rocket fire from Gaza dramatically increased in November 2008. In December, Hamas unilaterally abandoned a six month ceasefire. Although Israel aimed to sustain the ceasefire, with tens of thousands of Israelis under threat Israel decided to end its restraint, and responded to Hamas’s ending of the lull with a major military operation to weaken Hamas’s military capabilities and deter future attacks.
• Independent reports have confirmed that in Israel’s campaign, it confronted Hamas and other militant forces who sheltered within the civilian population with no regard to the rules of war or the welfare of Palestinian civilians.
• An Israeli investigation identified 1,166 Palestinians killed during the three and a half week operation: 709 terror operatives, 295 uninvolved Palestinians, and 162 men not yet attributed. The Hamas-run health ministry claimed 1,380 dead with the majority being civilians.
• International media and NGOs have made accusations against the IDF’s conduct, some of which were brought before the Israeli Supreme Court. At the conclusion of the operation, IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi commissioned five inquiries, led by five colonels not directly involved in the fighting, to investigate these allegations. At the same time, a separate general inquiry was launched into the entire operation, which will be concluded in June.
• Results of some specific inquiries have already been published. An inquiry into the deaths of the daughters of Dr Abu el Eish published in February found that they were mistakenly hit by IDF forces operating under fire, who believed they saw spotters for Hamas sniper and mortar fire operating in the house. However, an investigation into allegations made by IDF soldiers at the Rabin Pre-Military Academy published at the end of March concluded that the allegations were based on hearsay and could not be substantiated.

The five inquiries

1. Incidents where UN and international facilities were fired upon: Col. Itzik Turgeman
2. Incidents involving shooting at medical facilities, vehicles and crews: Col. Erez Katz
3. Incidents in which many uninvolved civilians were harmed: Col. Tamir Yidai
4. The use of weaponry containing phosphorous: Col. Shai Alkalai
5. Damage to infrastructure and buildings by ground forces: Col. Adam Zusman

Specific problems and mistakes identified

• Individual failures in coordination with the UN led to facilities and vehicles being unintentionally hit.
• Orders to avoid harm to uninvolved civilian infrastructure not stressed sufficiently in written plans for operation, though forces in the field did understand the limitations.
• In the case of the Al-Daia family residence in Zeitoun, IDF accepts an operational error led to mistake in identifying and targeting the building, with warnings also being issued to wrong building. Intended target was building used to store weapons next door.
• In the case of a truck carrying oxygen tanks targeted on 29 December, tanks were mistakenly identified as Grad rockets – though tanks were probably intended for rocket construction, and four of the eight killed were from Hamas.
• One soldier court-martialled for breaching rules of engagement in firing on UN vehicle.
• Use of weapons with phosphorous as active ingredient (as opposed to for smoke screens) ordered to be stopped part way through campaign to minimise civilian risk.

Main orders by the IDF chief of staff in response to inquiry findings

• Closer coordination required over movement of UN vehicles, with emphasis on precise routes and schedules. Regulations regarding safety distances from sensitive facilities to be highlighted.
• Preventing harm to medical crews to be practiced by all IDF forces in drills.
• Examination to be conducted into operation of ‘humanitarian corridor’ opened for local population.
• Importance of clear doctrine and commands on phosphorous munitions to be emphasised, and future use of phosphorous for purposes other than smokescreen to be treated as exceptional.
• Clear regulations and orders to be created with regard to issue of demolition of infrastructure and structures, as well as clear combat doctrine with definition of relevant ‘incidents and responses’ to be distributed to all combat forces.

Main rebuttals to general accusations and previously unaddressed specific cases

General accusations

• Harm to civilians was not intentional but was due to uncontrolled circumstances or operational mistakes. Many incidents occurred as result of Hamas taking cover among civilian population.
• IDF did not target UN facilities and coordinated extensively with the UN and other international organisations to protect 1,800 sensitive facilities and vehicle convoys.
• Hamas deliberately launched rockets and mortars and stored weapons close to these facilities, knowing the IDF restricted its activities in those areas.
• Strong orders were given to avoid attacking medical facilities and vehicles though they were systematically used by Hamas, including placing Hamas headquarters in Shifa Hospital. Some incidences in which medical facilities were harmed came as a result of illegitimate use.
• Destruction of civilian infrastructure was due to Hamas basing defences on residential civilian infrastructure, especially booby-trapped structures, explosive tunnels and tunnels for moving people and weapons. Considerable damage due to secondary explosions of Hamas weapons.

 

Specific cases

• Building containing Red Cross pharmaceutical storage facility in Tel Hawa hit on 15 January was next to Hamas forces attacking IDF forces and was not identified to the IDF as a Red Cross facility.
• In an incident where a mother and baby clinic was hit, the same building was used for weapons storage and the clinic was not identifiable.
• Alleged ‘UNRWA’ vehicle hit on 14 January was carrying Palestinian anti-tank squad.
• ‘Maqadme’ and ‘Rabat’ mosques were not attacked as claimed.

 

Summary of the inquiries

 

1. Incidences where UN and international facilities were fired upon: Col. Itzik Turgeman

• The IDF took numerous measures to avoid hitting facilities and vehicles affiliated with the UN, Red Cross and other international organisations:
  • Facilities marked on IDF maps in advance.
  • Clear orders stating that hitting these facilities and vehicles must be avoided.
  • Coordination between the IDF, the UN, the Red Cross and international organisations via Civil Administration situation room and Centre for Humanitarian Coordination established to allow day-to-day humanitarian aid coordination.
• Hamas and others launched rockets and mortar shells adjacent to UN and other international organisations knowing the IDF limits its operations in these areas.
• Hamas and others located headquarters, weapon storage facilities, etc. close to the UN, Red Cross and other international organisations.

Specific incidents

• Red Cross Pharmaceutical Storage facility in Tel El-Hawa: 15 January 2009
  • Terrorists located next to Red Cross pharmaceutical storage facility attacked IDF forces.
  • During exchange of fire, structure containing storage facility apparently hit.
  • IDF not provided with the location of storage facility by Red Cross in advance.
• Damage to storage facility in UNRWA headquarters compound: 15 January 2009
  • IDF deployed smokescreen to protect tank force against Hamas anti-tank crews adjacent to UNRWA HQ.
  • Fragments unintentionally hit UNRWA warehouse, causing it to catch fire.
  • IDF forces ordered to cease fire and entry of firefighting trucks coordinated with IDF.
• UNRWA school in Jabaliya (‘Fahoura’ School): 6 January 2009
  • Hamas fired mortars at IDF soldiers from within 80 metres of the school.
  • IDF soldiers responded by hitting Hamas operatives; all shells landed outside the school.
  • Five terrorists and seven civilians hit outside school, not the 42 deaths reported by Hamas.
• Alleged ‘UNRWA’ vehicle fired on in the Tel El-Hawa neighbourhood: 14 January 2009
  • Vehicle unmarked, travelling in area that international organisations had been informed was forbidden, carrying a Palestinian anti-tank squad.
  • Vehicle advanced on forces, creating fear it was a car bomb.

IDF-UN coordination

• Many problems solved in real-time but certain individual failures in coordination leading to vehicles and facilities unintentionally hit.
• One soldier court-martialled for firing on UN vehicle in breach of rules of engagement.
• No deliberate intention to hit UN vehicles or facilities found.
• IDF coordinated with the UN and others to protect more than 1,800 facilities and allow movement of 500 vehicles and convoys providing food and aid.
• Israel cooperated with UN investigation on damage to UN facilities.
• Conclusion that closer coordination of movement of UN vehicles is required, with emphasis on precise routes and schedules.

Chief of staff orders in response to findings

• Regulations regarding safety distances from sensitive facilities to be highlighted.
• Steps to improve coordination between the IDF and UN.

 

2. Incidences involving shooting at medical facilities, vehicles and crews:  Col. Erez Katz

• Medical vehicles driven in suspicious manner without prior coordination were in some cases incorrectly identified and fired on.
• Hamas systematically used medical facilities as cover:
  • Hamas placed central command centre in Shifa Hospital.
  • Hamas seized control of sections of Al-Shafa Hospital and converted Red Crescent facility in Khan Yunis into prisoner detention facility.
  • Ambulance driver claimed he was forced to extract terror operatives from fighting zone, with knowledge he could coordinate with the IDF to temporarily hold fire so that he could safely evacuate the wounded.
• Damage to medical facilities in some cases due to illegitimate use: of seven casualties reported during the incidences in question, five were from Hamas.
• Some members of medical crew supposedly ‘hit’ found to be alive and well; no evidence found for some other reported incidents.
• In the case of a building containing a mother and child clinic attacked by the IDF, Hamas used building to store weapons; clinic was not clearly identified; residents of building were given warning.
• Forces took care to avoid attacking medical vehicles and orders were strengthened during operation, making regulations stricter than those required by international law.
• IDF medical situation room coordinated 150 different requests for evacuation of bodies, wounded and trapped civilians.
• Additional claims still being investigated.

Chief of staff orders in response to findings

• Preventing harm to medical crews to be practiced by all forces in drills.
• Examination of operation of ‘humanitarian corridor’ opened for local population.

 

3. Incidences in which many uninvolved civilians were harmed: Col. Tamir Yidai

• Harm to civilians due to uncontrolled circumstances or operational mistakes. Many incidents occurred as result of Hamas taking cover among civilian population.
• IDF forces did not intentionally attack civilians and took many measures to minimise risk.
• Additional claims still being investigated.

Specific incidents:

• Attack on house of Dr Abu el Eish: 17 January 2009
  • IDF force identified suspicious figures in house, believed to be observing IDF forces in order to direct Hamas fire. Despite efforts to avoid civilian casualties, women in same house were hit.
  • Israeli security forces urged Dr Abu el Eish to leave in the days prior to incident.
• The Al-Daia family residence in Zeitoun: 6 January 2009
  • Intended target was weapons storage facility next to Al-Daia family residence.
  • Operational error led to mistake in identifying and targeting building.
  • Warning phone call received prior to attack by residents of building containing weapons storage, not Al-Daia residence.
• Truck apparently carrying oxygen tanks: 29 December 2008
  • Mistaken intelligence that truck was carrying Grad rockets.
  • Tanks likely to be used by Hamas for rocket manufacturing.
  • Strike killed four Hamas operatives and four civilians.
• Attack on house of senior Hamas operative Nazar Ri’an: 4 January 2009
  • House was storing large quantities of weapons.
  • Forces attacked after warnings including phone calls, warning shots and witnessing residents evacuating. Unknown why Ri’an and his family stayed in building.
• ‘Maqadme’ mosque in Beit Lahiya: 3 January 2009
  • Mosque not in fact attacked.
  • ‘Civilians’ allegedly killed in incident were Hamas operatives.
• ‘Rabat’ mosque in Beit Lahiya: 9 January 2009
  • No testimony of any IDF forces operating in the area. Mosque remains unharmed.

Chief of staff orders in response to findings

• Clear regulations and orders to be made on basis of conclusions of investigation.

4. Use of weaponry containing phosphorous: Col. Shai Alkalai

• IDF used two types of munitions containing white phosphorous:

1. Munitions containing phosphorous as active ingredient, not for smokescreens.

• Small number of such weapons fired in accordance with international law in open areas for marking and range-finding, and in one incident to uncover tunnels.
• To reduce risk to civilians, on 7 January, IDF forces were directed to cease use of such weapons, and were used subsequently on only two occasions.

2. Non-incendiary munitions containing pieces of felt dipped in phosphorous for smokescreens.

• IDF use in line with international law, balancing operational and humanitarian considerations.

Chief of staff orders in response to findings

• Importance of clear doctrine and commands on phosphorous munitions emphasised.
• Use of phosphorous for purposes other than smokescreen to be treated as exceptional.

5.  Damage to infrastructure and buildings by ground forces: Col. Adam Zusman

• The investigations did not identify any instances of intentional harm done to civilian infrastructure with the exception of a single incident, immediately halted by the relevant brigade commander, and dealt with using disciplinary measures.
• Orders and directions were to minimise damage caused to property not used by terrorists.
• However, investigation concluded this issue was not stressed sufficiently in written plans for the operation. Nevertheless, forces in field understood in which circumstances structures or infrastructure could be demolished as well as limitations relating to demolitions.
• Hamas based defences mostly on residential civilian infrastructure, and specifically booby-trapped structures, explosive tunnels and tunnels intended for moving people and weapons.
• Forces demolished structures that posed a threat, including
  • houses and other structures used by enemy for terrorist activity.
  • structures that prevented forces from moving from one area to another (given that many roads were booby-trapped).
  • structures used to protect Israeli soldiers.
  • agricultural elements used as cover for enemy tunnels and infrastructure.
  • infrastructure by security fence used for operations against IDF or digging tunnels.
• Demolition of booby-trapped structures prevented their detonation with IDF forces inside.
• Authorisation for demolishing houses made only by high-ranking officers, after it was determined they were vacant.
• As far as investigation could determine, no uninvolved civilians harmed during demolition.
• Significant damage caused due to secondary explosions of terrorist explosives or weapons.

Chief of staff orders in response to findings

• Acceptance of recommendation to create clear regulations and orders with regard to issue of demolition of infrastructure and structures, as well as a clear combat doctrine.
• Acceptance of recommendation that combat doctrine should include definition of relevant ‘incidents and responses’ to be distributed among all combat forces.
• Acceptance of recommendation to create clear procedure of documentation and reporting for such operations.