BICOM

Operation “Pillar of Defence” has entered its sixth day. At the time of writing, more than 600 missiles and rockets have been fired into Israel, a record in a single day. A dozen of them were fired at Israel’s largest city, Tel Aviv, and its capital, Jerusalem. Over 5.5 million men, women and children (about 70% of Israel’s entire population) are now under the direct threat of attack.

Israel, on its part, has targeted Hamas bases, headquarters, Government buildings and operatives on a daily (and mostly nightly) basis, reaching a record of 1350 aerial strikes.

The casualties rise every day, 3 Israelis killed and more than 30 injured and 100 Palestinians deaths, a large number of who are reported to have been members of Hamas, the strikes continue, the terror continues, both economies are stalling and both leaderships are analysing their next steps.

As the chances of reaching a mutually satisfactory ceasefire that could put an end to this cycle of violence hangs in the balance, now is a good time to analyse the situation on both sides.

Israel

According to the Israeli Government’s pre-stated principles, “Operation Pillar of Defence” is aimed at striking a heavy blow to Hamas’ military infrastructure in order to severely limit its launching capabilities (especially of long range missiles) and to create a new set of ground rules between Israel and the Gaza Strip based on a substantive deterrence. As of now, Israel can claim it has succeeded in carrying out the most intensive attack against Hamas in four years, eliminating an extensive portion of its military command network; targeting their most important operational bases and launch sites; crippling their long range rocket capabilities by destroying many of their Iranian made Fajr 5 missiles and the devastation of their special UAV programme that it has been working on for years.

So far, Israel has maintained its legitimacy among the international community by relying on their basic right to self-defence, and has even avoided the calling of a Special Session of the Security Council. This has allowed its military to continue their daily aerial strikes of specified targets and to prepare for a potential wide-scale ground operation.

Israel’s biggest strategic success is the use of the new civil defence system. The Iron Dome has successfully thwarted over 65% of the missiles launched at Israel and, even more importantly, all the missiles that have been targeted towards the centre of the country. It is hard to imagine what the situation on the ground, and what the possible chain of events politically and operationally would have been without the interception of these missiles. Israel’s ability to control the expansion of its military actions, and to allow more time for a negotiated ceasefire, is extremely important and has been granted by this Israeli-made defence system.

Hamas

Six days of intense fighting has positioned Hamas, especially in the Arab world, as a strong military and political entity. It has maintained its ability to conduct what they perceive to be a military retaliation for almost a week – despite hundreds of aerial strikes against their commanders, launch sites, bases and headquarters. Notwithstanding, it even reached new levels of military capabilities by firing more missiles and rockets in six days than they fired in over 3 weeks during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. Its success in launching missiles at Israel’s major cities, both in the South and especially in the centre have only been matched by Saddam Hussein’s attack on Tel Aviv in the early 1990s and the Egyptian and Jordanian attacks during the 1948 war. As a terror organisation, it is successfully affecting over 70% of Israel’s population on a daily basis, disrupting the everyday lives of millions and forcing them to stay close to, or in, bomb shelters.

It appears that Hamas is capable of rearming itself, even after heavy fire, through its effective network of weapons suppliers. And most importantly, Hamas has managed to politically position itself as a defiant entity governing the Gaza Strip; its 2007 military coup having been considered by the international community as illegitimate. Hamas has hosted more international leaders in six days than it has in the previous six years, all acknowledging their legitimate rule over Gaza. The Egyptian Prime Minister, the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Secretary General of the Arab League, the Tunisian Foreign Minister and even the Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister (an official representative of Hamas’ main rival amongst the Palestinians) are among those who visited, or are scheduled to visit, Gaza. Hamas is even politically strong enough to decline Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s pressure to cease the rocket attacks on Israel, and is reported to have hardened its conditions for a ceasefire – vowing to keep on fighting until they are met.

Having said all of this, it is clear why the fighting goes on and why it reaches a strategically important junction. Both sides want to win and, more importantly, neither side wants to come across as being seen as the losing party. Both sides are paying a price during the fighting, but neither of them is calling for an end to the violence. This junction can be seen as a slippery, and potentially very dangerous, slope. If a ceasefire cannot be reached in the next 48-72 hours, one which would enable both parties to fulfil their military and political needs, a serious escalation involving a massive Israeli military raid into the Gaza Strip is inevitable. While it seems that Israeli cabinet ministers do not consider this to be a preferable next step, the continuing of rocket firing towards Israel will leave them with no other choice than to move forward with a ground operation. While Hamas is well aware of the possible consequences of an Israeli military raid into Gaza, possibly even threatening its actual survival as an entity ruling Gaza, it still does not want to be the side that said “enough.” But with the continuation of the fighting it is bringing a raid on itself.

With these situations in the past, both sides needed a credible intermediary to help bring an end to the cycle of violence. While it should be noted that the Egyptian President is so far playing a crucial rule, with Israeli agreement, in his attempt to create a ceasefire, using possible leverage on Hamas, who expect him to fight its diplomatic war against Israel and its Western allies; Israel is now facing a new situation in which the triangle of countries working on the ceasefire is comprised of Governments which are at odds with the Israeli Government- Turkey, Qatar and Egypt. This, of course, affects the very ability of the Israeli Government to feel represented in the negotiations and to comprehend their outcome. Israel is now counting on third parties, such as the US and European actors to fight its battle with this triangle. Past experience is not very promising.

If all of these obstacles cannot be solved in the coming days, the road to a severe deterioration of the situation is already paved. Given that the gaps in the demands on both sides can only be bridged through leaders who will put aside their political concerns, their own “streets” and public opinions for the sake of the better solution, there is little room for optimism. But as we say in the Middle East – it’s better to be a “realistic optimistic” than a “dreadful pessimistic” – and so a state of war is probably the best state in which to implement this old phrase.

A version of this article was first published on the Middle Easterners blog of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and is reproduced with permission of the author.