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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Continued Iranian nuclear defiance and political change in Israel and the United States

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Key Points

  • UN officials have declared for the first time that the amount of low-enriched uranium in Iranian hands – more than a ton – is sufficient, with added purification, to produce a nuclear weapon.[i]  IAEA inspectors have discovered an additional 460 pounds, which amounts to a third more than prior Iranian disclosures. 
  • President Obama will be heavily criticised both at home and abroad if Iran is considered to perceive talks as merely a means of buying more time for itself, in the same way that it has done since its nuclear programme was uncovered six years ago and throughout subsequent EU-3 negotiations.
  • If he successfully forms a new coalition, Likud leader Netanyahu will then need to tread a fine line to both maintain a stable government and cooperate closely with the Obama administration to advance the peace process and promote regional stability.

Introduction

Two new reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency reveal that Iran has enriched enough uranium to produce a nuclear weapon; add to fears about secret Syrian efforts to construct a nuclear reactor; and warn that both regimes continue to obstruct efforts to inspect known or suspected nuclear facilities.[ii]  They come in the wake of a separate Israeli military intelligence assessment, which defines Iran as a “threat to Israel’s existence.”[iii]  The Iranian nuclear programme has been perceived in Israel as a serious threat for some years, but the defence establishment’s characterisation marks new language in official military doctrine, with implications for IDF investment, planning and preparations in 2009.

The political impact of these reports is hard to measure, but they are likely to bring nuclear proliferation in the Middle East back into sharp focus, given the already high tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  As Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak said recently, “[w]ithout a doubt, nuclear weapons in Iran are a central threat to world order; it creates the possibility of a massive nuclear arming of the entire Middle East.”[iv]  The timing of the reports could affect regional policy formulation by the new US administration and the impending Israeli government, which Benjamin Netanyahu was formally requested to establish last Friday.  This document sets out the latest developments and offers some observations as to how policy could take shape in Washington and Jerusalem in the months ahead.

Mixed signals, clear concerns: Iran’s ongoing non-cooperation

Despite disagreements about the precise minimum requirements for manufacturing an atomic bomb, UN officials have declared for the first time that the amount of low-enriched uranium in Iranian hands – more than a ton – is sufficient, with added purification, to produce a nuclear weapon.[v]  IAEA inspectors have discovered an additional 460 pounds, which amounts to a third more than prior Iranian disclosures.  The latest IAEA report also contains evidence of new centrifuge installations and the manufacture of uranium fuel rods for the Arak heavy water reactor.

The Iranian uranium enrichment programme has reportedly slowed down, but this is consistent with Iran’s sophisticated stop-start tactic in response to international pressure and developments.  Overall capacity has risen even since the last report in November 2008.[vi]  In IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei’s view, the current slowdown may be a political calculation by Tehran to induce a conciliatory signal from the US, which has explicitly said that it is ready to break with past American policy and open direct talks with Iran.  It is also reported that western intelligence agencies are successfully managing to interrupt Iran’s nuclear efforts.  The Daily Telegraph reported last week that, according to an unnamed former CIA officer and Reva Bhalla, a senior analyst with the US intelligence firm Stratfor, the Israeli Mossad is actively sabotaging them.[vii]  But the existence and effectiveness of these kinds of operations remain secret, and the international community remains very perturbed by the overall picture.

This is mostly due to the continued absence of cooperation by the Iranian regime with investigations.  Although Iran tries to create the appearance of being open and transparent, ElBaradei commented last week, “Iran right now is not providing any access or any clarification with regard to…the whole possible military dimension.”[viii]  Suspicions continue about clandestine activities and Iran has refused to disclose information about centrifuge manufacture and installation.  Finally, Iran is clearly making efforts to further obstruct inspectors’ efforts while simultaneously trying to eliminate its soft targets, for instance by erecting a roof over a “heavy water” nuclear reactor being built near the town of Arak and blocking ground inspections.  This is preventing sight of any activity at the facility, consistent with Iran’s defensive strategy.

Focusing policy in Washington

The IAEA’s diminishing ability to provide a comprehensive assessment of the advancing Iranian nuclear programme is liable to concentrate pressure on the Obama administration to act swiftly and move beyond general principles to a firm set of policies vis-à-vis Iran.  Obama spoke in his inaugural address about an outstretched US hand to America’s enemies if they “unclenched their fist”, but Obama’s diplomatic approach for specifically countering Iran’s nuclear programme still needs clarification.  He stated in his press conference on 9 February that “we will be looking for openings … that will allow us to move our policy in a new direction.  There’s been a lot of mistrust built up over the years, so it’s not going to happen overnight.”[ix]  But the issue of timing is crucial, as the latest information provided by the IAEA yet again underscores, and Washington will not be able to overlook developments taking place at the nuclear facilities themselves.  The US administration is understandably taking steps to manage expectations on key domestic and foreign policy issues after the euphoria of the election campaign, but at what stage and how will it act to tackle mounting concerns?

The US has indicated that it will be tough if Iran fails to comply with UN and IAEA demands, and the administration is sensitive to the need to open a “constructive dialogue” that yields results, foremost among them preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  But Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last week that Tehran is waiting for “significant changes” from Washington before relations between the two countries will improve.  The message Iran seemed to be conveying to the West when it launched its ‘Omid’ (‘Hope’) communications satellite into space on 2 February was that it cannot be coerced and that negotiations must reflect Iran’s regional rise.  Some express hope that if Mohammed Khatami, Iran’s leading reformist, is elected president in this summer’s elections, this could open the door to a new era in US-Iran relations,[x] but Iran’s nuclear programme is a symbol of national pride; there are no signs that it would simply be abandoned.  Obama will be heavily criticised both at home and abroad if Iran is considered to perceive talks as merely a means of buying more time for itself, in the same way that it has done since its nuclear programme was uncovered six years ago and throughout subsequent EU-3 negotiations.[xi]

New Israeli leadership, unambiguous priority

The trajectory of Iran’s progress towards manufacturing nuclear weapons and the ineffectiveness of international efforts thus far to prevent it has led Israel to officially define the Iranian regime as an ‘existential threat’.  Owing to Iran’s nuclear advances, as well as its operational and financial support for Hezbollah, Hamas and other militant groups, IDF Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi unequivocally referred to Iran as “the number one threat the IDF is now preparing for.”[xii]  In particular, the IDF is concentrating investment in its strategic aerial capabilities, especially the development of unmanned aircraft, and intelligence and communications infrastructure.[xiii]  Preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons will be the new government’s top foreign policy priority from its inception.[xiv]  Indeed, public awareness of the gravity and urgency of these issues is a source of domestic pressure for the new government to be set up as quickly as possible, as well as thinking about how the new coalition ought to be composed.

Increasingly, commentators are making the case for Likud party chair Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been formally tasked with forming the new cabinet, to establish a broad government with Tzipi Livni’s Kadima that will be able to deal with these pressing security challenges.[xv]  There is concern that a narrow right-wing government, comprised of the Likud, Yisrael Beitenu and the national religious parties, would lack the kudos and diplomatic experience to handle a major international crisis or showdown with Iran.  In any case, Netanyahu would prefer to lead a national unity government; he knows this offers the best chance of creating a durable return to the premiership, after his first term was cut short in the 1990s.

If he successfully forms a new coalition, Netanyahu will then need to tread a fine line to both maintain a stable government and cooperate closely with the Obama administration to advance the peace process and promote regional stability.  But the divided Palestinian leadership makes it virtually impossible to implement a deal at present.  As such, Netanyahu could attempt to reach a set of understandings with Obama during his early days in government.  One possible scenario may feature Netanyahu hoping to obtain US support for his “economic peace” agenda with the Palestinian Authority and international partners, which would take some time to implement, while the US attempts to open diplomatic channels with Iran to deal with the nuclear crisis.  Israel, meanwhile, could assist the US by keeping its reservations discreet about any talks which take place.

Netanyahu’s plans for Palestinian institution-building need to be spelled out in greater detail, but there is also the possibility that Netanyahu will be inclined towards some kind of concession to the Palestinians which can be implemented in sequence with an American achievement on the Iran issue.  Obama is seen to be likely to support an initiative which his Middle East team could assist with to bolster moderate Palestinians in the West Bank and at least ripen the ground for the kind of peace agreement which did not materialise on his predecessor George W. Bush’s watch.

Broader ramifications: the threat of nuclear proliferation

The stakes of Iran’s ongoing defiance are high and the future of the region hangs in a precarious balance as a result.  The main danger is a huge nuclear arming of the entire Middle East.  It is no coincidence that Syria is also refusing to cooperate with IAEA inspections of suspected sites used for constructing nuclear facilities.  Samples from the Al-Kibar site, which Israeli jets allegedly targeted in 2007, have revealed new traces of processed uranium.[xvi]

The intermediate risk is that the non-cooperation of Tehran and Damascus will be reflected across the region.  Since February 2006, at least 13 countries in the Middle East and North Africa countries have expressed aspirations to develop civilian nuclear programmes, including Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia.[xvii]  States may take greater strides to obscure their own activities and send mixed signals to their neighbours and the wider world, in order to create deterrence on the basis of bluff as much as transparent military power, with all the propensity for miscalculation that brings.

Conclusion

The expanding Iranian nuclear programme has led Israel into a critical strategic moment in its history, with which its new prime minister will have to contend upon taking office.  But the Iranian threat to regional stability and world order, part and parcel of the risk of nuclear proliferation, has once again been highlighted by the international nuclear watchdog, and the time available for the US to formulate its new foreign policy is shortening as the urgency for action mounts.  Natural political space appears to be opening up for close policy coordination between Israel and the US in order to promote the national interests of both countries, continuing the broader aim of bolstering moderate forces in the Arab world while undermining the radical regime in Tehran and the terror organisations that it supports.


[i] William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought’, The New York Times, 19 February 2009; Julian Borger, ‘Iran has enriched enough uranium to make bomb, IAEA says’, The Guardian, 19 February 2009.

[ii] Links to the reports can be found through the Institute for Science and International Security here and here.

[iii] Alex Fishman, ‘Defense establishment: Iran No.1 threat to Israel’, YNet News, 16 February 2009.

[iv] ‘Nuclear weapons in Iran are a central threat’, Israel Defense Forces, 16 February 2009.

[v] William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought’, The New York Times, 19 February 2009; Julian Borger, ‘Iran has enriched enough uranium to make bomb, IAEA says’, The Guardian, 19 February 2009.

[vi] Total current estimates range from 1,600 pounds to 2,227 pounds of uranium and 3,936 to 5,600 centrifuges, with a declared target of 9,000. Julian Borger, ‘Iran refusing to co-operate with nuclear inspectors, says UN’, The Guardian, 19 February 2009; ‘Iran already enriched enough uranium to make atomic bomb’, The Jerusalem Post, 20 February 2009.

[vii]  Philip Sherwell, ‘Israel launches covert war against Iran’, Daily Telegraph, 16 February 2009; ‘Report: Israel secretly sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program’, YNet News, 17 February 2009.

[viii] Julian Borger, op. cit.

[ix] The White House, ‘Transcript: Obama Press Conference’, CBS News, 9 February 2009.

[x] See, for instance, Ian Black, ‘Reformist to stand against Ahmadinejad in Iran election’, The Guardian, 9 February 2009.

[xi] See BICOM Analysis, 7 July 2008.

[xii] Alex Fishman, ‘Defense establishment: Iran No.1 threat to Israel’, Haaretz, 16 February 2009.

[xiii] ibid.

[xiv] Oded Eran, ‘The Elections in Israel: Diplomatic Implications’, The Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 93, 12 February 2009.

[xv] Yehuda Ben-Meir, ‘Only a unity government’, Haaretz, 20 February 2009.

[xvi] ‘IAEA: New uranium traces found at suspected Syria nuclear site’, Associated Press, 19 February 2009.

[xvii] ‘In the Shadow of Iran’, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 20 May 2008; Emily Landau, ‘New Nuclear Programs in the Middle East: What do they mean?’, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 11 December 2006.