BICOM

Key points

• Operation Cast Lead has introduced a number of new factors which may increase the chances for a successful conclusion to the current Palestinian unity talks in Cairo: First, a lack of rapprochement will seriously hamper reconstruction efforts in Gaza. In addition, the current unity talks in Cairo are taking place as a result of pressure on the Palestinians by the moderate Arab states, whose support and engagement is essential to the Palestinians. 
• But while Hamas sees the need to give the impression of wanting the formation of a unity government with Fatah, the movement is nowhere near accepting the minimal position which would enable involvement in the peace process. Rather, Hamas hopes to see the foundation of such a government as a result of Fatah (and Egypt’s) agreeing to waive any requirement of this type regarding Hamas. 
• Hamas officials have made clear that their agreement to attend the Cairo talks does not in any way imply that the movement is considering altering its basic rejection of the Quartet conditions for its acceptance into the political process.  According to these conditions, Hamas must renounce terrorism, accept Israel’s right to exist and commit to pre-existing agreements between the PLO and Israel, in order to become a legitimate player in the diplomatic process.
• Since this is the case, the most likely prognosis is that despite the understanding on all sides of the dire necessity for the foundation of a unity government, it will prove impossible to reach agreement on the terms for the actual founding of such a government. Should Fatah choose, however, to allow the formation of a unity government without insisting that Hamas sign on to the Quartet requirements – the resulting government is unlikely to be able to play a constructive role in advancing negotiations with Israel.

Introduction

Last week, representatives of the nationalist Fatah and Islamist Hamas movements and ten other Palestinian factions began negotiations in Cairo, in an attempt to bridge the deep rift that has opened up in the Palestinian national movement, and to form a national unity government for the Palestinian Authority. The intention is to reach agreement on the foundation of a unity government by 20 March.[i] This document will focus on the background to and major issues in the negotiations, and will seek to assess the chances for a renewed Palestinian national unity coalition, and the implications of the creation of such a coalition on chances for progress and a successful outcome in talks between the PA and Israel.

Why are renewed efforts at rapprochement taking place?

Fatah and Hamas have been engaged in a power struggle since the Hamas victory in Palestinian elections in January 2006. This struggle turned violent in July 2007, when Hamas carried out a coup in the Gaza Strip, expelling Fatah and forming a Hamas-led regime in the Strip.

Since July 2007, a number of unsuccessful attempts have been made at rapprochement between the sides.  In June 2008, Yemen sponsored talks between the two sides, which rapidly broke down. A more serious attempt at re-building Palestinian unity came in November last year, when Egypt attempted to sponsor talks. Hamas pulled out of the planned negotiations, however, on the grounds that members of the movement are still incarcerated by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

At that time, some analysts considered that Hamas had little incentive for rapprochement: the movement maintained exclusive control in Gaza – giving it executive authority for the first time since its foundation, control of Gaza allowed it to maintain that its model of ‘resistance’ had produced more results than had Fatah’s model of negotiations, and control of the Strip was in the strategic interest of Iran, with which Hamas maintains a deepening alliance.

All these factors may still apply, but in other ways, the situation has changed significantly since November. Operation Cast Lead has introduced a number of new factors which may increase the chances for a successful conclusion to the current unity talks: most importantly, a lack of rapprochement will seriously hamper reconstruction efforts in Gaza.  Palestinian economists have indicated that between $1.5-2 billion is needed in order to rebuild the Strip. Donors have already raised the issue of who will receive monies pledged. While unity talks are taking place as a result of a certain impatience with both Fatah and Hamas on the part of moderate Arab states, with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia want to see the rift in Palestinian politics repaired, the moderate Arab leadership is not willing to see Hamas take advantage of the donations.

Hamas faces the possibility of declining legitimacy among the Palestinian public al well, if the perception arises that reconstruction of housing and institutions is not taking place because of the movement’s refusal to enter a unity government. Delays in transfers of aid have already been reported because of Palestinian internecine bickering. This is also true of the issue of the Gaza crossings. Again, failure to reconcile is likely to mean delays in opening the crossings and complications in future arrangements of goods transfer into and out of Gaza. It is therefore in the interests of both Hamas and Fatah to make the maximum effort at achieving national unity – and to see the rival movement bear the blame if the talks fail.

In addition, Palestinian analysts suggest that the formation of a right-wing coalition in Israel following elections increases the sense among the Palestinians of the need to close ranks – increasing the chances of a successful outcome to the talks.   

What issues will be discussed at the talks?

A number of complex issues must be resolved in order to make a renewed Palestinian unity government possible. These include restructuring and reform of the Palestinian security services, discussing the issue of Hamas and the PLO, agreeing on the structure of a new interim government, and agreeing on a timetable for renewed presidential and legislative elections in the PA.[ii]

It is by no means certain that the sides will reach agreement on all or any of these issues, as each is complex and fraught. On the issue of the security services – Hamas has since 2006 created its own independent security forces in Gaza, built around the Interior Ministry. The ministry serves as a crucial base from which Hamas built its independent security capacity since its 2006 election victory. A large measure of bitterness remains between these forces and Fatah, many of whose militants were killed in combat with Hamas in 2007.

On the issue of Hamas entering the PLO, the Islamist movement is known to consider that it deserves a prominent and powerful role in Palestinian institutions, which have been dominated by Fatah since 1968. As one Palestinian political analyst expressed the basic dilemma “Hamas wants to dominate the Palestinian political system. Fatah also wants to dominate the Palestinian political system. This is the enigma between the two parties.”[iii] The rivalry for dominance between the two movements, combined with Hamas’s great ambitions and sense of optimism, mean that reaching agreement on arrangements for the movement’s role in the PLO will not be easy.

The key factor: Hamas refusal to compromise on core objectives 

Hamas officials have made clear that their agreement to attend the Cairo talks does not in any way imply that the movement is considering altering its basic rejection of the Quartet conditions for its acceptance into the political process. According to these conditions, Hamas must renounce terrorism, accept Israel’s right to exist and commit to pre-existing agreements between the PLO and Israel, in order to become a legitimate player in the diplomatic process.

But as a Hamas legislator in Gaza made clear last week: “If anyone thinks that Hamas is going to give up its principles and ideology in return for ministerial posts or international aid, they are mistaken.”[iv]As Ayman Taha, a Hamas official in Gaza confirmed, “We reject any pre-conditions in the formation of the unity government. Hamas will never accept a unity government that recognises Israel.”[v] The Quartet Middle East envoy Tony Blair stressed in a recent interview that Hamas remains committed to a path of violence, making it impossible for the movement to enter the peace process unless it undergoes a radical change in its outlook.[vi]

The evidence suggests that while Hamas sees the necessity of forming a unity government with Fatah, the movement is nowhere near accepting the minimal position which would enable involvement in the peace process. Rather, Hamas hopes to see the foundation of such a government, as a result of Fatah’s agreeing to waive any requirement of this type regarding Hamas. Such an outcome is unlikely.

Since this is the case, the most likely prognosis is that despite the understanding on all sides of the dire necessity for the foundation of a unity government, it will prove impossible to reach agreement on the terms for the actual founding of such a government. The wide gap in positions between the two sides, and the animosity that exists between the two movements is likely to prevent rapprochement at this stage. As Abdelaziz Shadi, a political analyst at Cairo University put it, “Given the level of animosity between the current leaders of the two movements, I don’t see much hope for reconciliation in the short-term future…And even if they achieve a measure of agreement, the rivalry will flare up again as soon as there is another crisis with Israel.”[vii]

However, Fatah’s attitude toward Hamas is complex. There are many within Fatah who do see Hamas as a legitimate faction and would like to find a way toward unity. The mood toward Hamas within Fatah is by no means uniformly combative. There are also elements within this deeply torn movement whose outlook on the conflict does not greatly differ from that of Hamas. The possibility exists, therefore, that a unity government will be created, without Hamas unambiguously signing up to the Quartet conditions.

If a unity government were to be formed on the basis of permitting Hamas to maintain its rejectionist position, the consequences would be grave on a number of levels.

Hamas would be able to credibly present this as a victory for its strategy of resistance – the movement would claim that it had brought Fatah to accept its position, while making no compromise of its own. This would have negative effects on any hopes for a revival of the peace process. It is difficult to see how a Palestinian government containing a senior partner committed to Israel’s destruction could manage to move toward the compromises necessary for a peaceful outcome to the conflict. Such a government would likely usher in a period of stalemate in the negotiations.

Such a government would also complicate Palestinian relations with potential western aid donors. The US has pledged $900 million to the reconstruction of Gaza and more has been pledged by the EU. But would the US, or European countries, be willing to accept as a full partner a government not clearly committed to international norms?

Conclusion

The split between Hamas and Fatah is a factor of a larger contest for power taking place across the region. Hamas has emerged as the representative of the pro-Iranian ‘resistance’ bloc among the Palestinians. Fatah, meanwhile, is aligned with the pro-western camp, though this movement is deeply split and possesses a less clear sense of its direction. While there is a clear practical need for Palestinian rapprochement, in order to facilitate aid to rebuild Gaza, the dynamic of this clash may prevent the successful conclusion of the current talks in Cairo. Hamas does not see itself as defeated, it is in no danger of losing control on the ground in Gaza and therefore sees no reason to surrender cardinal aspects of its programme in order to enter a unity government. The most likely outcome of the Cairo talks is therefore failure. In the event that they succeed in forming a PA unity government, this is likely to be on terms favourable to Hamas, which will then severely complicate the ability of such a government to take part in negotiations and to effectively act as the Palestinians’ representative on the international stage. 

 

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[i] “Abbas: Unity depends on Hamas recognizing Israel,” Haaretz, 28 February 2009 http://www.haaretz.com

[ii] “Feuding Palestinians meet for unity talks,” Agence France Presse, 26 February 2009 http://news.yahoo.com

[iii] Brenda Gazzar, “Hamas, Fatah to begin talks in Cairo,” Jerusalem Post, 25 February 2009 http://www.jpost.com

[iv] Khaled Abu Toameh, “In a Palestinian unity government, Hamas wins,” Jerusalem Post, 23 February 2009, http://www.jpost.com

[v] “Abbas, Hamas signal first dispute over unity talks,” Reuters, 28 February 2009. http://ca.reuters.com

[vi]  Tony Blair in Channel 4 news interview, 1 March 2009. 

[vii] “Fatah, Hamas on uphill road to reconciliation,” Beirut Daily Star, 28 February 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb