BICOM

Key Points

• Although his release remains in doubt, it has been speculated that Marwan Barghouti may be among the Palestinian prisoners freed by Israel as part of an agreement to secure the return of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.
• Adopting violence against Israel in 2000, this dominant leader of the ‘young guard’ of Fatah is a fierce critic of the corruption of the ‘old guard’, and of the failures of the Oslo peace process.
• Prioritising unity between rival Palestinian factions above negotiations with Israel, during his prison term Barghouti has been able to position himself at the heart of Palestinian politics, with a strong chance of being elected president.
• However, it is far from clear how he would bring about Palestinian reunification, what the impact of his release would be for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and how he might address the peace process with Israel. The question of whether or not to free Barghouti as part of the deal poses acute dilemmas for the Israeli public and decision makers.

Introduction

Marwan Barghouti, 50, is a leader of the ‘young guard’ of Fatah.  He is currently serving five concurrent life sentences and an additional 40 years in an Israeli prison for his involvement in suicide attacks on Israeli civilians in the Second Intifada.  There are reports that he may be included in a list of Palestinian prisoners released as part of an agreement to secure the return of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who has been held by Hamas in Gaza since June 2006.  Despite raised expectations of a deal, it remains far from assured that Barghouti will be freed.[i]  Whilst some Israelis see Barghouti as an arch-terrorist, whose release would unleash another reign of terror,[ii] there are those who cast him in the role of a Palestinian Nelson Mandela, hoping he can lead the Palestinian people to peaceful co-existence with Israel.[iii]  This analysis looks at Barghouti’s political rise, and how his possible release might impact on internal Palestinian affairs and the peace process with Israel.

Barghouti’s political rise

Marwan Barghouti became active in Fatah, the dominant faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in his teens.  By 1976, he had been arrested and jailed by Israel for membership in a terrorist group.  On his release, he enrolled for studies at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah, becoming head of the Fatah students’ faction and a vocal opponent of Israeli occupation.

Barghouti’s generation of young activists, born in the late 1950s and early 1960s, formed the core of Fatah’s presence on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza.  Known as the ‘Tanzim’, or ‘organisation’, they were the driving force behind the outbreak of the first Intifada in late 1987.  Their frustration was directed at Israel, but also at the increasingly distant and disconnected external Palestinian leadership.  Based in Tunis, following their expulsion from Jordan, the external leaders claimed to represent Palestinian interests, but did not share the burden of life in the territories.

Elected to the influential Fatah Revolutionary Council in 1989, Barghouti cemented his leadership within his own generation, and his role as protégé of the ‘old guard’.  From 1994, in the context of the new Oslo peace process, the Tanzim became Yasser Arafat’s chosen vehicle to control militant opposition.  Barghouti was at the forefront of the brutal repression of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other factions whose campaign of suicide bombing against Israeli civilians undermined the fragile diplomatic process.  Unlike his ‘young guard’ contemporaries, he rose into the higher reaches of formal power, and became Secretary-General of Fatah in the West Bank.

In subsequent years, however, Barghouti became increasingly disenchanted with the ‘old guard’ leadership, which sought to prevent the emergence of young blood in Fatah.  He complained of their corruption, their disregard for good governance and rule of law, and concluded that they were failing to deliver independence for the Palestinians.  Although he was careful to avoid direct confrontation, it was clear that his criticism was aimed directly at Arafat.

The outbreak of the Second Intifada in late 2000 placed even greater strains on the complex relationship between old and young leaderships.  Deeply disenchanted with the Oslo process, and the unwillingness of the ‘old guard’ to reject it as a failed vehicle for Palestinian national aspirations, Barghouti advocated armed opposition to Israel.  As head of the Tanzim forces, and the more militant al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Barghouti had the means to launch a ferocious attack on Israeli civilians.  ‘We tried seven years of intifada without negotiations, then seven years of negotiations without intifada.  Perhaps it is time to try both simultaneously,’ he is reported to have remarked.[iv]  To the dismay of the ‘old guard’, he also formed alliances with Islamist forces, arguing that the need for national unity was far greater than the differences between the factions.  To his Israeli interlocutors, he argued that he was fighting the occupation, not the principle of Israel’s right to exist. ‘I am not a terrorist, but neither am I a pacifist,’ he declared,  ‘I am simply a regular guy from the Palestinian street advocating only what every other oppressed person has advocated – the right to help myself in the absence of help from anywhere else.’[v]

Arrested by Israel in 2002, Barghouti was convicted by the Tel Aviv District Court on five counts of murder for orchestrating terror attacks, including an attack on the Tel Aviv Seafood Restaurant which killed three diners.[vi]  In jail, he has become the most high profile Palestinian prisoner.  In August 2009, at Fatah’s Sixth General Conference – its first in twenty years – he was promoted to the Central Committee, the faction’s highest decision-making body.  In recent years he has reinforced his credentials as a ‘leader-in-waiting’ with broad national appeal.  He played an instrumental role in brokering the 2006 Prisoners’ Document[vii] – a reconciliation formula agreed by leaders from various factions currently in Israeli jails – and the 2007 Mecca Agreement,[viii]  which produced a short-lived unity government between Fatah and Hamas in early 2007.  The unity government collapsed when Hamas violently consolidated its control of Gaza in June of that year.

Last week, Barghouti declared that he will be ready to submit his candidacy for Palestinian president once unity has been restored.[ix]  If not freed as part of the Shalit deal, he may run a campaign from behind bars, though ongoing political crisis has put the timing of presidential and Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in question.

Barghouti and Palestinian affairs

The release of Barghouti, or even a presidential bid from behind bars, could significantly alter Palestinian power dynamics.  He is considered to be the leading candidate to succeed Mahmoud Abbas as head of Fatah, and perhaps as Palestinian president.  From jail Barghouti has not been tarred by the negative developments in internal Palestinian or Israeli-Palestinian politics. Indeed his credibility on the Palestinian street has been boosted through being in an Israeli cell.  Abbas says he is not interested in standing for re-election, and Barghouti represents the key challenge within Fatah to the ‘old guard’ leadership.

How Fatah would cope with transition remains to be seen. It has been speculated that Barghouti’s political re-entry could aggravate tensions within Fatah.[x]  There are other ambitious ‘young guard’ figures; former Palestinian Authority (PA) security commanders Jibril Rajoub and Mohammed Dahlan are the most prominent.[xi]  They have support within the Fatah faction, but do not enjoy Barghouti’s widespread national popularity.  Dahlan is considered a favourite of Abbas, but is perceived by many Palestinians to be partially responsible for Gaza’s loss to Hamas.

Beyond Fatah, Barghouti is frequently described as the key to national unity between Fatah and Hamas.  Reports also point to his close ties with the Hamas leadership, both in Gaza and Damascus.[xii] In recent interviews, he has singled out this goal as the most important challenge facing the Palestinian leadership.  Opinion polls show that national unity is the most important issue to Palestinian voters. Being perceived as a unity candidate is therefore a powerful political card for Barghouti.

But inside Hamas there are competing underlying interests with regard to Barghouti which are pulling it in different directions.  Hamas itself is not monolithic, with more pragmatic and more hard-line elements. On the one hand, the movement seeks to convey its commitment to reconciliation and the broad Palestinian national interest.  Hence, publicly, its spokesman stress the movement’s commitment to free prominent prisoners affiliated with rival factions, specifically, Barghouti, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader, Ahmed Sa’adat.  On the other hand, Hamas’s position could be threatened by Fatah’s resurgence under Barghouti’s leadership.

By putting national unity above negotiations with Israel, Barghouti has managed to position himself at the heart of Palestinian politics, and as a leadership contender.  He especially wants to reach out to non-PLO Islamist movements of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  But would Hamas be more willing to be pragmatic on Palestinian unity, elections, and the peace process with Israel if Barghouti were released? Many questions remain about how Barghouti could secure Palestinian unification and tackle the compromises required for advancing a peace agreement with Israel.

 

Barghouti and the peace process

Barghouti’s prospective leadership bid comes amid deadlock in diplomatic talks.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced a new 10 month moratorium on Israeli settlement construction but, under considerable domestic pressure, Abbas continues to refuse to resume bilateral negotiations with Israel.  For Barghouti, the deadlock is consistent with his long-held scepticism about the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.[xiii]

If Abbas departs and Barghouti takes over, Israel could be facing a very different Palestinian leadership, and one far harder to read than the present PA.  Barghouti has recently expressed support for popular ‘resistance’ alongside negotiations in order to realise Palestinian national aspirations of independence.  In Palestinian parlance, the notion of ‘resistance’ is all-encompassing. It can be interpreted as the kind of suicide attacks Barghouti once orchestrated or as non-violent demonstration against occupation.[xiv]  Barghouti benefits from the ambiguity of his message.  It suggests a more hard-line political world-view than that of Abbas, with uncertain implications for how the diplomatic track might proceed in practice, but without explicitly calling for renewed Palestinian violence. Another question is how Barghouti would relate to the effort of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to build Palestinian state institutions unilaterally from the ground up.

As far as the international community is concerned, it will continue to support both Abbas and Fayyad, in whom it has invested heavily, as long as they remain in power. Many world leaders have contacted Abbas in recent weeks to try to persuade him to remain in office. International and Israeli conditions that Palestinian leaders renounce violence, accept previous agreements, and recognise Israel, in order to receive international support, are likely to remain in place.

Conclusion

Despite all that is known about Marwan Barghouti’s past, how he would operate were he released from prison today is difficult to gauge.  He might be able to achieve some form of reconciliation between rival Palestinian factions, though the form of unity he would bring is not clear-cut.  Barghouti is much more amenable to Hamas than Mahmoud Abbas, and he would bring a different style of leadership, but whether militant groups are prepared to adopt a more pragmatic approach to power-sharing and diplomacy remains to be seen.  Any change in the balance of power in the Palestinian arena would inevitably have far-reaching implications for addressing the compromises necessary to secure a final status peace agreement with Israel.  The keen debate in Israel about whether Barghouti presents more of an opportunity or a threat, will inevitably affect Israel’s considerations with regard to the deal to release Gilad Shalit.

 

 

 

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[i] ‘Lieberman: Barghouti Will Not be Released’, Israel National News, 26 November 2009.

[ii] For instance, whilst serving as foreign minister in 2005, Silvan Shalom said of Barghouti: “We must not forget that he is a cold-blooded murderer who was sentenced by the court to five life sentences.” Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, ‘Barghouti´s Popularity Spurs Campaign to Free Him’, Israel National News, 27 November 2005.

[iii] See, for example, Uri Avnery, “Palestine’s Mandela”, New Internationalist, November 2007, and for further analysis, Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘Marwan Barghouti – A Nelson Mandela or a PR gimmick?’, The Jerusalem Post, 26 November 2009.

[iv] Nicole Gaouette, ‘The ‘Palestinian Napoleon’ behind Mideast cease-fire’, Christian Science Monitor, July 3, 2003.

[v] Marwan Barghouti, ‘Want Security? End the Occupation’, Washington Post, January 16, 2002.

[vi] Barghouti was also convicted of several other offences, and acquitted on 21 counts of murder.  For further details about his crimes and indictment, see ‘Information on Marwan and Ahmed Barghouti, 15 April 2002’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel and  ‘Statement of Indictment – Marwan Barghouti – 14 Aug 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel.

[vii] National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners, June 28, 2006.

[viii] Mecca Agreement, February 8, 2007.

[ix] Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Barghouti: Shalit abduction achieved what no dialogue could’, Haaretz, 25 November 2009.

[x] Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘Marwan Barghouti – A Nelson Mandela or a PR gimmick?’, The Jerusalem Post, 26 November 2009.

[xi] Daoud Kuttab, ‘Palestine After Abbas?’, Khaleej Times Online, 21 November 2009.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] See, for instance, Ghada Karmi, ‘Where next for Palestinians?’, Bitterlemons, 43, 23 November 2009.

[xiv] See Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Barghouti: Shalit abduction achieved what no dialogue could’, Haaretz, 25 November 2009.