BICOM

• Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier then aged 19, was kidnapped on 25 June 2006 in a cross-border raid near the Gaza Strip. Recent indications suggest that the negotiation for his release may be nearing conclusion.
• In Israel, the desire to bring about the return of a captive soldier is a very emotional issue affecting the whole country, as well as being an issue of broader political and strategic significance.
• Whilst Israel is ready to pay a high price to bring back Shalit, there is a concern about the impact it may have in strengthening Hamas within the Palestinian political arena. There is therefore an imperative to minimise any damage to the position of moderate Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas.
• The prisoner exchange deal may include the release of the highly popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, who was convicted and imprisoned in Israel for his involvement in suicide bombings. His return to the Palestinian political arena would have a very significant impact on the internal Palestinian political scene. He has made clear his intention to run for the Palestinian presidency and to end the division between Fatah and Hamas.

 

Background

Gilad Shalit was kidnapped on 25 June 2006 in a cross-border raid at Kerem Shalom by the Gaza Strip. The terrorists, operating on behalf of three terror groups headed by Hamas, used a tunnel dug under the border fence to cross into Israel. They attacked a tank crew situated nearby, killing two soldiers, injuring one and seizing Shalit. According to Israeli intelligence assessments, Shalit was injured in the attack, but has since recovered. However, for over three-and-a-half years in which he has been held by Hamas forces in Gaza, Shalit has not been visited by any independent international body and it is believed that the soldier, 19-years-old at the time of his abduction, has been held in harsh solitary conditions throughout this period.

Reports in recent days indicate that significant progress has been made toward a prisoner exchange deal that will see the release of Shalit. Reports suggest that the deal will include the preliminary release of 350-450 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, including a relatively large group of individuals who have been directly involved in terror attacks against Israelis. Before that, Shalit will be transferred to Egypt where he will undergo medical examination. The first stage will be followed by the release of up to 650 additional prisoners within several weeks or months.

In addition to the personal fate of Shalit, the conclusion of a deal would have a broader impact on regional issues including the peace process, the Palestinian political arena, Israel’s domestic politics and the international community’s involvement in the region. The following assesses the potential impact of a deal.

The Shalit issue in Israel: Domestic and regional considerations

The fate of Shalit has been of great concern to the Israeli public for over three years. If carried out, the prisoner deal is likely to enjoy broad Israeli public support, with polls suggesting a clear majority in favour of its implementation. However, Israeli decision makers are also facing the regional and international implications of approving a deal.

Since his abduction, Shalit has stood at the centre of a mass public campaign calling for his release. Shalit’s face constantly appears on street banners and Israeli news websites maintain counters indicating the days he has been in captivity. This overwhelming public interest is part of a general sense among Israelis that Shalit’s fate could have been the fate of one’s own family members or friends. Most Israeli families see their sons and daughters conscripted to serve for 2-3 years, just as Shalit was, and so identify very personally with him. This accentuates the emotional attachment many Israelis feel toward Shalit and his family and helps explain the very high importance of the issue in Israeli public life.

The negotiations relating to Shalit follow Israel’s well established history of prisoner redemption. There are voices in Israel criticical of Israel’s willingness to negotiate with terror groups, including those that argue that the released terrorists will go on take more innocent lives, and those that believe that making a deal encourages future kidnap attempts. However, the compulsory nature of service in the IDF and its status as ‘the people’s army’, lead a majority to feel that making the exchange, however painful, fulfills an unwritten contract of mutual obligation between Israel’s citizens and their leaders.

Nonetheless, Israel’s decision makers will not be able to ignore the fact that the Shalit deal will also have significant political and strategic implications. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement yesterday of a 10-month settlement moratorium in the West Bank, may well be influenced by a desire to balance Hamas’s potential achievement with steps that strengthen PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. The desire to minimise any step that could strengthen Hamas will also be a consideration for Israel when it comes to easing restrictions on the Gaza border crossings.

It is possible that some will try to present the deal as a de facto recognition of Hamas, which legitimises calls for international engagement with the Islamic group. However, for Israel this deal does not constitute a recognition of Hamas as a legitimate counterpart for negotiations. Similarly, Israel’s release of Hezbollah terrorists in exchange for the bodies of two IDF soldiers in 2008 did not translate into a legitimisation by Israel of the Shiite Lebanese movement. Israel will continue to insist that Hamas to abide by the demands of the international community to recognise Israel’s right to exist, halt terror activity and accept previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. Hamas has so far refused to abide by these conditions and Israel is likely to oppose a shift in international policy toward the group. However, developments in the Palestinian internal arena as a result of the deal may nonetheless have far reaching political consequences.

The Palestinian arena

The implementation of a prisoner exchange deal would have a significant effect on the Palestinian political sphere. For several years, the two main Palestinian factions – Fatah and Hamas – have been deadlocked in fierce rivalry that has led to the division of the Fatah-controlled West Bank from the Gaza Strip, violently seized by Hamas’s in June 2007. Despite repeated efforts by the Egyptians to broker a deal between the two, no resolution has been achieved thus far. This division has severely complicated Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas’s ability to negotiate a final status agreement, having lost control over part of the Palestinian territories.

The release of Fatah-Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti may mark a turning point in the relations between the two factions. Barghouti was a leader of the Second Intifada who was convicted in Israel on five counts of murder for his involvement in suicide bombings. He is considered to be the leading candidate to succeed Mahmoud Abbas as the head of Fatah and perhaps as Palestinian president. Abbas has been threatening to resign for some time and Barghouti’s release may pave the way for an official change of guard in Fatah’s leadership. Barghouti’s release has the potential to change the balance of power within the Palestinian political arena. In recent days Barghouti has been explicit in his support for Palestinian unity between rival factions, noting that this is the single most important challenge facing the Palestinian leadership. 

A prisoner exchange is likely to boost Hamas’s popularity in the Palestinian street. The release of prisoners held in Israeli jails is a pivotal and symbolic part of Palestinian discourse across the political spectrum. Hamas’s will seek to portray a deal as a vindication of its path of violent resistance and terror. By having Barghouti included in the prisoner release, a figure with such widespread popularity, Hamas will hope to improve their image as a party acting for the greater Palestinian national interest, rather than their own narrow factional interests.

However, Hamas has no leader that could challenge Barghouti’s popularity and the movement’s support in the West Bank remains relatively low compared with its strongholds in Gaza. Furthermore, Hamas may have succeeded in releasing a large number of prisoners, but some of those who topped the movement’s demand list, including leading terrorists, will remain in Israeli prisons. Others will be forced to leave the Palestinian territories after their release. These factors may dent Hamas’s sense of achievement.

In reality Hamas is in great need of a tangible success having been severely damaged by Operation Cast Lead earlier this year. Hamas has failed to achieve through violence its key objectives of easing the restrictions on the Gaza Strip and legitimising its control there. Hamas’s popularity has declined as a result of this. Its popularity is also threatened by its refusal to agree a unity deal paving the way for Palestinian elections. The balance between Hamas’s participation in the political process and its pursuit of terrorism and violence has been an issue of contention within the movement for several years. It will remain to be seen if concluding this deal, including the release of Barghouti, will signal a desire within Hamas to move in a more pragmatic direction.

Putting Palestinian unity above negotiations with Israel, Marwan Barghouti has been able to reposition himself at the centre of the Palestinian political map and bolster his status as a leading candidate for the leadership. However, it is far from clear how he would bring about Palestinian reunification and address the compromises needed to secure a final-status agreement with Israel.

Implications for the peace process

Mahmoud Abbas, has refused requests from Israel and the US to renew negotiations until Israel accepts a complete settlement freeze in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Abbas is reluctant to compromise on his stance whilst facing challenges to his popularity and legitimacy from Hamas. Fearing further deterioration in their public position and growing support for Hamas, the latest developments may only deepen the trenchant opposition within the Fatah leadership to compromise.

Wary of the declining popularity of Fatah’s leadership, Israel and the US have been working to accompany any deal on Shalit with additional Israeli gestures toward Abbas. The 10-month moratorium on West Bank settlement construction announced yesterday, is understood as an important step in this direction. Further steps to bolster Abbas may yet be forthcoming in the effort to persuade Abbas to re-enter negotiations.

The release of Barghouti and a Fatah-Hamas unity deal could provide an opening to overcome the rift that divides the Fatah-controlled West Bank and the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip. This would change completely the context of the peace process. However, the effects of these processes will only be played out in the medium to long term. In the meanwhile, the urgent need to strengthen the moderate Palestinian leadership and overcome the obstacles that prevent the renewal of talks remains in place.