BICOM

Key Points

 

• The 30-year-old ‘cold peace’ between Israel and Egypt is a crucial strategic relationship both for the parties themselves and for external actors interested in promoting regional stability.
• Hamas’s consolidation of power in the Gaza Strip has aggravated frictions but it has also brought more sharply into focus the common threat that the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip poses.
• Jerusalem and Cairo are trying to prevent Hamas from playing them off against one another, though the issue of the Gaza-Sinai smuggling tunnels remains a real challenge for both parties.
• Despite some mutual suspicion at the military level, the political partnership between the two countries remains solid at present, as illustrated by Israeli President Shimon Peres’s recent state visit.
• The frostiness which traditionally characterises the peace, and uncertainties about the future both of the peace process and President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, only underscore the need for both parties to ensure ongoing diplomatic investment in one other.

 

Introduction

 

A number of recent developments bring attention to Israeli-Egyptian relations.  Between 21-23 October, Egypt conducted the largest-ever training exercise of its armed forces, simulating Israel as its adversary and offending Israel’s defence establishment. Ensuing public debate subsequently spurred right-wing Israeli politician Avigdor Lieberman to make a cynical attempt to lay down a campaign marker by speaking disparagingly of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the Knesset.  These incidents come against the backdrop of a shared challenge, which is the ongoing Hamas regime in Gaza, and in particular Hamas’s increased control and strategic use of the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Sinai to undercut the effects of international isolation.

 

The 30-year-old ‘cold peace’ between Israel and Egypt is a crucial strategic relationship both for the parties themselves and for external actors interested in promoting regional stability.  It is often described as tense, not least because it is sensitive to Palestinian affairs and the politics of the Arab world.  Hamas’s consolidation of power in the Gaza Strip has aggravated frictions but it has also brought more sharply into focus the common threat that the Hamas regime in Gaza poses.  The Egyptian-Israeli peace is a key building block in the development of broader peace in the region, but what do these recent developments tell us about how secure this block is?

 

Some new frost, but no deep freeze

 

Diplomatic tensions between Jerusalem and Cairo mounted significantly late last year when Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni accused Egypt of making no real effort to tackle weapons smuggling to Hamas-controlled Gaza under the Philadelphi Route.[1]  Israeli officials acknowledge that sophisticated US-supplied equipment has aided Egypt’s ability to destroy tunnels, but contradictory intelligence assessments exist about the degree of Egypt’s commitment to put a stop to the smuggling.[2] Cairo is keen to avoid a repeat of the large-scale social unrest which led to hundreds of thousands of Gazans crossing into Sinai earlier this year after Hamas blew up most of the border fence.

 

That the issue of the tunnels has become more significant recently is partly due to Hamas’s efforts to place smuggling operations on an ‘official’ footing.  By regulating and taxing tunnel use (some reports suggest as many as 800 now exist), Hamas can more easily conceal its military build-up and generate income, estimated at around $20 million monthly.[3]  In parallel to goods and fuel imports, Hamas uses the underground network for bringing in arms, explosives, rockets and militants.[4]  Nevertheless, the adoption of less confrontational diplomatic tones in Jerusalem and Cairo in the year following Livni’s comment, signal that they are trying to prevent Hamas from playing them off against one another, though the dispute over tunnels remains a real challenge for both parties.

 

Whilst the political leaders have been trying to keep their cool, tensions flared in the last fortnight over military relations. Amos Gilead, head of the Political-Security Bureau at the Israeli Ministry of Defence, has formally complained to Cairo following what were considered unnecessarily belligerent military manoeuvres carried out by Egyptian forces.  Billed to commemorate the sinking of an Israeli vessel 41 years ago, it was an opportunity for Cairo to promote Egyptian national pride as questions are being asked about the regime’s future.  Even so, Gilead expressed a genuine concern, shared by many in Israel, about the ‘absence of a culture of peace’ between the IDF and the Egyptian army.[5]

 

Israel’s disquiet about the lack of a ‘culture of peace’ extends to Egypt’s political echelon, as well.  In 30 years of peace, President Mubarak has never made an official state visit.[6]  This fact was exploited by the chair of the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, Avigdor Lieberman, in the Knesset on 29 October, when he said the Egyptian leader could “go to hell.”[7]  The following weekend, he tried to stoke fears about an Egyptian plan to deploy troops in the Sinai in preparation for an attack[8] – a fear dismissed by senior figures in the defence establishment.[9]

 

Similar rhetoric can be expected from Lieberman in the run-up to the February 2009 Knesset elections.  What was most revealing about his outbursts was the reaction of President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who demonstrated the importance Israel attaches to the relationship with Egypt when they each telephoned Mubarak to apologise for Lieberman’s remarks.  In a statement, Peres added, “I want to make clear that we have the highest respect for President Mubarak.  He is a very stable force for peace in the Middle East.”[10]  Whilst most Israeli politicians probably recognise that Mubarak has to consider how his relations with Israel play with the Egyptian public, they would still like to see the partnership strengthened.

 

The irony is that whilst Mubarak is a force for regional stability, he himself turned 80 this year.  Israel fears a major crisis if the leadership transition does not go smoothly.  If more power finds its way into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the biggest domestic threat to the regime, it would be a huge boost to its followers, including Hamas in Gaza and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan.

 

The state of the bilateral relationship

 

Plainly, Israel and its western-orientated Sunni Arab neighbours have a common interest in limiting the influence of destabilising terror groups and their sponsors in Iran.  In September, Israeli and Egyptian security services cooperated to prevent kidnappings in Sinai by Hezbollah (thought to have been operating on Egyptian soil for the first time) and a Palestinian cell.[11]  And despite the recent incidents which have brought ongoing tensions into the limelight, the political basis of the Egypt-Israel relationship remains sound for the time being.

 

Indeed, it was Amos Gilead’s well-grounded connections in Cairo, especially with Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, that enabled him to feel comfortable to speak up on the issue of military cooperation.  Gilead was Israel’s emissary in Egypt’s mediation of the Gaza ceasefire with Hamas in June.  The situation remains delicate, partly because the Egyptian mediation has not succeeded in a deal to release IDF soldier Gilad Shalit from Hamas captivity. But the main reason for this is that Hamas does not appear to consider a deal in its present interest.  However, Egypt is uniquely placed to apply pressure and remains central to the ongoing negotiations.

 

The clearest recent expression of the state of the relationship was President Peres’s official state visit to see President Mubarak two weeks ago. With a leadership vacuum in Israel, Peres took the initiative to lend a hand in keeping the Israeli-Egyptian relationship warm in a delicate period.

 

From Egypt’s perspective, it certainly is a critical juncture.  It is scheduled to host a Middle East Quartet summit on 9 November, which could be the last such assessment of progress on peace talks before changes of administration in Washington, Jerusalem and Ramallah.  It may also be US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s final visit to the region.  Furthermore, PA President Mahmoud Abbas is scheduled to go to Cairo for the separate launch of power-sharing talks with Hamas on 9 November.^[12]  In short, Egypt’s brokering role is unparalleled at present.

 

Conclusion

 

In choosing to sign a peace treaty with Israel almost 30 years ago, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat broke the mould in the Arab world and changed the political face of the modern Middle East.  The frostiness which traditionally characterises the peace only underscores the need for both parties to ensure ongoing diplomatic investment in one other.  The partnership is crucial for achieving a range of key objectives, from securing the release of Gilad Shalit and stemming the flow of weapons to Hamas, to achieving Palestinian statehood and developing relations with other moderate Arab regimes.  It will also be an alliance that the next US president will seek to utilise in rebuilding America’s image overseas.  Former US Middle East envoy Dennis Ross expressed his view in an interview last week: “I think we have to realise who our natural partners are and how we can work with both them and our allies so we, in a sense, build our collective leverage against those who constitute threats to us.”[13]

 

---

[1] Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee: ‘[t]he need to dramatically decrease the amount of arms that are being smuggled into Gaza is an Israeli strategic goal, and of course this affects our relations with Egypt… [W]hat they are doing at Philadelphi is deplorable and problematic.’  See Amnon Meranda. ‘Livni: Egypt’s actions along border harm Israel-PA peace process’, YNet News, 24 December 2007; Associated Press. ‘Egypt: Livni should mind her own business’, YNet News, 25 December 2007.

 

[2] Israel’s Military Intelligence branch has suggested that the Egyptians have intensified their anti-smuggling efforts, whereas the Shin Bet (Israel’s equivalent of MI5) maintains that they have avoided being energetic.

 

[3] For more details, see ‘Hamas’s military build-up in the Gaza Strip’, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, 8 April 2008 and Avi Issacharoff. ‘Hamas piping in fuel from Egypt’, Haaretz, 31 August 2008.

 

[4] For instance, Reuters correspondent Nidal al-Mughrabi recently wrote: ‘[h]undreds of Gaza merchants throng around the border area of Rafah every day to pick up merchandise coming to Gaza from Egypt via subterranean passages that have created a flourishing trade zone.’  A 23-year-old tunnel operator, identifying himself as Abu Luqaib, reflected these sentiments, saying: ‘[i]t’s an industrial zone here.’  As many as 25,000 people are employed in this business.  Nidal al-Mughrabi. ‘Underground cattle trade thrives in Gaza tunnels’, Reuters, 21 October 2008.

 

[5] Ben Caspit. ‘Israel to Egypt: You treat us as if we were an enemy’, Maariv, 28 October 2008; Julie Stahl. ‘Egyptian War Games Cause For Concern in Israel, Lawmaker Says’, CNSNews.com, 29 October 2008.

 

[6] Mubarak did attend the funeral of former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, following his assassination on 4 November 1995, but this was not an official state visit.

 

[7] Shahar Ilan and Barak Ravid. ‘Lieberman says Mubarak can “go to hell”; Peres, Olmert apologize’, Haaretz, 30 October 2008.

 

[8] ‘Lieberman: Israel acting like battered wife with Egypt’, YNet News, 1 November 2008.

 

[9] Reshet Bet News, 2 November 2008.

 

[10] Shahar Ilan and Barak Ravid. ‘Lieberman says Mubarak can “go to hell”; Peres, Olmert apologize’, Haaretz, 30 October 2008.

 

[11] Barak Ravid and Yuval Azoulay. ‘Egypt hunts cell planning to kidnap Israelis in Sinai’, Haaretz, 16 September 2008.

 

[12] ‘Olmert to meet Bush by January’, Haaretz, 30 October 2008.

 

[13] Natasha Mozgovaya. ‘Engagement without illusions’, Haaretz, 24 October 2008.