BICOM

 BICOM Analysis: What now for the Gaza ceasefire? 

• The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza commenced in June, and was intended to continue for an initial six month period. This period will end on December 18, 2008. The violence of the last few days indicates the fragility of the arrangement.
• However, Israel sees Hamas as only one element in a larger constellation of threats which includes Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Few Israeli analysts believe that the Hamas enclave in Gaza will be able to co-exist with Israel in the longer term, but Israel does not currently seek an escalation in Gaza, which could lead to Israeli forces becoming bogged down in a costly re-occupation.
• Therefore, the latest events probably do not mean that the ceasefire is ending now. Hamas’s decision not to attend the Cairo talks reflects the movement’s desire to preserve its sovereign enclave in Gaza, and its preference to be recognized on its own terms, and not be treated as an equal of smaller rejectionist factions. This desire is also likely to mean that Hamas will also press for the return of the ceasefire, and will work to ensure that the current clashes with Israel do not turn into an unstoppable deterioration toward open conflict. Introduction

  Last week’s news was dominated by the US Presidential elections. As a result, a significant series of events that took place in Gaza have gone under-reported. On the night of Tuesday 4 November, IDF forces carried out a raid into Gaza in order to locate and destroy a tunnel that was being constructed by the Hamas authorities between Gaza and Israel. The tunnel was intended to be used to kidnap Israeli soldiers and bring them into Gaza, a tactic that has been tried in the past. Following the raid, Hamas fired Qassam rockets and mortar shells at towns in the western Negev.  This document will detail key aspects of the events of last week, and will look into the implications of the events for hopes of the continuation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza.  The document will also place the events in the larger context of efforts to bring Gaza back under the framework of the Palestinian Authority, and end exclusive Hamas control there.

  The raid and its aftermath

  In the night hours of Tuesday 4 November, Israeli forces entered Gaza near the town of Deir al-Balah. Their target was a tunnel under construction 250 metres from the border fence. Hamas gunmen attempted to engage with the Israeli forces, and one Hamas man was killed in the subsequent exchanges of fire, which also wounded a small number of Israeli soldiers. Hamas then began the launching of mortar shells across the fence separating Israel and Gaza. The IDF responded, and five more Hamas men were killed.  Hamas and other Palestinian organizations then began the launching of Qassam rockets at Israeli civilian targets.[1] In the following days, the Qassam fire continued, carried out by teams from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PFLP and DFLP organisations[2], and there were further exchanges of fire between IDF troops and Hamas gunmen.

  The renewed hostilities were the worst since Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement in June, 2008. Israeli spokesmen stressed throughout the week that Israel did not wish to bring the ceasefire to an end. Rather, Israeli forces had no choice but to act against the clear and present danger represented by the tunnel. But with this threat removed, Israel favoured a return to the ceasefire. A spokesman for Islamic Jihad, meanwhile, initially said that for the organization, the ceasefire was over. Later however, this was amended and Islamic Jihad spokesmen said that the ceasefire would be renewed if Israeli ‘attacks’ ceased.

  In light of the rocket attacks, Defence Minister Ehud Barak ordered that goods crossings between Israel and Gaza be kept closed.[3] The situation remains tense, and defence officials say that the Home Front Command remains on high alert, and a continuation of the flare up is possible. Though goods crossings are to remain closed as long as rockets are fired at Israel, on Monday the Defence Minister authorized the transfer of a limited amount of fuel to Gaza, mainly for the power station after complaints that shortages had forced power outages.[4] 

  Implications: is the ceasefire over?

  The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza commenced in June, and was intended to continue for an initial six month period. This period will end on December 18, 2008. The events of the last days indicate the fragility of the arrangement.  The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas contains no political element – that is, Israel in no way recognizes the legitimacy of the Hamas regime in Gaza, which itself is strategically and ideologically committed to Israel’s destruction. Rather, the ceasefire came into being because it served the interests of both sides.

  The ceasefire has allowed Israel to avoid escalation which would lead to a full-scale military invasion of Gaza. Such an invasion would cost Israeli lives, and whilst it could undoubtedly be carried out from a military point of view, in so far as an Israeli force could quickly complete a conventional re-capture of the Strip, it would subsequently leave Israel with the more onerous task of occupying the area. Hamas would remain in existence following an invasion and would undoubtedly seek to continue violence against Israeli forces in the Strip. Hamas has been smuggling weaponry into Gaza at an increased rate over the last year, including advanced anti-tank missile systems and anti-aircraft missiles.[5] This smuggling has continued throughout the period of the ceasefire. So from Israel’s point of view, therefore, a full-scale invasion would be undertaken only as a last resort.

  Maintaining calm in the South, and avoiding a large scale military conflict, also serves Israel’s interests in a number of ways. Israel’s broader strategic concerns, including the threat from Iranian backed Hezbollah which creates a tense security situation in the north, are an important reason why Israel would prefer not to see its forces bogged down in the Gaza Strip if it can be avoided. 

  From Israel’s point of view, the ceasefire has allowed residents of western Negev towns to live normal lives, free from the constant threat of Qassam rocket fire. With elections near, the government has a clear interest in preserving quiet in this area. Israel also perceives the ceasefire to be in its interests because it has created a space in which the negotiations for the release of Gilad Shalit can continue. While the negotiations have as yet proved fruitless, the issue is a constant concern for the Government and the public.

  The issue of the current government’s legitimacy should also be considered.  In the midst of an election period, and under an interim government, there is a question mark over whether Israel’s government has the authority or backing to open up a major new initiative such as a large-scale operation in Gaza.

  From Hamas’s point of view, the ceasefire has allowed the organization to strengthen and entrench its rule in Gaza. Hamas’s control of Gaza is complete, and observers within the Strip confirm that the organization has, through often brutal means, succeeded in imposing order on Gaza in a way which its Fatah predecessors were unable to do. The Palestinian Authority has proven incapable of challenging Hamas rule in Gaza and its attempts to organize strikes and demonstrations have led nowhere. Hamas has come under serious pressure from Egypt to give up its exclusive control of Gaza, but as of now, there are no indications that the movement is about to do so.

  PA officials were hopeful that the talks in Cairo, planned to begin on Sunday 9 November, might lead to a reconstituted PA unity government. Hamas, however, has announced at the last moment that it would not attend the talks.[6]  The Cairo talks were intended to lead to the signing of a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas were also unhappy that the talks were not going to be direct between Fatah and Hamas, but were to include other small factions also. In any case, pursuing the agreement would have meant Hamas giving up exclusive security control in Gaza, in return for little of substantive value to it. Hamas therefore used the issue of Hamas prisoners held by Fatah in the West Bank as an excuse not to attend. This decision not to attend the Cairo talks reflects the movement’s desire to preserve its sovereign enclave in Gaza.

  Hamas’s interest in preserve its current position is also likely to mean that Hamas will press for the return of the ceasefire, and will work to ensure that the current clashes with Israel do not turn into an unstoppable deterioration toward open conflict. Hamas spokesmen were clear that they do not consider that the latest violence means the end of the ceasefire.  Thus, senior Hamas figure Mahmoud Zahar said Hamas would not end the ‘tahdiyeh’ (lull) arrangement because of “Israeli provocations,” but nevertheless it retained its right to respond accordingly. Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha expressed himself in similar terms. Hamas also claimed to be attempting to restrain other organizations involved in the violence.[7]

  Conclusion

  The current clashes between Israel and Hamas are unlikely to lead to a general deterioration, leading to an Israeli invasion of the Strip. Both Israel and Hamas have an interest in preventing such a deterioration. Hamas leader Khaled Mashal indicated over the weekend that the organization is currently waiting to see if the administration of President-elect Obama leads to a major western shift in Middle East policy, which might include the opening of dialogue with the movement, and the consequent strengthening of its position. For this reason, it is currently doing all it can to stay in power in Gaza, and hence will not for the moment wish to provoke Israel unduly. As of now, the international conditions which Hamas must meet to become a participant in the diplomatic process remain in place, and these were re-iterated at Sunday’s meeting of the Quartet. However, Hamas is clearly confident that it can maintain its control in Gaza regardless.

  Israel, for its part, sees Hamas as just one element in a larger constellation of threats which includes Iran and Hizballah in Lebanon. Israel is watching with concern as Hamas brings high grade weaponry into Gaza but Israel does not currently seek an escalation at this time. The most likely scenario is therefore that the uneasy ceasefire will return, at least until December 18. Few Israeli analysts, however, believe that the Hamas enclave in Gaza will be able to co-exist with Israel in the longer term. Rather, at a certain point, it is likely to be used as the launching pad for further violence against Israel. 

 

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[1] “IDF: Air Strike destroys rocket launcher in northern Gaza,” Haaretz, November 8, 2008.  http://www.haaretz.com

[2] Reuven Ehrlich, “Escalation in Gaza- Update,” The Intelligence and Terrorism Information center, November 6, 2008.  www.terrorism-info.org.il

[3] Yaakov Lappin, “IAF Kills Islamic Jihad terrorist in northern Gaza airstrike,” Jerusalem Post, November 6, 2008.  http://www.jpost.com

[4]  “ Barak renews fuel supplies – Israel: Gaza blackouts are Hamas propaganda,” Ynetnews, November 11, 2008. http://www.imra.org.il  

[5]  Jonathan Spyer, “Fortress Gaza,” Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2008.  http://www.jpost.com

[6] “Egypt postpones Cairo talks at Hamas’ request,” Ma’an News Agency, November 8, 2008. http://imra.org.il

[7] Ehrlich.