“During the last few weeks, a lot of space has been dedicated to the study of the characteristics an Iranian response to an Israeli Revolutionary Guard to guarantee the Islamic Republic with power projection. The use of terrorist groups as proxies and the threat of localized terrorist attacks are to be read in that same way.

The Iranian navy, with its maneuverable speed boats along with its strategy based upon deploying vast quantity of mines does not abide by the conventional tenets of maritime warfare. The development of a massive ballistic missile arsenal is meant to circumvent Tehran’s absolute lack of air superiority. In other words, since the 1980s Iran has been standardizing the use of guerrilla and terrorist activities inside its own armed forces to gain a minor strategic advantage.

When defining the possible conflict as an asymmetric one a point is often missed: the psychology of it.

Since 1948, all conventional wars against state actors have been – for Israel – existential ones. With its extremely limited strategic depth the Jewish State cannot compromise about its defensive positions, either they hold and the counter attack is effective or the country may cease to exist in less than a week.”