BICOM

 

Please note, this corrects the version posted and sent on the evening of Thursday 14 May, which contained some minor typographical errors. In the final sentence of the first paragraph of the section, ‘Finding a Consensus’, the word ‘not’ was accidentally omitted. It should read ‘…he [Obama] will not challenge the fundamental relationship between the US and Israel.’

Key Points

 

• Netanyahu’s and Obama’s teams have been reviewing their policies on the peace process and the wider region. Netanyahu’s agenda is to address the expectations of the Obama administration without threatening the stability of his governing coalition.
• Netanyahu believes the threat posed to Israel by Iran should be the central priority, but since taking office he has adopted a more pragmatic stance regarding peace with the Palestinians. According to some European leaders, Netanyahu is well positioned to make a dramatic change in the geopolitical reality of the region.
• Whilst the mood music and language of the US towards the Middle East Peace Process is set to shift, the fundamentals of the deep rooted ties between Israel and the United States are not about to change, and both sides will search for consensus in Washington.
• What happens in front of the cameras will be as important as the policies that will be discussed behind closed doors. The parties will need to ensure that the outcomes of the meeting are communicated in a manner that will not be wrongly interpreted.

 

Introduction: Netanyahu’s urgent policy review

Amid a flurry of regional diplomatic efforts and a clear US commitment to advance the peace process, a small set of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s advisors have been working hard to develop a position on the peace process with the Palestinians and the wider region that will meet the expectations of the Obama administration without wounding Netanyahu’s broad coalition. Netanyahu deliberately delayed his visit to Washington to give himself more time to formulate his position. This balancing act was always destined to be one of the key challenges for Netanyahu’s premiership. The US is not seeking a public bust up with Israel, but the statements of senior officials in the administration have increased pressure on Netanyahu to take a pragmatic stance with regard to the Palestinians. This analysis focuses on respective US and Israeli policies and how the policy gaps might be addressed.

The US challenge

It is still early days for the US government. Policies are now being finally formulated, and jobs in the administration are still being filled. However the tone of the new US government in the Middle East is clearly different to that of the Bush administration. Whilst Obama, like his predecessor, is committed to confronting extremism and stopping Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons capability, he is also keen to repair damaged relations with the Islamic world and to take a more diplomatic approach. Obama, unlike Bush, believes instinctively in multilateralism. Much like Tony Blair, he believes in making friends and building political capital. This is not only a personal trait, but reflects a broader recognition in the US that it can no longer try to solve its problems without the help of allies around the world.

In this context, Obama’s administration is placing a strong priority on making a very visible effort to engage with the Palestinian issue from the outset. To this end, envoy George Mitchell, Secretary State Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself have all conspicuously emphasised US commitment to a Palestinian state. Before a congressional committee on 23 April, Clinton went further, endorsing the argument that Israeli engagement on the Palestinian issue is important to maintaining unity between itself and the pro-Western Arab states on dealing with Iran.[1] However, it should be noted that the administration has been clear that this will not compromise the security of the State of Israel.

A commitment to sustained and active engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace process is nothing new for the United States, nor is it a new feature of the US-Israeli relationship. Every US administration has, at times, found cause to put pressure on Israel in this respect. But the Obama administration is stating publicly what the Bush government acknowledged only late on in its term; that the Palestinian issue is important for the relationship between the US and the Arab world, which is in turn important for tackling Iran and removing the excuses of the extremists. But, whilst the Obama administration has noted the link between the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the Iranian issue, it is a crude misinterpretation to think that Israeli concessions to the Palestinians are the quid pro quo for a tough US stance on Iran. Obama has made explicit his determination to tackle nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide,[2] and specifically with regard to Iran. Failure to stop Iran gaining nuclear weapons would represent a major policy failure for Obama personally. Therefore whilst he may believe advances on the Israeli-Palestinian front will help this effort, his determination to deal with Iran will in no way be contingent on Israeli efforts to move forward on the Palestinian issue. Nor will the administration settle for a policy of containing a nuclear Iran. The possibility that the US might take such an approach frightens the Arabs as much as anyone else.

In June, Obama is due to make a major speech in Cairo which will set out his broad approach to the Arab world, and there is talk of a regional conference to follow. His aim will be to convince the Arab world of his friendship, and reassure them that his overtures to Iran are not a policy of appeasement that will come at their expense. The planned diplomatic offensive towards the Arabs risks the false interpretation that Israel will be the fall guy for Obama’s friendship with the Arabs. It is important not to misread Obama’s diplomacy in this way. His aim will be to build trust with the Arab world; it will not mean a change in the underlying US-Israel relationship.  

Nevertheless, the US will be looking for Israel to move forward not only with peace talks, but with concrete steps on the ground in line with the Roadmap. This includes improving movement and access in the West Bank, removing illegal settlement outposts and freezing construction in the existing settlement blocs, as well as halting the controversial demolition of illegally built houses in East Jerusalem.[3] Both Britain and the US believe there is untapped potential in the Arab Peace Initiative, and have been exploring with Arab states what moves they would need to see from Israel in order for them to reciprocate with steps towards normalisation of relations. King Abdullah of Jordan’s recent calls for Israel to meet face to face with many of its regional neighbours is an aspect of this work.[4] Given the Obama administration’s policy of dialogue with Syria, the US would most likely be happy to see renewed peace talks between Israel and Syria, though the US is not naïve over the Syrian issue, and has shown frustration regarding the mixed signals currently being sent by Damascus.[5]

The Israeli position

Differences of opinion with the United States over the peace process were a major problem for Netanyahu when he was last Prime Minister, from 1996 to 1999, and he will want to avoid similar problems. But delays in key appointments, and considerable difficulties over the handling of the budget in the last few days, have suggested to some that he may not have learned all the lessons of his first term as Prime Minister. However, regardless of his handling of domestic policies, he has developed some surprising relationships with left of centre European leaders who now believe he has the potential to be a ‘Nixon to China’ type leader.

To make a success of his trip to Washington, what happens in front of the cameras will be all important. To ensure the meeting outcomes are interpreted accurately, the American president and the Israeli prime minister will need to ensure a robust communication strategy that will not be susceptible to wilful misinterpretation that will make their policy task harder.

In terms of content, the driving concern of the Israeli government, over which there is broad consensus among Israeli politicians, is the nature of the national security threats facing the country. The Iranian regime, which combines an ideological commitment to Israel’s destruction, weighty influence over Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel’s borders, and a rapid advance to nuclear weapons capability, poses a clear threat to Israel’s security. Netanyahu will argue that addressing the Iranian threat is not only a priority for Israeli security, but for the peace process, because Iranian support for extremists opposed to peace is the key barrier to progress. Furthermore, Israel is all the more likely to be resistant to concessions that compromise its security when such a clear threat is growing in the region. Whilst Israel has not objected outright to Obama’s policy of engagement with Iran, there is concern in Jerusalem that the US policy is not well defined. Mixed messages from US officials reinforce that impression. Israel and several Arab states fear that without a clear timetable and red lines, the US openness will be used by Iran to play for time.

With regard to the Palestinian question, whilst Netanyahu has no problem with the notion of extensive Palestinian autonomy, he has been reluctant to endorse the notion of full Palestinian statehood, which he fears would reduce Israel’s ability to secure its vulnerable borders. He also has to be careful not to take positions that could see right-wing parties abandon his coalition or a split in his own Likud party. He had responded to the pressure on him to endorse a two-state solution with a counter-demand for the Palestinians to recognise Israel as a Jewish state.

Up to his election his approach to the Palestinian issue had been to downplay – though not to dismiss – political negotiations and to focus on economic development in the Palestinian territories. But it is significant to note how hard Netanyahu worked to give himself room for manoeuvre by establishing a broad based coalition that included the left of centre Labour party under Ehud Barak, rather than an exclusively right-wing coalition. In his opening address to the Knesset as Prime Minister, Netanyahu made a far more progressive statement of policy, committing the government to advance peace with regard to the Palestinian Authority on political, economic and security tracks. He stated that the government will conduct ‘ongoing peace negotiations with the PA, with the aim of reaching a final status arrangement.’ Adding that: ‘In the final status arrangements, the Palestinians will have all the authorities needed to govern themselves, except those which threaten the existence and security of the state of Israel.’^[6] Addressing an AIPAC conference via video on May 5, he re-emphasised the message, saying: “We seek expanded relations with the Arab world. We want normalization of economic ties and diplomatic ties. We want peace with the Arab world.  But we also want peace with the Palestinians.”[7] In Cairo on Monday he called for talks with the Palestinians to resume quickly, and he has already appointed a committee which he himself is chairing to address quality of life in the West Bank.[8]

Whilst policy options on Iran are being developed along with key ministers in the coalition, the approach on the Palestinian issue is being kept more closely within Netanyahu’s own team. His National Security Advisor and long time associate Uzi Arad is intimately involved, as is his legal advisor with specific expertise on the Palestinian negotiations, Yitzhak Molcho, and political communications chief, Ron Dermer. But ultimately the survival of his coalition depends on maintaining the support of his chief coalition partners, and avoiding major splits within his own Likud party. Any commitments made to the US on the settlements in particular are likely to cause severe strains on the right.

Finding a consensus

The relationship between the United States and Israel has very deep roots not only in American strategic thinking but in American political culture. The underlying relationship is not about to change. However, because of the importance of this relationship to Israel, it is uncomfortable for any Israeli government to have stark policy gaps between itself and its key strategic ally. It is in neither side’s interest for this meeting to go badly, and in both side’s interest to present a positive image of the relationship to the outside world. Whilst Obama may want to rebuild US political capital in the Arab world, and he may expect more from Israel than the Bush administration, he will not challenge the fundamental relationship between the US and Israel.

Whilst the sides may disagree on the relationship between the Iranian issue and the Palestinian issue, both recognise that the issues will be addressed in parallel. And whilst the US may believe that progress on the Palestinian issue is helpful in undermining Iranian influence, in the final analysis the Iranian issue will remain a US priority in its own right.

On the issue of Palestinian statehood, it is an open question whether Netanyahu will bow to US pressure and publicly endorse a Palestinian state in some form. The amount of attention that has been focussed on Netanyahu’s reluctance to talk publicly about a Palestinian state has built up the issue, perhaps artificially, given the fact that Netanyahu has accepted previous agreements including the Roadmap. A surprise statement from Netanyahu explicitly endorsing a Palestinian State would earn Netanyahu capital with the US and the wider world, without him actually having to offer any tangible concessions, and this possibility should not be ruled out. But whilst it may make for a successful White House press conference, the problems he will face within his coalition when he returns home ought not to be underestimated. Therefore Netanyahu may be more forthcoming in his private meetings with Obama, but avoid specific commitments in his public statements.

On the question of settlements, Obama is likely to make clear his expectations, and give Netanyahu time to deliver. Whilst some tensions may lie around the corner over issue of rehabilitating Gaza in the case of a Palestinian unity government, whilst the Palestinians remain deeply divided, this is a bridge that is yet to be crossed. Palestinian division and the intransigence of Hamas will ultimately place limitations on what the US can realistically expect from Israel in terms of advancing towards a final status agreement. US officials have made absolutely clear that they have no intention of softening the US stance towards Hamas, and the administration recognises its responsibility to support Palestinian moderates, in particular the West Bank based government of Salam Fayyad.

On the regional dimensions of the peace process, Netanyahu is likely to welcome regional engagement in principle but under the right circumstances. The Arab Peace Initiative currently makes demands on Israel in terms of borders and refugees which it cannot accept, and the Arabs will have to show greater flexibility if they are serious about a regional process. Whilst the US is likely to be sympathetic to Israeli concerns, it has already created expectations in the Arab world, and it will expect Israel to be constructive, and not evasive, if the Arabs do come forward with new proposals. On the Syrian front Netanyahu, who secretly pursued a Syria deal in his first term, has kept the option of talks very much open. But both sides will agree that the process cannot advance far if Syria does not distance itself from Iran.

Conclusions

Given the deep rooted nature of the US-Israel relationship, a public falling out is in neither side’s interests, and the meeting is likely to be smoother than many have anticipated, at least in front of the cameras. Fundamentally, a compromise will have to be found between the two sides positions. The Americans believe that the peace process with the Palestinians must be conducted in a top-down manner, according to which diplomatic progress toward a final-status agreement determines economic and political progress on the ground. Israel, on the other hand, supports an opposite model, where economic stabilisation and political reform provide the conditions for diplomatic progress. At the end of the day, both sides understand that the process will have to include simultaneous progress on all aspects.

How the meeting is perceived by the watching world will be all important in determining its success for both sides. For Obama in particular, the challenge will be to project a stance that will earn trust in the Arab world, without giving the impression of a rift between Israel and the US. Netanyahu will be looking for a tough US line regarding Israel’s central concern with Iran, but he is well aware that the Obama administration wants to see a credible Israeli approach to the peace process. Netanyahu’s challenge will be to show sufficient seriousness in his commitment to move forward with the Palestinians and on broader regional tracks, and find a form of words to express it that does not overly embarrass either the Americans or the key members of his coalition.

 

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[1] Clinton: Israel risks losing support on Iran; Yitzhak Benhorin; Ynet News;  23 April 2009

[2] See President Obama’s Prague Speech, 5 April 2009

[3] These points were stressed by Joe Biden in his speech to AIPAC on May 5, 2009

[4] King Abdullah: ‘This is not a two-state solution, it is a 57-state solution’, Times, May 11, 2009

[5] Despite U.S. Outreach, Syria Affirms Iran Ties, Andrew Lee Butters, Time Magazine, 7 May 2009

[6] Incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speech at the Knesset Swearing In Ceremony; March 31, 2009

[7] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speech at AIPAC, 5/5/2009

[8] Government Communiqué: PM Netanyahu appoints ministerial committee to improve Palestinian economy and quality of life, 7 May 2009; www.mfa.gov.il