Iran and their Proxies

Updated July 7, 2026

Iran uses Khamenei funeral to project regime strength

What’s happened: Millions of mourners have taken to the streets of Iran’s capital, Tehran, for the multi-day funeral procession and ceremony of its former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Ali Khamenei’s funeral began on 3rd July, moving from Tehran to the holy cities of Qom and Mashhad, before crossing into Iraq for stops in Najaf and Karbala.
Delayed by four months since his elimination by Israel on 28th February 2026, his son and successor as Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, was notably absent, which added to rumours about his poor state of health.
Mojtaba’s three brothers, Masoud, Meysam and Mostafa were all present along with other dignitaries including former President Ahmedinejad, and General Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the IRGC as were many senior foreign dignitaries.
Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sent condolences which were conveyed to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian by the Kingdom’s Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Elkhereiji.
Other notable attendees included Lebanon’s Defence Minister, Pakistan’s Prime Minister and Interior Minister, Turkey’s Vice President – the only NATO member state to send a representative – India’s Deputy Foreign Minister, the Russian Security Council’s Deputy Chairman.
The President of Tajikistan, Prime Minister of Armenia, President of Georgia, and Afghan Taliban’s Foreign Minister were also in attendance.
Four other members of the Khamenei family killed on 28th February have also been buried in the past week including Mojtaba’s wife, son, and daughter.

Context: Ali Khamenei was eliminated by an Israeli air strike during the opening salvos of the US and Israel’s war against Iran which broke out on 28th February.

The Iranian regime appears to be using the funeral as an opportunity to showcase an impression of a strengthened post-war self to the world post-ceasefire and MOU signing.According to the dissident news site, Iran Wire, the regime has invited and hosted 400 foreign influencers to cover the funeral, and present a more positive image of the country to global audiences, including from the UK.
Mojtaba Khamenei was reported to have been severely injured in the air strike which eliminated his father, although no definitive proof of life has emerged or been provided. He has not been seen in public since before the war begun, and has only communicated externally in writing.
In his absence, Iran is understood to have effectively fallen under the IRGC’s control reinforcing the relative impotence of the President, currently Masoud Pezeshkian. Negotiations with the US were led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament.
Proceedings have been significantly more controlled and dignified than during the previous Supreme Leader, Ruhollah Khomeini’s funeral which took place in 1989 where the casket was damaged because of crowds of mourners attempting to touch it. Dozens were also reportedly crushed to death.
The fact that Lebanon sent a senior government representative, Defence Minister Michel Menassa, suggests the continued influence of Iran on Lebanon. A Lebanese political source suggested this reflects no policy shift on Iran’s interference, only a desire to lower tensions and avoid burning bridges.
Beirut wants to keep Iran from sabotaging its framework agreement with Israel. President Aoun defended the government’s decision saying, “Our diplomatic relations with Iran are ongoing and unbroken. How did other Arab and non-Arab countries participate in expressing condolences? Was it expected that Lebanon would officially be absent from this funeral?”
The most recent round of indirect “technical” talks in Doha, between Iran and the US were described by President Trump as having been “very good” but remain inconclusive. Israel has a highly sceptical view of these talks, particularly as they fail to address the two issues of most immediate concern to Jerusalem: ballistic missiles and regional proxies such as the Houthis and Hezbollah. However, at this point, Israel appears unable to influence proceedings.
Meanwhile, Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Yechiel Leiter, yesterday claimed that the trilateral framework signed with Lebanon had superseded the first clause of last month’s US-Iranian MOU. The US is yet to respond to these comments.
President Trump has also said that ⁠the United ⁠States will ‌either ‌make a ‌deal with Iran or “finish the ‌job”, while reiterating the former was his preference.

Looking ahead: Khamenei is due to be buried in Mashhad on 9th July.

US-Iran negotiations are due to resume two days later on 11th July. These talks are expected to address a range of issues including sanctions relief, unfreezing funds, and nuclear enrichment.

July 2, 2026

Israel marks 1000 days since October 7

What’s happened: Israel marked 1,000 days today since the October 7 massacre. Commemorations began this morning at 6:29, the hour of the initial salvo which opened the attack on that Saturday morning. A ceremony was held at 8:00 this morning at the site of the Nova Festival, where 378 Israelis were murdered and 44 abducted. Ceremonies and protests of various kinds are scheduled today in at least 50 different Israeli cities, towns, and villages.

1,000 days after the onset of war, and despite various ceasefires in place on all fronts, low intensity combat continued in Gaza. Just in the last few days, the IDF carried out a few successful targeted operation against wanted terrorists in the Gaza Strip.
On Tuesday, a precision operation successfully eliminated Adel Jihad Mohammad Asfour, a platoon commander in the military wing of Hamas, who was rebuilding and training new Hamas fighters in preparation for a future round of combat with Israel. The day before that, the IDF struck Mohammad Fathi Abd al-Hay Abu Fakher, a commander in Hamas’ Rafah brigade who for twenty years has served as a central figure in Hamas’ network of weapons smugglers.
Earlier this week, the IDF eliminated Talal Jaber Mohammad Abd al-Aal, an Islamic Jihad terrorist who took part in the October 7 attack and later in holding Israeli hostages kidnapped that day. One of his hostages, Rom Braslavski, reacted with relief at hearing that his tormentor was dead. “This is Talal Abd al-Aal, or as I know him, Abu Youssef,” he wrote on social media. “This is the man who weighed 100 kilograms and jumped on my neck while I was malnourished. This is his face. This is his hand. This is him.”
In other interviews, he described how al-Aal forced open his mouth at a time when he could barely move his emaciated body from malnutrition and spat into it. Braslavski, who has also spoken at length about the physical and sexual torture he endured in captivity, spoke yesterday with journalists about his satisfaction with the IDF operation to eliminate al-Aal and his continued trauma. “My October 7 continued every day, again and again,” he said. “As far as people are concerned, we have moved on. They say, ‘Look how nicely he is dressed, how nicely his hair is arranged,’ but no one knows what is happening inside. No one is with us when we wake up screaming at night. No one is with us when we get flashbacks in the middle of life.” Braslavski is expected to speak tonight at the main gathering in Hostages Square in Tel Aviv to commemorate 1,000 days since the massacre.
There were no public updates on US-Iran talks in held in Doha yesterday, but according to media reports they focused on mechanisms for reopening the Straits of Hormuz — an issue of acute concern not just for the two belligerent parties, the US and Iran, but especially for the mediating country, Qatar — and the unfreezing of $6 billion in Iranian assets held in Qatar. Iranian state media reported that the Doha talks had concluded, but did not report what the outcome was.

Context: On the one thousandth day of the war which Hamas and its allies launched against Israel on October 7, all the various parts of the axis arrayed against Israel are severely weakened, but not all are completely defeated.

Hamas has been reduced to a militia policing one third of Gaza, without any of its strategic capabilities to invade Israel or fire rockets on its cities.
Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self, struggling to sabotage a US-backed agreement that will lead to its dismantling by Lebanese authorities. Despite its loses, Hezbollah still maintains some of its military capabilities.
Iran has sustained two massive attacks by the US and Israel that have left its stock of uranium buried underground, its missile production facilities offline, and its economy in shambles.
Israel has recovered its hostages and made major strategic gains on all fronts, but defeated none of its enemies. The State itself and the Jewish people more widely have come under a sustained moral attack from activists, organisations, and governments the from across the world. Internally, despite a moment of unity, it remains divided as ever as elections approach and recriminations about the failures leading up to the attack mount.
State Commissions of Inquiry have been formed after previous security failures in Israel, but the current governing coalition has refused to allow such an inquiry to be held. A State Commission is normally chaired by a Supreme Court judge, and many in the Netanyahu bloc believe that this would unfairly bias the work of a committee formed under the State Commission of Inquiry law.
They have instead proposed an ad hoc Commission that would have equal representation of coalition and opposition figures. This proposal is rejected by opposition figures, senior military and security officials past and present, and, according to opinion polls, the overwhelming majority of Israeli citizens.
A decidedly nonpolitical commemoration was held by senior officers of the IDF yesterday evening at which Chief of Staff Zamir told assembled officers that the IDF was at a “strategic crossroads in the war” which began on October 7. “Today we are holding a multi-arena operational, intelligence, and strategic assessment, marking 1,000 days of combat,” he said. “This war has changed methods of warfare, operational concepts, and the way we operate. We remember, we learn, and we prepare for the continuation of the combat and the many challenges that lie ahead.” At the same event, he described the October 7 attack as “an attack on the very existence of the Jewish people.”
In pre-election opinion polls, former Chief of Staff Eisenkot’s Yashar party continues to strengthen, mostly at the expense of the combined list led by former Prime Ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, known as Together.

Looking ahead: There is, as yet, no final date for the upcoming election, though speculation is focused on October 20, which would be only seven days earlier than the originally scheduled date of October 27 (which has still not been ruled out).

In Tel Aviv this evening there will be a protest outside the Defence Ministry and several events at the square in front of the Tel Aviv Museum of Art which has become known as Hostage Square, following the nonstop vigils there for two years after the massacre on behalf of the hostages held in Gaza until the last ones were released in October 2025.
Many of the unofficial ceremonies being held, including a large rally planned for tonight in Tel Aviv, are organised as protests demanding a State Commission of Inquiry into the failures that led to the massacre.

June 23, 2026

Concern over US limiting Israeli freedom of action

What’s happened: Israel affirms it will continue to act against threats.

On Monday evening Prime Minister Netanyahu along with his Minister of Defence and the IDF Chief of Staff issued a joint statement declaring, “The IDF will continue to act with determination in order to neutralise threats against our soldiers and our citizens, demolish terrorist infrastructure, and maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon.”
The comments followed reports from the talks in Switzerland between the US and Iran that Israel would not be party to a new de-confliction mechanism in Lebanon. Instead, the US would serve as Israel’s representative, and Iran would represent Hezbollah, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar.
Against the backdrop of those talks, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated earlier in the day that his directive to the IDF were clear and had not changed, adding that “Our fighters in southern Lebanon have full freedom of action to thwart any direct or developing threat to them or to the residents of the North. The IDF has no restrictions on this matter.”
While the IDF maintains full freedom of action inside the yellow line security zone, and can act to remove immediate threats, the US has placed restrictions to act elsewhere, specifically Beirut, but also elsewhere in Lebanon. A senior Israeli official told Channel 13 News, “The message we’ve gotten from the Americans in the past few weeks is clear: ‘You had credit to operate without restrictions, and that’s over.’”
On Monday evening, IDF Chief of Staff Zamir met in Gaza with senior IDF officers to discuss developments in the Strip and Hamas’s ongoing military buildup. The recommendation that was presented at the meeting was to begin an operation in the Gaza Strip to disarm Hamas—and to leave the intensity of this operation to the government’s discretion. However, the concern and assessment aired at the meeting was that President Trump would prevent a major operation and would agree to be flexible with Hamas on the issue of disarmament.
The IDF also announced that over the weekend security forces eliminated Sabai Zaher Abd al-Hamid Abu Hasna, a Nukhba terrorist in Hamas’ military wing. According to the IDF, “Throughout the war, Abu Hasna planted explosive devices and recently attempted to advance terrorist attacks targeting IDF troops operating in the area. Abu Hasna infiltrated Israeli territory during the October 7th massacre and took part in holding Omer Shem Tov hostage in Hamas captivity.”
Abu Hasna was eliminated alongside Ahmed Samir Muhammad Washah, who the IDF say “simultaneously served as a photographer for the Al Jazeera network and as a sniper operative for Hamas.”
In a separate strike last week, the IDF eliminated two more operatives in the military wings of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). According to the IDF, they operated within a Hamas-run financial network responsible for transferring funds into Gaza. As a result, they “facilitated the transfer of more than half a billion NIS (~£126 million) to Hamas’ military wing by operating a network of dozens of couriers and money exchangers in Turkey and the Gaza Strip. With these funds, Hamas has continued, particularly in recent months, to pay salaries to its terrorists and finance terror attacks against IDF troops and the civilians of the State of Israel, in violation of the ceasefire agreement.”

Context: Israel faces a challenging balancing act maintaining its freedom of operation in both Lebanon and Gaza, as well as how they maintain close coordination with the US.

Despite these latest IDF operations (described above) it is also understood that the Trump administration recently blocked other planned Israeli military operations in Gaza. The operation was discussed by senior Israeli officials, but the Americans were reportedly unimpressed and asked Israel not to pursue it at the current juncture in time.
There is ongoing concern that not enough pressure is being brought to bear by the US and their international partners to force Hamas into fulfilling its commitment to disarm. Two weeks ago, a delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya travelled to Egypt to begin talks about the second stage of the Trump peace plan and Hamas’s disarmament. Hamas officials argued that they could not comply because of Israel’s ongoing targeted attack and instead would only agree to disarm after a Palestinian state was established.
In lieu of any progress on disarmament, Israel is expanding its control of the Strip, now holding close to 70 per cent of the enclave. Despite the lack of progress the US are aiming to begin reconstruction in parts of Gaza that are under IDF control.
One of the current agenda items is where to base the technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. Israel is insisting that it be built near the yellow line so as to keep the NCAG out of Hamas’s control, but the Palestinian Authority has demanded that the structure be built deep inside Gaza territory. Israeli officials are worried that acceding to this demand will have a negative impact on disarmament, and on the reconstruction and future administration of the Gaza Strip, producing a situation in which Hamas is able to perpetuate its rule under the auspice of the NCAG.
Meanwhile Hamas remains armed and has continued to recruit and train operatives as well as preparing for future military operations against the IDF in Gaza.
Another concern is the amount of aid entering into Gaza now exceeds demand. Hamas is able to control the supply and stockpiling goods and selling the aid for profit.
Last week secret documents that were discovered in Gaza reveal that just before the October 7 assault, Hamas’s leadership discussed the need to prevent at any cost the steps being taken to normalise relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Two weeks before the massacre, Yahya Sinwar fiercely attacked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and – just a few days before October 7 – said that there was no choice but to take extraordinary measures to generate a strategic reversal. The documents include minutes of a meeting in Tehran between Iranian officials and a Hamas delegation.

Looking ahead: The latest round of direct talks between Israel and Lebanon are scheduled to begin later today in Washington. The parties are expected to discuss reaching an agreement about an initial IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Israel is thought to have drafted plans to resume fighting Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but will presumably seek to coordinate with the US first.

June 22, 2026

Hezbollah tunnel complex tests fragile Lebanon ceasefire

What’s happened: A publicly undeclared ceasefire appears to have taken hold in southern Lebanon over the past day after a particularly deadly weekend for the IDF in combat with Hezbollah.

Over the weekend, five Israeli soldiers were killed in two incidents, with a further thirteen injured. Since the formal ceasefire went into effect in on 17th April, 24 IDF soldiers have been killed in combat with Hezbollah.
Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said that Israel will respect the ceasefire as long as Hezbollah does as well. “We don’t have territorial ambitions in Lebanon,” he posted in a summary of a call with his New Zealand counterpart, “but we will not withdraw from the security zone and expose our citizens to Hezbollah’s attacks and possible invasion. Lebanon’s sovereignty has been breached for decades to this very day by Iran’s indirect occupation by Hezbollah. It’s the interest of both Lebanon and Israel that Hezbollah’s terror state will be dismantled.”
Tensions in Lebanon occur against the backdrop of talks in Switzerland that began yesterday between Iran and the US, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan.
The talks were attended by US Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The US delegation also included Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, while the Iranian one had parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani was there too, as were both the Prime Minister and top military officer of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif and Asim Munir.
After 18 hours of talks, the sides agreed to establishment of a “de-confliction cell” to end the fighting in Lebanon and reportedly agreed on a “roadmap” framework for negotiations to reach an agreement within the sixty days stipulated by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Context: Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire are intended to leave Israel in a strategic bind. Either it responds, and risks the ire of the Trump administration, as well as blame for scuttling talks to end the war in Iran, or it does nothing, allowing Hezbollah to attack it at will and formalising a linkage between Tehran’s priorities and the vulnerability of Israel’s northern towns and villages.

The focus of Israel’s paused, but essentially ongoing, military effort in Lebanon is on Nabatiyeh and the Ali Taher ridge, especially around the Beaufort Castle. Both sites are beyond the so-called Yellow Line, and both bring with them historical resonances from Israel’s previous wars in Lebanon.
Nabatiyeh is remembered in Israel as the place where Israel irrecoverably lost support from Lebanon’s Shias in an incident in October 1983. The bitter experience is widely studied as an example of what to avoid in any counterinsurgency situation.
The Beaufort Castle is remembered for the pitched battle to conquer it from the PLO early in the 1982 war and the triumphant but politically tone deaf appearance of senior politicians there the next day. It was also the most well documented site of Israel’s hasty withdrawal in May 2000, memorialised in a best-selling novel and popular film.
In the Ali Taher ridge itself, the IDF has located a massive underground complex of Hezbollah terrorists. Here is where the IDF has located the Badr’s unit’s nerve centre, including at least one tunnel that is one kilometre among an extensive system of tunnels, parts of which are inside the Yellow Line area of southern Lebanon. These are the tunnels Hezbollah would use in an October 7-style raid on northern Israel.
Since the weekend, the IDF has surrounded the facility and believes it is now in control of all the tunnel compound’s access points. It is estimated that there at least 30 Hezbollah fighters besieged in the complex. In line with US demands, the IDF is not opening fire for now.
Israeli officials quoted in the media believe that once the operation around the tunnel complex is ended, the IDF can begin staged withdrawals of territory in Lebanon, particularly territory north of the Yellow Line.
For Israel, it is important that any withdrawal be seen as an Israeli initiative or the outcome of Israel-Lebanese negotiations, and not as something dictated to Israel by the needs of US-Iran diplomacy.
Despite pressure from the political echelon (responding to pressure from the Trump Administration), senior IDF officials are unanimous that Israeli border communities cannot be protected right now from Hezbollah attack, whether that is in antitank missiles being fired at homes, as was the case from late 2023 until November 2024, or in an October 7-like raid into a civilian community, without an IDF presence close to the border in southern Lebanon.

Looking ahead: The political leaders who attended the talks in Switzerland are due to fly home today, but the technical teams will continue the talks on site and in person.

Talks between Israel and Lebanon are expected to be renewed today. Israel is interested in reaching an agreement with Lebanon that would see its forces leave small pockets of territory and hand them over directly to the Lebanese Armed Forces. These would serves as “pilot zones” where the LAF would prove that it could keep Hezbollah out and take responsibility for territory vacated by Israel.

June 19, 2026

Critique of the US-Iran MOU

The MOU appears to grant Iran significant economic concessions at the outset, while deferring the most important nuclear, regional, and enforcement questions to a later agreement.

Immediately upon signature, the United States commits to begin lifting the blockade of Iranian ports and to waive sanctions necessary to allow Iran to resume oil exports. At current prices, it is estimated that this could provide the Iranian regime with over $5 billion a month in additional revenue.

Iranian nuclear programme

The nuclear language in the MOU is limited. Iran reaffirms that it “shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons”, but similar commitments were already made under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the JCPOA. The MOU establishes a 60-day period to negotiate a full nuclear agreement and says that any final deal must resolve the disposition of Iran’s stockpiled enriched material, with down-blending on site under IAEA supervision.
However, the MOU does not require all enriched uranium to be removed from Iran. Nor does it make clear whether Iran would have to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, whether it would be permitted to retain enrichment capacity, or whether inspectors would have the “anytime, anywhere” access necessary to verify compliance.

Lebanon

The MOU also contains language with direct implications for Israel’s freedom of action. It states that the US, Iran, and “their allies in the current war” declare the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” This formulation appears to seek to bind Israel to an end to operations against Hezbollah, despite Israel not being a party to the MOU and despite ongoing threats from Hezbollah.
This could also complicate the US-backed Israel-Lebanon ceasefire reached in early June, which stated that any cessation of hostilities must be agreed directly between Israel and Lebanon, and not through a separate track.
It is also incredibly worrying that the US appears to have acceded to Iranian demands to link between the Islamic Republic in Iran and its proxy undermining sovereignty in Lebanon. For decades it has been a long established US position through consecutive administrations of both Democrats and Republicans that Hezbollah is a proscribed terrorist organisation responsible for the deaths of US citizens.

Financial and sanctions relief

The MOU also states that, “upon the implementation” of the agreement, the US will make fully available for use frozen or restricted Iranian funds and assets, potentially worth up to $100 billion. However, the text does not specify what concrete steps Iran must take before gaining access to these funds.
The agreement also allows released funds to be paid to any beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of Iran. This is significant because it appears broad enough to permit payments to entities linked to the IRGC, the Iranian military, or suppliers connected to Iran’s weapons procurement networks.
The MOU also envisages the development, together with regional partners, of a reconstruction and economic development plan for Iran worth at least $300 billion, to be implemented under a final agreement. Given the IRGC’s extensive role in the Iranian economy, including in construction and infrastructure, it is difficult to see how such a package could avoid materially benefiting an organisation designated by the US as a terrorist group.
Under a final agreement, the MOU calls for the complete elimination of sanctions on Iran, including UN Security Council sanctions and US primary and secondary sanctions. It does not appear to include a clear snapback mechanism should Iran violate the terms of the deal. This is especially significant because many US primary sanctions on Iran were originally imposed in response to terrorism, not only the nuclear programme. The agreement therefore appears to envisage the lifting of terrorism-related sanctions without requiring Iran to end its support for terrorist organisations.

Terrorism & proxies

The agreement does not address Iran’s support for terrorism, nor its missile and drone programmes. This omission is particularly important because sanctions relief could give Iran the resources to rebuild its conventional military capabilities and increase funding and other support to their proxies such as Hezbollah and newly established HAYI terrorist network that operates across Europe including in the UK.

Human rights

Finally, the MOU requires the US not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. This provision could be read as limiting American support for Iranian democracy, human rights, internet freedom, and broadcasting efforts. It would also mark a significant political concession to the regime at a time when Tehran continues to face domestic opposition and international criticism over its repression of protesters.

Conclusion

Taken together, the MOU appears to front-load economic relief for Iran, postpone the hardest nuclear questions, leave Iran’s regional proxy network untouched, and risk constraining Israeli action against Hezbollah. For Israel and other regional actors concerned by Iranian power, the central question is whether the 60-day negotiating period produces a more palatable agreement.

June 19, 2026

Iran MOU fallout grows as Hezbollah attacks IDF

What’s happened: Four IDF soldiers were killed Thursday night when a Hezbollah drone exploded on troops near the village of Kfartebnit in southern Lebanon.

Among those killed was Lt. Col. Dor Gedalia Ben Simhon, 32, of Kibbutz Beit Hashita, commander of the 52nd Battalion of the 401st Armoured Brigade.
In response to Hezbollah’s ongoing violations of the ceasefire, the IDF struck more than 80 command centres, terrorists, launch positions, and additional terrorist infrastructure sites in the area of Nabatieh and additional areas in southern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Iran’s negotiating delegation has suspended its trip to Switzerland due to continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, despite the recent signing of the MOU between the US and Iran.
US Vice President Vance delivered a speech featuring unusually harsh criticisms of Israel. Vance warned that Israel should not “attack” the only powerful ally they have in the world, and that Trump was “the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time.”
Furthermore, Vance stated that Israel was built with American money, in reference to the defensive ammunition used in Israel which is made in the US. Vance did, however, make clear that Israel has the right to defend itself in reference to the ceasefire with Lebanon. Vance also called out critics of the MOU, stating that the deal that was signed forces Iran to change its behaviour before receiving any benefits.
The Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament also stated that Lebanon is committed to the ceasefire in place with Israel, and Hezbollah will adhere to it as long as Israel does as well. This comes as Hezbollah attacks continued on Thursday, in which another IDF soldier Master Sergeant (res.) Alexander Filin was killed along with 6 more injured.

Context: Israel has stated that they reject the provision in the agreement requiring an immediate and permanent end to hostilities in Lebanon. Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed to President Trump that Israel does not consider itself bound by the MOU.

An IDF official has clarified that IDF forces will remain in the buffer zone 10km into southern Lebanon as long as the security situation warrants it. Israel won’t want to directly contradict and certainly not antagonise the US government, but as any self-respecting sovereign country – they will do all they need to do to protect their civilians and defend their national interests.
Israelis remain puzzled by the agreement that appears to consolidate the linkage and influence that Iran has over Lebanon. It has been a long-standing US foreign policy objective to decouple Iran’s stranglehold over Lebanon and its support for Hezbollah, a proscribed terrorist organisation.
Tensions between Israel and the US are likely to remain heightened, as the prevailing thought is that the US administration has moved from touting regime change, to now promising hundreds of billions to prop up a fundamentalist regime that has murdered tens of thousands of its own citizens.
The Lebanese president has blamed Hezbollah for beginning the latest round of fighting, and for importing a foreign conflict at Iran’s behest, which is against the interests of the Lebanese people.

Looking ahead: Efforts to reach a separate deal Israel and Lebanon are expected to continue, parallel to any agreement with Iran and the US.

There is heavy scepticism that the allotted 60-day period is a realistic timeframe to reach full agreement based on the MOU, and even if extended, if it can be implemented at all.

June 18, 2026

Israel reels from Trump’s Iran MOU

What’s happened: Yesterday in Versailles, President Trump signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated with Iran which will reopen the Strait of Hormuz and launch a sixty-day period of negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and the lifting of US sanctions on Iran.

The MOU comprises 14 points in total.
The first point declares “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Lebanon, in fact, is mentioned three times in the first point, which includes a clause committing the US and Iran to “ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon,” which presumably applies both to America’s ally Israel and to Iran’s proxy force Hezbollah.
The MOU establishes a sixty-day period for the two sides to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, extendable by mutual agreement. At the outset, the Iranians commit not to “procure or develop nuclear weapons.” Also, the US commits itself to terminating all sanctions on Iran when a final deal is agreed upon. When a final deal is agreed upon, it shall be endorsed by a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.
The US will end its blockade of Iran within 30 days, but otherwise maintains its status quo posture for the duration of the negotiation period. Once a final deal is reached, it will make a substantial withdrawal of its forces within 30 days after the comprehensive deal is signed.
Iran will reopen the Straits of Hormuz for commercial shipping traffic immediately, though it is given 30 days to complete the removal of mines and other obstacles. The MOU commits Iran to keep the Strait open and toll-free for sixty days, the same period as the negotiation period for the final deal, but curiously does not link the two, leaving it open to interpretation what the status of this aspect of the agreement would be if, as expected, the negotiations taking longer than sixty days and the period is extended by mutual consent.
A clause in the MOU committing both sides not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs would seem to be an official American abandonment of regime change in Iran as a political goal.
The White House also released the full text of the MOU, something it had refused to do in recent days after it had already agreed to it but before the President signed it.
The official text resembled the purported versions circulated by Iranian officials in the media over the past few days in most aspects, but with a few differences. The agreed text does not explicitly call for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and does not allow (for now) Iran to charge tolls for the passage of commercial vessels through the Strait, despite rumours and Iranian claims to the contrary over the past week.
Trump’s speech last night at the G7 was full of criticisms of Israel, its war in Lebanon, and Prime Minister Netanyahu. In this it continued a theme Trump has warmed to repeatedly in recent days.
The President once more criticised Israel’s use of force in Lebanon, saying, “You don’t have to knock down a building every time somebody walks into it that’s from Hezbollah.”
He unsubtly referred to Israel as “a very small partner,” though in this he was quoting something Prime Minister Netanyahu said to him.
He also dug up an incident from the distant past, when, according to him, the US and Israel endeavoured to eliminate Qassem Soleimani in a joint operation in 2020, but at the last minute Prime Minister Netanyahu opted out of any Israeli involvement. Ultimately, the US successfully eliminated Soleimani on its own. Few in Israel regretted the elimiation and few regretted that Israel wasn’t directly involved.
Though the diplomatic drama has put the war in Lebanon mostly on pause, it has not stopped it entirely. IDF soldiers moving on foot near the Litani River were hit by a Hezbollah IED yesterday. The device killed Master Sgt. Alexander Filin, a 29-year-old reservist from Haifa, and injured six others, including a female soldier and a deputy commander. Filin made aliyah from Ukraine as a teenager. In 2018, on the occasion of Israel’s 70th Independence Day, he was the recipient of the President’s Citation for Outstanding Soldiers for his courage in an incident where he successfully stopped a terrorist trying to carry out a stabbing attack.

Context: The agreement has almost universally been seen in Israel as a diplomatic and military catastrophe.

Israel media commentary was scathing in its assessment of the agreement and of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s management of the war effort.
Writing on the online news site Walla, Idan Kweller calls the agreement a “formative moment” in US-Israel relations. “This wasn’t Israel’s abandonment, but it definitely was a stern warning to Netanyahu. American support exists under the Trump administration, as long as Israel doesn’t stand in the way of clinching the larger deal.”
In Haaretz, Amos Harel argues that “The Iran affair is emerging as the second worst fiasco in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s long history, following Hamas’ massacre in southern Israel on October 7, 2023.”
Avner Vilan, in a posted commentary on N12, wrote, “At best, we’ve bought ourselves an insanely expensive nuclear agreement, without missiles and without proxies [being included] and with endless Iranian immunity. At worst, we’ve given Iran a lifeline, while it has barely given anything at all in return. In both cases, the same question remains: Why did we start this to begin with?”
Most Israeli analysts doubt that Iran and the US can actually come to a final agreement within 60 days — or at all, even with the deadline being extended. In such a scenario, Iran would not be able to enjoy significant sanctions relief and would probably not be able to see the promised relief fund of some $300 billion get off the ground, but it would begin recovering frozen assets and it would start selling oil, even if only to countries outside the direct US orbit. This would allow it to rapidly rebuild the defence facilities that it lost in the war and to reflate its economy, removing the main source of domestic pressure on the regime.
Even if negotiations did seem to be making serious progress, Iran could presumably threaten to close the Straits once more or attempt to reach an arrangement with the Omanis about “service fees,” as long as that was after 60 days — a deadline no one believes can be met anyway.

Looking ahead: US-led efforts to reach an agreement between Lebanon and Israel continue apace.

President Trump’s remarks earlier this week about having Syria, under its post-Assad regime, take responsibility for fighting Hezbollah rattled Israelis, Lebanese, and for that matter, Syrians too. Israeli media reported that the new Mossad head Roman Gofman suggested to the Cabinet taking the proposal seriously, but was overruled by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Meanwhile, a quiet effort is underway to arrange a public meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Washington, possibly with the participation of President Trump too.

June 15, 2026

US-Iran agreement leaves key nuclear questions unresolved

What’s happened: The US and Iran have reached a framework agreement to end the war that began nearly four months ago on February 28. The deal is to be signed this Friday.

The deal was announced by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who had served as a lead mediator between the sides, and was quickly confirmed by Iranian and US officials, including President Trump.
The text of the deal has not yet been made public. However, media reports are in general agreement about several of the key points in the agreement.
It is widely believed that the deal will stipulate a sixty-day period for the United States and Iran to come an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. At the beginning of this period, the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened to shipping, and the US’s blockade of Iranian ports will also be lifted.
The Pakistani statement on the agreement said that it included a commitment to a full ceasefire in Lebanon too, something which was not confirmed by US officials.
The issues that are addressed upfront in the deal include:
- An Iranian commitment not to develop nuclear weapons and to abide by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
- An immediate opening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping.
- An end to the US blockade of Iranian ports.
- A cessation of armed hostilities for the duration of the negotiation period.
The issues that are to be addressed in the sixty-day negotiation period include:
- Iran’s nuclear facilities.
- Limitations on Iranian enrichment capacities. Earlier US demands were for a 20-year moratorium on all enrichment followed by a permanent cap on enrichment no higher than 3.67 per cent, a level usable for energy but not weapons. In an interview with The New York Times yesterday, Trump hinted he might be willing to accept a 15-year moratorium, but would still insist on the permanent cap.
- The fate of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, including not just the highly enriched uranium currently believed to be buried under the ruins of a nuclear facility bombed by the United States in June 2025.
- Sanctions relief, which the United States has made no provision for in the interim agreement and will only consider as part of the larger comprehensive agreement, if one is reached.
Issues that might overlap or for which there are conflicting reports include:
- Billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, which the Iranians claimed may be, at least in part, unfrozen already during the sixty-day ceasefire period. US officials deny this, though they have in the past been keen to separate the issue of frozen assets from sanctions relief, on which they have been decidedly more insistent about not treating until after a full nuclear agreement is in place.
- Tolls on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, about which there are entirely contradictory claims from both Washington and Tehran that are difficult to assess in the absence of any publication of an agreed text.
- Iran’s ballistic missile programme, its support for regional proxies, and its internal repression are not treated in the interim agreement, and it is not clear which if any of these will be included in the negotiations during the sixty days of ceasefire.

Context: The announcement of an agreement came against the backdrop of a very tense day on the Israel-Lebanon front. Hezbollah launched three attack drones on Israeli communities in the north, sending residents into shelters, but ultimately causing no casualties on the Israeli side. Israel responded with a significant air strike in Beirut, eliminating three Hezbollah terrorists, including one wanted by the US for the killing of five Americans.

The air strike was followed by an Iranian threat to launch missiles against Israel in response. Israel’s Home Front Command raised alert levels and cancelled large public gatherings.
Ultimately, no Iranian missiles were launched. Significant US pressure on Iran not to do anything which would unravel the almost completed agreement, coupled with a vocal American condemnation of the Israeli operation in Beirut, brought the escalation to an end.
For the US, it was a significant diplomatic test, as well as a dilemma. For most of the last two months, the US has been insisting that any Israeli response to Hezbollah fire be contained to southern Lebanon, or at the very least, be outside of Beirut. The fact that one of the Hezbollah terrorists targeted yesterday was wanted by the US itself only heightened the dilemma faced by the Trump administration.
For Israel, it was an even more delicate and trying test. Israel does want to appear to ratify the new Iranian “equation” by which any Israeli attack in Lebanon leads to a counterattack on Israeli cities from Iran. In Jerusalem, it was understood that the Hezbollah drone attack was deliberately meant to set a diplomatic trap for Israel. If it failed to respond to the Hezbollah attack out of fear of Iranian retaliation, it was leaving itself open to an unlimited war of attrition on its north which it could not respond to. If it responded, it risked both US condemnation and a renewal of the war with Iran. Ultimately, Israel chose not accept the “equation,” and at the last minute, it was Iran that blinked.

Reactions: Vice President JD Vance, who is expected to sign the agreement this week in Switzerland on behalf of the United States, said that it would “fundamentally transform the Middle East for the next 50 years.”

Prime Minister Starmer welcomed the agreement and offered UK support for mine clearing in the reopened Strait of Hormuz. A statement from Number 10 added that, “We are clear that toll-free freedom of navigation must now be restored in the Strait of Hormuz, to begin easing the severe economic impacts that have been felt for several months – on families here in the UK and around the world.”
Official reactions in Israel have been muted thus far, with government officials stressing Israel’s independent authority to act both in Lebanon and in response to any Iranian attack on Israel.
Opposition politicians condemned Netanyahu for fumbling, in their eyes, Israel’s diplomacy.
Opposition Leader Yair Lapid tweeted that the deal “doesn’t achieve any of Israel’s war goals – the regime survives, the missile program is intact, and Iran can rebuild the nuclear programme,” and added that it was “total failure” by Netanyahu that turns Israel into a “protectorate that receives instructions regarding its national security.”
Yair Golan, leader of the left-wing Democrats, described the US-Iran agreement as “made over the heads” of Israel’s leaders. “With one signature, tremendous military achievements achieved with the courage of our pilots and the blood of our fighters were erased, while Netanyahu stood by – weak, sick, isolated and ineffective,” he posted on social media.
Also critical were ministers in the Government associated with the far-right. Finance Minister Smotrich called the agreement “bad for Israel and the entire free world.”
The announcement of the Iran framework agreement coincided with a pompous celebration of Donald Trump’s birthday in the White House Gardens.

Looking ahead: The allowed sixty days for negotiating a comprehensive agreement would take the US past the World Cup and well into the midterm election season, also an election period in Israel. Trump, in multiple interviews over the past two days, has threatened that he would not hesitate to use force again if an agreement is not reached.

Despite this, there is some scepticism about whether the US would really be able to mount a costly military operation at the end of summer as an election campaign is underway. This scepticism will surely weaken the American bargaining position in the talks.
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Trump dropped an interesting hint about how he weighs his potential lever in a situation where talks do break down after sixty days. He claimed that the American naval blockade on Iranian ports had ultimately proved more successful at pushing the Iranians closer to US positions than any kinetic military action. Despite getting less attention than American or Israeli air strikes and the Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz, the blockade, according to Trump, was “more powerful than the hits.”
Beyond the concerns that Israeli officials expressed about the nuclear programme or even the ballistic missile programme or Iran’s regional proxies, there is a real apprehension that even a good agreement, accompanied by sanctions relief, could end up extending a financial lifeline to the Islamist regime only months after it appeared on the verge of collapse.
Donald Trump is due to attend the G7 Summit in France, which starts today and runs until Wednesday. This will be the first opportunity for US G7 partners, including the UK, to be briefed on the details of the Iranian deal at the highest level.

June 11, 2026

US and Iran escalate exchange of strikes

What’s happened: The US and Iran engaged in a fresh exchange of missile fire and air strikes yesterday and overnight.

The US launched what CENTCOM characterised as “self-defence strikes” against multiple targets in Iran, including in the southern port city of Bandar Abbas. The term “self-defence strikes” is the preferred term to describe American operations that are intended to be seen as pointed responses and not signal the end of the ceasefire in effect since April 8.
US media reported that this wave of strikes included not just ordnance fired from aircraft but also 49 Tomahawk missiles. Among the targets reportedly hit was a large water facility on the Iranian coast of the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians reported that water service in the region was cut off for 20,000 people. The water facility is adjacent to an underground Iranian air force base. Other targets by US forces included IRGC service units, coastal posts, and police command sites.
Iran announced this morning that it had launched 18 attacks on US military facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain. This morning’s attacks, unlike yesterday, did not apparently include targets in Jordan.
In the hours since this morning’s Iranian attacks, a US reprisal attack has apparently been underway, with a broader geographical range than the operations on Tuesday or Wednesday. CENTCOM reported targeting Iranian military surveillance capabilities, communication systems and air defence sites across southern Iran. An explosion was reported in Karaj, outside of Tehran, site of a major Iranian base and missile factory. There were conflicting reports of an attack on the South Pars gas facility.

Rhetoric: While previous rounds of mutual limited attacks between the US and Iran since the ceasefire went into effect have been accompanied by statements from both sides that sought to portray the operations as not signalling the imminent end of the ceasefire, today’s exchange of fire was accompanied by more bellicose statements.

The commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, General Majid Mousavi was quoted in Iranian state media as saying, ““You are making the holy Strait of Hormuz unsafe? We will turn the entire region into hell from across Iran. This is the response to America’s aggression in the region.”
President Trump, too, signalled that he is running out of patience with the ceasefire and the negotiations that have not yet led to any agreement, telling US media that if an agreement was not reached soon, he would “bomb the shit out of Iran.”

Context: The possibility that the ceasefire with Iran could unravel has brought about a change in the IDF’s priorities too. The IDF has begun scaling back its operations in Lebanon to free up air forces for a potential renewal of hostilities in Iran.

The IDF also brought home forces that were operating for 30 days in Lebanese territory north of the Litani River.
With the soldiers safely back at base, the IDF shared with media for the first time some of the details of its operations in this sector, including the capture of a massive weapons facility, hastily abandoned by Hezbollah fighters whose units have been collapsing in the face of the Israeli onslaught. At the facility were launchers with missiles ready to be launched at Israel’s northern communities, as well as drones, anti-tank missiles, rifles, and vests, presumably for use in an October 7-style invasion of northern Israel.

Gaza: Talks continue in Egypt to reach an agreement on Hamas disarmament, in line with the comprehensive plan which ended two years of war in Gaza last October. Israel is not a participant in the talks, which are also mediated by Qatar and Turkey, along with Egypt.

According to Arab sources, Hamas has shown some willingness to give up its “heavy weapons,” but not its “light weapons. The former category includes the missiles and rockets it uses to attack Israel. The latter category includes the rifles and other munitions it needs to maintain its domestic control of Gaza.
The Israeli assessment is that Hamas has almost no heavy weapons left anyway, so this is at most a symbolic concession. Though Israel is not a party to the talks, it is unlikely to permit the entry into the Gaza Strip from Egypt of the so-called “technocratic committee” which is supposed to handle governance of Gaza unless there is an agreed disarmament that meets Israel’s minimal conditions.
Without disarmament, the progress of the comprehensive agreement is stalled, and the renewal of combat becomes more likely. This is especially the case as the major international actors involved have been laying the blame for the failure on Hamas and not on Israel, and as Israel will not, in any renewed hostilities, need to avoid operating in the Hamas redoubts of the refugee camps in the centre of the Strip for fear of harming Israeli hostages — because Hamas no longer holds any.

June 10, 2026

US strikes Iran as Israel intensifies operations in Lebanon

What’s happened: A US Apache helicopter went down near the Strait of Hormuz yesterday. Both crew members were rescued alive by an unmanned sea drone. According to CENTCOM, this is the first such rescue successfully carried out by an autonomous surface vessel.

Official Iranian media claimed that Iranian forces had not engaged in any aerial activities near the Strait, and for hours after the incident it was unclear what exactly had transpired. Then President Trump announced that the helicopter had been shot down by Iranian fire, with US officials confirming that an Iranian one-way Shahed drone had brought the helicopter down.
In response, US forces launched a limited air strike against Iranian air defence, radar, and ground control stations near the Strait of Hormuz. An official CENTCOM statement referred to the US operation as “self-defence strikes,” the preferred term of US officials for operations that are not intended to signal an end to the US-Iran ceasefire in effect since April 8.
The Iranians responded this morning with what they claimed were attacks on 21 US bases in the region. Iran also claimed to have shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Iranian territory.
US officials denied that Iran had struck 21 or even fired at 21 sites. US and regional officials described successful interceptions of Iranian missiles over Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, where the target appears to have been a large US air base at Al Azraq.
The ceasefire that was effectively imposed by the Trump administration on Iran and Israel after one day of mutual fire on Monday held. The Iranian attempt to leverage missile launches on Israel to bail out its proxy in Lebanon failed to stop Israeli action in Lebanon, however. The IDF this morning announced further evacuation orders in southern Lebanon ahead of anticipated Israeli military strikes. Earlier today, the IDF carried out a large strike against Hezbollah targets in the Lebanese city of Tyre.
The Israeli operations in Lebanon, including fire beyond the Litani River, carry significance on two levels. They constitute offensive action against Hezbollah, which had been attacking northern Israel in the week before, and they demonstrate definitively that the Iranian attempt this week to create a new “equation” by which Iran could fire at Israeli cities if Israel operated in Lebanon, failed to produce the result desired by Tehran.
Also yesterday, an armed man in a military uniform crossed into Israel from Lebanon. When he was discovered by the IDF, he opened fire, but was eliminated by IDF fire.
The UK Government is advancing legislation in Parliament that would designate the IRGC as a “threat to national security,” potentially closing a loophole that made it difficult to apply existing anti-terrorism provisions to a state-run intelligence service, rather than a non-state actor, even one backed a sovereign state, as existing legislation permits. This follows the discovery of at least 20 suspected plots to carry out attacks in the UK, especially against Jewish targets.
This move occurs on the same day that the UK announced a raft of sanctions against six firms it alleges are complicit in enabling settler violence in the West Bank. The six associations are small fundraisers, none of which are known to have assets or activities in the UK. This announcement was accompanied by an announcement of £10 million in aid for the Palestinian Authority, that was, notably, not conditioned on any reform or an end to the Authority’s policy of paying families of convicted terrorists.

Context: The low-scale flare-up between US and Iranian forces in the Gulf, like the one day of fighting between Israel and Iran earlier this week, all occur on the backdrop of a feverish US effort to reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme.

US officials have begun leaking to American media some of the areas of agreement between the two sides in negotiations thus far. These include:
- An Iranian commitment to suspend uranium enrichment for an extended period. The Iranians have apparently offered to suspend enrichment for ten years, while the US has demanded twenty. There was speculation the sides might agree on fifteen, though public pronouncements by President Trump indicate that the US will insist on twenty to reach an agreement.
- Iran will “downblend” all enriched uranium. Earlier the US had insisted that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium be shipped out of the country. This stockpile is estimated at roughly 480 kg and believed to be buried in the ruins of a nuclear site destroyed by US forces in Operation Midnight Hammer last summer. If the leak is true, then none of this stockpile would leave Iran; it would, rather, be diluted (or “downblended”) in Iran with an active US role. Moreover, the agreed downblending would apply not just to the 480kg of highly enriched uranium, but to all the estimated 11 tons of uranium that has been enriched, even to much lower levels.
- Iran would dismantle all three of its major nuclear sites in Natanz, Fordo, and Isfahan. It is unclear if Iran has actually agreed to this or whether it is still insisting on shutting down only two out of three.
- A strict international inspections regime. Iran would have to agree to so-called “snap” inspections, which are unannounced ahead of time, by international inspectors, including at IRGC sites, where Iran had previously blocked inspectors’ access.
It is not known what the sides may or not have agreed to as far as the two parallel blockades imposed by the US and Iran, though it is widely believed both would be lifted quickly. It is much less likely, however, that any unfreezing of Iranian assets would happen as quickly, at least according to US sources.
Notably, none of the leaks about negotiations mention issues that were key points of contention in the lead-up to the war which began on February 28, including Iran’s support of regional proxy armies, its ballistic missile programme, or its violent suppression of protests in January of this year.
Global energy markets continue to adjust for Iran’s blockade, now more than 100 days old, on shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. While the process is hardly painless and affects major US allies differently — Saudi Arabia and the UAE have alternative to the Strait while Qatar does not — the impact of the Iranian blockade has so far been much less catastrophic than initially feared. On the other hand, the US blockade or Iranian ports continues to grind down the Iranian economy with Israeli officials believing a breaking point there may be only weeks away.

Looking ahead: In Cairo, talks are underway between Palestinian factions under an Egyptian-led effort to reach an agreement on implementing the Gaza ceasefire and finding a workable formulation for Hamas disarmament, a key provision of the ceasefire. A successful agreement could pave the way for the “technocratic” committee to enter Gaza and bring the comprehensive agreement, which ended the war in October 2025, to the next stage.

Israeli officials are markedly pessimistic about any real mechanism for Hamas disarmament. According to Israeli analysts, Hamas has managed to retrench and rebuild its military and governing capacities in the roughly 40% of the Gaza Strip which it still controls.
Failure to implement the disarmament clause of the comprehensive agreement increases the likelihood that at some point the IDF will enter the rest of Gaza and forcibly disarm Hamas itself. In the war which began on October 7, 2023 and ended two years later with the comprehensive agreement, Israeli forces refrained from entering Hamas redoubts in central Gaza’s refugee camps for fear of harming Israeli hostages who were largely held in, and under, those densely populated areas. These hostages are all now home.

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