What’s happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu met President Trump at the White House yesterday (7th April) in a hastily arranged meeting that reportedly focused on tariffs and Iran, with some attention also given to the war in Gaza and the hostages still held there by Hamas.
- Trump announced that the US will be holding direct talks with Iran in an attempt to reach a new deal on the Iranian nuclear programme. Talks are due to begin this Saturday in Oman, where an American delegation led by Steve Witkoff will meet the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.
- This will be the first such high-level contact between the sides in ten years. Failure to reach an agreement would place Tehran “in great danger,” in Trump’s words.
- Netanyahu had hoped to secure an American cancellation of tariffs imposed on Israel last week. This was not forthcoming, though President Trump did commend Israel for eliminating duties on American goods last week. Referring to Israeli efforts to eliminate any remaining barriers to US imports in Israel, Netanyahu said “I think Israel can serve as a model for many countries who ought to do the same.”
Context: The 2015 agreement between Iran and six leading states, known as the JCPOA, limiting Iran’s nuclear programme for a period of fifteen years was deeply opposed by Israel as well as hawkish element in domestic American politics and elsewhere. Disagreement over the JCPOA was the high point of tensions between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
- In 2018, President Trump withdrew from the agreement, but the other countries who were part of it — the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China — did not.
- It has been ten years since the last time the US and Iran engaged in direct talks over Iran’s nuclear programme, and the implied threat hovering over the talks of US-led military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities hasn’t changed. But at least three aspects of the threat and incentive structure are dramatically different in 2025 compared to 2015:
- Iran appears to have enriched significantly more uranium than was the case in 2015.
- Iran’s ability to defend itself from aerial attacks is greatly degraded as a result of the Israeli operation in 2024 which destroyed its air defences as well as its missile fuel production facility.
- Iran’s array of regional proxies threatening Israel and American interests in the region has been even more severely degraded than its air defence system. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been almost entirely taken out of a commission since a rapid Israeli offensive last autumn. And Hamas in Gaza has been pinned down by the destructive war it launched on October 7, 2023.
- An additional Iranian proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, have also experienced strikes from the US. Following the Trump-Netanyahu meeting US Secretary of Defense Hegseth told reporters “It’s been a bad three weeks for the Houthis, and it’s about to get worse.” He described the campaign as “devastating,” targeting underground facilities, weapons manufacturing bunkers, Houthi fighters, and air defence systems. Hegseth also criticised Iran for its continued support warning that “We have a lot more options and a lot more pressure to apply.”
- Israel’s strategic posture vis-à-vis a negotiated process it is not a direct party to is also significantly different from what it was in 2015. On the one hand, it is much less threatened by Iranian deterrent assets on its borders. On the other, if it opposes whatever deal the Trump administration reaches with the Iranians, it has no one in domestic American politics with whom it can make a common cause over such opposition.
- Despite the less festive tone (in comparison to the previous Netanyahu Oval Office visit earlier this year) and the obvious areas of disagreement, both Israel and American officials were keen to emphasise the ideological and personal alignment of the two countries’ leaders.
Looking Ahead: As negotiations get underway, the positions staked out by the US and Iran on the most contentious issues are very far apart. Israel, which is not a party to the talks, insists on a “Libya model,” alluding to the 2003 agreement which saw Libya dismantle entirely its nascent nuclear facilities and ship them out of the country.
- The announcement of direct US-Iran talks shuts the window, for now, on an Israeli military offensive against Iranian nuclear assets. Israel cannot launch an attack while the US is negotiating with Iran without angering the American administration. And if talks succeed in reaching an agreement, Israel cannot realistically launch an attack either. If talks fail, it will be up to the US to carry out its threats against the Iranians, or find itself in a weaker position in any future diplomatic confrontation. Referencing just such a threat, President Trump said, “I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious.”
- Both the Prime Minister and the President addressed the question of Turkey’s role in Syria in particularly delicate terms. The implication of both men’s comments was that the US will seek to mediate discreet understandings between Turkey and Israel regarding each side’s most vital interests in post-Assad Syria. Israel is very concerned about a jihadist government on its doorstep backed by Turkey, a hostile regional power that is also a member of NATO.
- President Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next month, and it is widely speculated that he would like a new ceasefire in Gaza in place in time for that visit, and that he is particularly keen to see the last remaining living hostage with US citizenship, Edan Alexander, among those released.


