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Israel, the UK and the world

Key background
  • The UK and Israel share a strong relationship, built on historical, economic, and diplomatic ties. Both nations collaborate closely in trade, science, technology, and defence, with the UK being a key partner to Israel. The UK supports Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. Scientific progress, academic partnerships, and shared values of democracy further strengthen the bond.
  • Israel maintains diplomatic ties with 165 of the other 192 UN member states.
  • Israel maintains full diplomatic relations with two of its Arab neighbours, Egypt and Jordan, after signing peace treaties with the former in 1979, and the latter, 1994.
  • In 2020, supported by the US, Israel signed the Abraham Accords agreements establishing diplomatic relations with Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco.
Palestine Action Protest in London, September 6, 2025.
Palestine Action Protest in London, September 6, 2025. Photo credit: indigonolan, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

Updated June 17, 2026

Court of Appeal upholds Palestine Action proscription

What’s happened: On Monday, the British Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s February ruling that then Home Secretary’s designation of Palestine Action had been unlawful, meaning that the group’s proscription still stands.

  • Responding to the announcement, the Home Secretary said that “The Court has found that Palestine Action has carried out acts of terrorism, celebrated those who have taken part in those acts and promoted the use of violence. It is not an ordinary protest or civil disobedience group, and its actions are not consistent with democratic values and the rule of law.”
  • She added that “This decision does not affect lawful protest in support of the Palestinian cause, which remains a fundamental democratic right. There is a difference between supporting Palestine and supporting a proscribed terrorist group.”
  • In a summary of the case, the Lady Chief Justice, Baroness Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill, said that it was “not sustainable” for Palestine Action to be portrayed as a non-violent organisation or a normal protest group given its continued intent to use violence. “It is not – as claimed – a direct action civil disobedience protest group like the suffragettes, operating transparently in the open,” she said, adding that the group “is a covert organisation which operates with secret cells to avoid the detection and prosecution of those using violence to destroy property and cause injury.”
  • The court concluded that the original judgement had been lawful, striking a fair balance between protecting national security and the right to protest.

Context: The government’s intent to proscribe Palestine Action was announced in June 2025 by the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper. That decision was taken days after the group raided and vandalised two Airbus A330 MRTT planes at RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire. Palestine Action subsequently claimed that this was an attempt to interrupt “Britain’s direct participation in the commission of genocide and war crimes across the Middle East”.

  • The planes were sprayed with red paint using repurposed fire extinguishers, and no other damage was caused. Two Palestine Action members infiltrated the airfield using scooters, and do not appear to have been challenged by base security. The damage caused was estimated by the authorities at £7 million. 
  • Addressing the Commons on 23rd June, Cooper stated that, since its founding in 2020, the group had “orchestrated a nationwide campaign of direct criminal action against businesses and institutions.” Increasing the frequency of its operations since 2024, Cooper argued that its “methods have become more aggressive, with its members demonstrating a willingness to use violence”. Apart from defence industry and infrastructure, other targets have included financial firms, charities, universities and Government buildings.
  • Cooper also emphasised that these activities had since reached the “threshold set out in the statutory tests established under the Terrorism Act 2000”, and that the group had “provided practical advice to assist its members with conducting attacks that have resulted in serious damage to property.”
  • In November 2024, Palestine Action claimed responsibility for an attack against the building which housed BICOM’s offices, as well as other Jewish community charities and Jewish-owned businesses. The accompanying Palestine Action specifically identified BICOM as having been the attack’s target.
  • In October 2025, Palestine Action’s founder, Huda Ammori, was granted permission to judicially appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision. She was initially successful in doing so, with the High Court ruling that proscription was both “unlawful” and disproportionate in how it interfered with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, both of which are protected under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights in February 2026.
  • Immediately after the High Court’s ruling, the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, announced her intent to contest it in the Court of Appeal. Her appeal began in April of this year, and concluded on Monday with a finding in her favour.
  • As a proscribed group, belonging to or supporting Palestine Action is punishable by sentences of up to 14 years. Since its initial banning, its supporters have deliberately risked arrest by holding signs in public reading “I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action.”
  • Over 3000 individuals have been arrested on suspicion of Terrorism Act breaches in support of Palestine Action since July 2025, mostly at large demonstrations. Of these, just over 700 have been charged.
  • 117 individuals were arrested on suspicion of showing support for a proscribed organisation, namely Palestine Action at protests outside of the Court of Appeal. Of these, it is a realistic possibility that a significant proportion will be charged and face criminal proceedings for their alleged support of Palestine Action.
  • Last week, Four Palestine Action activists were jailed after causing £1.2m of damage and inflicting grievous bodily harm on a police sergeant.

Looking ahead: In an interview with the Guardian, Huda Ammori has confirmed her intent to have the Court of Appeal’s decision overturned and that the battle to do so will be won in the courts “or on the streets.”

  • No timeframe for has been given for when this legal action may be initiated, but Ammori has specifically cited a willingness to escalate to the UK Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights if necessary.
  • It is highly likely that the Home Office will continue to challenge any further legal attempts to override Palestine Action’s proscription.
  • Even in the event that Monday’s decision is appealed to the Supreme Court or European Court of Human Rights, it is highly unlikely that any ongoing prosecutions against alleged Palestine Action members and supporters will be discontinued.

June 10, 2026

US strikes Iran as Israel intensifies operations in Lebanon

Sailors aboard USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) conduct night flight operations. June 7, 2026.
Sailors aboard USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) conduct night flight operations. June 7, 2026. Photo credit: US Central Command / X

What’s happened: A US Apache helicopter went down near the Strait of Hormuz yesterday. Both crew members were rescued alive by an unmanned sea drone. According to CENTCOM, this is the first such rescue successfully carried out by an autonomous surface vessel.

  • Official Iranian media claimed that Iranian forces had not engaged in any aerial activities near the Strait, and for hours after the incident it was unclear what exactly had transpired. Then President Trump announced that the helicopter had been shot down by Iranian fire, with US officials confirming that an Iranian one-way Shahed drone had brought the helicopter down.
  • In response, US forces launched a limited air strike against Iranian air defence, radar, and ground control stations near the Strait of Hormuz. An official CENTCOM statement referred to the US operation as “self-defence strikes,” the preferred term of US officials for operations that are not intended to signal an end to the US-Iran ceasefire in effect since April 8.
  • The Iranians responded this morning with what they claimed were attacks on 21 US bases in the region. Iran also claimed to have shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Iranian territory.
  • US officials denied that Iran had struck 21 or even fired at 21 sites. US and regional officials described successful interceptions of Iranian missiles over Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, where the target appears to have been a large US air base at Al Azraq.
  • The ceasefire that was effectively imposed by the Trump administration on Iran and Israel after one day of mutual fire on Monday held. The Iranian attempt to leverage missile launches on Israel to bail out its proxy in Lebanon failed to stop Israeli action in Lebanon, however. The IDF this morning announced further evacuation orders in southern Lebanon ahead of anticipated Israeli military strikes. Earlier today, the IDF carried out a large strike against Hezbollah targets in the Lebanese city of Tyre.
  • The Israeli operations in Lebanon, including fire beyond the Litani River, carry significance on two levels. They constitute offensive action against Hezbollah, which had been attacking northern Israel in the week before, and they demonstrate definitively that the Iranian attempt this week to create a new “equation” by which Iran could fire at Israeli cities if Israel operated in Lebanon, failed to produce the result desired by Tehran.
  • Also yesterday, an armed man in a military uniform crossed into Israel from Lebanon. When he was discovered by the IDF, he opened fire, but was eliminated by IDF fire.
  • The UK Government is advancing legislation in Parliament that would designate the IRGC as a “threat to national security,” potentially closing a loophole that made it difficult to apply existing anti-terrorism provisions to a state-run intelligence service, rather than a non-state actor, even one backed a sovereign state, as existing legislation permits. This follows the discovery of at least 20 suspected plots to carry out attacks in the UK, especially against Jewish targets.
  • This move occurs on the same day that the UK announced a raft of sanctions against six firms it alleges are complicit in enabling settler violence in the West Bank. The six associations are small fundraisers, none of which are known to have assets or activities in the UK. This announcement was accompanied by an announcement of £10 million in aid for the Palestinian Authority, that was, notably, not conditioned on any reform or an end to the Authority’s policy of paying families of convicted terrorists.

Context: The low-scale flare-up between US and Iranian forces in the Gulf, like the one day of fighting between Israel and Iran earlier this week, all occur on the backdrop of a feverish US effort to reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme.

  • US officials have begun leaking to American media some of the areas of agreement between the two sides in negotiations thus far. These include:
    • An Iranian commitment to suspend uranium enrichment for an extended period. The Iranians have apparently offered to suspend enrichment for ten years, while the US has demanded twenty. There was speculation the sides might agree on fifteen, though public pronouncements by President Trump indicate that the US will insist on twenty to reach an agreement.
    • Iran will “downblend” all enriched uranium. Earlier the US had insisted that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium be shipped out of the country. This stockpile is estimated at roughly 480 kg and believed to be buried in the ruins of a nuclear site destroyed by US forces in Operation Midnight Hammer last summer. If the leak is true, then none of this stockpile would leave Iran; it would, rather, be diluted (or “downblended”) in Iran with an active US role. Moreover, the agreed downblending would apply not just to the 480kg of highly enriched uranium, but to all the estimated 11 tons of uranium that has been enriched, even to much lower levels.
    • Iran would dismantle all three of its major nuclear sites in Natanz, Fordo, and Isfahan. It is unclear if Iran has actually agreed to this or whether it is still insisting on shutting down only two out of three.
    • A strict international inspections regime. Iran would have to agree to so-called “snap” inspections, which are unannounced ahead of time, by international inspectors, including at IRGC sites, where Iran had previously blocked inspectors’ access.
  • It is not known what the sides may or not have agreed to as far as the two parallel blockades imposed by the US and Iran, though it is widely believed both would be lifted quickly. It is much less likely, however, that any unfreezing of Iranian assets would happen as quickly, at least according to US sources.
  • Notably, none of the leaks about negotiations mention issues that were key points of contention in the lead-up to the war which began on February 28, including Iran’s support of regional proxy armies, its ballistic missile programme, or its violent suppression of protests in January of this year.
  • Global energy markets continue to adjust for Iran’s blockade, now more than 100 days old, on shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. While the process is hardly painless and affects major US allies differently — Saudi Arabia and the UAE have alternative to the Strait while Qatar does not — the impact of the Iranian blockade has so far been much less catastrophic than initially feared. On the other hand, the US blockade or Iranian ports continues to grind down the Iranian economy with Israeli officials believing a breaking point there may be only weeks away.

Looking ahead: In Cairo, talks are underway between Palestinian factions under an Egyptian-led effort to reach an agreement on implementing the Gaza ceasefire and finding a workable formulation for Hamas disarmament, a key provision of the ceasefire. A successful agreement could pave the way for the “technocratic” committee to enter Gaza and bring the comprehensive agreement, which ended the war in October 2025, to the next stage.

  • Israeli officials are markedly pessimistic about any real mechanism for Hamas disarmament. According to Israeli analysts, Hamas has managed to retrench and rebuild its military and governing capacities in the roughly 40% of the Gaza Strip which it still controls.
  • Failure to implement the disarmament clause of the comprehensive agreement increases the likelihood that at some point the IDF will enter the rest of Gaza and forcibly disarm Hamas itself. In the war which began on October 7, 2023 and ended two years later with the comprehensive agreement, Israeli forces refrained from entering Hamas redoubts in central Gaza’s refugee camps for fear of harming Israeli hostages who were largely held in, and under, those densely populated areas. These hostages are all now home.

April 30, 2026

Israel condemns London terror attack

Terrorist stabbing people in Golders Green, London, April 29, 2026.
Terrorist stabbing people in Golders Green, London, April 29, 2026. Photo credit: CCT footage / X

What’s happened: President Herzog said he was “horrified by yet another violent attack on Jews in broad daylight on the streets of London.”

  • He added, “No Jew anywhere in the world should be a target because of their faith. In one of the great capital cities of the West, it has become dangerous to openly walk the streets as a Jew. This is an unacceptable situation. The British government and authorities must take urgent and immediate action before the next antisemitic attack occurs.”
  • The Prime Minsters Office released a statement noting, “Weakness gaslights one antisemitic attack after another in London. Words are not enough to confront this scourge. We demand and expect action by the British Government to protect the Jews of England and bring antisemites to justice.”
  • Israeli media reported that two Israeli tourists had saved at least ten other people from the terrorist. An eye witness told Kan News, “They ran after the stabber and warned everyone. There was a woman with a baby carriage with a little girl in it, whom they ushered away from the site. He was literally chasing her, so she was really, really lucky. They simply ran after him and began to yell to people to simply go, to go, to go, run away from here.”
  • Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism connected the attack to the new Iranian terrorist group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI)  after they claimed responsibility for this latest attack in London. They had previously been behind several recent arson attacks targeting Jewish sites. 
  • Minister Chikli said, “The handwriting is on the wall, written in blood. We have warned in recent weeks that this is an emerging organisation with characteristics of decentralised terrorism, and today we see the realisation of this threat in the heart of London. The British government must wake up, do much more, and ensure the security of the Jewish communities.
  • Israeli officials monitoring the new group say they have identified, “coordinated pattern of operation that combines online propaganda, the mobilisation of local operatives, and distribution infrastructures linked to pro-Iranian militant networks.”
  • The ministry calls on European countries to “increase intelligence cooperation and enforcement against terrorist infrastructures operating in the digital and physical spheres, to prepare for the possibility of further attempted attacks against Jewish communities, and to act to thwart any terrorist activity against Jewish communities.
  • According to the ministry, “Between 27 April 2025, and 27 April 2026, approximately 6.37 million antisemitic posts related to the UK were published on X . Simultaneously, there was an increase in violent incidents against Jews, including the assault of an Orthodox Jewish man in Slough, arsons and attempted arsons of Jewish institutions in London, the torching of “Hatzola” ambulances in Golders Green, additional physical assaults against Jews in public spaces, and a fatal attack outside a synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur.”

April 20, 2026

Iranian proxy targets London Jewish sites

View of Regent Street in London, England. September 23, 2022.
View of Regent Street in London, England. September 23, 2022. Photo by Nati Shohat/Flash90

What’s happened: Police have opened an investigation into Iranian links to a series of arson attacks on Jewish targets in London.

  • On Saturday night, Kenton United Synagogue was targeted in an arson attack; two teenagers were arrested.
  • Chief Rabbi Sir Ephraim Mirvis said the Kenton fire, which did not cause any significant damage, was the third “cowardly” attack on Jewish sites in London in less than a week.
  • Posting on X Mirvis said, “A sustained campaign of violence and intimidation against the Jewish community of the UK is gathering momentum…Thank God, no lives have been lost, but we cannot, and must not, wait for that to change before we understand just how dangerous this moment is for all of our society.”
  • On Friday night, there was another attempted arson attack on a building  with links to the Jewish community, while last week, police arrested two suspects over an attempted arson attack on another synagogue in the capital.
  • Prime Minister Starmer said, “This is abhorrent, and it will not be tolerated. Attacks on our Jewish community are attacks on Britain.”
  • The Pro-Iranian group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) or Movement of the Companions of the Right Hand of Islam, has said it is responsible, and posted a video purporting to show the attack on the Kenton synagogue on social media.

Context: Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) are a recently established Iranian proxy group. They have only been active since Israel and the US began their military campaign against Iran on 28th February 2026, and are likely part of Tehran’s retaliation strategy against Israel.

  • HAYI’s activities are assessed as almost certainly being part of a broader Iranian intelligence service-led psychological warfare campaign against Israel using diaspora Jewish communities as a proxy target.
  • HAYI represent a low-cost and low-risk asset which is almost certainly easy to operate with a degree of deniability, yet able to achieve significant cognitive effects on an adversary target audience, as well as divert responding local security agency resources.
  • Often described as a cut-out, they primarily exist on Telegram and are not believed to have members in a traditional sense. They are assessed as likely being controlled and directed by an Iranian intelligence service, i.e. the IRGC.
  • HAYI target Jewish and Zionist organisations with relatively unsophisticated arson attacks. Rather than attempting spectacular attacks to maximise casualties, HAYI tends to use or claims to have used incendiary devices or drones against these organisations, then creates videos of the attacks which are uploaded onto Iranian-linked Telegram channels.
  • HAYI’s claimed attacks include:
    • An explosion at a synagogue in Liege, Belgium on 9th March.
    • A claimed attack on an unspecified site in Greece on 11th March. No evidence of any such attack has been found.
    • An arson attack on a synagogue in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on 13th March.
    • An explosion at a Jewish school in Amsterdam, the Netherlands on 14th March.
    • An arson attack on ambulances belonging to the Hatzolo charity in Golders Green, London on 23rd March. HAYI claimed that the adjacent synagogue was targeted.
    • An attack against the Bank of America in Paris was foiled by French authorities in on 29th March. The bank had been named as a potential target on HAYI’s Telegram channel.
    • A failed arson attack at a synagogue in Finchley, London, on 15th April.
    • An arson attack at Iran International’s parent company’s studios in Park Royal, London on 15th April
    • A claimed radioactive drone attack against the Israeli Embassy in Kensington, London, on 16th April. The Metropolitan Police and Israeli MFA have since confirmed that the Embassy was not attacked.
    • A failed arson attack at a Jewish charity (Jewish Futures) with links to Israel’s former offices in Hendon, London on 17th April.
    • A failed arson attack at a synagogue in Kenton, London on 18th April.
  • While investigations have been led or supported by Counter Terrorism Policing, they are being treated as antisemitic hate crimes rather than terrorist attacks.
  • The Metropolitan Police have said that the arson attack on Jewish Futures was “not being linked to other incidents in the northwest London area over the last week or last month’s arson in Golders Green”.
  • This is likely due to a level of distance between HAYI and its assessed Iranian intelligence service sponsors, as well as the fact that the group has not yet been proscribed. If HAYI were to be proscribed then acts linked to them would likely be investigated by Counter Terrorism Policing by default. It could also make sharing their videos an offence under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
  • HAYI’s Telegram channel was deactivated shortly after March’s Golders Green attack. It peaked with approximately 200 followers. Footage of its attacks are now distributed on other major Iranian regime-linked channels including Sabereen News and Almihwar News.
  • HAYI’s agents are assessed as highly likely to be recruited online with promises of payment after providing evidence of following their handlers’ instructions, primarily using encrypted messaging apps such as Signal or Telegram to communicate.
  • In line with other examples of Russian and Iranian-sponsored espionage and terrorist activities against the UK and Israel, recruits typically lack a particular religious or ideological affinity for those they act on behalf of, and are motivated by money.
  • For example, both the Wagner Group and Iranian intelligence services have contracted local or European criminals to act on their behalf in the UK, i.e. to attack and burn down Ukrainian-owned businesses or conduct surveillance on Iran International’s studios.

Looking ahead: President Trump’s two week deadline for negotiations with Iran expires on Wednesday.  

  • Whilst significant gaps remain between the US and Iranian position, it remains unclear if they will reach an agreement or the deadline will be extended or there will be a resumption of hostilities.  

February 26, 2026

Modi’s visit deepens Israel-India ties

Prime ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Narendra Modi in Jerusalem, February 25, 2026.
Prime ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Narendra Modi in Jerusalem, February 25, 2026. Photo credits: Ma’ayan Toaf (GPO)

What’s happening: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the Knesset yesterday in a speech hailing ties between his country and Israel.

  • “It is a privilege and an honour for me to stand before this distinguished House,” he told assembled lawmakers. “I do so as the Prime Minister of India, and also as a representative of one ancient civilisation addressing another. I bring with me the greetings of 1.4 billion Indians, and a message of friendship, respect, and partnership.”
  • His speech ranged over issues including counterterrorism, regional cooperation, trade, and even tourism. It was well received by MP’s in the chamber and very positively covered in Israeli media. Particularly attention was given to his forceful condemnation of the October 7 attack on Israel and his description of Israel as “a protective wall against barbarism.”
  • Modi also explicitly referenced the IMEC initiative, the name used for the envisioned India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, the Indian initiate for a multi-modal connection between India and Europe through allies such as Israel and the UAE that would see a dedicated network of rail, ship-to-rail, fibre optic cable connections — and even a proposed hydrogen pipeline.
  • It was followed by addresses from both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Opposition Leader Lapid.  “We are two ancient civilisations, and we had to travel through the journey of generations and face troubles and challenges,” Netanyahu said. “We have so many shared interests. We are two democracies. You are a giant democracy, but so is Israel. Think of the things we had to do, the things we went through, and how we preserved our democracy against challenges that I think very few countries have faced.” The Prime Minister described relations between the two countries as an “iron alliance” in the face of extremist Islam.
  • Yesterday, also saw another state visit cementing Israel’s new regional posture. President Isaac Herzog concluded a visit to the Addis Ababa, where he met Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed after meetings with Ethiopian President Taye Atske Selassie and local Jewish leaders as well.
  • Also on Wednesday, Israel formally accepted the appointment of an ambassador from Somaliland. In December, Israel became the first state to formally recognise Somaliland as an independent state.

Context: India is Israel’s largest market for defence exports, accounting for 34 per cent of total sales since 2020. The two countries have opened negotiation for a free trade agreement recently too.  

  • Modi’s visit put many non-security items on the agenda too, not least the possibility of a free trade agreement between the two countries, something the Indians are particularly keen to advance. The volume of trade between the two countries stood at $5 billion, with Israeli exports to India far exceeding Indian exports to Israel. This makes India Israel’s second largest trading partner in Asia (after China).
  • An alliance with a major Asian power, supplemented by already close ties in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and Cyprus, places Israel in the centre of a broad regional strategic alliance. The Israel-India axis also includes, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Sri Lanka, as well as the strategically placed Ethiopia and Somaliland in the Horn of Africa.
  • For India, closer ties with Israel are part of its portfolio diversifying national security strategy in the face of China. Closer ties, and large weapons purchases, allows them pick and choose from a variety of partners, such as Germany, France, Israel, in order not to become solely reliant on the US. Israel is located in a strategic region defined by Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in his recent speech at the Munich Conference as “West Asia.”There is also an element of solidarity and gratitude in the relations between the states and especially the two Prime Ministers. Though India has managed to solidify ties with leading Western democracies in recent years, Modi himself was largely shunned initially when he came to power in 2014, but not by Israel. And Modi’s unequivocal support for Israel’s self-defence in the wake of October 7 stands out as well in comparison to the hedged public support Israel has received from many traditional allies in Europe and elsewhere.
  • India also recently joined the US-led “Pax Silica,” a strategic initiative for securing supply chains for semiconductors and AI-related industries. Core members include the US, UK, Israel, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Netherlands.

Looking ahead: For all the excitement of the Modi visit to Jerusalem and the Herzog visit to Addis Ababa, Israeli attention continues to focus on the possibility of a US strike on Iran and its implications for the Israeli home front.

  • A third round of indirect talks between the US and Iran is underway today in Geneva, with the Iranians due to present their detailed proposal for a compromise on the nuclear programme.
  • Unlike in January when the US administration initially made its implicit threat that “help was on its way,” now US forces are positioned to actually carry out a threat if that is the direction the administration chooses to take.

February 12, 2026

Trump and Netanyahu talk Iran strategy

Prime Minister Netanyahu and Marco Rubio and their staff.
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Marco Rubio in the Blair House, Washington DC. February 11, 2026. Photo credit: Avi Ohayon (GPO)

What’s happening: President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu met for 2.5 hours yesterday in what was their seventh meeting since Trump returned to office in January 2025.

  • After the meeting, which lasted twice as long as was planned, Trump confirmed he had “insisted” negotiations with Iran would continue, but that “nothing definitive” had been agreed up to that point.
  • In a social media post, Trump expressed his preference to reach a negotiated settlement with Iran, but failing that “we will just have to see what the outcome will be”, invoking the US Air Force and Navy’s air strikes on Iranian nuclear targets on 22nd June 2025.
  • The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office wrote that Netanyahu had “emphasised the security needs of the State of Israel in the context of the negotiations, and the two leaders agreed on continued coordination and the close contact between them.”
  • Netanyahu also met with Secretary of State Rubio and signed on as a member of the Board of Peace for Gaza and signed another agreement stating that Israel accepts the terms of the charter of Trump’s board.
  • While there was no press conference after the meeting, reports in Jerusalem suggest the discussions touched on various scenarios in case the US negotiations with Iran collapse, or if a strike on Iran is launched whether the US would carry it alone.
  • Yesterday, Iran observed the 47th anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Republic. It included mass parades in cities throughout Iran and  displays of missiles, burning American and Israeli flags, throwing darts at Trump’s portrait and coffins with stickers showing the faces of American generals, including a picture of US CENTCOM Commander Cooper.
  • In his address, Iranian President Pezeshkian said that “wall of distrust” created by the West is hindering nuclear talks with the US, vowing that Iran will never surrender to excessive demands and aggression.
  • Also yesterday, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi told Russia Today that Iran will not negotiate on its missile programme or regional alliances but he believes the sides can strike a nuclear deal better than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in July 2015.

Context: The Trump-Netanyahu meeting follows US-Iranian nuclear negotiations resuming in Muscat on Friday where indirect talks were mediated by the Omani government. While the first round of negotiations yielded little beyond a mutual commitment from both the US and Iran to engage in further talks, no date for them has been set or announced.

  • Commenting on the negotiations, President Pezeshkian reasserted that Iran would not yield to “excessive” demands, but confirmed that it was ready for “any verification” of its nuclear programme in a seem willingness to engage with IAEA inspectors.
  • On Tuesday, Ali Larijani, Iran’s Secretary to the Supreme National Security Council, visited Oman to meet with Muscat’s Foreign Minister, Badr al-Busaidi who has served as the current round of talks’ main mediator. A photo released of the two men together shows al-Busaidi with a sheathed letter. Iran is known to communicate via mediators with written correspondence, and it is a realistic possibility that the letter contained a message intended for President Trump and his advisors.
  • While the US has entered negotiations with Iran insisting that its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxies be addressed, Israel is concerned that these points may be conceded by Trump to achieve a nuclear deal.
  • Israel considers Iran’s missiles as a more imminent threat than that presented by Iran’s nuclear project. Officials in Jerusalem are also worried Israel might find itself hamstrung – as happened after the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration negotiated last decade.
  • While Iran has ostensibly indicated a level of willingness to engage with IAEA inspectors to ensure that its nuclear programme is only used for peaceful purposes, it has not demonstrated or indicated any flexibility on ceasing to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, nor on the issues of missiles or proxies. In fact, Tehran has gone as far as to specifically rule out negotiating on its missile stock, of which it is believed to possess 2000-3000.

Looking ahead: The Wall Street Journal has also reported that the US is currently preparing to deploy a second aircraft carrier group to the Middle East.

  • American officials said that the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which is currently in Asia, and the carrier USS George H. W. Bush, which is off the East Coast of the United States, are presumably the candidates to head for the Middle East. That carrier would join the USS Abraham Lincoln which arrived in the region towards the end of January.
  • This deployment is likely intended to increase military pressure on Iran as negotiations potentially continue.

February 11, 2026

Netanyahu arrives to Washington

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met, at the Blair House in Washington, with the special envoys of the US President, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Washington, DC. February 10, 2026. Photo credit: Avi Ohayon (GPO)

What’s happening: Prime Minister Netanyahu arrived in Washington for a working meeting with President Trump in what will be their seventh meeting since Trump’s second term began, barely one year ago.

  • Prior to his departure, Netanyahu said the focus would primarily be on Gaza and Iran. Netanyahu announced that he would “present our views regarding the principles in the negotiations to the president – the important principles – and in my view, they are important not only to Israel, but to anyone who wants peace and security in the Middle East.”
  • Netanyahu will also reportedly share with Trump intelligence regarding Iranian efforts to develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching Europe and the United States as well.
  • Trump continues to broadcast optimism at the prospect of reaching a deal with Iran that could avert an armed confrontation. “We can make a great deal with Iran,” he told an interviewer yesterday, while Netanyahu was en route. Of Netanyahu, he said, “He also wants a deal. He wants a good deal.”
  • The US is reportedly working on a proposal for the disarmament of Hamas in Gaza that would allow Hamas to keep the small arms it uses to maintain power in the Strip. The US proposal, details of which were leaked to the New York Times while Netanyahu was on his way to Washington, would only require Hamas to give up weapons that can be used to strike Israel, mainly rockets and launchers, in order for it be considered to have fulfilled its obligations in Phase Two of the Comprehensive Plan which ended the war last October.

Context: Leaks in the Israeli media indicate that senior Israeli officials were alarmed at the prospect of Trump securing a deal with Iran that would be far below Israel’s minimum needs.

  • Israeli officials believe that Trump is under enormous pressure from his allies in Turkey and Qatar to accede to a deal that leave Iran with some enrichment capabilities and that would not set back its ballistic missile programme, a cause of acute concern in Jerusalem.
  • Iranian ballistic missiles caused significant damage to the Israeli home front in the Twelve Day War, and Israel believes that Iran has at least 2000 of them in its current stock and is rapidly developing the capabilities to manufacture many more.
  • For all the Israeli concern about an unsatisfactory deal, the consensus among local analysts and officials remains that ultimately the US will attack Iran. The Iranians have not thus far signalled any willingness to compromise even on the enrichment issue, much less the other American priorities (missiles, regional proxies, and the protest crackdown).
  • Trump, for his part, reminisced about the Iranian miscalculation that led to Operation Midnight Hammer last June in the same interview where he spoke of the prospects for an agreement. “Last time they didn’t believe I would do it,” he said of the US airstrike on three nuclear facilities. “They overplayed their hand.”
  • If the scenario reported by the New York Times about Gaza were to happen, Israel would face pressure to undertake its own commitments in Phase Two, including a significant territorial withdrawal from the position it holds along the Yellow Line today to a narrow buffer zone around the old Gaza-Israel border from before the war.
  • The Israeli understanding of the disarmament clause of the Comprehensive Plan includes not just offensive weapons, but also small arms and the massive tunnel infrastructure in Gaza as well.
  • It is unclear whether Hamas accepts even the more lenient American proposal for disarmament. Absent any kind of disarmament, it is unlikely Israel will carry out any further territorial withdrawals in Gaza.
  • There is, in such a scenario, even the possibility that Israeli will launch a new military offensive into central Gaza to carry out a forceful disarmament of Hamas, this time unhindered by consideration for the fate of hostages.

Looking ahead: At their meeting, Netanyahu is expected to formally invite Trump to Israel for this year’s Independence Day Festivities, which are to be held on April 21-22. Trump is already due to receive the prestigious Israel Prize, normally awarded only to Israeli citizens, in a ceremony that traditionally closes out the day’s official festivities. Netanyahu may reportedly also ask Trump to light a torch on Mount Herzl in the ceremony that usually opens the official festivities.

  • The political calendar may also be a consideration for this. With no compromise in the offing on the ultra-orthodox conscription bill, it is increasingly likely that parliament will be dissolved and early elections called. Elections are currently scheduled for October, when discussion will likely be dominated by the third anniversary of the October 7 invasion and massacre. But an early election would put Independence Day, and Trump’s festive visit as the Prime Minister’s guest, right at the peak of campaign season.

February 5, 2026

Israel sends team to the Winter Olympics

Israel bobsleigh team, January 22, 2026.
Israel bobsleigh team, January 22, 2026. Photo credit: The Olympic Committee of Israel

What’s happening: The XXV Winter Olympics are due to commence tomorrow in Milan and Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy. Israel will be represented by ten athletes, making it the largest delegation from any Middle Eastern country.

  • The Israeli athletes will be led at the opening ceremony at Milan’s San Siro Stadium by figure skater Mariia Seniuk, who was chosen as the nation’s flag bearer and will later compete in Women Single Skating.
  • The bulk of the team will compete in the four-men bobsleigh competition making the history as the first Israeli team ever to compete in this discipline at Olympics.
    • The team of AJ Edelman, Menachem Chen, Ward Fawarseh, Omer Katz and Uri Zisman qualified after finishing one place outside the official cut-off and later received an invitation when the UK decided to send only one team rather than two.
    • The Olympic appearance is a pinnacle for the bobsleigh team, which is made up of athletes from other disciplines who committed to switching to bobsleigh to fulfil their Olympic dreams, in a move reminiscent of the iconic 1990s film ‘Cool Runnings’, about Jamaican athletes on a similar journey.
    • Two of the team members will compete also in the two-men bobsleigh event.
  • Jared Firestone will represent Israel in skeleton, while other athletes will compete in various skiing competitions. Attila Mihaly Kertesz will take part in the Cross-Country Skiing, and Noah Szollos and her older brother Barnabas Szollos will contest in alpine skiing.

Context: Middle Eastern representation at the Winter Games is often limited due to environmental conditions and different cultural traditions.

  • With ten members, Israel’s delegation is the largest from the region, outnumbering much larger countries such as Turkey and Iran, which are sending eight and four athletes respectively.
  • The only other Middle Eastern countries attending are Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates, each of which is set to be represented by two athletes.
  • Last week, the International Olympic Committee express its concerns for Iranian athletes amid the government’s brutal repressions against the protests. “At this moment in time, we are particularly concerned about the situation of Iranian athletes impacted by the events unfolding in their country – as we are with all athletes who face conflict and tragedies elsewhere in the world,” the IOC said.
  • The IOC’s concerns were voiced as news emerged that a 19-year-old wrestler, Shahab Fallahpour, was killed by security forces during demonstrations in the south-western city of Andimeshk.
  • This year’s Winter Olympics appearance marks the ninth attendance in a row for Israel since her Olympians first appeared at 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway.
  • The discipline with the strongest Israeli presence is figure skating, where Israeli athletes have featured at every Winter Games since then.
  • Any Israeli Olympic participation carries historical resonance because of the 1972 Munich attack, in which eleven Israeli Olympians were murdered by Palestinian terrorists. Since then, Israeli teams put emphasis on remembrance and security at Olympic events, alongside the sporting focus.
  • Israel’s location in the heart of the Middle East means winter sports are relatively rare. However, Israelis enjoy winter sports, including skiing, on Mount Hermon, which serves as the main hub for snow and skiing, and for many Israelis it is their first exposure to winter sports.
  • The venue was closed following the 7 October 2023 massacre. The complex was heavily damaged in September 2024 by Hezbollah. It was partially reopened in spring 2025 but skiing and snowboarding are still not possible due to security concerns.
  • Ward Fawarseh, an Israeli Druze and part of the bobsleigh team is indicative of the inclusivist role sport plays in Israeli society. Similarly, for example numerous Arab and Muslim footballers have represented the Israeli national team.  

February 3, 2026

US Envoy Witkoff to arrive in Israel

US Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff delivers a statement to the media, near Kiryat Gat, on October 21, 2025
US Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff delivers a statement to the media, near Kiryat Gat, on October 21, 2025. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

What’s happened: Diplomatic efforts to reach some sort of agreement between Iran and the US that might avert an impending US offensive operation in Iran kicked into high gear this week. Following high-level meetings between senior defence and intelligence officials in Washington over the weekend, US and Israeli officials are expected today to discuss respective positions on a diplomatic settlement.

  • To that end, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff will arrive in Israel today for meetings with the Prime Minister, Mossad Director, and IDF Chief of General Staff. The four are expected to discuss the Israeli position on the principal issues which the Americans will be negotiating with Iran.
  • The three principal issues under discussion are the Iranian nuclear programme, the Iranian ballistic missile programme, and Iran’s regional proxies. Significant gaps exist between the Israeli and American positions on the latter two issues.
  • Publicly, at least, the Iranians reject any negotiations on the latter two issues, rendering the difference between the Israel and American position slightly less important.
  • Of the upcoming negotiations between the US and Iran, President Trump said, “We have a tremendous force going there, just like we did in Venezuela, even bigger, and they’ll be there soon. And I’d like to see a deal negotiated. I don’t know that that’s going to happen. But right now we’re talking to them, we’re talking to Iran, and if we can work something out that would be great, and if we can’t probably bad things will happen.”

Context: Israel’s approach to the prospect of a negotiated settlement between Iran and the US is best characterised as multilayered scepticism. Scepticism regarding the issues mooted by a deal, scepticism about Witkoff’s motives and capabilities, scepticism about the viability of a deal altogether even if it is a good one.

  • In public at least, Israel has several red lines. On the nuclear programme, Israel insists on zero enrichment and the removal of uranium from Iranian territory. On missiles, Israel wants to see a reduction in stocks, range, and production capacity. On regional issues, Israel wants to reach an informal understanding that Iran is no longer exporting its revolution through proxy armies in the region.
  • Witkoff is perceived in Israel as an opponent of any US military strike in Iran, and Israeli officials have leaked to local media concerns that Witkoff might be “duped” by Iranian negotiators and rush into a deal that appears like an achievement while leaving Iran in a position to threaten Israel and the region.
  • Even if a deal is reached, Israelis are sceptical that its implementation could be monitored and enforced in the long term. A ‘good’ deal throws the Islamist regime a lifeline at its weakest moment, and a ‘bad’ gives it the opportunity to regroup and rearm. Any deal, it is assumed, would lead to sanctions relief, eliminating the one lever that actually succeeded in bringing Iranians out into the streets against the Islamic regime.
  • Israel is in a sense reassured, that Iran hawks in both Congress and the administration take Israel’s position on the nuclear programme, especially, quite seriously. For this reason, it is understood in Jerusalem, the Americans need a level of coordination that clearly delimits things Israel wants, things Israel can tolerate while publicly opposing, and things that Israel will actively oppose.
  • The Israeli assessment remains that the US is more likely than not to mount a military offensive, given the enormous movement of military assets to the region. However Trump currently wants to first exhaust the diplomatic route. 
  • The pressure on Iran is mounting, as the UK Home Office confirmed that it would begin the process of proscribing the IRGC in the UK. This announcement immediately followed the EU confirming that it would take the same steps after France dropped its long-standing opposition to banning the group.
  • The EU’s decision to designate the IRGC as a terrorist group is understood to have been in response to its participation and leading role in violently suppressing mass anti-government protests across Iran which are alleged to have killed tens of thousands.
  • While the Home Office have reportedly supported proscription under both this and prior governments, the FCDO allegedly opposed and blocked it on the grounds that doing so risked prejudicing diplomatic relations with Iran which they feared could be broken off.

Looking ahead: Witkoff’s meetings in Israel today are only a prelude to the main diplomatic event in Turkey this Friday, where he will meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Jared Kushner will attend the talks in Turkey (he is not joining in Witkoff in Israel today), as will representatives from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. There were unconfirmed reports that officials from UAE, Oman, and Pakistan might also be invited.

  • In the build-up to the talks, Iranian officials have spoken to various Western media outlets about concessions Iran might entertain on the nuclear programme, including shutting it down, joining a regional consortium to produce nuclear power, and shipping its uranium to Russia.

January 21, 2026

Netanyahu to join Trump’s Board of Peace

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a 40 signatures debate, at the plenum hall of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, on January 19, 2026.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a 40 signatures debate, at the plenum hall of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, on January 19, 2026. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

What’s happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu announced this morning that Israel would accede to President Trump’s invitation to join his Board of Peace.

  • Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam have also said they would join. It was not clear from the Prime Minister’s announcement if Israel would be paying $1 billion for a permanent membership.
  • President Trump told reporters yesterday that “we think we know” where the body of the last Israeli hostage in Gaza is. Referring to Ran Gvili, who was killed in the October 7 attacks and whose body has been held ever since in Gaza, the President said, “They have one left that we think we know where it is, amazing, it looked like we weren’t going to get anywhere near that, now they’ve gotten that almost.”
  • Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will meet President Trump today on the sidelines of the Davos. The two are due to discuss Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire and to coordinate their moves before a bruited American ultimatum on Hamas disarmament and the possible entry of Egyptian-trained Palestinian forces into Gaza.
  • In Jerusalem, the Israel Lands Authority took possession of a large UNRWA facility in Jerusalem and began demolishing parts of it. This was in accordance with the new law from last year which bans all UNRWA activity inside Israel and severely limits any official interaction between Israel and UNRWA in territories Israel controls.
  • UNRWA vacated the facility six months ago, and the ILA proceeded with the demolition yesterday to stop other illegal activities taking place at the site as well as to advance plans for its redevelopment.

Context: According to various media sources, President Trump is expected to deliver an ultimatum to Hamas regarding the terrorist organisation’s disarmament in the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire. Reports differ, however, on the content of the ultimatum, its timeline, its proposed methods of decommissioning, and the threats which back it up.

  • A Palestinian police force presently being trained in Egypt is reportedly ready to carry out the disarmament, should Hamas accept the conditions of Trump’s ultimatum. This force reports directly to the Palestinian committee of technocrats whose appointments were announced last week. They would be tasked not only with collecting rockets and IEDs, but also the rifles and small arms with which Hamas enforces its domestic rule.
  • Notably, this would mean that disarmament is an internal Palestinian affair, and not an endeavour achieved by the International Stabilisation Force, which has not yet come into being and does not have pledged commitments from enough countries to be viable.
  • The Egyptian-trained force would, if Hamas agrees to Trump’s ultimatum, hope to enter Gaza sometime in February or March and seek to complete its task rapidly. Despite whatever enthusiasm both Egyptian and US officials express (in anonymous leaks) regarding both the ultimatum and the police force, both Israeli and Palestinian officials remain sceptical about the entire plan.
  • Palestinian officials are concerned that an under-equipped police force seen, accurately or not, as aligned with the PA could quickly find itself a target of superior Hamas weapons (as happened in 2007). Israeli officials share that concern while also opposing any role for the PA in Gaza.
  • In the meantime, few in Israel believe Hamas will agree to Trump’s ultimatum anyway. As such, the IDF continues to prepare itself for a possible military offensive in February or March to disarm Hamas by force.
  • An Israeli operation following a Hamas refusal to carry out the conditions of the ceasefire, it is believed, would have a measure of international legitimacy. And a ground offensive into central Gaza unencumbered by the presence of Israeli hostages and the implied threat to their wellbeing, it is further believed, could be more effective than anything tried in two years of warfare following the October 7 attack.

Looking ahead: President Trump is scheduled to make a major prime time address tonight. In the background are at least four major international crises: the Gaza ceasefire and the formation of the new Board of Peace, the violent crackdown on anti-regime protesters in Iran and the possibility of US military action there, and the US threats on Greenland and the attendant tensions in the NATO alliance and the transition in Venezuela following the US capture of Nicolas Maduro.

  • With international attention focused on Venezuela and Greenland, US forces continue to move to the Persian Gulf region.
  • The eruption of violence in Iran in late December caught the US  Navy without a carrier group in the Gulf. As of yesterday, the USS Lincoln Carrier Strike Group transited through the Strait of Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal. It is expected to continue west to the Persian Gulf.
  • Circumventing the globe in the opposite direction were the F-15Es which had served to intercept drone attacks from Iran in previous rounds of fighting in 2024 and 2025. These reportedly left bases in the UK for bases in Jordan yesterday, accompanied by KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refuelling jets.

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