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Israel, the UK and the world

Key background
  • The UK and Israel share a strong relationship, built on historical, economic, and diplomatic ties. Both nations collaborate closely in trade, science, technology, and defence, with the UK being a key partner to Israel. The UK supports Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. Scientific progress, academic partnerships, and shared values of democracy further strengthen the bond.
  • Israel maintains diplomatic ties with 165 of the other 192 UN member states.
  • Israel maintains full diplomatic relations with two of its Arab neighbours, Egypt and Jordan, after signing peace treaties with the former in 1979, and the latter, 1994.
  • In 2020, supported by the US, Israel signed the Abraham Accords agreements establishing diplomatic relations with Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco.
Israelis await the release of Israeli/US hostage Edan Alexander, whom Hamas is expected to release from captivity today, at Hostage Square in Tel Aviv May 12, 2025. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

Updated May 13, 2025

Edan Alexander reunited with his family

What’s happened: The kidnapped soldier was released yesterday evening after 584 days in captivity. 

  • He is now recovering in hospital in Tel Aviv, having been reunited with his parents and siblings at an IDF base in the Gaza envelope. 
  • Dr. Hagar Mizrahi, the director of the Health Ministry’s General Medicine Division, told Kan News, “Edan appears to be all right and is able to stand on his own two feet. He will need to be put through extensive tests to determine his true physical and emotional condition.”  Mizrachi added that, “He’s independent, is speaking and appears to all of us to be okay. Having said that, we know  that a lot of things can remain hidden behind that ‘okay.’”
  • Upon his release Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “This was achieved thanks to our military pressure, and the political pressure that was exerted by President Trump. That is a winning combination.” 
  • Netanyahu added, that he had spoken with President Trump who expressed his commitment to Israel and “continuing to work with you in close cooperation in order to achieve all of our war objectives. To free all of the hostages and to defeat Hamas. They go together; they are intertwined with one another.”
  • Later last night the IDF announced that it attacked a number of prominent Hamas terrorists in a command and control compound that Hamas had established in Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis.

Context: Though every hostage released is seen as a blessing, 58 hostages remain in captivity. Thirty five are understood to be dead. Twenty are alive, whilst the status of three is unclear.    

  • Edan Alexander’s release was unlike all the others that have taken place until now, as this was a US led initiative that circumvented Israel. 
  • Unlike in the past, Hamas held no release ceremony (reportedly at Trump’s specific demand) and nothing was given in exchange. 
  • Also unlike the past, it was Steve Witkoff, the US Special Envoy (rather than an Israeli official) who was the person to receive the call from Alexander once Hamas handed him over to Red Cross officials.
  • Israel’s role was limited to agreeing to pause aerial intelligence gathering over Gaza and the facilitation of an access corridor in the Khan Yunis area to allow the Red Cross in and out. 
  • There is speculation over the motives of Hamas to agree to this release without receiving something in return. Was it simply a good will gesture to curry favour with Trump during future talks, or was it part of a wider Qatari strategy (which along with the gift of a $400m luxury plane) meant to secure US support for ending the war on their terms. 
  • This release is the first one since January 22nd, and there is renewed hope that this will reinvigorate efforts to reach a new deal. Israel had already given their consent to Witkoff’s most recent proposal that reportedly includes the release of around half of the living hostages over a 40-day ceasefire, during which time intensive negotiations will look to release all the remaining captives and end the war.
  • Israel has continued to insist that Hamas cannot remain in power in Gaza on the day after the war, whist Qatar, perceived as Hamas’s main backer, have a vested interest in them remaining in situ.
  • Concerns remain over humanitarian conditions inside the Strip, although Israeli officials continuing to insist there are currently still enough supplies.
  • In parallel, the US is working on a new mechanism to allow aid to reach the Gazan civilian population whilst circumventing Hamas. Israel is keen to support any initiative that will deprive Hamas of its governing capabilities. 
  • Born to Israeli parents, Alexander grew up in the US, moved to Israel after high school and joined the Golani infantry brigade.  
  • Israeli media reported that upon his release, he described to his family being outnumbered 30 – 1 when he was captured on his Kissufim base on the Gaza border on October 7th
  • The fact that Trump was able to extract him – due to his dual nationality – has caused some disquiet in Israel and among other hostage families that have sadly concluded that holding US citizenship is worth more than just being Israeli.     

Looking ahead: There is speculation as to whether Alexander might fly to Doha and meet President Trump. Although his medical condition is stable, he is likely to remain in hospital and not travel at this point. 

  • Israeli negotiators led by the former Shin Bet deputy, and including the Coordinator for the Hostages and the Missing Persons Gal Hirsch, the prime minister’s foreign policy adviser, Ophir Falk, and Mossad and IDF Military Intelligence Directorate representatives, will travel to Doha today and are expected to remain there at least until Thursday to see if a new deal can be reached. 
  • Meanwhile, the IDF has continued to prepare for a potential large-scale ground manoeuvre.

Edan Alexander is free. What comes next? Richard Pater, Director of BICOM, spoke with LBC on 12 May 2025 about the release of Edan and President Trump’s upcoming trip to the Middle East.

May 9, 2025

US unveils Gaza aid plan

United States Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff
United States Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff visits at Hostage square in Tel Aviv, January 30, 2025. Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** חרבות ברזל מלחמה שחרור סטיב ויטקוף משפחות חטופים עסקה

What’s happened: US envoy Steve Witkoff unveiled an American aid initiative for Gaza at the UN yesterday. 

  • The US is looking to establish a Gaza Humanitarian Foundation which would operate four distribution sites in the Gaza Strip, serving 1.2 million people initially. 
  • The Foundation would not be operated by the US government personnel, but rather private contractors and would not involve the IDF in its operations, instead relying on its own private security. 
  • It would endeavour to distribute aid in a way that circumvents Hamas control and prevents out the possibility of Hamas profiting from it. 
  • This proposal would be more in line with the IDF’s preference for aid to be distributed by a private international organisation not affiliated with Hamas or UNRWA. Top brass in the IDF have resisted calls by some ministers in government for the IDF to be directly responsible for distributing aid.
  • Fighting continued in the Gaza Strip yesterday. Two Israeli soldiers, Sergeant Yishai Elyakim Urbach, 20, from Zichron Yaakov and Staff Sergeant Yam Frid, 21, from Slait died in two separate incidents in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. Two other soldiers were seriously wounded in the same attacks. 
  • Israel announced that of  the 24 hostages officially presumed to be alive, there are grave concerns about three, two foreign hostages and one Israeli. Families of all three have been informed. This follows days of rumours on the heels of President Trump’s references to 21 living hostages, rather than the official number of 24. 

Context: In parallel with the IDF’s resumption of fighting in Gaza since mid-March, no aid has been allowed into the Strip.

  • During the last hostage deal around 600 trucks of aid entered the strip every day which allowed Hamas to replenish and stockpile goods, but those could run out in the next few weeks.
  • Earlier this week, there was a clash between the IDF Chief of Staff Zamir and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, after the minister declared it was unnecessary to allow into Gaza. Zamir reportedly responded, “You don’t understand what you are saying. You are endangering us all. There is international law and we are committed to it. We cannot starve the Strip, your statements are dangerous.”  
  • Israel had hoped that the temporary block on aid would create internal pressure on Hamas to agree to a new hostage deal, but this has not transpired. 
  • Ahead of Trump’s visit to the region next week there was some hope that his presence would serve as a catalyst for the sides to reach an understanding around the Witkoff / Egyptian parameters31(12.7%). 
  • Meanwhile, it is now being reported that the US is pursuing a broad defence deal with the Saudis and no longer conditioning it on normalisation of ties with Israel. If true, this would be a dramatic reversal of a longstanding US policy, and significant shift in a major policy priority of both the Biden administration and the first Trump administration.
  • This would be the third time in recent weeks that the US appears to have distanced itself from Israeli policy positions. The first was when Trump announced the resumption of talks with Iran, whilst sitting alongside Prime Minister Netanyahu. The second  was earlier this week, when the US announced it was ending its bombing campaign against the Houthis, on the same day Israel attacked Yemen in response to the missile attack on Ben Gurion Airport. 
  • In addition, President Trump’s flattering remarks about Turkish President Erdogan and the announced withdrawal of US forces from have also raised concerns in Jerusalem.   
  • The new US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, known both for his strong pro-Israel views and his loyalty to Trump, defended the US ceasefire with the Houthis in an interview with Israel’s Channel 12 News in unusually blunt language, saying, “The United States isn’t required to get permission from Israel to make some type of arrangement that would get the Houthis from firing on our ships.”
  • Since the renewal of hostilities in March, eight Israeli soldiers have fallen in combat in Gaza and one died in an accident near the Strip. The latest deaths take the number of troops killed since the start of the war to 856, including 414 since the launch of the ground operation inside Gaza in November 2023.
  • As well as the fighting in Gaza, the IDF remains active across other fronts including the West Bank and Lebanon. Most recently, the Israel Air Force carried a significant air strike in southern Lebanon yesterday, reportedly against a large Hezbollah tunnelling project near the Israeli border.

Looking Ahead: The IDF continues its preparations for a major offensive  in Gaza. Thousands of reserve soldiers have already been called up. Speaking to reservists yesterday, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “to Hamas I say one thing: The rules are about to change very soon.”

  • It is widely believed that a major military operation will not get underway until after President Trump’s Middle East visit next week.
  • The very public nature of the preparations, while obviously eliminating the element of surprise, are understood to be a means of pressuring Hamas to agree to a hostage deal and ceasefire on terms that are more agreeable to Israel.

May 7, 2025

Israel strikes Yemen again, as Trump announces end of US offensive

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Air Force Command Center during the Attack on Houthi Terrorist Targets in Yemen, Monday, 5 May 2025
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Air Force Command Center during the Attack on Houthi Terrorist Targets in Yemen, Monday, 5 May 2025, photo credit: Ma'ayan Toaf (GPO)

What’s happened: For a second time within 24 hours the Israeli Air Force (IAF) jets struck strategic targets in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

  • Among the targets struck were runways, aircraft, and infrastructure at Sanaa International Airport which put it out of commission and disrupted three scheduled flights. 
  • The IDF said that the airport was used “for transferring weapons and operatives, and is regularly operated by the Houthi regime for terror purposes.”
  • Prime Minister Netanyahu commented that Israeli planes “attacked the airport in Sanaa, an airport that enables the terrorist army and allows for the entry by air to the terrorist state, which enables the firing of missiles at us.”
  • Prior to the strike, the IDF issued an “urgent” warning to civilians to evacuate the airport area immediately.
  • IAF jets also hit several power stations near Sanaa and a cement factory north of the city, which the IDF said, “constitutes a blow to the regime’s economy and its military buildup.”
  • The strikes came in response to repeated Houthis missiles targeting Israel, one of which landed inside the perimeter of Ben Gurion Airport on Sunday.
  • Dozens of IAF aircraft once again took part in the operation, including fighter jets, refuelers and intelligence gathering planes. The IDF said the fighter jets dropped 50 munitions on the targets.
  • This morning the IDF said they shot down a UAV launched from Yemen, before it entered Israeli airspace. As such no sirens were sounded. 

Trump announcement: In a move that surprised Israel officials, President Trump declared that the US is ending its (almost) two month bombing campaign targeting the Houthis.  

  • Trump said the Houthis approached the administration on Monday night indicating “they want to stop the fighting.” 
  • Trump added, “It’s not a deal….They said, ‘Please don’t bomb us anymore and we’re not going to attack your ships.’”
  • The Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi confirmed on X that his country mediated talks between the Houthis and the US, adding “in the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping.”

    For context on the strikes on Yemen – see yesterday’s briefing

Context: Trump’s announcement was the second time in recent weeks that he surprised Israel officials, after he announced that the US would hold talks with Iran while Prime Minister Netanyahu was sat next to him in the White House.

  • Israeli officials were initially disappointed by the announcement. Despite the US attacks, the Houthis still maintain capacity to launch missiles and drones. 
  • However the initial assessment in Jerusalem is that Trump’s announcement would not affect Israel nor restrict its freedom of action against the Houthis. 
  • Earlier this week, the Israeli security cabinet approved Operation Gideon’s Chariots, which involves intensifying the military activity in Gaza. It is only expected to begin after Trump’s visit, and only if no hostage deal can be reached. 
  • President Trump said last night that only 21 hostages in Gaza are still alive. The Hostage and Missing Families Forum issued a statement this morning saying that the number of living hostages, as they had been officially informed, was 24. The forum added that if there was any new information that they have not been given, they wanted to receive it immediately. It echoed a comment made last week by the Prime Minister’s wife Sara that there were fewer than 24 hostages still alive. 
  • Ahead of Trump’s arrival, mediators have reportedly increased the pressure on Hamas in an effort to reach a new hostage deal.
  • The US are apparently encouraging Hamas’s two biggest supporters – Turkey and Qatar to reduce their support for Hamas, and to induce them to compromise. 
  • In addition, Hamas claims that Egypt has begun to pressure it to agree to dismantle its military wing. 

Looking ahead: It is anticipated that the Houthis will continue to try and attack Israel. President of the Houthis Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, warned in response, “To all Zionists, from now on, stay in shelters or leave to your homelands immediately, for your failed government will no longer be able to protect you.”   

  • Relating to the strikes in Yemen, Defence Minister Katz said that this also constituted a “warning to the head of the Iranian octopus: You bear direct responsibility for the attack by the Houthi tentacle against the State of Israel, and you will also be held accountable for the results.”
  • Minister for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer is in Washington and is expected to meet US officials in the White House today and coordinate positions ahead of Trump’s visit to the region next week.
  • At present Trump is not scheduled to stop in Israel during his visit, but there are several weighty issues that do affect Israel, including the talks with Iran, hopes for another hostage deal and a potential defence agreement between US and Saudi Arabia.

May 7, 2025

Next Pope from Israel? Meet Cardinal Pizzaballa

Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Pierbattista Pizzaballa arrives to the annual Christmas eve procession in the Church of the Nativity, in the West Bank town of Bethlehem, December 24, 2024.
Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Pierbattista Pizzaballa arrives to the annual Christmas eve procession in the Church of the Nativity, in the West Bank town of Bethlehem, December 24, 2024. Photo by Wisam Hashlamoun/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** בית לחם חג המולד חג מולד בית

As the conclave to elect a new pope begins today, one name stands out among Vatican watchers and Middle East experts alike: Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem is widely seen as papabile – a potential future pope.

Pizzaballa, a Franciscan friar who has spent most of his priestly life on the ground in the Holy Land, has been leading the Catholic Church across Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Cyprus since 2020. Apart from his native Italian, he speaks English, Hebrew, and Arabic.

He enjoyed a close relationship with the late Pope Francis, who valued his deep knowledge of the region and commitment to interfaith dialogue. Francis regularly turned to him for advice on navigating the complexities of the Middle East — entrusting him with sensitive missions and consultations that helped shape Vatican policy toward the region.

Notably, in June 2014, Pope Francis entrusted Pizzaballa with organizing a historic peace prayer at the Vatican Gardens, bringing together Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas.

Throughout his career, he has not hesitated to voice his opinions on sensitive issues. He criticized Israel’s construction of the barrier between the West Bank and Jerusalem and participated in protests against it in 2015.

At the same time, before becoming a bishop, he criticized Palestinian leaders for blaming all problems solely on the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, reflecting his nuanced view of the region’s conflicts.

His moral credibility was powerfully underscored in October 2023, when he offered himself to Hamas in exchange for Israeli children taken hostage during the October 7 attacks. Though the exchange never took place, the gesture resonated in Israel and attracted attention, especially from the Catholic community around the world.

In the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict, Pizzaballa has advocated for an end to the war and called for humanitarian access to Gaza. He was a signatory to the “Statement on the Escalating Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza,” which called for de-escalation.

On Christmas Eve 2023, visiting Bethlehem, Pizzaballa donned a Palestinian keffiyeh and called for peace in the region. In solidarity with those affected by the war, he co-signed the Christmas message by the Patriarchs and Heads of Churches in Jerusalem, urging Christians to refrain from public celebrations.

If elected, Pizzaballa would not only be a historic choice — the first pope with deep roots in modern Israel.

Learn more about the late Pope Francis and his relationship with Israel and the Middle East in the latest episode of our podcast, featuring veteran journalist and Middle East expert Henrique Cymerman.

April 30, 2025

UK backs Palestinian Authority with MoU

Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa
Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa sign a strategic cooperation memorandum of understanding in London on 28 April 2025. Photo credit: UK Government, under the Open Government Licence.

What’s happened: In London, the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy and the Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation.

  • The document outlines in very general terms the commitments of the two governments to cooperate on a range of issues, including climate change, gender, culture, and education.
  • It commits both sides to diplomatic solutions in line with UN Security Council resolutions without referencing any specific ones.
  • In the memorandum, the UK “reiterates the centrality of the Palestinian Authority as the only legitimate governing entity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in Gaza,” obliquely rejecting the status quo since 2007 of a separate Hamas-led government in Gaza.
  • The document makes repeated references to Palestinian statehood as a goal and to the 1967 lines as the basis for a future international border, and includes East Jerusalem as part of the West Bank.
  • The Memorandum includes a Palestinian commitment to hold Presidential and Parliamentary elections “within the shortest feasible timeframe,” and stipulates that such elections must include the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, implicitly extending the feasible timeframe well into the distant future. No such election has been held in two decades.  The last one was called in 2021, but it was cancelled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) itself. Mahmoud Abbas has ruled as President of the PA since the last elections in 2005, extending his mandate well beyond his original four-year term.
  • While the Palestinian Authority’s Prime Minister was in London, the newly appointed Vice President of the PLO, Hussein Al-Sheikh, travelled to Riyadh to meet top Saudi officials to discuss what is widely believed to be an upcoming American diplomatic initiative to be unveiled by President Trump during his scheduled trip to Saudi Arabia.

Context: Since the October 7th massacre, there has been a campaign afoot in various European states to recognise Palestinian statehood unilaterally, without a peace agreement. This was done despite the fact that  there are two competing governments in these territories: one led by Fatah from Ramallah and one by Hamas from Gaza. Norway, Spain, and Ireland have already carried out such a recognition, and France has indicated that it may do so as well this summer.

  • To that end, the MoU’s reference to the “importance of recognition as a contribution to the two-state solution” can be read as an indication that the UK Government is considering a similar move.
  • Signing MoU with the PA could be viewed as an attempt by the Labour government to solidify its position prior to the incoming local elections across England as they face opposition from pro-Gaza Independents in some areas.
  • A Palestinian state has not come into being in the various rounds of final status talks since the Oslo Accords (Camp-David / Clinton Parameters and Taba negotiations in 2000-1, the Annapolis talks in 2007-8, and the Kerry negotiations in 2013-4) not because Israel or the international community has refused one, but because each time the Palestinian side rejected the prospect of statehood if the price of statehood was full reconciliation with the presence of a neighbouring Jewish state and the termination of all claims and conflict. 
  • In particular, the Palestinian side at these negotiations demanded a “right of return” for the descendants of refugees from the 1948 war.
  • Recognising a state now that has not been formed and does not in fact exist would not change the reality on the ground for the Palestinians; only a full peace agreement with Israel can do that. But it would set the stage for even more abuses of the international system, in particular international courts, for hostile actions against Israel.
  • Al-Sheikh’s appointment last week as a deputy to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas puts him in an advantageous, but far from guaranteed, position to succeed the ailing Palestinian President. He is seen as close to the Saudis and someone both Israeli and Western officials have worked well with in the past.
  • Abbas’ appointment of a deputy and, by implication, a favoured candidate for succession comes a week after his much reported condemnation of Hamas and his demand that they release the hostages and end Gaza’s suffering.

Looking ahead: In any negotiated settlement for an Israeli-Palestinian peace, the two sides will have to come to an agreement on the well-known list of final status issues: sovereignty, borders, Jerusalem, security, refugees, and settlements. 

  • It is notable that the UK position as expressed in this memorandum predetermines the outcome of the first three, and all in line with the Palestinian and not the Israeli position.
  • In Israel it is widely believed that a Palestinian state on the West Bank, especially one proclaimed and recognised without a peace agreement with Israel, will quickly become a Hamas stronghold, rendering all of Israel’s population centres threatened with rocket attacks and October 7-style rampages, as happened following Israel’s withdrawal of settlers and soldiers from Gaza. Moreover, the dangling of a symbolic gesture such as recognition as a reward not for peacemaking but for an enormity like October 7th incentivises more violence, more rejectionism, and more war.

April 24, 2025

US Secretary of State Rubio reiterates Iran cannot enrich uranium

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio attends the International Women of Courage Awards at the State Department in Washington, D.C., on April 1, 2025. Photo by Liri Agami/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** מרקו רוביו טקס מזכיר המדינה פורצות דרך

What’s happened: US Secretary of State Rubio said yesterday that Iran could be allowed a civil nuclear programme but emphasised that it must refrain from enriching uranium.

  • In an interview on Bari Weiss’s podcast Rubio said, “If Iran wants a civil nuclear programme, they can have one just like many other countries in the world have one. That is, they import enriched material.”
  • Rubio also reiterated President Trump’s longstanding position that diplomacy was preferable to military action, while praising Special Envoy Witkoff’s efforts in negotiating with Iran.
  • With US-Iranian talks ongoing, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke by phone on Tuesday, with Trump later saying that they were “on the same side of every issue.”
  • The call follows a second round of talks between the US and Iran hosted at the Omani Embassy in Rome where the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, said that he and Witkoff had “managed to reach a better understanding on a series of principles and goals.”
  • Witkoff had previously stated that the US would accept a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment. However, a day later, he U-turned and asserted that all enrichment would have to end.
  • In parallel, Mohammed Eslami, the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, has confirmed that Iran has begun fortifying tunnel systems linked to its nuclear project, explaining that “efforts are ongoing…[to] expand protective facilities.”

Context: While the US seemingly open to Iran developing and maintaining a civil nuclear energy programme if it refrains from enriching its own uranium, Israel is taking a less compromising position.

  • In parallel to the negotiations Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei laid out his country’s red lines for negotiations that include:
    • Not dismantling any of their centrifuges.
    • Not lowering uranium enrichment below 3.67% (the level agreed in the JCPOA 2015 nuclear agreement).
    • Not ceasing missile programmes (that currently remain outside the scope of the JCPOA).
    • Guarantees that the US will not withdraw from a future deal (as President Trump did in 2018).
  • Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that the only diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis with Iran is the ‘Libya option’ in which all existing infrastructure in Iran will be dismantled or is shipped out of the country.
  • A recent New York Times article claimed Trump had blocked an Israeli military attack on nuclear facilities, with the administration wanting to give more time for diplomacy.
  • In the context of these military threats, evidence that Tehran has begun fortifying tunnel systems linked to its main nuclear facility – that could potentially store highly enriched uranium, and other undeclared nuclear materials, or advanced centrifuges – is pertinent. 
  • The evidence was taken from commercial satellite imagery taken over Iran at the end of March 2025, and published in a report by the Institute for Science and International Security. The Institute’s President, David Albright, has suggested that the new tunnels could become operational relatively soon, and that it was highly unlikely that UN nuclear inspectors would be granted access to them.
  • Israel has long attempted to undermine and weaken Iran’s nuclear programme, primarily through covert and deniable means including cyber-attacks, sabotaging facilities, and targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and officials.
  • All these efforts are assumed to be paused while Israel closely follows US efforts to reach a diplomatic solution.
  • Although not party to the talks, Israel will be hoping that Netanyahu’s personal ties – along with those of Minister Dermer – will be able to influence the US position.

Looking ahead: A third round of US-Iran nuclear talks will take place on Saturday, this time returning to Muscat in Oman.

  • This upcoming round has been described as both “technical” and “high-level”, and is understood to focus on agreeing a framework for a potential nuclear deal which would not be dissimilar to the JCPOA.

April 17, 2025

Trump and the Iranian nuclear project

Donald Trump
Donald Trump, photo by Daniel Torok, who has released it into the public domain.

New BICOM research: Ahead of the highly anticipated second round of US–Iran talks in Rome this Saturday (October 19), BICOM’s latest paper examines the US position and the strategic implications of a potential deal for Israel and the wider Middle East.

Key points:

  1. For the first time in a decade, the US has opened direct talks with Iran over its nuclear programme, while simultaneously threatening military action if an agreement acceptable to the Trump administration is not reached within sixty days.
  2. In parallel, American military action in Yemen – together with the ostentatious forward deployment of naval assets in striking distance of Iran – is intended to signal that the US will not hesitate to use force if negotiations over a nuclear deal with Iran fail to achieve an agreement.
  3. The US is demanding improvements over the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) on four major issues of contention:
    • time limits on nuclear activities,
    • weaponisation capabilities,
    • international inspections,
    • ballistic missile programme.
  4. While the basic points of contention between the sides remain unchanged from a decade ago, the larger geostrategic environment is dramatically different. So too is Iran’s bargaining position. On the one hand, it is at a far more advanced stage in its nuclear development. At the same time, it has seen its proxy forces in the region degraded and under pressure in Lebanon, Gaza, , and Yemen. And it has seen its own air defences largely rendered useless by Israeli strikes.
  5. President Trump seems determined to reach a deal, one that he can convince himself and his constituents is better than the one achieved by President Obama signed in 2015. His choice of real estate mogul Steve Witkoff, a trusted non-ideological dealmaker that he has relied on in other foreign policy crises, as his envoy is further evidence that Trump is keen to make a deal, even – as seen in discussions over the future of Ukraine – at the cost of alienating allies or sacrificing long-held principles.
  6. Israel is most directly affected by the outcome of these negotiations, but not a part of them. While Israeli action against Iranian capabilities and proxies has been leveraged to bolster the American negotiating position, it will ultimately be American, not Israeli, interests that determine the talks’ outcome.

April 10, 2025

Oman to host US-Iran nuclear negotiations this weekend

US President Donald Trump
US President Donald Trump seen with Israeli prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after a meeting at the White House in Washington D.C., April 7, 2025. Photo by Liri Agami/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** ארצות הברית ישראל הבית הלבן פגישה נשיא ארצות הברית ראש ממשלת ישראל בנימין נתניהו דונלד טראמפ

What’s happened: Negotiations are due to take place between the US and Iran in Oman over the weekend. “We have a very big meeting on Saturday, and we’re dealing with them directly,” Trump told reporters on Monday after his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

  • The Iranian delegation will be led by its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, and the US delegation by Steven Witkoff.
  • Yesterday, President Trump told reporters that he had a deadline in mind for when the talks must culminate in an agreed-upon solution, but did not go into details about the nature of the timeline. Trump also threatened “great danger” if the two sides fail to come to an agreement.
  • “We have a little time, but we don’t have much time, because we’re not going to let them have a nuclear weapon. We can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.” Trump said.
  • Trump added that the military option was very much on the table, suggesting that Israel might take the lead on any attack. “If it requires military, we’re going to have military,” Trump told reporters. “Israel will obviously be very much involved in that. They’ll be the leader of that. But nobody leads us. We do what we want to do.”
  • The U.S. Treasury Department yesterday said it had imposed sanctions on five Iran-based entities and one person based in Iran for their support of Iran’s nuclear programme with the aim of denying Tehran a nuclear weapon. “The Iranian regime’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons remains a grave threat to the United States and a menace to regional stability and global security,” Treasury Secretary Bessent said. “Treasury will continue to leverage our tools and authorities to disrupt any attempt by Iran to advance its nuclear programme and its broader destabilising agenda.”
  • CIA Director Ratcliffe arrived in Israel last night and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and his counterpart, Mossad Director Barnea. 
  • Israeli officials have confirmed that they intend to monitor their progress for any perceived “erosion” of Washington’s position on nuclear development, missiles, and its use of proxies across the region.
  • Iranian officials have said the Islamic Republic is approaching the weekend talks ‘warily’ with little confidence in progress and suspicions over US intentions.
  • The talks come as The Times reports that Iran is transferring long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to its proxy militias in Iraq for the first time. These missiles can reportedly reach targets as far away as Europe. 

Context: 

  • Several major gaps exist between the US and Iran:
    • The nature of the talks: While the US has stated that negotiations will be direct, Iran maintains that they will be indirect and moderated by Omani mediators. 
    • Sanctions on the Islamic Republic: Iran has previously indicated that it would only engage in negotiations if sanctions were gradually lifted, not merely at their conclusion once an agreement had been reached. While it had previously indicated that sanction relief was a precondition for participation, it has since dropped this demand.
    • Iran’s nuclear programme: America demands a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and missile programmes. Tehran insists that despite uranium enrichment reaching military levels, its nuclear purposes is only for peaceful civilian purposes, repeatedly denying that it intends to develop nuclear weapons citing a fatwa by Ayatollah Khamenei which bans them. 
    • Iran’s missile programme: Iran has reportedly refused to negotiate on the status of its missile programme following reports that Israel had requested the US directly address this particular issue.
    • Regional proxies: The US is also expected to seek to push Iran to address its network of terrorist proxy groups which act on its behalf across the region. The Houthis and Iraq’s Shia militias continue to represent a particular security threat to Israel and the US which is unlikely to abate given Tehran’s insistence that they act as independent agents rather than proxies or clients. The Houthis have continued to launch missiles at Israel since military operations in the Gaza Strip resumed, with the US conducting a large number of air strikes against the group in an attempt to deter their ongoing aggression.
  • While Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq have refrained from attacking Israel since December 2024, they have previously targeted and killed both American and Israeli troops since escalating their activities in the aftermath of 7th October 2023, which has included jointly claimed missile and drone attacks with the Houthis.
  • An article in Israel Hayom suggests that the US and Israel are aligned and that Trump and Netanyahu “had reached clear agreements on the issue”. It also details that negotiations would be time-limited, only giving Iran two months “to exhaust the option of negotiations”. The article adds that Israeli officials were grateful to have been notified of these developments ahead of time, and that the US had learned lessons from Adam Boehler’s unilateral attempts to engage with Hamas earlier in the year. In that case, Israel had not been advised that they would be taking place.
  • Netanyahu has described two options to prevent Iran going nuclear. This week he said that a deal would only be acceptable if it were similar to the one with Libya: “We go in, blow up the facilities, and dismantle all the equipment, under American supervision and execution. That’s the ideal scenario…The second option, which we don’t want, is that they’ll simply drag out the negotiations, and in that case, the military option becomes the only choice.” 
  • While often discrete in doing so, Oman has historically acted as a regional broker, mediator, and backchannel for sensitive negotiations, especially between the US, Iran, and conservative US-aligned Sunni states. In 2013, Oman hosted the initial US-Iranian talks which resulted in the JCPOA being signed two years later. Oman also helped facilitate 2023’s Iran-Saudi normalisation agreement with Iraqi assistance, and has acted as a diplomatic touchpoint for Bahrain to positively engage with both Iran and Qatar.

Looking ahead: With so many substantive gaps between the sides, and still disagreement as to whether talks will be direct or indirect, there is little optimism of a breakthrough in the short-term.

  • It has also been reported that Witkoff may not travel to Oman if Iran continues to refuse to hold direct talks with him.

April 8, 2025

Netanyahu meets Trump as US eyes Iran talks

Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump in the Oval Office
Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump in the Oval Office, White House, Washington, D.C., 7th April 2025. Photo credit: Avi Ohayon, GPO

What’s happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu met President Trump at the White House yesterday (7th April) in a hastily arranged meeting that reportedly focused on tariffs and Iran, with some attention also given to the war in Gaza and the hostages still held there by Hamas.

  • Trump announced that the US will be holding direct talks with Iran in an attempt to reach a new deal on the Iranian nuclear programme. Talks are due to begin this Saturday in Oman, where an American delegation led by Steve Witkoff will meet the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. 
  • This will be the first such high-level contact between the sides in ten years. Failure to reach an agreement would place Tehran “in great danger,” in Trump’s words.
  • Netanyahu had hoped to secure an American cancellation of tariffs imposed on Israel last week. This was not forthcoming, though President Trump did commend Israel for eliminating duties on American goods last week. Referring to Israeli efforts to eliminate any remaining barriers to US imports in Israel, Netanyahu said “I think Israel can serve as a model for many countries who ought to do the same.”

Context: The 2015 agreement between Iran and six leading states, known as the JCPOA, limiting Iran’s nuclear programme for a period of fifteen years was deeply opposed by Israel as well as hawkish element in domestic American politics and elsewhere. Disagreement over the JCPOA was the high point of tensions between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

  • In 2018, President Trump withdrew from the agreement, but the other countries who were part of it — the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China — did not.
  • It has been ten years since the last time the US and Iran engaged in direct talks over Iran’s nuclear programme, and the implied threat hovering over the talks of US-led military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities hasn’t changed. But at least three aspects of the threat and incentive structure are dramatically different in 2025 compared to 2015:
    • Iran appears to have enriched significantly more uranium than was the case in 2015.
    • Iran’s ability to defend itself from aerial attacks is greatly degraded as a result of the Israeli operation in 2024 which destroyed its air defences as well as its missile fuel production facility.
    • Iran’s array of regional proxies threatening Israel and American interests in the region has been even more severely degraded than its air defence system. The Assad regime in has fallen. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been almost entirely taken out of a commission since a rapid Israeli offensive last autumn. And Hamas in Gaza has been pinned down by the destructive war it launched on October 7, 2023.
  • An additional Iranian proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, have also experienced strikes from the US. Following the Trump-Netanyahu meeting US Secretary of Defense Hegseth told reporters “It’s been a bad three weeks for the Houthis, and it’s about to get worse.” He described the campaign as “devastating,” targeting underground facilities, weapons manufacturing bunkers, Houthi fighters, and air defence systems. Hegseth also criticised Iran for its continued support warning that “We have a lot more options and a lot more pressure to apply.”
  • Israel’s strategic posture vis-à-vis a negotiated process it is not a direct party to is also significantly different from what it was in 2015. On the one hand, it is much less threatened by Iranian deterrent assets on its borders. On the other, if it opposes whatever deal the Trump administration reaches with the Iranians, it has no one in domestic American politics with whom it can make a common cause over such opposition. 
  • Despite the less festive tone (in comparison to the previous Netanyahu Oval Office visit earlier this year) and the obvious areas of disagreement, both Israel and American officials were keen to emphasise the ideological and personal alignment of the two countries’ leaders.

Looking Ahead: As negotiations get underway, the positions staked out by the US and Iran on the most contentious issues are very far apart. Israel, which is not a party to the talks, insists on a “Libya model,” alluding to the 2003 agreement which saw Libya dismantle entirely its nascent nuclear facilities and ship them out of the country.

  • The announcement of direct US-Iran talks shuts the window, for now, on an Israeli military offensive against Iranian nuclear assets. Israel cannot launch an attack while the US is negotiating with Iran without angering the American administration. And if talks succeed in reaching an agreement, Israel cannot realistically launch an attack either. If talks fail, it will be up to the US to carry out its threats against the Iranians, or find itself in a weaker position in any future diplomatic confrontation. Referencing just such a threat, President Trump said, “I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious.”
  • Both the Prime Minister and the President addressed the question of Turkey’s role in in particularly delicate terms. The implication of both men’s comments was that the US will seek to mediate discreet understandings between Turkey and Israel regarding each side’s most vital interests in post-Assad . Israel is very concerned about a jihadist government on its doorstep backed by Turkey, a hostile regional power that is also a member of NATO.
  • President Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next month, and it is widely speculated that he would like a new ceasefire in Gaza in place in time for that visit, and that he is particularly keen to see the last remaining living hostage with US citizenship, Edan Alexander, among those released.

April 7, 2025

Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington, D.C.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu upon landing in Washington.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu upon landing in Washington. Photo credit: Avi Ohayon, GPO

Prime Minister Netanyahu landed in the US on the night of Sunday, 6th April, and is scheduled to meet with President Trump on the evening of Monday, 7th April.

  • On arrival, Netanyahu met with US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer at the Blair House.
  • The visit was only arranged last week in what Maariv newspaper described as a “most unconventional and improvised way possible,” following a phone call with US President Trump.
  • The first order of business is to try and cancel (or reduce) the 17 per cent tariff the Trump administration has imposed on Israeli goods.
  • There are then a range of diplomatic issues on the agenda. Foremost among them is a hostages deal and to that end the President’s envoy Witkoff will also join the meeting.
  • Also on the agenda are Israel-Turkey relations, the Iranian threat, and efforts to neuter decisions of the International Criminal Court.
  • Netanyahu and Trump are first expected to talk in private, before expanding the meeting to include senior officials. The two leaders will then answer reporters’ questions. 
  • Back in Israel, in response to a motion that was filed by Netanyahu, the judges in his trial agreed to cancel his court appearance today, but have stated he is expected to appear in court on Wednesday.

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