What’s happened: The Houthis, an Iran-backed jihadist militia that has controlled parts of Yemen for much of the last decade, launched at least two ballistic missiles at Israel over the weekend, joining the war after waiting on the sidelines for four weeks. Both missiles were intercepted.
- The Houthis began attacking Israel on October 19, 2023, twelve days after the Hamas invasion and massacre in southern Israel, and continued firing missiles on Israel until the ceasefire which ended the Gaza war came into effect in October 2025.
- Earlier in 2025 there was a short US-led bombing campaign against the Houthis that ended in a ceasefire which did not include Israel, which has been in effect since May 2025. This ceasefire resulted in the reopening of the Red Sea to most shipping traffic.
- There is growing concern that the Houthis will once more endeavour to block shipping in the Red Sea and through to the Suez Canal by blockading the Bab al Mandab Strait.
- President Trump’s ceasefire with the Houthis in May 2025 left Israel alone in fighting them for the next five months. Similarly, the regional effort to contain the Houthis led to a fierce division between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who backed different factions inside Yemen that were fighting the Iran-backed militia.
- The IDF continued to operate in both Iran and Lebanon over the weekend. Overnight, the IDF conducted 140 air strikes in Iran on targets connected to weapons production. These included facilities used for the production of anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, and ballistic missile engines.
- The IDF also struck targets in Lebanon, including Hezbollah positions in Beirut. An air strike eliminated Ali Hassan Shaib, a senior operative in Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force. Three Israeli soldiers were seriously wounded in combat with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
- Foreign Minister Saar informed this morning that he spoke with Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper. They’ve discussed:
- The latest incidents in the UK, including the arson attacks on Hatzalah ambulance.
- The rise of antisemitism in the West and the delegitimisation of the State of Israel.
- The situation in Lebanon, where according Saar “the Lebanese Foreign Ministry’s decision to expel the Iranian ambassador has remained on paper only. Just as the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah has also remained on paper only. Just as the Lebanese army’s statement three months ago claiming it had achieved ‘operational control’ in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River – was baseless.”
- Over the weekend Sgt. Moshe Yitzchak Hacohen Katz, a 22-year-old from New Haven, Connecticut, was killed in action in southern Lebanon. Three other soldiers were moderately wounded in the same incident, in which the soldiers came under rocket fire.
- This morning the army announced that Sgt, Litan Ben Zion, 19 from Holon, from the 401st Armoured Brigade was also killed by an anti-tank missile fired at his tank. An officer was seriously wounded in the same incident.
- In Tel Aviv, Viacheslav Vidment, a 52-year-old resident of Ashdod, was killed by an Iranian missile. Vidment worked as a security guard at a site that had been struck early in the war by an Iranian missile. Vidment did not enter a bomb shelter in response to the air raid siren, and was killed by missile debris that struck him in the head.
- Yesterday, Knesset passed the budget bill for the current fiscal year in a 62 to 55 vote. Failure to pass a budget by March 31 would have led to automatic dissolving of parliament and early elections. Elections are currently scheduled for October of this year. The 850 billion shekel (£203bn) budget includes 30 billion shekels (£7bn) in supplementary funding for defence, bringing the total defence budget to 142 billion shekels (£34bn).
- Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich boasted yesterday that “for the first time since 1988, the government will complete its term and has passed four annual budgets, and all that while at war.”
- Opposition leader Yair Lapid blasted the roughly 6 billion shekels (£1.4bn) of “coalition funds,” mostly sectoral earmarks, in the budget. As an example, he pointed to 49 million shekels (£11.7m) set aside ostensibly to prevent dropouts from yeshiva programmes. “We aren’t stupid,” he said. “We know what a program to prevent dropouts from yeshivas is. It’s a program designed to prevent young Haredi men from enlisting in the IDF. This isn’t money for security. This is 49 million shekels to damage security (£11.7m).”
Context: Gulf diplomacy had, in the years immediately before the current war, been seen to be moving away from a dependence only on the United States. China and Russia had made inroads, and the Saudis had even concluded a bilateral defence pact with a nearby declared nuclear power, Pakistan. But so far in the current war, that pact hasn’t had any material impact, and in fact Pakistan has positioned itself as a neutral mediator between the US and Iran.
- The UAE is in a particularly tight spot between Israel, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran.
- According to the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, only 17 percent of Iranian missiles and drones have been aimed at Israel in the current war, with the rest targeting Gulf countries. And of the 4,391 targeting the Gulf, 2,156 (nearly half) have targeted the UAE.The Emiratis have quietly frozen Iranian assets in their country. More than 8,000 Iranian firms have operations in the UAE, something which until the current war effectively helped Iran circumvent sanctions.
- In the months leading up to the war, the UAE was involved in a bitter clash with Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen, with the two countries backing different forces in the effort to contain the Iran-backed Houthis.
- As far as the Pakistani-sponsored mediation, little is known publicly about the progress of diplomatic negotiations.
- Multiple media reports suggest that the Iranian position, to the extent there is a coherent Iranian position, is more open to compromise than what was suggested by the Iranian proposal for ending the war last week, which was an effective rejection of the US 15-point plan.
- Internal divisions between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on the one hand, and more radical figures from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the other, are widely seen as contributing to the delayed Iranian response.
- Reportedly, Iran conveyed a willingness for a significant, but not full, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an immediate US-Israeli ceasefire while negotiations were conducted on other outstanding issues. This proposal was rejected by the Trump administration.
- US officials believe that the mounting economic damage to Iran will exert a pressure on Tehran far greater than the accumulating economic damage Iran has been able to impose on the rest of the world.
- In Iran itself, civil servants have not been paid since the war began, ATM’s have run out of cash, and inflation has risen to 120% on an annualised basis. Even Iran’s much hyped ability to sell oil to neutral countries at imported prices has only yielded about $2 billion in revenue, significantly less than what Iran was able to make from selling oil beforehand at the lower prewar prices.
Looking ahead: The various diplomatic initiatives are taking place on the backdrop of a new US deadline for an agreement and an implied threat for a limited ground operation. The latest extension of President Trump’s ultimatum runs to April 6.
- But the gradual buildup of US marine and airborne forces in the region has led analysts to speculate that an entirely different operation is under consideration.
- The four possibilities most discussed include:
- Invading and occupying Kharg Island, from which nearly all of Iran’s oil is exported. This would cripple the Iranian economy even further, but it is not clear if this would actually force Tehran to back down. Facilities on the island could be destroyed either in battle or by retreating Iranian forces themselves.
- Reopening by force the Strait of Hormuz, possibly including a small littoral offensive on the Iranian coast.
- Taking several disputed islands in the Gulf that have been occupied by Iran since the 1970s, possibly in cooperation with Gulf countries who claim them, most notably the UAE.
- A complex operation to seize the estimated 450 kg of highly enriched uranium believed to still be in Iran’s possession. The HEU is believed to be buried under two Iranian nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Natanz that were heavily damaged by US air strikes in last June’s war.


