Hezbollah and Lebanon

Updated August 18, 2026

Remains of last missing Israeli soldier from 1982 Lebanon War recovered

What’s happened: IDF troops on a special mission in Lebanon found and recovered the remains of First Sgt. Yehuda Katz, the last IDF soldier who has been missing-in-action ever since the 1982 battle of Sultan Yaakoub in the first Lebanon War.

The IDF informed Katz’s family this morning.

Context: In 2019, the Syrian opposition released a document from 1984 indicating that Katz had been buried by the Syrian army alongside Zachary Baumel and Zvi Feldman, two other Israeli soldiers who were killed and went missing in the same battle.

Baumel’s remains were returned to Israel in 2019 with assistance from Russia.In May 2025, Feldman’s remains were recovered in a special joint operation in Syria by the IDF and the Mossad.
The battle of Sultan Yaakoub was fought against the Syrian army on June 11, 1982, on the sixth day of the first Lebanon War. Twenty-two IDF soldiers were killed in the battle, more than 30 were wounded and two soldiers were captured alive and were held as POWs until they were returned to Israel at a later date. Three of the soldiers—Katz, Baumel and Feldman—were formally declared missing-in-action.
There remain two more IDF soldiers classified as missing in action:
- Ron Arad, an Israeli Air Force navigator. On October 16, 1986, his aircraft was damaged during a mission over Lebanon. He ejected and was captured by the Shiite Amal militia. Israel received information about him for a period, but contact eventually disappeared, and his fate and whereabouts remain unknown.
- Guy Hever, an IDF soldier who disappeared on August 17, 1997, after leaving his base in the Golan Heights. He was 20 years old. No confirmed evidence has established what happened to him, and the IDF continues to classify him as missing.

Looking ahead: Katz’s remains have now been brought back to Israel for burial and closure for his family.

July 22, 2026

US advances Saudi nuclear deal as Trump weighs next move on Iran

What’s happened: The Trump administration announced that it is moving forward on a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia which will provide for American companies to develop nuclear infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, possibly even including enrichment capabilities. The agreement must be approved in Congress, where it could face serious opposition.

The US completed its eleventh consecutive night of airstrikes on Iran overnight.
According to CENTCOM, targets included aircraft hangars, drone storage facilities, and operational military infrastructure. The choice of targets would appear to indicate that for now the US is focused on degrading Iran’s capacity to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than hitting any symbolic or strategic target that would indicate an escalation.
Iranian fire overnight was more limited than in previous nights earlier in the week. The Iranians reported employing anti-aircraft fire (without apparently hitting anything) in various regions, including around Tehran. There were no reports of ballistic missile launches overnight. Earlier in the week, the Iranians launched ballistic missiles at targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In one incident in Jordan, an Iranian missile killed three American servicemen.
The deadly attack in Jordan was Iran’s fourth attack on the kingdom (and at a target so close to the border with Israel that shrapnel from missile defence fell inside Israeli territory) in five days. It was carried out with Iran’s medium-range Kheibar Shekan missile system. These are buried deep underground in facilities that were hit by US bombs during the war earlier this year, but which the Iranians managed to excavate during the ceasefire in place since April.
President Joseph Aoun of Lebanon met with President Trump in the Oval Office yesterday, where he reportedly presented a detailed Lebanese plan for the full implementation of the US-brokered June 26 framework for a long-term settlement in southern Lebanon.
The Aoun plan calls for staged withdrawals of the IDF from southern Lebanon, with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) progressively taking over territory vacated by the IDF. It also envisions Hezbollah’s military capabilities being completely dismantled or placed under the authority of the Lebanese state.
President Trump praised Aoun and announced the resumption of direct commercial flights from the US to Lebanon, ending a ban that has been in place since 1985.
Aoun too praised his American counterpart, calling him a “great president.”
In comments that garnered wide attention in Israel, Aoun also raised the “ultimate objective of ending the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel forever,” a wording that falls short of a call for a full peace treaty and normalised relations, but still goes well beyond what any Lebanese leader has been willing to say since the ill-fated peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon in 1983.
In recent days, three “pilot zones” of formal LAF responsibly in southern Lebanon have been established. All three are north of the so-called Yellow Line demarcating the areas under formal IDF control since a tenuous ceasefire went into effect in April. Yesterday, the IDF pulled out of the town of Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh and handed it over directly to the LAF.

Context: The looming Saudi-US nuclear agreement would be a dramatic shift in the regional alliance structure and overall geostrategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement grants US companies nearly exclusive rights to develop civilian nuclear infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. At their discretion, non-US firms could be allowed to act as secondary suppliers.
The agreement does not rule out developing enrichment capabilities in Saudi Arabia, nor does it guarantee it. Instead it calls for the two sides to jointly conduct a two-year long study of the viability of domestic enrichment.
If the conclusion of the study is that there is an economic viability to enriching uranium on Saudi soil, a facility would be constructed under a so-called “blackbox” arrangement, where the facility would be built and managed by Americans without any sensitive technology being transferred to the Saudis themselves. In the event the study ends without a US agreement for a “blackbox” facility, the Saudis would be banned from pursuing an enrichment arrangement of their own — but only for ten years, after which they would be allowed to seek other non-US partners.
This part of the agreement constitutes a marked departure from the agreement the US previously signed in 2009 with another regional partner, the UAE, which included a pledge from the Emiratis not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel. Instead they rely on partnerships with foreign (mostly American, but also South Korean) firms for these processes.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not explicitly ban uranium enrichment for non-nuclear powers, but very few countries have pursued these capabilities, and the ones that have are almost all US allies and, importantly, had achieved the capability before acceding to the treaty.
Previous attempts to reach a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia were pursued by the Biden administration, which had conditioned any agreement on Riyadh concluding a full peace treaty with Israel and normalising relations with the Jewish state. These negotiations reportedly came very close to fruition in the autumn of 2023, but were cast aside in the aftermath of the October 7 massacre and the subsequent war in Gaza.
The US interest in a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia is twofold. It serves both as a check on Iranian regional ambitions and firmly locks the door on what was seen in Washington as a possible encroachment of China on a strategically important region where the US maintained for decades the only real superpower presence.
For Israel, there are long-term concerns about any nuclear capabilities in an Arab country whose regime can change orientation from one day to the next by succession or coup. When a potential deal was the price for normalising relations with a large and influential Arab state that is home to Islam’s two most sacred shrines, it was seen more favourably. Without that upside, it is looked upon rather more cautiously.
The wider regional implications are a cause for concern as well. Other medium powers, such as Egypt and Turkey, can be expected to pursue their own nuclear capabilities — still well below anything needed to build weapons — in light of the Saudis’ progress on this front.

Looking ahead: Reports from Washington indicate that the Trump administration is expected to make a fateful decision on the Iran conflict in the next few days. Either it escalates dramatically, or it moves to a new ceasefire.

On the table right now is a proposed ten-day ceasefire, during which the US and Iran would negotiate exclusively on the issue of reopening the Strait of Hormuz. This was supposed to have been covered by the more comprehensive MOU the two sides agreed to on June 17, but differing interpretations of the ambiguous wording led to conflict early on, and since the recent escalation the Strait has once more been closed entirely.
A significant escalation remains on the table too. President Trump has openly spoken of his preference for attacking a specific target, the deep underground facility at Pickaxe Mountain, where the Iranians are believed to be hiding centrifuges and other nuclear equipment more than 100 metres underground. The facility, notably, has not been attacked yet by Israeli or US forces.
The Israeli assessment is that the probability of an escalation remains high. Israeli officials have been widely quoted, by name and anonymously, saying that they prefer not to be involved in the present round of US-Iran fighting.

July 20, 2026

Lebanese Army deploys into first pilot zone in Southern Lebanon

What’s happened: Progress has been reported on the Lebanese army’s deployment in southern Lebanon.

On Friday, Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had redeployed troops to the towns of Froun and Burj Qalaouiyah. They are located close to the yellow line, Wadi Saluki and the Litani River.
As they are technically outside of the IDF’s security zone, no IDF soldiers withdrew from the area in order for the Lebanese army to enter. Israeli forces are currently stationed close by, but slightly further south in the Zatar al-Sharqiya area, and will be required to withdraw from there as the deal progresses.
In parallel, Lebanese President Aoun arrived in Washington and met Secretary of State Rubio on Sunday. The Lebanese Embassy in Washington said the meeting would deal with bilateral US-Lebanese relations, regional security, and continued American support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity, and state institutions.
Following the meeting Rubio praised Aoun and the courage of the Lebanese government for their, “determined effort to reclaim Lebanon’s sovereignty, disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure, and move towards peace.”
Over the weekend IDF soldiers identified a Hezbollah drone in the area of Tebnit. According to the IDF, “Following the identification, the Israeli Air Force conducted searches in the area and identified a Hezbollah terrorist cell that had been operating drones and taking cover near the Security Zone and IDF soldiers. Shortly after, the IDF struck the terrorists in order to remove the threat posed to the IDF soldiers operating nearby. The terrorists’ actions constitute a violation of the ceasefire understandings.”
Also on Saturday, a Lebanese Army vehicle drove over an explosive device in the area of Al-Mansouri, within the Security Zone in southern Lebanon. As a result, a Lebanese Army soldier was killed, and two additional soldiers were injured. Following a review, the IDF stressed that its soldiers were not recently in that area and determined that “the explosive device did not belong to the IDF and was most likely placed in the area by the Hezbollah terrorist organisation.” The IDF added that “the Lebanese Army vehicle entered the Security Zone without prior coordination with the IDF, as required according to the existing coordination mechanism.”
Elsewhere in the region, the US has struck targets in Iran for a ninth consecutive evening. On Sunday, Iran fired four missiles at Jordan, with Jordanian officials saying that US air defence systems intercepted three missiles, while the fourth landed in an open area.
Israeli officials have warned that Iranian missiles fired on Jordan might miss and land in Israel.
US CENTCOM announced that two US servicemen were killed in Jordan and that the remains of a third person had been found. In a separate incident an American soldier was killed in northern Iraq while handling an Iranian drone that had been shot down.

Context: Aoun is the first Lebanese president to visit to Washington since Michel Suleiman was received by President Obama in 2009.

For Aoun it is vital to lock in US commitment and engagement into the political and security process within Lebanon.
Aoun received his invitation from the White House following the signing of the framework agreement with Israel. It had been suggested that a trilateral meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu was also on the agenda, but this appears premature for now.
According to the terms of the agreement, the LAF will gradually assume full and effective security responsibility in the pilot areas, which will serve as a mechanism for the phased and verified redeployment of the IDF and the deployment of the LAF.
Aoun is expected to ask the US administration for clear guarantees that Israel will continue to withdraw, and the US will step up their support for the LAF. At the same time, Washington expects Beirut to move forward with moves to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons and to assert state security control in the south.
Hezbollah for its part has rejected the deal and pledged to continue its “resistance.”
As part of the Israel Lebanon agreement secured last month, both countries would aspire to reach a full peace agreement, but the first stage agreed was a phased withdrawal of the IDF, starting with two “pilot zones.”
Last week the sides held talks in Rome, facilitated by the US. Part of the discussions focused on how to verify that pilot zones under Lebanese army control are free of Hezbollah weapons and fighters.
Verification remains a crucial component of this agreement, particularly in light of previous failed efforts. It was suggested that the Italians could play a role here, which from Israel’s perspective constitutes a better option than the UN mechanism that so often turned a blind eye on Hezbollah violations.
Israel remains insistent that any redeployment meets their security concerns.
Meanwhile the IDF says that there is extensive Hezbollah infrastructure that still needs to be dismantled and is known to exist in several places in southern Lebanon, in particular along the Ali Taher ridge, where it is thought they are still a number of Hezbollah fighters trapped underground.

Looking ahead: With the World Cup over, Israel’s security establishment is braced for further escalations between Iran and the US whilst preparing for various scenarios that could draw Israel into the fighting.

The IDF is preparing to announce the second pilot zone in Lebanon that they will withdraw from. Additional pilot zones are expected to be discussed soon and will be determined by mutual consent.
Talks through the Trilateral Framework are expected to continue. The next stage includes technical discussions focused on implementing all elements of the agreement with the goal of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon.
President Aoun is scheduled to meet President Trump in the White House on Tuesday.

June 30, 2026

IDF destroys Hezbollah’s underground ‘drone airport’

What’s happened: The IDF destroyed a massive tunnel complex in southwestern Lebanon yesterday that, among other things, was used s a production and launch facility for Hezbollah’s deadly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and had come to be known by Israeli soldiers as the “Ben Gurion Airport for drones.”

Hundreds of tons of explosives were used to demolish the facility. Authorities in Israel warned northern residents that they might hear a loud noise and feel the earth shake momentarily, but that this was not an earthquake.
The tunnel facility was 25 metres deep and more than 200 metres in length. It was heavily reinforced and included multiple blast doors to contain damage from Israeli air strike. Dozens of UAVs were discovered in the tunnels before their destruction. Hezbollah’s use of fibre-optic UAVs has been particularly deadly for the IDF in the fighting this year, which began on March 2 and continued even after a nominal ceasefire went into effect on April 16.
The main entrance to the tunnel was located in the centre of the village Majdal Zoun, nestled between the village school and mosque. Majdal Zoun, less than 6 kilometres from the border with Israel, sits atop the so-called Shiite Ridge in southern Lebanon.
Referring to the ongoing developments in Lebanon, Defence Minister Yisrael Katz said in a press event yesterday that Israel had no territorial claims on Lebanon, but that he would not allow the IDF to “withdraw even one millimetre” without the Lebanese Army fulfilling its commitments to disarming Hezbollah and dismantling its infrastructure. For now, according to Katz, Israel was not planning on any further withdrawals beyond the first two “pilot zones” mapped out in the unpublished security annex to the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement, signed last week.
Elsewhere in the same press event, Katz discussed a large offensive operation against Hezbollah that had to be cancelled due to US pressure. The planned operation consisted of massive air strikes that, according to Katz, would have destroyed Hezbollah. With this operation vetoed due to US concerns about maintaining the ceasefire with Iran, the IDF chose instead to focus on deepening its land operation in southern Lebanon.
Katz also referred to the possibility of further Israeli action against Iran, either with or without the United States. “Israel’s position is clear,” he said. “There isn’t a reality in which Israel will allow missile fire on its territory.”
Fighting was reported in Abdin in southwestern Syria, near the point where the borders of Israel, Syria, and Jordan meet. There were other reported incidents of gunfire around Israeli outposts in the buffer zone Israel has held in southwestern Syria since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024.

Context: By mutual agreement, the security annex to the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement was not made public. Yesterday, a reporter for Asharq Bloomberg released what she claimed was a leaked text of the annex, and it has widely been regarded as authentic. No Lebanese, American, or Israeli officials have denied its authenticity.

The annex has six points, and it goes into some detail about the “pilot zones” method for staged Israeli withdrawals. It calls on Israel and Lebanon to establish a Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L) to oversee the logistics and implementation of the pilot zones.
A designated pilot zone will be evacuated by the IDF and handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), who will be responsible for “clearance, taking legal measures against all non-state armed personnel engaging in unauthorised activity, and destroy or render inoperable associated infrastructure, including but not limited to weapons, weapons caches, tunnels, and command centres, by those non-state armed groups.”
A verification method is employed, overseen by both Lebanon and Israel, together with the United States, and any further redeployment is conditioned on fulfilment of the conditions in each pilot zone.
This entire mechanism is a massive departure from previous ceasefires following previous rounds of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, including those in 1993, 1996, 2006, and 2024. It nowhere mentions the UN or UNIFIL and does not assign either body any responsibility. It implicitly endorses a continued Israeli military presence wherever the LAF is unable to dismantle Hezbollah. It includes a staged and verifiable mechanism for clearing southern Lebanon of Hezbollah arms and infrastructure, rather than just declaring the exercise of full Lebanese sovereignty over its territory as an aspiration. And, together with published Framework Agreement, it brings Lebanon closer to full recognition of Israel than any previous arrangement.

Looking ahead: Pressure is mounting on all sides to move forward to the next stages of the Comprehensive Agreement which ended the Gaza War in October last year. Israel’s public position is that it cannot move on to the next stages unless the commitments to disarm Hamas are carried out.

According to Israeli media reports, however, the Trump administration submitted to Israel a document laying out a set of demands for Israeli actions on Gaza even in the absence of disarmament.
These include allowing large-scale infrastructure work, allowing Palestinians to be relocated to designated areas currently under Israeli control, allowing construction for the facilities that are to house the “technocratic” governing committee, known as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, and the international armed force (ISF) that is supposed to oversee the next stage of implementation.
Neither has yet entered Gaza, and in principle, both are only to commence work once disarmament has been agreed to. The entry of either would severely limit Israel’s ability to renew military action in Gaza, and the threat of renewed military action is the only leverage Israel has over Hamas right now as it resists carrying out its own obligations under the Comprehensive Agreement.
In meetings with officials from the Board of Peace and even, according to media reports, directly with at least one US official, Hamas has refused to accept any kind of disarmament as called for in the ceasefire agreement from last October.
An official IDF intelligence assessment, leaked to Israeli media, indicates that Hamas is preparing for another round of fighting in Gaza. The terrorist organisation has consolidated its governing apparatus over the parts of the Gaza Strip not held by the IDF, and it has, according to military intelligence, been manufacturing IED’s and anti-tank rockets in Gaza while smuggling drones and communication equipment from Egypt.

June 29, 2026

Israel and Lebanon agree on a historic pathway to peace

What’s happened: Israel and Lebanon have signed a framework agreement for a cessation of fighting and roadmap to peace.

Among the 14 points, the agreement calls for:
- Mutual recognition between Israel and Lebanon.
- Restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty over all its territory, including by disarming Hezbollah and dismantling its infrastructure.
- Direct, immediate dialogue will begin between Lebanon and Israel through designated channels.
- Lebanon, “explicitly commits to prevent reconstruction funds from flowing to non-state armed groups and connected entities.”
- The parties to cease acting against each other in the international political and legal arenas.
- Work to locate the remains of missing persons (possibly a reference to IDF serviceman Ron Arad) and the release of prisoners.
Defence Minister Katz called the signing of the document a “historic event and an important diplomatic and security achievement for Israel.”
Katz emphasised that, “Israel is not withdrawing from Lebanon and is maintaining the security zone, including Beaufort. Israel will not redeploy in Lebanon and will not withdraw as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed throughout Lebanon and the safety of the northern residents is not ensured….If Iran tries to attack Israel in order to prevent the implementation of the agreement—we will act against it with great force.”
The agreement also received backing in Lebanon. The prominent Sunni leader, Lebanese parliament member Fouad Makhzoumi, wrote, “For the first time in Lebanon’s history, Lebanon and Israel have signed an official trilateral framework.” He termed it “a historic milestone and a decisive step on the path to achieving a just and sustainable peace with Israel, to resolving longstanding issues through diplomacy, to strengthening the authority of the Lebanese state, to ensuring the state’s exclusive right to bear arms, and to ending the existence of Hezbollah’s weapons and those of all militias, thus creating the necessary conditions for security, stability, and prosperity.”
Meanwhile, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem announced that the government in Beirut had “stabbed the resistance in the back,” and that the agreement “is null and void.” Hezbollah member of the Lebanese parliament, Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, said, “This is not an agreement. This is a surrender. We do not recognise the agreement. It will not be implemented.”
In parallel to the diplomatic agreement, IDF operations in southern Lebanon continue. On Sunday evening the Prime Minister and Defence Minister announced that the IDF had destroyed underground terrorist infrastructure in the area of the village of Majdal Zoun in southern Lebanon. The tunnel was over 200 metres long and more than 25 metres deep, contained hundreds of weapons and several launch silos intended to target the territory of the State of Israel and its citizens.
Netanyahu and Katz added that Israel updated the United States and the US representative in Lebanon in advance regarding the destruction of the infrastructure.
Discussing the war in general at a press conference after the signing, Netanyahu said, “Hezbollah had 150,000 missiles and rockets, and we eliminated about 90 percent of this vast arsenal. We astonished them with the pagers, we eliminated Nasrallah, and we eliminated the commanders of the Radwan Force. In the last two weeks alone, we eliminated over 200 terrorists, and since the beginning of the war, over 9,000 Hezbollah terrorists.”

Context: The agreement enshrines popular sentiments held by the majority of both Israelis and Lebanese, such as the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of the residents of northern Israel, and southern Lebanon and their shared aspirations for a peaceful border.

Israel is hoping that the provisions in this new agreement override the components relating to Lebanon that appeared in the US-Iran MOU. Unlike the MOU, Iran is not party to this deal, and neither is Hezbollah a signatory.
At the very least, this agreement should serve to counterbalance the Lebanon component of the Iranian-US MOU and may neutralise the influence of the Iranian, Qatari, Pakistani monitoring cell over the ceasefire, even rendering it redundant.
Another positive sign is the angry reactions among Hezbollah supporters. Hezbollah would prefer the implementation of the US-Iran MOU instead.
The agreement does not call for an immediate IDF redeployment and in fact sets no time limit. Instead it places the burden of proof on the LAF to effectively show they can take over locations when the IDF withdraws and ensure Hezbollah does not return.
Analysts have noted that this agreement is structured in a similar pattern to the US brokered agreement for Gaza (and Iran). Similar to that deal which is stuck translating the necessity to disarm Hamas, so too, have the LAF in the past promised to root out Hezbollah but have so far failed to deliver.
The agreement makes no mention of the Palestinian issue. Traditionally, Lebanese governments conditioned a peace deal with Israel on progress toward the two-state solution in the context of the 2002 Saudi peace initiative.

Looking ahead: As in any agreement, the test will come in translating the principles on paper to implementation on the ground. Several previous agreements, going back to 2006, have spoken about the need to remove Hezbollah, weapons, fighters and infrastructure from southern Lebanon and empower the LAF, so far with only limited results.

According to the agreement, “the two countries will work to establish working groups to draft the full comprehensive peace and security agreement.”
Prime Minister Netanyahu noted, “Israel and Lebanon have agreed on two adjacent areas near the Yellow Line, recommended by the IDF, where there will be a pilot programme for disarming Hezbollah and transferring the territory to the control of the Lebanese army.”
However, in other areas, the PM pledged “IDF commanders and fighters will remain in the security zone in southern Lebanon and will continue to destroy terrorist infrastructure, remove threats to northern communities, and safeguard the security of Israel’s citizens.”
Israel remains coordinated with the US over the Iranian threat. Over the weekend, Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of US CENTCOM once more visited Israel and held talks with IDF Chief of Staff Zamir. The two military leaders discussed plans to be implemented should fighting with Iran resume.

June 24, 2026

Washington hosts 5th round of direct Israel-Lebanon talks

What’s happened: The US State Department hosted the latest round of talks, led by the respective ambassadors from Israel and Lebanon.

According to Israeli media reports, and contrary to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s previous commitments, Israel is preparing to make a partial withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
A senior Israeli official told Channel 13 News, “We conquered territories in recent days for the purpose of negotiations in order to withdraw from them.” Adding, “We will withdraw from a small parcel of territory in southern Lebanon, a small percentage of the territory…We need to let the US try their pilot programme.”
Elsewhere, according to Israel Hayom, Netanyahu sent the US president a direct message, saying that he would not be able to accept dictates regarding a troop withdrawal from Lebanon. The White House would be better served by not making demands of that kind so as to avert a conflict. This message was conveyed yesterday via Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter.
Ambassador Leiter himself related to the process that began in Washington and is now also part of the agenda in the wider US-Iran talks. He is quoted as saying, “We sat in the same car and travelled to the same destination, with the United States serving as the locomotive. The train was heading in a very clear direction: full peace between the countries, Iran and its malign influence out of Lebanon, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and peace and security for Lebanon and Israel. Today, this train is in danger of derailing. I hope we can get it back on track.”
According to Leiter, “The basic premise was that Iran was not involved, and the main discussion is about Lebanon and Hezbollah — not about the extent to which Iran can restrain Hezbollah…That is not Iran’s role. Its role is to get out of Lebanon. The role of the Lebanese government is to exercise its sovereignty. Sovereignty means that Iran will no longer be involved… in Lebanon.”
Also yesterday, Lebanese President Aoun spoke out against both Israel’s presence in south Lebanon and in a reference to Iran “other foreign interference.” (Lebanese officials rarely call out Iran by name).

Context: There currently appear to be four elements of the Israeli-Lebanon diplomatic process. The two formal tracks in Washington, one political and second security, a separate dialogue between Israel and the US, and the new mediation mechanism of the US along with Iran, Pakistan and Qatar, which Israel is not included in.

Israel is highly concerned that the talks between Iran and the US in Switzerland will have direct repercussions on the Lebanese track. Vice President JD Vance has said that very good progress had been made on the deconfliction mechanism between Israel and Hezbollah, and that Hezbollah would be part of the dialogue.
The new coordination mechanism is different from the mechanism that was formed following the November 2024 ceasefire in which Israel, the Lebanese government, France, and the US were partners. This time, according to Vance, Hezbollah – through Iran – is effectively party to the talks.
Israeli officials reject the framing of deconfliction. As Ambassador clarified, “Israel is not in conflict with Lebanon. Therefore, deconfliction is not the issue. All that is needed is coordination with Lebanon… The only issue is Hezbollah. Hezbollah must be defeated and removed from the equation. Instead, there is a danger that Hezbollah has received a boost. It certainly feels stronger and bolder.”
Leiter also warned that, Iran is expected to benefit from a flow of funds under the MOU, asking how “we ensure that these funds do not find their way to Hezbollah? If we cannot guarantee that, then all the words we agree to here will make no difference, because Hezbollah will simply rebuild itself.”
There remains a high degree of concern that in the meantime the US has imposed restrictions on the IDF and on the Israeli government.
Israeli officials maintain that troops are free to act inside the yellow line security zone where they continue to decommission Hezbollah infrastructure and counter immediate threats, but are forbidden to operate in more distant areas, such as Beirut and Tyre.
In one incident on Tuesday the IDF said, “soldiers identified four Hezbollah terrorists riding a bulldozer and a motorcycle who had crossed into the security zone and approached the soldiers, posing an immediate threat. Following the identification, the soldiers conducted warning fire. After the terrorists continued to approach and failed to comply with the soldiers’ calls, additional fire was conducted in order to remove the threat. Hits were identified.”
Despite these claims, former Prime Minister Bennett said he had spoken to soldiers and commanders who had fought in Lebanon and who reported that they have seen Hezbollah terrorists re-establishing themselves, repairing infrastructure, arming up, and returning to activity, and Israeli soldiers are forbidden from opening fire on them.
In addition, they have reported seeing Hezbollah terrorists observing IDF soldiers with binoculars, and they are not allowed to shoot. He added that “When Netanyahu and Israel Katz announced… that the IDF has freedom of action in Lebanon—they didn’t tell the truth…The truth is that our boys’ hands are tied in Lebanon. This is the situation on the ground right at this moment. This is abandonment. There’s no such thing as sending our boys against Hezbollah terrorists with their hands tied! Release now, at this very moment, the hands of our soldiers!”

Looking ahead: The talks are scheduled to continue today on the security track at the Pentagon.

The focus is expected to focus on the details of an Israeli withdrawal from part of southern Lebanon currently held by the IDF. As part of the pilot plan, the US will train Lebanese Armed Forces, who will take over areas relinquished by the IDF and ensure no Hezbollah presence returns.
US pressure on Netanyahu to have the IDF withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon could intensify with time, but at this stage a full withdrawal is all but impossible from Netanyahu’s perspective.

June 23, 2026

Concern over US limiting Israeli freedom of action

What’s happened: Israel affirms it will continue to act against threats.

On Monday evening Prime Minister Netanyahu along with his Minister of Defence and the IDF Chief of Staff issued a joint statement declaring, “The IDF will continue to act with determination in order to neutralise threats against our soldiers and our citizens, demolish terrorist infrastructure, and maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon.”
The comments followed reports from the talks in Switzerland between the US and Iran that Israel would not be party to a new de-confliction mechanism in Lebanon. Instead, the US would serve as Israel’s representative, and Iran would represent Hezbollah, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar.
Against the backdrop of those talks, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated earlier in the day that his directive to the IDF were clear and had not changed, adding that “Our fighters in southern Lebanon have full freedom of action to thwart any direct or developing threat to them or to the residents of the North. The IDF has no restrictions on this matter.”
While the IDF maintains full freedom of action inside the yellow line security zone, and can act to remove immediate threats, the US has placed restrictions to act elsewhere, specifically Beirut, but also elsewhere in Lebanon. A senior Israeli official told Channel 13 News, “The message we’ve gotten from the Americans in the past few weeks is clear: ‘You had credit to operate without restrictions, and that’s over.’”
On Monday evening, IDF Chief of Staff Zamir met in Gaza with senior IDF officers to discuss developments in the Strip and Hamas’s ongoing military buildup. The recommendation that was presented at the meeting was to begin an operation in the Gaza Strip to disarm Hamas—and to leave the intensity of this operation to the government’s discretion. However, the concern and assessment aired at the meeting was that President Trump would prevent a major operation and would agree to be flexible with Hamas on the issue of disarmament.
The IDF also announced that over the weekend security forces eliminated Sabai Zaher Abd al-Hamid Abu Hasna, a Nukhba terrorist in Hamas’ military wing. According to the IDF, “Throughout the war, Abu Hasna planted explosive devices and recently attempted to advance terrorist attacks targeting IDF troops operating in the area. Abu Hasna infiltrated Israeli territory during the October 7th massacre and took part in holding Omer Shem Tov hostage in Hamas captivity.”
Abu Hasna was eliminated alongside Ahmed Samir Muhammad Washah, who the IDF say “simultaneously served as a photographer for the Al Jazeera network and as a sniper operative for Hamas.”
In a separate strike last week, the IDF eliminated two more operatives in the military wings of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). According to the IDF, they operated within a Hamas-run financial network responsible for transferring funds into Gaza. As a result, they “facilitated the transfer of more than half a billion NIS (~£126 million) to Hamas’ military wing by operating a network of dozens of couriers and money exchangers in Turkey and the Gaza Strip. With these funds, Hamas has continued, particularly in recent months, to pay salaries to its terrorists and finance terror attacks against IDF troops and the civilians of the State of Israel, in violation of the ceasefire agreement.”

Context: Israel faces a challenging balancing act maintaining its freedom of operation in both Lebanon and Gaza, as well as how they maintain close coordination with the US.

Despite these latest IDF operations (described above) it is also understood that the Trump administration recently blocked other planned Israeli military operations in Gaza. The operation was discussed by senior Israeli officials, but the Americans were reportedly unimpressed and asked Israel not to pursue it at the current juncture in time.
There is ongoing concern that not enough pressure is being brought to bear by the US and their international partners to force Hamas into fulfilling its commitment to disarm. Two weeks ago, a delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya travelled to Egypt to begin talks about the second stage of the Trump peace plan and Hamas’s disarmament. Hamas officials argued that they could not comply because of Israel’s ongoing targeted attack and instead would only agree to disarm after a Palestinian state was established.
In lieu of any progress on disarmament, Israel is expanding its control of the Strip, now holding close to 70 per cent of the enclave. Despite the lack of progress the US are aiming to begin reconstruction in parts of Gaza that are under IDF control.
One of the current agenda items is where to base the technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. Israel is insisting that it be built near the yellow line so as to keep the NCAG out of Hamas’s control, but the Palestinian Authority has demanded that the structure be built deep inside Gaza territory. Israeli officials are worried that acceding to this demand will have a negative impact on disarmament, and on the reconstruction and future administration of the Gaza Strip, producing a situation in which Hamas is able to perpetuate its rule under the auspice of the NCAG.
Meanwhile Hamas remains armed and has continued to recruit and train operatives as well as preparing for future military operations against the IDF in Gaza.
Another concern is the amount of aid entering into Gaza now exceeds demand. Hamas is able to control the supply and stockpiling goods and selling the aid for profit.
Last week secret documents that were discovered in Gaza reveal that just before the October 7 assault, Hamas’s leadership discussed the need to prevent at any cost the steps being taken to normalise relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Two weeks before the massacre, Yahya Sinwar fiercely attacked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and – just a few days before October 7 – said that there was no choice but to take extraordinary measures to generate a strategic reversal. The documents include minutes of a meeting in Tehran between Iranian officials and a Hamas delegation.

Looking ahead: The latest round of direct talks between Israel and Lebanon are scheduled to begin later today in Washington. The parties are expected to discuss reaching an agreement about an initial IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Israel is thought to have drafted plans to resume fighting Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but will presumably seek to coordinate with the US first.

June 22, 2026

Hezbollah tunnel complex tests fragile Lebanon ceasefire

What’s happened: A publicly undeclared ceasefire appears to have taken hold in southern Lebanon over the past day after a particularly deadly weekend for the IDF in combat with Hezbollah.

Over the weekend, five Israeli soldiers were killed in two incidents, with a further thirteen injured. Since the formal ceasefire went into effect in on 17th April, 24 IDF soldiers have been killed in combat with Hezbollah.
Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said that Israel will respect the ceasefire as long as Hezbollah does as well. “We don’t have territorial ambitions in Lebanon,” he posted in a summary of a call with his New Zealand counterpart, “but we will not withdraw from the security zone and expose our citizens to Hezbollah’s attacks and possible invasion. Lebanon’s sovereignty has been breached for decades to this very day by Iran’s indirect occupation by Hezbollah. It’s the interest of both Lebanon and Israel that Hezbollah’s terror state will be dismantled.”
Tensions in Lebanon occur against the backdrop of talks in Switzerland that began yesterday between Iran and the US, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan.
The talks were attended by US Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The US delegation also included Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, while the Iranian one had parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani was there too, as were both the Prime Minister and top military officer of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif and Asim Munir.
After 18 hours of talks, the sides agreed to establishment of a “de-confliction cell” to end the fighting in Lebanon and reportedly agreed on a “roadmap” framework for negotiations to reach an agreement within the sixty days stipulated by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Context: Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire are intended to leave Israel in a strategic bind. Either it responds, and risks the ire of the Trump administration, as well as blame for scuttling talks to end the war in Iran, or it does nothing, allowing Hezbollah to attack it at will and formalising a linkage between Tehran’s priorities and the vulnerability of Israel’s northern towns and villages.

The focus of Israel’s paused, but essentially ongoing, military effort in Lebanon is on Nabatiyeh and the Ali Taher ridge, especially around the Beaufort Castle. Both sites are beyond the so-called Yellow Line, and both bring with them historical resonances from Israel’s previous wars in Lebanon.
Nabatiyeh is remembered in Israel as the place where Israel irrecoverably lost support from Lebanon’s Shias in an incident in October 1983. The bitter experience is widely studied as an example of what to avoid in any counterinsurgency situation.
The Beaufort Castle is remembered for the pitched battle to conquer it from the PLO early in the 1982 war and the triumphant but politically tone deaf appearance of senior politicians there the next day. It was also the most well documented site of Israel’s hasty withdrawal in May 2000, memorialised in a best-selling novel and popular film.
In the Ali Taher ridge itself, the IDF has located a massive underground complex of Hezbollah terrorists. Here is where the IDF has located the Badr’s unit’s nerve centre, including at least one tunnel that is one kilometre among an extensive system of tunnels, parts of which are inside the Yellow Line area of southern Lebanon. These are the tunnels Hezbollah would use in an October 7-style raid on northern Israel.
Since the weekend, the IDF has surrounded the facility and believes it is now in control of all the tunnel compound’s access points. It is estimated that there at least 30 Hezbollah fighters besieged in the complex. In line with US demands, the IDF is not opening fire for now.
Israeli officials quoted in the media believe that once the operation around the tunnel complex is ended, the IDF can begin staged withdrawals of territory in Lebanon, particularly territory north of the Yellow Line.
For Israel, it is important that any withdrawal be seen as an Israeli initiative or the outcome of Israel-Lebanese negotiations, and not as something dictated to Israel by the needs of US-Iran diplomacy.
Despite pressure from the political echelon (responding to pressure from the Trump Administration), senior IDF officials are unanimous that Israeli border communities cannot be protected right now from Hezbollah attack, whether that is in antitank missiles being fired at homes, as was the case from late 2023 until November 2024, or in an October 7-like raid into a civilian community, without an IDF presence close to the border in southern Lebanon.

Looking ahead: The political leaders who attended the talks in Switzerland are due to fly home today, but the technical teams will continue the talks on site and in person.

Talks between Israel and Lebanon are expected to be renewed today. Israel is interested in reaching an agreement with Lebanon that would see its forces leave small pockets of territory and hand them over directly to the Lebanese Armed Forces. These would serves as “pilot zones” where the LAF would prove that it could keep Hezbollah out and take responsibility for territory vacated by Israel.

June 19, 2026

Iran MOU fallout grows as Hezbollah attacks IDF

What’s happened: Four IDF soldiers were killed Thursday night when a Hezbollah drone exploded on troops near the village of Kfartebnit in southern Lebanon.

Among those killed was Lt. Col. Dor Gedalia Ben Simhon, 32, of Kibbutz Beit Hashita, commander of the 52nd Battalion of the 401st Armoured Brigade.
In response to Hezbollah’s ongoing violations of the ceasefire, the IDF struck more than 80 command centres, terrorists, launch positions, and additional terrorist infrastructure sites in the area of Nabatieh and additional areas in southern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Iran’s negotiating delegation has suspended its trip to Switzerland due to continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, despite the recent signing of the MOU between the US and Iran.
US Vice President Vance delivered a speech featuring unusually harsh criticisms of Israel. Vance warned that Israel should not “attack” the only powerful ally they have in the world, and that Trump was “the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time.”
Furthermore, Vance stated that Israel was built with American money, in reference to the defensive ammunition used in Israel which is made in the US. Vance did, however, make clear that Israel has the right to defend itself in reference to the ceasefire with Lebanon. Vance also called out critics of the MOU, stating that the deal that was signed forces Iran to change its behaviour before receiving any benefits.
The Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament also stated that Lebanon is committed to the ceasefire in place with Israel, and Hezbollah will adhere to it as long as Israel does as well. This comes as Hezbollah attacks continued on Thursday, in which another IDF soldier Master Sergeant (res.) Alexander Filin was killed along with 6 more injured.

Context: Israel has stated that they reject the provision in the agreement requiring an immediate and permanent end to hostilities in Lebanon. Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed to President Trump that Israel does not consider itself bound by the MOU.

An IDF official has clarified that IDF forces will remain in the buffer zone 10km into southern Lebanon as long as the security situation warrants it. Israel won’t want to directly contradict and certainly not antagonise the US government, but as any self-respecting sovereign country – they will do all they need to do to protect their civilians and defend their national interests.
Israelis remain puzzled by the agreement that appears to consolidate the linkage and influence that Iran has over Lebanon. It has been a long-standing US foreign policy objective to decouple Iran’s stranglehold over Lebanon and its support for Hezbollah, a proscribed terrorist organisation.
Tensions between Israel and the US are likely to remain heightened, as the prevailing thought is that the US administration has moved from touting regime change, to now promising hundreds of billions to prop up a fundamentalist regime that has murdered tens of thousands of its own citizens.
The Lebanese president has blamed Hezbollah for beginning the latest round of fighting, and for importing a foreign conflict at Iran’s behest, which is against the interests of the Lebanese people.

Looking ahead: Efforts to reach a separate deal Israel and Lebanon are expected to continue, parallel to any agreement with Iran and the US.

There is heavy scepticism that the allotted 60-day period is a realistic timeframe to reach full agreement based on the MOU, and even if extended, if it can be implemented at all.

June 18, 2026

Israel reels from Trump’s Iran MOU

What’s happened: Yesterday in Versailles, President Trump signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated with Iran which will reopen the Strait of Hormuz and launch a sixty-day period of negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and the lifting of US sanctions on Iran.

The MOU comprises 14 points in total.
The first point declares “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Lebanon, in fact, is mentioned three times in the first point, which includes a clause committing the US and Iran to “ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon,” which presumably applies both to America’s ally Israel and to Iran’s proxy force Hezbollah.
The MOU establishes a sixty-day period for the two sides to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, extendable by mutual agreement. At the outset, the Iranians commit not to “procure or develop nuclear weapons.” Also, the US commits itself to terminating all sanctions on Iran when a final deal is agreed upon. When a final deal is agreed upon, it shall be endorsed by a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.
The US will end its blockade of Iran within 30 days, but otherwise maintains its status quo posture for the duration of the negotiation period. Once a final deal is reached, it will make a substantial withdrawal of its forces within 30 days after the comprehensive deal is signed.
Iran will reopen the Straits of Hormuz for commercial shipping traffic immediately, though it is given 30 days to complete the removal of mines and other obstacles. The MOU commits Iran to keep the Strait open and toll-free for sixty days, the same period as the negotiation period for the final deal, but curiously does not link the two, leaving it open to interpretation what the status of this aspect of the agreement would be if, as expected, the negotiations taking longer than sixty days and the period is extended by mutual consent.
A clause in the MOU committing both sides not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs would seem to be an official American abandonment of regime change in Iran as a political goal.
The White House also released the full text of the MOU, something it had refused to do in recent days after it had already agreed to it but before the President signed it.
The official text resembled the purported versions circulated by Iranian officials in the media over the past few days in most aspects, but with a few differences. The agreed text does not explicitly call for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and does not allow (for now) Iran to charge tolls for the passage of commercial vessels through the Strait, despite rumours and Iranian claims to the contrary over the past week.
Trump’s speech last night at the G7 was full of criticisms of Israel, its war in Lebanon, and Prime Minister Netanyahu. In this it continued a theme Trump has warmed to repeatedly in recent days.
The President once more criticised Israel’s use of force in Lebanon, saying, “You don’t have to knock down a building every time somebody walks into it that’s from Hezbollah.”
He unsubtly referred to Israel as “a very small partner,” though in this he was quoting something Prime Minister Netanyahu said to him.
He also dug up an incident from the distant past, when, according to him, the US and Israel endeavoured to eliminate Qassem Soleimani in a joint operation in 2020, but at the last minute Prime Minister Netanyahu opted out of any Israeli involvement. Ultimately, the US successfully eliminated Soleimani on its own. Few in Israel regretted the elimiation and few regretted that Israel wasn’t directly involved.
Though the diplomatic drama has put the war in Lebanon mostly on pause, it has not stopped it entirely. IDF soldiers moving on foot near the Litani River were hit by a Hezbollah IED yesterday. The device killed Master Sgt. Alexander Filin, a 29-year-old reservist from Haifa, and injured six others, including a female soldier and a deputy commander. Filin made aliyah from Ukraine as a teenager. In 2018, on the occasion of Israel’s 70th Independence Day, he was the recipient of the President’s Citation for Outstanding Soldiers for his courage in an incident where he successfully stopped a terrorist trying to carry out a stabbing attack.

Context: The agreement has almost universally been seen in Israel as a diplomatic and military catastrophe.

Israel media commentary was scathing in its assessment of the agreement and of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s management of the war effort.
Writing on the online news site Walla, Idan Kweller calls the agreement a “formative moment” in US-Israel relations. “This wasn’t Israel’s abandonment, but it definitely was a stern warning to Netanyahu. American support exists under the Trump administration, as long as Israel doesn’t stand in the way of clinching the larger deal.”
In Haaretz, Amos Harel argues that “The Iran affair is emerging as the second worst fiasco in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s long history, following Hamas’ massacre in southern Israel on October 7, 2023.”
Avner Vilan, in a posted commentary on N12, wrote, “At best, we’ve bought ourselves an insanely expensive nuclear agreement, without missiles and without proxies [being included] and with endless Iranian immunity. At worst, we’ve given Iran a lifeline, while it has barely given anything at all in return. In both cases, the same question remains: Why did we start this to begin with?”
Most Israeli analysts doubt that Iran and the US can actually come to a final agreement within 60 days — or at all, even with the deadline being extended. In such a scenario, Iran would not be able to enjoy significant sanctions relief and would probably not be able to see the promised relief fund of some $300 billion get off the ground, but it would begin recovering frozen assets and it would start selling oil, even if only to countries outside the direct US orbit. This would allow it to rapidly rebuild the defence facilities that it lost in the war and to reflate its economy, removing the main source of domestic pressure on the regime.
Even if negotiations did seem to be making serious progress, Iran could presumably threaten to close the Straits once more or attempt to reach an arrangement with the Omanis about “service fees,” as long as that was after 60 days — a deadline no one believes can be met anyway.

Looking ahead: US-led efforts to reach an agreement between Lebanon and Israel continue apace.

President Trump’s remarks earlier this week about having Syria, under its post-Assad regime, take responsibility for fighting Hezbollah rattled Israelis, Lebanese, and for that matter, Syrians too. Israeli media reported that the new Mossad head Roman Gofman suggested to the Cabinet taking the proposal seriously, but was overruled by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Meanwhile, a quiet effort is underway to arrange a public meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Washington, possibly with the participation of President Trump too.

Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood