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Syria

Key background
  • Following Israel’s establishment in 1948, Syria – along with other hostile neighbours – immediately declared war. Since then, the two countries have been in a state of belligerent hostility.
  • In the lead up to the 1967 Six Day War – during which Israel captured the strategically located Golan Heights – Syria had fired mortars and attacked Israeli farmers in northern Israel. Six years later, Syria (along with Egypt in the south) launched a surprise attack in what became the Yom Kippur War. After several days of intense fighting, Israel ultimately regained positions won in 1967. In 1974, US diplomatic efforts established the armistice line that was monitored by UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force).
  • For close to 50 years since 1974 this was Israel’s quietest frontier, and in 1981, the government asserted Israeli civil administration over the territory, effectively annexing it. In 2007 Israel destroyed a Syrian site aiming to produce nuclear weapons.
  • During the Syrian civil war, as Iran tried to militarily entrench itself in Syria, use the country as a smuggling route for advanced weapons for Hezbollah, and set up Iranian proxies on the Syrian Golan, Israel launched its ‘Campaign between the wars’ to disrupt these activities.
  • In March 2019, the Trump administration reversed decades of US policy by formally recognizing Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights.
  • Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel has taken over positions in the former UN controlled demilitarised zone, including the strategic high point on Mount Hermon. Israel has also vowed to protect the Druze of southern Syria.
Mossad Director Roman Gofman attends the funeral of IDF soldier Yekutiel Yehuda Katz at the Mount of Olives cemetery in Jerusalem, August 21, 2026. Katz was killed in the Battle of Sultan Yacoub during the First Lebanon War in 1982, and his remains were returned to Israel 44 years later.
Mossad Director Roman Gofman attends the funeral of IDF soldier Yekutiel Yehuda Katz at the Mount of Olives cemetery in Jerusalem, August 21, 2026. Katz was killed in the Battle of Sultan Yacoub during the First Lebanon War in 1982, and his remains were returned to Israel 44 years later. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

Updated August 24, 2026

Mossad in talks with Syrian officials amid tensions over Turkey

What’s happened: Senior officials from Israel and Syria held a meeting yesterday with the goal of defusing tensions, less than a week after an Israeli air strike on an airbase in the northwest of Syria.

  • The meeting was hosted in Jordan and attended by, among others, Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and the Mossad Director Gofman. There were conflicting reports about Gofman’s attendance, with some reporting that he participated by video.
  • Most media coverage in Israel, citing Israeli sources, reported a positive meeting between the Syrian and Israeli officials, with all sides committed to understanding the vital interests and red lines of the others.
  • The air strike last week was widely seen as a warning shot by Israel against the entrenchment and expansion of Turkey’s presence in Syria. Following the operation, Prime Minister said in a video statement, “We will not tolerate Turkish military entrenchment moving southward because that threatens us.”
  • Official Turkish responses to the Israeli operation were scathing, though equivocal about the extent of Turkey’s involvement in the restoration works at the Syrian airbase.
  • Diplomatic responses from other countries were more muted, but overwhelmingly negative, with American officials in particular appearing to cast doubt on Israel’s assessments of the situation on the ground in Syria as well as the motives of Israeli leaders in ordering the strike.
  • One notable exception to this is Greece, which has not taken any public position on the Israeli air strike, but whose Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis warned in an interview yesterday with a leading Greek newspaper that Turkey’s interventions in Syria “are not always beneficial” for the region, and pointedly refused to condemn the Israeli operation.

Context: Syria under the Assads functioned as an Iranian satellite in the regional alliance structure from the 1980s until the regime fell in 2024. It was armed by the Soviets (and, later, the Russians) for decades, and hosted a large Russian presence from 2015.

  • The collapse of the Assad regime brought both the Iranian and Russian influence in Syria to an abrupt end. For Israel, this was an enormous and immediate strategic gain, cutting Hezbollah in Lebanon off from its land bridge to Iranian arms supplies and opening Syrian airspace for Israeli planes to reach Iran unmolested in two wars in 2025 and 2026.
  • When the Assad regime fell, Israel undertook another dramatic action that has shaped the politics of the next two years: it launched a massive operation that destroyed not only Syria’s stockpiles of unconventional weapons, but completely eliminated its entire air force and navy.
  • The rationale for the operation was to ensure that no jihadist force could get its hands on weapons and capabilities that are normally reserved for sovereign states, as had happened when Libya fell apart a decade earlier. The result was to completely eliminate any direct threat on Israel from Syria (and purchase for the IDF an extraordinary freedom of action in confronting Iran), but also to create a vacuum in Syria that other regional powers, not least Turkey, were tempted to fill.
  • Despite the tension between them, Israel and Turkey do have shared interests. Both strongly wish to avoid any return of Iranian military assets or influence into Syria. Both strongly wish to avoid seeing the Syrian state disintegrate again, and both strongly wish to avoid Syria becoming a base for ISIS or any ISIS-like jihadist organisation.
  • Israel accepts that Syria will need to reconstitute some of its military capacities that were destroyed, it is wary of the grey area between Turkish assistance in rebuilding airbases and naval capabilities and effective Turkish control of such facilities or a long-term Turkish presence at rebuilt bases.
  • Unlike in the Assad era, today Israel can enunciate its red lines in direct diplomatic contacts like yesterday’s meetings. It can also express those red lines kinetically, as in last week’s air strikes at a Syrian airbase. But the room to manoeuvre there is small.
  • Bombing a runway at a base where Turkish forces paid an earlier visit isn’t risky. If and when Turkish forces are permanently stationed there, such a base becomes a much more complicated target. This is why the US is so interested in a deconfliction mechanism. The last thing it needs in the region is an operational miscalculation that has one of its regional allies accidentally killing troops from the army of another of its regional allies. This explains the logic and timing of the strike last week, initiated by the IDF, led by intelligence.
  • Turkey, like Israel, has forces controlling bits of sovereign Syrian territory near its border, though the Turks hold far more territory than the Israelis (roughly 5,000 square kilometres held by Turkish forces as opposed to about 350 square kilometres held by the IDF).
  • The prospect of an expanded Turkish presence in Syria poses a challenge to Israel that is of a radically different nature than that posed by the historic presence of Iran and Russia.
  • Turkey, unlike Iran and Russia, is a member of NATO and a US ally. The alliance with the US is longstanding and structural, but in the Trump era it is personal too. Erdogan, Turkey’s autocratic ruler with a history of antisemitic pronouncements and a pronounced hostility to Israel, is very close to Trump and has successfully leveraged his influence on White House decision making at multiple junctions, often to Israel’s disadvantage.
  • The Iranian presence in Syria was an obvious and, in many ways, uncomplicated threat to Israel. The Islamic Republic was a sworn enemy of Israel and of the United States as well. Turkey and Israel are not enemies, and they share many common interests besides just close ties with Washington.
  • Turkey under Erdogan has broad regional ambitions that concern Israel (and other states as well). But in Syria, it also has a clear set of interests that are more immediate and not connected just to long-term ambitions.
    • It would like a stable regime in Damascus, and not a return to civil conflict and chaos. It wants to begin repatriating refugees from the Syrian civil war  — and to use its ability to influence the refugee situation as a lever of power in its relations with western Europe.
    • It would like to cooperate with Syria in curbing Kurdish political ambitions on both sides of the border.
    • And it has an obvious financial interest in being the main contractor of any reconstruction of the Syrian military.
  • Israel too has an interest in a stable Syria governed under a strong central government, rather than a return to civil conflict and jihadist encroachment. But Israel would prefer that any reconstruction of Syria’s military capability be limited and not an open door for competing regional powers to entrench themselves on Israel’s northern borders.
  • Israel is particularly interested to keep out of Syria new radar and anti-aircraft facilities that would close the air bridge that has been crucial to its operations in Iran over the last two years.
  • And Israel has also made a moral and material commitment to Syria’s Druze and Kurdish minorities that it cannot afford to betray.

Looking ahead: The direct talks between Syria and Israel come on a background of discreet American efforts to create a deconfliction mechanism that would bring Turkey into the picture as well. It is not yet known if any formal agreement has been reached for a such a three-way mechanism involving Israel, Syria, and Turkey, and if so, what its content will be.

  • Syria, for its part, has indicated that it sees the talks as a part of its larger effort to reach a fuller security understanding with Israel that would see Israeli forces withdraw to the disengagement lines in place from 1974.
  • Foreign Minister al-Shaibani gave an interview to Reuters on Saturday, the day before his meeting in Jordan with the head of the Mossad, where he said that he anticipated that talks with Israel, suspended since the beginning of the war with Iran in February, would recommence soon.

August 20, 2026

Israel warns Turkey against deepening military presence in Syria

An Israeli F-15I Ra'am fighter jet is seen in the skies over central Israel, August 19, 2026.
An Israeli F-15I Ra'am fighter jet is seen in the skies over central Israel, August 19, 2026. Photo by Nati Shohat/Flash90

What’s happened: The IDF conducted an air strike early Tuesday morning on a Syrian airbase in the Idlib Governate in northwestern Syria. According to Israeli reports, two Israeli fighter jets carried out the strike, and according to Syrian reporting, eight targets were hit.

  • The air strike came just hours after the visit to the airbase by a Turkish delegation, and it was widely interpreted as an Israeli warning against deepening Turkish involvement in post-Assad Syria.
  • Official reaction from the US came not from Washington but rather from US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who also serves an American special envoy to Syria and Iraq. He called the Israeli air strike an “unnecessary escalation” and said that the US was for working to establish a “deconfliction mechanism” for Israel, Syria, and Turkey.
  • US Ambassador to Israel also spoke of the need for an American-led deconfliction mechanism, saying that “all the various parties—Syria, Turkey, Israel—will be able to have a mechanism through which they can communicate and make sure that any intentions are clearly understood. Nobody wants to see an escalation of intention, an intention of violence.”
  • Prime Minister Netanyahu released a pre-recorded video in which he addressed the operation in Syria on Tuesday explaining the rationale behind the IDF operation. “We will not tolerate Turkish military entrenchment that descends southward,” he said in the video. “It threatens us. That is something that we conveyed generally speaking. Now, we have seen that Turkey intends on establishing itself at an airport that is south of its [border] line, near Aleppo, and we sent a clear message. How might I define that message? Don’t. The message was delivered, but apparently it wasn’t heard, so we made sure they might understand it better.”
  • Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani condemned the Israeli air strike as “unjustified,” while also making a point of emphasising that Syria has no plan to let Turkish forces be stationed at the targeted airbase. Syrian officials were quoted in media reports as claiming that the Turkish visit to the airbase was intended to review ongoing rehabilitation work.
  • Turkish officials strongly condemned the Israeli air strike while refraining from addressing the central Israeli claim of a possible Turkish military presence at the site. Ankara’s communications directorate instead accused Israel’s leadership of making “untenable allegations … intended to legitimise Israel’s unlawful airstrikes targeting Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of pursuing “expansionist and destabilising policies in the region ahead of the elections in Israel.”

Context: Over the past decade and a half  the IDF has carried out extensive operations in southwestern Syria, in areas close to the border with Israel, this particular operation was unusual in that it took place far from Israel and close to Syria’s border with Turkey.

  • This latest strike has been justified by Israeli officials as a violations of the agreed “status quo” in place in Syria. The status quo, as Israeli officials see it, essentially respects full Syrian sovereignty over Syrian territory despite the presence of both Israeli and Turkish forces in small parts of Syrian territory. As understood by the Israeli side, it commits the Syrians not to allow any further encroachment into Syrian territory of another regional power — including Iran and Turkey. Importantly, this would mean that Israel has not demanded that Turkey be ejected from the Syrian territory it currently holds, but that Israel strongly objects to any expansion of the Turkish presence. This would be doubly true if that presence involved air or naval forces.
  • Turkish forces currently occupy about 5,000 square kilometres of Syrian territory in northern Syria. This is roughly half the territory that Turkey occupied during the peak of the Syrian Civil War, when it held at times as much as 10,000 square kilometres. In comparison, Israeli forces moved into southwestern Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and presently control roughly 350 square kilometres of Syrian territory.
  • According to reports in Israeli media, a telephone call was held between the Syrian Foreign Minister and the Director of the Mossad earlier this week to discuss the status quo arrangement in general and Israel’s concerns about a possible Turkish military buildup in Syria. This is the highest level direct contact between Syrian and Israeli officials that has ever been publicly acknowledged. In the call, which took place only days before the air strike on the Syrian airbase, the Mossad Director told the Syrian Foreign Minister that Israel would not tolerate any deepening of the Turkish military presence in Syria.
  • Israel and Turkey conducted talks in Azerbaijan in 2025 intended to come to some discreet understandings about the two countries’ priorities in post-Assad Syria. Whatever agreements may have been reached there were not publicly disclosed.
  • Israeli officials have long been concerned about Erdoğan’s aggressive posture, both domestically and across the region. As his rule becomes more authoritarian at home, Erdoğan has increasingly drawn on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire to advance Turkey’s regional ambitions. These concerns are compounded by Turkey’s continued financial support for Hamas and its provision of safe haven to Hamas terrorists. Erdoğan also routinely employs anti-Israel rhetoric in political campaigning and official communications. In June, for example, he accused Netanyahu of “following the path of Hitler”, while Turkey’s interior minister called for the “liberation of Jerusalem”.
  • The proposed “deconfliction mechanism” was the same term used to describe the coordination between Israel and Russia under the Assad regime, and was primarily aimed to ensure there would be no direct entanglements between the two militaries, particularly their air forces.    
  • Under the Assad regime, Syrian airbases were occasionally leased to the Iranians. The fall of the regime removed a potent threat from Israel’s immediate neighbourhood. But Israeli planners are concerned that the new regime could be angling to replace the Iranian presence in Syrian bases with a Turkish one. Israel is also concerned about heightened Turkish naval activity in the Syrian arena. Turkey’s NATO membership and its close relations with the United States — and the Trump administration in particular — make any threat assessment by Israel particularly sensitive.

Looking ahead: From Israel’s perspective, the limited air strike should establish a clear red line that ends the affair without any direct confrontation with either Syria or Turkey — and without any unnecessary provocation of the United States.

  • The moves in Syria by the new regime and two close US allies with vastly differing interests all occur on a backdrop of a stalemate in the US-Iran conflict and potential progress on the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan for Gaza, which ended the war there in October 2025.
  • President Trump announced an economic “D-Day” that would go into effect, severely limiting Iran’s ability to trade internationally, while multiple reports indicate that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has been partially restored on the Omani side of the Strait.
  • If Trump’s new sanctions can effectively cripple the Iranian economy, and if Iran has lost the ability to completely shut off commercial traffic through the Strait, that would indicate that the US can wait for now before threatening any new military action, at least until after elections take place in both the US and Israel in the next ten weeks.

February 10, 2026

IDF confronts terrorists in Rafah, Syria and Lebanon

IDF soldiers.
IDF soldiers. Photo credit: IDF

What’s happening: In Rafah, in the south of the Gaza Strip, four Hamas terrorists emerged from a tunnel and attacked IDF troops on the Israeli side of the Yellow Line. The soldiers returned fire and eliminated all four gunmen.

  • An IDF operation in Syria yesterday destroyed a weapons depot belonging to the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) terror group. The IDF’s announcement of the operation noted that the depot was located thanks to precise intelligence on the group’s activities.
  • Earlier this week, an IDF operation in Lebanon resulted in the capture of a senior member of the terrorist organisation, known for its close links with both Hezbollah and the foreign operations of Hamas. When his capture was announced, he was described as a “high-quality intelligence target.”
  • Domestically, the Israeli political discussion is still dominated by reactions to the 55-page document released by the Prime Minister last week which spelled out his actions and statements in the lead-up to Hamas’s October 7 attack. The document included many quotes from Cabinet protocols that cast Netanyahu in a flattering light and portray him as alert to the Hamas threat while being stymied at every step by the security establishment.
  • Critics, including opposition politicians and former security officials, pushed back on the claims in the document and pointed to many places where context was missing that apparently changed the entire import of the quotes statements attributed both to the Prime Minister and senior security officials. Benny Gantz called it a “rewriting of history,” while Yair Lapid called it a “falsification of security protocols in an official document issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, in a way that must have been intentional.” 
  • The Israeli cabinet approved measures pushed by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to broaden Israel’s civil powers in the West Bank, notably on property, planning, and the management of two holy sites. The measures are technical, but their impact could be broad, making it much easier for Israeli citizens to purchase property from Palestinians in the West Bank.
  • The Trump Administration did not directly condemn this move, but it did issue a statement reiterating that “President Trump has clearly stated that he does not support Israel annexing the West Bank.”

Context: Dozens of Hamas fighters are suspected to still be hiding out in tunnels on the Israeli side of the line, and incidents such as this one have become a regular occurrence since the ceasefire went into effect last October.

  • The al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya organisation has been operating in Lebanon and Syria since the 1980s in cooperation with other larger terrorist organisations. Its independent standing was not affected by the ceasefires agreed to by Hezbollah in 2024 and Hamas in 2025.
  • Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya is, like Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate. Following leadership changes in 2022, the Lebanese branch pursued a closer alliance with Hamas and Hezbollah, setting aside past differences to focus on fighting Israel.
  • The decisions made on the West Bank don’t change the legal status of any territory and don’t herald any dramatic demographic changes either. They are all minor legal changes that grant more civil powers to Israel, rather than leaving the territory to be governed as an occupied territory by the IDF.
  • The changes are technical and may not withstand challenges in Israeli courts. But taken together, they could dramatically alter the balance of power in the territory between the IDF, the Palestinian Authority, and the civilian aspects of the West Bank settler enterprise.
    • One notable change is to open up property registries. These have been mostly sealed for decades. Making them available to the public could make it easier to locate absentee property holders to offer to buy land from.
    • A second change repeals a Jordanian ban on land sales that made it effectively illegal for a Palestinian in the West Bank to sell any property to an Israeli.
    • A third change broadens the powers of Civil Administration planning authorities to parts of the West Bank that lie outside Israeli settlements.
    • A fourth change establishes new authorities under Israeli control for the management of two holy sites, Rachel’s Tomb on the outskirts of Bethlehem and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron.
  • In the background of this decision are two major political weaknesses. First, the party of Bezalel Smotrich, the Minister most associated with this decision, is polling at or below the electoral threshold. And secondly, the settler movement itself has not been able to bring more Israelis to move from Israel into the West Bank. Nearly all of the population growth of Israelis in the West Bank has been confined to three ultra-orthodox settlements right on the Green Line, with negative net migration for many of the remaining 120 or so settlements deeper in the territory.

Looking ahead: Prime Minister Netanyahu leaves for Washington today for private talks with President Trump about the Iran situation. Contrary to earlier reports, he will not be taking with him a delegation of senior military and security officials. Unlike previous trips to the White House, this one is designated as a closed meeting, and there are no scheduled public events or media availabilities.

  • While it is likely that Iran will be the main focus of talks, we might as well expect that Netanyahu and Trump will touch on other issues such as the situation in Lebanon and reconstruction of Gaza. 
  • There is still no date for the beginning of operations for Gaza “technocratic” governance committee, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). This is despite reports that it might be entering the Strip this coming week.
  • It was reported yesterday that up to 8000 soldiers from Indonesia could be headed to Gaza as part of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). This is the first major commitment of manpower to the ISF, though here too there was no date given for when the operation would be underway. Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel.

January 7, 2026

Israel and Syria establish new coordination mechanism

People look at the view on Mount Bental, overlooking the border with Syria, in the Golan Heights
People look at the view on Mount Bental, overlooking the border with Syria, in the Golan Heights on August 30, 2025. Photo by Michael Giladi/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** רמת הגולן ישראל סוריה הר בנטל תצפית

What’s happened: Israel and Syria have reached an agreement on establishing a “de-escalation” mechanism for future dialogue following two days of US-brokered negotiations in Paris.

  • According to a joint statement released by the US State Department, Israel and Syria have now established a “joint fusion mechanism and communication cell” which will “facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the United States.”
  • The US statement confirmed that talks had “centred on respect for Syria sovereignty and stability, Israel’s security and prosperity for both countries,” while the mechanism it established is intended to allow for a more rapid resolution of disputes between them.
  • The talks in Paris were facilitated by the US mediators Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, and Thomas Barrack. Israel was represented by Acting National Security Council Director Gil Reich, the prime minister’s military secretary, Maj. Gen. Roman Gofman (and designated next head of Mossad), and Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter. Attending the talks for Syria were Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Syrian General Intelligence Service Director Hussein al-Salama.

Context: The announcement follows last week’s summit between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu in Mar-a-Lago. In his public remarks President Trump had stated that he hope that Prime Minister Netanyahu would “get along with Syria”, while praising President al-Sharaa that he, “is working very hard to do a good job.”  

  • The renewal of this track and the formulation of the mechanism followed a hiatus of two months, is viewed as part of broader US efforts to stabilise the region and reduce conflict.  
  • The Syrian government has consistently opposed Israel’s interventions in the south of the country, along with its presence in a buffer zone following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 in which it has subsequently established 10 military outposts.
  • Israel has also conducted numerous counter-terrorism operations in southern Syria in order to disrupt and dismantle Iranian sponsored militias and weapons smuggling networks, as well as threats of Sunni affiliated terror cells including ISIS. These operations have been heavily criticised by the Syrian government. The communiqué does not include a commitment by Israel to halt these operations.
  • Despite this breakthrough, Israel and Syria remain deeply divided over several substantive issues. The Syrians have demanded an Israeli withdrawal from the areas in southern Syria in which the IDF has been operating since December 2024 with Syrian officials emphasising that any future agreement would have to include a commitment to full Syrian sovereignty over these areas.
  • Israel would consider removing most of the military outposts established a year ago, but is insisting on remaining on the strategic high points on Mount Hermon.
  • Israel also has red lines that they see as non-negotiable. Israel will not leave the Golan Heights. It extended Israeli sovereignty to the Israeli side of the Golan in 1981. President Trump recognised Israeli sovereignty on the Golan in 2019 during his first term in office.
  • It is also understood that part of the conversation explored the possibility of updating the 1974 disengagement agreement, which was signed after the Yom Kippur War and created a UN-supervised buffer zone between Israel and Syria. In previous negotiations, Syria had indicated that it was willing to engage with Israel on the same principles as that agreement.
  • Israel is insisting that any future agreement would include clear security guarantees, including the demilitarisation of sensitive areas in southwestern Syria to prevent the entrenchment of hostile groups close to its border.          
  • Under President al-Sharaa, Syria has joined the US-led coalition to combat ISIS, and proactively worked to expel Iranian and Iranian-linked militias including Hezbollah from the country. So far these actions have done little to assuage Israeli security concerns about Syrian territory being used to launch attacks.
  • Following Hamas’s 7th October attacks in 2023, Prime Minister Netanyahu has frequently reinforced how Israel cannot allow terrorists to exist and operate on any of its borders, and will likely require US assured security guarantees from Syria in exchange for a withdrawal.
  • While this agreement falls short of normalisation, it nevertheless marks a milestone in bilateral relations which were some of the most mutually antagonistic in the Israeli-Arab Conflict. Significantly this new announcement does indicate Syrian willingness to explore commercial and diplomatic engagement with Israel.
  • Previous talks had stalled in October 2025, reportedly over Israel’s demands that a humanitarian corridor be established to allow aid provision to the predominantly Druze area of Sweida in southern Syria. While Syria sees this as a domestic issue, Israel has a strong affiliation and a commitment to the Israeli Druze community to protect their brethren.  
  • Hundreds of Syrian Druze were killed by Sunni Bedouin and government forces during ethnic clashes in the summer of 2025. Israel subsequently launched a series of airstrikes to protect the areas Druze community, and remains committed to doing so.
  • An Israeli readout following yesterday’s meeting reaffirmed this, confirming that the talks would continue “to advance shared objectives and to safeguard the security of the Druze minority in Syria.”

Looking ahead: Further talks are expected to discuss the remaining areas of disagreement and focus on confidence building measures.  

  • The two sides agreed that the mechanism will initially be based on telephone communication aimed at real time conflict resolution and to avert misunderstandings on the ground. At a later stage both countries have expressed interest in face-to-face meetings in third countries, though no date or venue for a meeting of that kind have been set.
  • At this point the talks are focused on security, and not a diplomatic process, but could eventually lead to normalised relations or a comprehensive peace agreement.

January 5, 2026

Post Trump meeting, Netanyahu declares support for the Iranian people

President Donald Trump hosts a bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
President Donald Trump hosts a bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago. December 29, 2025. Photo credit: The White House.

What’s happened: At the start of Sunday’s weekly cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed support for the Iranian people.

  • Netanyahu told his ministers, “we identify with the struggle of the Iranian people, with their aspirations for freedom, liberty, and justice. It is very possible that we are standing at the moment when the Iranian people are taking their fate into their own hands.”
  • Similarly, President Trump has also expressed support for the protesters in Iran and warned that if Iran, “starts killing people like they have in the past, I think they’re gonna get hit very hard by the United States.”
  • According to the New York Times, senior Iranian officials acknowledged that the Islamic Republic has entered “survival mode.”
  • During the cabinet meeting, Netanyahu also related to the Iranian issue that came up at last week’s meeting with President Trump saying, “We reiterated our joint position of zero enrichment on one hand, and the need to remove the 400 kilograms of enriched material from Iran and oversee the sites with tight and genuine supervision.”
  • Netanyahu also expressed support for the US “determined decision and action” in Venezuela, “to restore freedom and justice to that part of the world.”

Context: The Iranian issue was one of the top priorities for Netanyahu when he met Trump last week. Overall, the top objective for Netanyahu was to consolidate on the military achievements across several fronts including Iran, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The common thread was to reaffirm US support that if necessary Israel will act to prevent Iran and their proxies from rearming and to ensure Israeli military freedom of action to counter any developing threats.

  • Although details of the private meeting between Trump and Netanyahu remain vague, Netanyahu also told ministers on Sunday that Trump was “unequivocal” on Gaza.
  • Netanyahu said, “He repeated this both in our private conversations and to public opinion at the press conference there. He said it: ‘The essential condition is that Hamas disarms.’ There is no other option. This is an essential and fundamental condition for the implementation of his 20-point plan. He made no concessions and showed no flexibility on this issue.”
  • Without continued Israeli action Israeli officials are concerned that the achievements of the last year will be eroded. To ensure the achievements are consolidated Israel is banking on continued close coordination with US defence officials.    
  • In the wake of the October 7th attack Israel is pursuing a new security doctrine, that includes forward and pre-emptive defence. It is further understood Israel’s new defence posture includes:
    • Disarming terrorist armies.
    • Disarming and destroying military infrastructure above and below ground in a way that will make it impossible to renew the fighting, or to carry out surprise attacks on Israel’s borders and civilian communities adjacent to them.
    • Preventing terror groups from restoring their military capabilities.
    • Establishing effective international enforcement mechanisms that will ensure and enforce precise implementation of the disarmament.
    • Secure US support to operate independently, without having to coordinate with the US every time Israel detects violations of the arrangements.
  • Specifically on Gaza, Netanyahu reiterated the Israeli position to secure the return of the body of Ran Gvili, the last remaining hostage who has not been buried in Israel before transitioning to the second phase.
  • When it comes to disarming Hamas the priorities include decommissioning RPG launchers, other rockets, missiles, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and heavy drones.
  • Thirdly, the destruction of the remaining underground infrastructure, especially attack tunnels, as well as  command and control centres and weapons manufacturing sites. Israel is also demanding a complete ban on military training in the Strip.
  • At this point Israel remains insistent on remaining on the Yellow Line to ensure the protection of communities on the Gaza periphery.
  • Similarly in the north, Israel is demanding that Hezbollah be fully stripped of its heavy and long-range arms, including rockets and missiles and drones
  • Regarding Iran, Israel will support an international agreement that removes Iran’s ability to develop its military nuclear programme. In addition, Netanyahu seems to have secured support from Trump that also recognises Iran’s efforts to rebuild its array of conventional military threat of ballistic missiles as another red line.      
  • It appears that Trump was accommodating to most of Israel’s demands. The main area of disagreement appears to be the role of Turkey, both in Gaza and their ambitions to extend their sphere of influence in Syria.
  • According to Nahum Barnea writing in Yediot Ahronot, “There will probably not be Turkish soldiers in the international force whose establishment is unlikely, but Turkish contractors will be included in the [Gaza reconstruction] work, and F-35 jets will be sold to the Turkish air force. Netanyahu was unable to persuade Trump that Erdogan is bad; Erdogan was unable to persuade Trump that Netanyahu is bad. Trump enjoys both of their displays of sycophancy.”    
  • On Venezuela, Israel has been concerned for several years of their alliance and connection to both Iran and Hezbollah.    

Looking ahead: Later today Israeli – Syrian negotiations over a security agreements in southern Syria are expected to be resumed in Paris. The talks have been on hold for the last two months.

  • Israeli defence establishment remains on high alert over concern that the Iranian regime could try and divert domestic attention by launching an attack on Israel.
  • On Sunday, Iran International, a Persian language opposition channel broadcasting from London, reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has conducting further missile launching exercises. The exercise includes tests of air defence systems and is being conducted in several cities including Tehran and Shiraz.
  • The Israeli assessment remains that the Iran remains exposed, and that their air defences have not been reconstituted since the 12 Day War last summer. Nevertheless, there is concern that if the regime fears it will be deposed then an attack on Israel could be its only move left.

December 11, 2025

Prospects for an Israel – Syria security arrangement

IDF reserve soldiers take part in a surprise military drill in northern Israel along the border with Lebanon and Syria, Golan Heights, November 24, 2025.
IDF reserve soldiers take part in a surprise military drill in northern Israel along the border with Lebanon and Syria, a day after Hezbollah's chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai's elimination, Golan Heights, November 24, 2025. Photo by Michael Giladi/Flash90

What’s happened: Addressing the Jerusalem Post Washington conference on Wednesday, US Ambassador to Turkey and Trump’s envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack spoke with cautious optimism over the prospects of reaching a security and border arrangement between Israel and Syria.

  • He outlined the scope of a future arrangement as “a return to a variation of the 1974 disengagement structure, updated with modern mechanisms, is entirely feasible…zones of limited weaponry, airspace arrangements, and verifiable layers of demilitarisation.”
  • He recognised, “After October 7, Israel doesn’t trust anyone…That’s why we’ve offered to serve as a peacekeeping force. Verification replaces trust.”
  • According to Arab media reports the sides have almost reached an agreement that could include the deployment of a US led international force that would supervise the agreement.
  • Speaking at the same conference, Foreign Minister Saar struck a less optimistic tone suggesting that “the gaps between us and Syria are growing.”
  • Earlier this week an IDF patrol in the Syrian village of Khan Arnabeh, close to the border was met by local residents who threw stones at Israeli troops. Soldiers initially fired warning shots into the air and later targeted the legs of two protest leaders, in self-defence and in order to prevent further escalation. Following this, social media captured the arrival of Syrian internal security forces arriving in heavily armed pick-up trucks. There was no direct confrontation between the sides on this occasion.

Context: Reaching an Israel – Syria security arrangement, or non-aggression pact is high on the agenda when President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu meet later this month.  

  • Following a year since the fall of Assad from power, the new president al-Sharaa has –despite his Jihadi background – made a positive impression on President Trump, including a warm meeting in the White House last month.
  • Al-Sharaa becoming the first Syrian leader to meet an American president in Washington since Syria’s independence in 1946. As part of the visit, Trump announced a six-month extension of the sanctions freeze on Syria, praised Al-Sharaa, and described him as a “young and attractive man, tough, with a very strong background.”
  • Over the last few months al-Sharaa’s foreign minister, al-Shaibani has held negotiations with Ron Dermer, who until recently served as strategic affairs minister. Israel is keen reach a new security arrangement but is insisting on three principles:
    • The demilitarisation of southern Syria.
    • The establishment of a humanitarian corridor for the Druze in the As-Suwayda area, in order to ensure the free flow of humanitarian aid.
    • Maintaining their presence on the highest peak of Mount Hermon, on the Syrian side of the 1974 armistice line.
  • Israel currently holds several outposts on the Syrian side of the armistice line. It is thought that if given an appropriate security guarantees for demilitarisation, Israel would agree to remove these outposts and return to the 1974 line, with the exception of the Mount Hermon post which is seen as strategically significant.
  • Earlier this week, IDF Chief of Staff Zamir held a special meeting to prepare for a possible surprise attack from across the Syrian border. IDF prepared for a scenario whereby dozens of pick-up trucks, mounted with machine guns, and heavily armed terrorists would swarm the Israeli border at several points. In anticipation Israel has dug trenches to serve as an obstacle, and has troops deployed in the area. Nevertheless, there remains concern over the prospect of another October 7 style attack.
  • This is the context of the IDF operation the troops carried out recently in Beit Jinn.  The goal was to engage with the terrorists before they attack and to keep them on the defensive.
  • However, Israel is also showing some restraint. Following that incident, Israel was preparing further strikes on terror targets but called them off to avoid a further escalation and keep the prospect of a US mediated agreement alive.
  • Israel also has ongoing concerns that the new Syrian regime is not fully in control of its territory. This includes independent Jihadist organisations operating in the south, as well as the residue of Iranian backed groups that continue to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.

Looking ahead: US Special Envoy Barrack is scheduled to visit Israel next week.

  • He will meet with Benjamin Netanyahu and is expected to apologise for his recent comment when he said, “Israel can claim that it’s a democracy, but in this region, really what has worked the best, whether you like it or don’t like it, is a benevolent monarchy.”
  • Israel has accused Barrack of advancing Turkish interests in the region, including encouraging President Trump to allow Turkey to rejoin the F-35 programme, (after it was removed in 2019 when they procured S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia).
  • Trump reportedly instructed Barrack to visit Israel and smooth their relations ahead of their meeting.

December 3, 2025

Rafah border crossing to reopen

People seen before crossing to Egypt through the Rafah border crossing in the southern Gaza Strip
People seen before crossing to Egypt through the Rafah border crossing in the southern Gaza Strip, on November 24, 2020. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90

What’s happening: Despite the ongoing failure of Hamas to release the remains of all hostages, Israel announced today that it will allow the reopening of the Rafah crossing for Palestinians leaving Gaza into Egypt.

  • The crossing will operate under the coordination of Israel, Egypt, and a small contingent of officials from the European Union.
  • According to Israeli media there are suggestions that the Israeli decision to open the crossing even before the last hostages are recovered came as a result of a request from President Trump in phone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu on Monday.
  • The human remains transferred to Israeli by Hamas on Tuesday are not those of deceased hostages, according to the Israeli National Institute of Forensic Medicine, which examined the remains.
  • Today, Palestinian Islamic Jihad said that it is working with the Red Cross to locate the remains of one deceased hostage whom it had abducted.
  • The bodies of two hostages taken in the October 7 attack, one Israeli, Ran Gvili, and one Thai citizen, Sudthisak Rinthalak, have yet to be handed over.
  • This morning Palestinian sources are claiming that the body of a deceased hostage has been found in northern Gaza, but there has not yet been a formal statement.
  • Prime Minister Netanyahu met yesterday with Trump’s Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus. Israeli officials reportedly shared with Ortagus intelligence showing both that Hezbollah are rearming and that the Lebanese Armed Forces were either unwilling or unable to do much about it.

Context: The latest phone call between Netanyahu and Trump once more highlighted the president’s direct engagement in the Middle East and across the various fronts including Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.    

  • Not only is Trump’s influence seen in Israel’s decision to open the Rafah crossing, but also in the de-escalation in Syria, following the Beit Jinn incident late last week in which six Israeli soldiers were wounded and 13 Syrians were killed.
  • It has since been reported that some of the armed men weren’t just militants, but rather part of the new regime’s security forces. The US administration is keen to reach understandings with Syria and Israel on a number of issues before the expected Netanyahu-Trump meeting. These include restrictions on IDF operations in areas in which al-Sharaa’s troops operate, cooperation in dealing with Sunni terrorist organisations, and guaranteeing the wellbeing of the Druze population in the As-Suwayda enclave.
  • On Lebanon, tensions are ratcheting up as the sides approach the unofficial US deadline of December 31 for the disarmament of Hezbollah. Foreign Minister Gidon Saar, who also met yesterday with US Envoy Ortagus, told reporters, “The terrorist organisation is rearming at a far quicker pace that it is being disarmed. The responsibility resides with the Lebanese government. There have also been money transfers from Iran to Hezbollah via Turkey. That needs to be curtailed.”
  • In a rare positive diplomatic development Lebanon has agreed to send a civilian government  representative to the ceasefire monitoring committee meeting with Israel. Simon Karam, their former Ambassador to the US  will head Lebanon’s delegation to review the ceasefire mechanism. Until now Lebanon has always sent military representatives so as not to legitimise engagement with the State of Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister’s office will also send a representative.
  • However, with the Pope’s visit in Lebanon now over, the perceived immunity from Israeli strikes has been lifted. Israel has reportedly conveyed to the Lebanese government that it is “very likely to begin to take harsher measures” against Hezbollah if the disarmament conditions of the November 2024 ceasefire are not fully implemented.
  • US diplomacy is making its presence felt here too. The US will not provide aid to Lebanon unless it fulfils its commitments on disarming Hezbollah. Where American statements regarding Israel and Syria on the one hand and Israel and Gaza on the other have largely pushed in a de-escalatory direction, this has not been the case regarding Israel and Lebanon.
  • The UN General Assembly approved by a majority of 123 votes a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights.  7 countries voted against and 41 abstained, including the UK.
  • The resolution is presented to the General Assembly every year, at the initiative of Syria and receives an automatic majority. The resolution  calls for Israel to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines.
  • In Gaza, Israel is concerned that Iran has been encouraging Hamas to refuse any kind of disarmament. In parallel,  the US is seeking to begin reconstruction in Gaza even without disarmament, but focused only on the area under Israel’s control. This measure is strongly opposed by Egypt.

Looking ahead: Ortgaus’ next stop after Israel will be  Lebanon, where she is expected to take part in the Mechanism meeting. She is expected to demand strict enforcement of the disarmament clauses, including a measure the Lebanese Armed Forces have refused thus far to implement: searches in private homes where Hezbollah caches are stored.

  • The latest reports suggest that Netanyahu and Trump will meet on December 28 in Mar-a-Lago, and not the White House. Netanyahu is expected to fly directly to Florida, and to return to Israel within 48 hours, without a stop in Washington.

December 2, 2025

Trump calls for continued Israeli – Syrian dialogue

A general view of Syrian villages as it seen from the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, August 12, 2025.
A general view of Syrian villages as it seen from the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, August 12, 2025. Photo by Ayal Margolin/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** סוריה חרמון סוריה ישראל כפרים מבט כללי

What’s happened: Following a meeting in Damascus between Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and US Special Envoy Tom Barrack, US President Trump posted on Truth Social that the US was “very satisfied” with the progress made in Syria.

  • Trump continued to say that the US is “doing everything” to ensure such progress continues. Notably, the post also called on Israel to “maintain a strong and true dialogue with Syria,” and “that nothing takes place that will interfere with Syria’s evolution into a prosperous state.”
  • Trump added that the Syrian President, “is working diligently to make sure good things happen, and that both Syria and Israel will have a long and prosperous relationship together.”  
  • Shortly after the post President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu held an hour-long phone conversation, which stressed the importance of disarming Hamas and demilitarising the Gaza Strip, as well as potential expansions to peace agreements.

Context: The meeting between Al-Sharaa and Special Envoy Barrack came following an IDF operation on 28 November in southern Syria.

  • Israeli security intelligence had indicated that multiple terrorist elements had been amassing in the village of Beit Jann, around 10km from the Israeli border, and were planning an attack against Israel.
  • In a pre-emptive operation, the IDF raided the village, arrested three operatives from the Lebanese-based Jamaa al-Islamiya organisation.
  • The troops were then caught in ambush, leading to an intense exchange of fire, with Syrian sources reporting around 15 people killed, the majority (if not all) believed to be armed men.
  • The operation also resulted in the injury of six IDF soldiers, three seriously who were airlifted to hospital in Israel.
  • Jamaa al-Islamiya is a Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood founded in the 1980s which has operated against Israel along with other terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
  • Israeli intervention in Syria is not new, following the ousting of Assad in 2024 the IDF has maintained a security buffer zone.
  • The goal is to avert the establishment of terrorist infrastructure in the area, protect the Syrian Druze and to pre-empt any possible plans by terrorists to infiltrate Israeli territory, including arrested suspects and confiscated weapons.
  • These recent Israeli operations have maintained Israel’s security buffer zone with Syria, but have also brought criticism from hostile regional actors as well as from allies including the US. Reports suggest that US officials expressed frustration to Israel regarding the escalations in Syria.
  • Overall, since October 7, the Syrian front has been the least complex front from Israel’s perspective. There is concern that the events of Bet Jann might signal a change whereby Israeli forces may encounter more resistance to their presence.
  • The incident occurred on the day Syrians marked the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime, which prompted the marches in solidarity with the regime to become angry protests against the ‘Israeli occupation.’ While Israel is targeting its operations against terrorist factions like Jamaa al-Islamiya, they are seeking to avoid direct confrontations with al-Sharaa’s forces, particularly now he appears to have Trump’s support.
  • In the background it is understood Israel and Syria have been engaged in discreet diplomatic talks over the last few months in an effort to formulate security understandings. The talks are thought to be based on the 1974 disengagement agreement following the Yom Kippur War. The main difference is Israel’s desire to hold onto the strategic high point on the Hermon mountain range.
  • Israel is concerned not only by the Jihadi cells that operate in southern Syria, but also the growing influence of  Turkey and their support for al-Sharaa. In addition, although no longer in coordination with the regime, Iran and Hezbollah continue their efforts to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon. All of this underlines why Israel is keen to maintain its security zone close to the border.
  • In July 2025, the IDF intervened against targeted attacks by al-Sharaa’s Syrian forces against the Druze in Suwayda.
  • Syrian forces entered Suwayda after violent clashes between Druze and Bedouin members, leading to Syrian military intervention. However, Syrian forces reportedly joined the Bedouin fighters, and these clashes resulted in the deaths of around 1,100 people.
  • A tense and fragile ceasefire agreement was reached following Israeli intervention and humanitarian aid delivered to the Druze community.  

Looking ahead: Trump invited Netanyahu back to the White House in the near future, for what will be his fifth visit since Trump returned to office.

  • The meeting is likely to centre around a range of regional issues, including Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Iran.
  • On Syria, Israel will be seeking a commitment for a demilitarised southern Syria, with US understanding the need for Israeli freedom of action to counter security threats (similar to the understandings reached in Lebanon).
  • Israel is expected to continue to highlight their commitment to the Druze community in Syria.

November 20, 2025

IDF operations across Gaza, Lebanon and Syria

Forces of the Kfir Brigade under the command of the Gaza Division are operating in the Yellow Line area in accordance with the ceasefire agreement
Forces of the Kfir Brigade under the command of the Gaza Division are operating in the Yellow Line area in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon. Photo credit: IDF

What’s happened: Hamas terrorists opened fire on an IDF position in Khan Yunis on the Israeli side of the Yellow Line.

  • In response, the IDF carried out a wave of strikes on Hamas positions including in Gaza City and al-Muwasi area. Israel’s Kan radio reported this morning that the commander of Hamas’ Zeitoun battalion, who also served as the organisation’s chief of naval forces, was eliminated in the IDF operation.
  • The IDF also carried out extensive operations in Lebanon yesterday. A weapons storage facility in southern Lebanon was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force hours after the IDF Spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate the site. Other Hezbollah targets were struck throughout the day yesterday, especially around Beit Lif, where, according to Israeli officials, Hezbollah was reestablishing terrorist infrastructure and where the Lebanese Armed Forces were refusing to operate.
  • Prime Minister Netanyahu toured the buffer zone in Syria held by the IDF since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Speaking to Israeli soldiers, he said, “We attach immense importance to our capability here, both defensive and offensive, safeguarding our Druze allies, and especially safeguarding the State of Israel and its northern border opposite the Golan Heights. This is a mission that can develop at any moment, but we are counting on you.”

Context: IDF operations yesterday in both Gaza and Lebanon are potent reminders of how different the current ceasefires are from those which ended previous rounds of fighting — and how different Israel’s approach to forward defence is in a post-October 7 world.

  • The IDF’s overwhelming response to a shooting attack in which no Israelis were injured is an indication that as far as Israel is concerned the containment policies of previous ceasefires no longer holds. Not only will the IDF respond to any provocation, but Israel will prefer not to move on to the next stage of the ceasefire without all the terms of the first stage being met, namely the return of all hostages, including deceased hostages.
  • The bodies of three Israeli hostages are still in Gaza and have not been returned. This may yet turn into a point of contention with the Trump administration, which is likely to want to move forward even if all the terms of the first phase are not met entirely.
  • Israeli officials continue to brief local media that they do not believe that the Lebanese Armed Forces will successfully disarm Hezbollah. The IDF has conducted attacks on targets affiliated with both Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanese territory. An unnamed Israeli official told Israel Hayom that “the Lebanese Armed Forces are not doing enough. The truth of the matter is that I don’t see the Lebanese Armed Forces disarming Hezbollah. Only the IDF will disarm Hezbollah.”

Looking ahead: The Supreme Court ordered the Government to produce an explanation within 45 days of why it has not yet formed a State Commission of Inquiry to investigate the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023.

  • This court order came in response to a petition from several Israeli civil society groups demanding such a Commission of Inquiry.
  • The Government has refused to approve such a commission, arguing that the role of the President of the Supreme Court in choosing the composition of the commission, as called for by the relevant Israeli laws, would bias it against the Government.
  • Instead, it announced earlier this week a ministerial panel — all of whose members save one were in ministerial posts on October 7 — that will organise a special investigative committee that will not be an official State Commission of Inquiry and whose membership “will reflect as broad a public consensus as possible.”
  • The latter commitment is widely interpreted as ensuring that any committee includes right-wing backers of the governing coalition.

November 12, 2025

Standoff in Gaza continues as al-Sharaa visits Washington

A yellow concrete block placed by the Israeli army is seen in the buffer zone east of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip
A yellow concrete block placed by the Israeli army is seen in the buffer zone east of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, November 2, 2025. Photo by Fathi Ibrahim/Flash90

What’s happened: Israel and the US are staking out positions on the future of Gaza, as concerns mount in the US that the first stage of the ceasefire might be turning into a stable status quo, rather than a temporary measure leading to a more comprehensive political agreement.

  • According to reports, both Israel and the US are examining various modes of cooperation with informal militias in Gaza that are not aligned with Hamas.
  • The standoff over the one hundred or so Hamas fighters holed up in tunnels on the Israeli side of the Yellow Line near Rafah also continues.
  • Syria too has emerged as an issue where Israel and the US have partially overlapping positions and priorities. This week, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa became the first Syrian President to be hosted at the White House since 1946. The US announced a partial suspension of sanctions against Syria.
  • While in Washington, al-Sharaa said to the US media that Syria was “engaged in direct negotiations with Israel, and we have gone a good distance on the way to reach an agreement.” But he stressed that “to reach a final agreement, Israel should withdraw to their pre-December 8 borders.” Al-Sharaa added that “Mr. Trump supports our perspective as well, and he will push as quickly as possible in order to reach a solution for this.”
  • By referencing the pre-December 8 borders, al-Sharaa is referring to the situation prior to the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria. Following that, Israel expanded the Golan perimeter and intervened to protect Syrian Druze, particularly in the al-Suwayda region. Al-Sharaa’s phrasing, however, may imply an acceptance of Israel’s control over the Golan Heights.
  • Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, who served as the main point man in Israel’s relationship with the Trump administration, has resigned his post in Cabinet. Dermer had long indicated his desire to quit, but stayed in his post in order to see through the completion of the ceasefire deal which ended the war in Gaza. In his resignation letter, he wrote, “This government will be remembered both for the October 7 attack and for its management of the two-year, seven-front war that followed.”

Context: While US officials are also those most enthusiastically pushing for an expansion of the Abraham Accords to include the new Syrian regime. The Syrian President himself is much less enthusiastic. In an interview with the Washington Post, he rejected the possibility of a full normalisation of relations with Israel in the near future, though he indicated that his country is in direct contact with Israel on a number of issues.

  • Al-Sharaa claimed in the interview that the Trump administration supported his position that Israel should withdraw to the positions it held on December 8, 2024, the day the Assad regime fell. He also rejected Israel’s demand for the demilitarisation of the region of Syria south of Damascus, something Israel has been de facto enforcing since a spate of violence targeted the Druze minority in the region earlier this year.
  • Regarding the Hamas terrorists trapped in the tunels behind the Yellow line, there were conflicting media reports about Israel’s position on the issue amidst the US efforts to resolve the crisis as quickly as possible. The US is keen for the fighters to receive safe passage on condition that they surrender their weapons. Israel reportedly objects to this arrangement, as some of the besieged terrorists are believed to be members of Hamas Nukhba forces that carried out the October 7 massacre. An unnamed Israeli official quoted on Kan, the Israeli public broadcaster, called the proposal to have them leave the tunnels without their weapons “naïve,” since, according to the same official, “weapons will be waiting for them at home.”
  • One option reportedly being considered according the Israel’s Channel 12 News was exile to a third country.
  • Advancing to the next phase of the agreement requires the full handover of the remaining deceased hostages as well as the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF). But four deceased hostages remain in Gaza, and few countries have expressed any interest in joining the ISF without a clear mandate from the UN. Of the countries that have indicated that they could join, most are only willing to take on peacekeeping roles and do not wish to be a part of any effort to actively disarm Hamas or remove it from power. A report in Reuters datelined in Manama, Bahrain cited “ten diplomats” as saying that governments “remain hesitant to commit troops.”
  • The result for now is that the status quo of the first phase, rather than leading to the next phases, appears to be settling into something longer and more stable. The Yellow Line is clearly demarcated by the IDF with yellow concrete blocks. Moreover, a resolution of the tunnel standoff in Rafah will only further the distinction between the two zones – on one side of the line will be only Israeli forces, and on the other Hamas will have nearly completely reasserted its control.
  • The Reuters report also cited “six European officials with direct knowledge of the efforts to implement the next phase” of the Gaza ceasefire, as well as a Jordanian Minister details growing concerns that the Gaza Strip is being partitioned for the long term into two roughly equally sized zones, one under Israel’s control and under Hamas’s. According to the ceasefire agreement, Israel withdrew its forces to the so-called Yellow Line, leaving the IDF in control of 53% of the Strip. Most of Gaza’s population is in the remaining 47%.
  • The de facto partition casts a shadow over reconstruction efforts too. A report in Maariv claims that US reconstruction efforts could, in the immediate term, be focused only on the Israeli-controlled sector of the Strip. The pledges of Arab money for reconstruction in the rest of the Strip are on hold as long as Hamas’s role remains unclear.

Looking ahead: The US continues its efforts to get a UN Security Council resolution that would authorise an international force to implement the agreement. But the text won’t change the basic conundrum:

  • there is a consensus that Hamas should disarm and a willingness to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction and governance once Hamas is disarmed;
  • the international community does not want the IDF to do the disarming;
  • no other countries want to do it either.

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