New BICOM research: Six months after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel faces a new and volatile reality on its border with Syria. BICOM’s latest paper explores the post-Assad landscape, from Israel’s posture to the emerging Druze alliance and the changing regional axes of power.

1. In the six months since the Assad regime’s collapse, Israel has adopted a forward-leaning posture in Syria – militarily, politically, and diplomatically. Despite initial satisfaction at Assad’s removal, Israel has not welcomed his successor, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who previously led the jihadist Nusra Front and is viewed with deep suspicion in Israeli security circles.
2. On the day the regime fell, the IDF moved decisively to take full control of the long-standing buffer zone once patrolled by UNDOF, along with several strategic sites just inside Syrian territory. This step was taken to ensure that southwestern Syria does not become, like southern Lebanon or post-Qaddafi Libya, a haven for hostile militias and jihadist operating under the cover of state collapse.
3. After Assad’s fall, Syrian Druze began seeking Israeli protection following jihadist attacks and civil unrest. Cross-border Druze visits and religious pilgrimages have resumed, symbolising a growing informal alliance. Nevertheless, for Syrian Druze, overt alignment with Israel remains fraught with risk. Historical precedent from Lebanon offers cautionary lessons about the long-term viability of alliances with Israel for minority groups in the region.
4. Israeli strategy is anchored in one central imperative: preventing the emergence of jihadist-controlled zones along its borders. Past experience with Hezbollah and Hamas has shown that it is easier to prevent the consolidation of such actors than to dislodge them once entrenched.
5. Israel is also committed to protecting the Druze minority and, where possible, maintaining its longstanding alliance with the Kurds as well. This is a moral commitment that Israel needs for its own regional credibility, as well as a minimal condition of maintaining its rule in the Golan.
6. The rise of al-Sharaa has opened the door for the Turkish-Qatari axis to expand directly into Syria. Trump’s overture, aligned with Qatari and Turkish interests, does not necessarily conflict with Israeli actions on the ground – in fact, it tacitly acknowledged and accepted Israel’s assertive military presence, including in the buffer zone and in support of the Druze.

Diplomatic speculation: During a visit to France, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (Mohammed Abu al-Jolani) confirmed that Syria was holding indirect negotiations with Israel. 

• It followed a report by Reuters that the UAE has set up a backchannel for talks focused on security, intelligence matters and confidence-building between the two states.
• Asked about that report during a press conference in Paris, Sharaa responded: “There are indirect negotiations taking place via mediators to calm the situation…We talk to all states that are in communication with the Israeli side to pressure them to stop interfering in Syria’s affairs and violating its airspace and striking some of its installations.”
• An intelligence source said UAE security officials, Syrian intelligence officials and former Israeli intelligence officials were involved in the mechanism, among others. One source described the effort as focused on “technical matters,” and said there was no limit to what may eventually be discussed. A senior Syrian security source told Reuters that the UAE-based backchannel was limited strictly to security-related issues, focusing on several counterterrorism files.
• Israel Hayom quotes Western diplomatic sources who believe that various channels of communication exist between the countries in the region. It quotes security expert saying, “It is very important to study the messages from Syria at this time of regime change,” adding “At this stage, no final decisions have been made about the response to these changes.” 
• The backchannel with Israel was reportedly established a few days after Sharaa met with UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan last month.
• UAE Assistant Foreign Minister for Political Affairs and Foreign Minister’s Envoy told Reuters that “the claim that the UAE is ‘mediating secret talks’ between Syria and Israel is categorically false, adding that the UAE is not part of any such talks.”

Protecting the Syrian Druze: Over the last week, reports from Druze communities in southern Syria described Syrian security forces making arrests, insulting Druze religious leaders, and harassing women. There were also reports of more than 10 people killed.      

• As a result, hundreds Israeli Druze who have served in the IDF sent a letter to the prime minister and the defence minister demanding Israel support the Druze in Syria. The letter reads: “We expect you to keep your promise of solidarity, defence, and a halt to the massacre of our fellow Druze across the border. Hundreds of soldiers are ready to volunteer immediately to fight to save our brethren. We are brothers, Jews and Druze, in our country and outside its borders.” 
• Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Katz issued a joint statement saying, “We will not allow [Syrian] troops to deploy south of Damascus or pose any threat to the Druze community.” 
• The IDF Spokesperson’s Office announced that military forces were ready in southern Syria to prevent hostile elements from entering the Druze towns. 
• Earlier this week Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) Maj. Gen. Ghassan Aliyan visited southern Syria and met with leaders of the Druze community to discuss their security-related and humanitarian difficulties. The Druze representatives at the meeting presented both a humanitarian crisis and security threat from radical Islamists. 
• Israeli helicopters reportedly dropped equipment and supplies in Syria last week and evacuated injured Druze to hospitals in Israel.  

Context: Israel officials and analysts are still trying to determine the true nature of new Syrian regime.

• The Syrian President’s visit to Paris (his first ever visit to a European country) and his meeting with President Macron mark an incredible turnaround for someone who spent most of his adult life as jihadist, affiliated with Al-Qaeda.  He also remains on the US list of wanted terrorists and has a 10 million dollar bounty on his head.
• The Syrian motivation for diplomatic talks stems from the desire of the new regime to lift the sanctions on it and to repair the country’s international status. Syria likely wants international recognition as part of a process of normalisation with the West.   
• Israel’s strategic interests in southern Syria include:
  • Keep jihadist forces away from its border. 
  • Protecting the Druze minority and, where possible, maintaining its longstanding alliance with the Kurds as well. This constitutes a moral commitment that Israel needs for its own regional credibility, as well as a minimal condition of maintaining its rule in the Golan. But much more than that, it is important for domestic Israeli politics. The Druze community has made an outsize contribution to Israeli security, in this war no less than in previous ones, and it constitutes a cohesive and focused pressure group that the Israeli leadership cannot just ignore, particularly on an issue that is now so salient for the community.

• The Israeli Air Force strikes on Syrian territory last weekend were intended to destroy what remains of weapons systems left over from Assad’s army that could be used against Israel; and to send a message to Syria’s new ruler against continuing the murderous clashes that they started with the Druze. 
• One of those strikes was 500 metres from the presidential palace in Damascus. 
• Israel has no interest in continuously operating in Syrian territory. It appears that the IDF prefers to accumulate a bank of targets and attack them in one go when there is appropriate opportunity. 
• The new Syrian regime has two main objections to the Druze:
  • Religious – for Sunni jihadists, the Druze are considered infidels 
  • Political – the Druze in Syria have a degree of autonomy in the area of Al-Suwayda and this poses a challenge to the new central government. This is a similar situation to the Kurds in the northeast and the Alawites in western Syria. 

Looking ahead: Israel is expected to maintain control of a security zone inside southern Syria adjacent to the Israeli border.

• It is also expected to continue to provide humanitarian aid to Syrian Druze and explore the possibility of allowing a limited number to work inside Israel. 
• The rhetoric from the new Syrian regime towards Israel has been surprisingly moderate, insisting it does not want any military entanglement with Israel. At the same time, Israel is concerned that due to the close relations between Jolani and Turkish President Erdogan, Turkey could increase its influence in the country, including in some military sensitive areas.

11/03/2025

What’s happened: Israeli Air Force jets conducted air strikes in southern Syria last night.

• The IDF Spokesperson’s Office announced that the planes “struck radars and detection assets used for constructing aerial intelligence assessments in southern Syria.”
• The IDF added that “command positions and military sites containing weapons and military equipment belonging to the Syrian Regime in southern Syria were [also] struck.”
• According to Syrian reports, there were at least 41 airstrikes, making this the largest attack in the last two months.
• On Sunday the new IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Zamir, visited troops inside Syria and conducted a situational assessment. He reviewed their deployment in the area of the northeastern Israeli  border and was briefed about the developments inside Syrian territory. Zamir was also presented with anticipated possible developments and the planned reactions.
• Yesterday saw the new Syrian President announce an agreement with the commander of the Kurdish forces in Syria (SDF) to integrate the Kurds into Syrian institutions and the Syrian army.
• This development followed the regime’s attacks against Alawites in western Syria over the weekend, with reports of hundreds of civilians killed.
• The IDF has not changed its deployment in Syria, and does not intend to intervene in domestic Syrian affairs. 

Context: The attacks against the Alawites by regime supporters has sharpened Israeli concerns that they are dangerous recalcitrant Jihadis.

• The current Israeli assessment is that the new regime, led by Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) has not yet secured full control of Syria after seizing power, and is still facing numerous challenges.
• Yesterday, Israeli Foreign Minister Saar related to the killings saying, “They were jihadists and remain jihadists, even if some of their leaders have donned suits.” He called for the international community to “come to its senses… it must raise its voice against the barbaric murder of civilians, against the pure evil of jihadists.”
• In hindsight, there is further appreciation inside Israel for the significant strikes that Israel carried against the weapons of the former Assad regime that were estimated to have destroyed 80% the Syrian army’s main capabilities.
• Those strikes in December 2024 were the largest military operation the IDF has ever undertaken, and one the IDF had not prepared in advance.
• It was based on the logic that Syria possessed significant capabilities that could pose a threat were they to fall into irresponsible hands.
• Three months later, these strikes yesterday attest to residual concern over four potential threats from Syria:
  • The new regime: although Israel may not be their current priority, once stabilised, they could pivot to attacking Israel, especially with their leader al-Sharaa having family roots in the Golan. Israeli leaders have been clear that they will not accept regime forces south of Damascus.      
  • The still possible fragmentation of Syria: and the role of ISIS affiliated Sunni Jihadis in southern Syria. Israel has already targeted armed men that approached the border area.  
  • Palestinian terror groups: including Hamas and Islamic Jihad – some of whom were released from prison after Assad fell – and who could still use Syria as a launchpad for attacks.
  • The role of Turkey: and their ambitions to set up military bases close to the Israeli border. 
• Whilst all these threats are currently contained, Israel remains deployed in small but strategically significant positions inside southern Syria. Israel’s primary position is within the demilitarised zone established in the 1974 armistice agreement. This includes the strategic summit on Mount Hermon. Beyond that, Israel also has operational freedom of movement in what it calls a ‘security zone’, which includes some (mostly Druze) villages.  
• Last month Prime Minister Netanyahu committed to defend the Druze of southern Syria.  

Looking ahead: Israeli leaders have said that they expect the IDF to remain in the buffer zone adjacent to the Israeli border for the foreseeable future.   

• Israel is hoping that the US troops remain deployed in Eastern Syria, despite suggestions that Trump was to remove them.
• Defence Minister Katz is exploring the possibility of granting Druze in southern Syria permits to work inside Israel. This could see Syrian Druze working in construction and agriculture in Druze towns on the Israeli controlled Golan.