In this episode, Richard Pater speaks with Jonathan Paris, who outlines how Trump’s personalised diplomacy has reshaped regional dynamics. They discuss Trump’s relationships with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the new Syrian leadership. Jonathan also explains the US and Israeli strategy towards Iran and reflects on Yemen, Hezbollah, and the rise of antisemitism across Europe and the United States.
Jonathan Paris is a London-based Middle East analyst and former Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He also served as a consultant to the US government and was a Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Transcript
(This transcript has been automatically generated by AI — please excuse any potential errors.)
00:00:07:07 – 00:00:28:23
Hello and welcome to the Bike Home Podcast. I’m Richard Pater, the director of become. And today is the 11th of December. As we approach the end of the calendar year. I thought this episode, we would take a little bit of a look back at 2025 and, explore some of the regional development of the last 12 months, as well as forecasting some of the trends for the year ahead.
00:00:29:00 – 00:00:47:18
My guest to discuss these issues is Jonathan Paris, who has been on the podcast. We said at least 2 or 3 times before. So welcome back to the pod, Jonathan. Thank you. Now, this is at least our third time. It may have been four, but we always seem to meet at the end of the year. And I really am looking forward to this podcast.
00:00:47:20 – 00:01:08:04
Fantastic. So just by way of introduction for our listeners, Jonathan, served as a senior fellow at the church of Group with expertise across a wide range of foreign policy issues. And he’s also served in the past as a consultant to the US government before moving to London. He was a middle East fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as a fellow at the Atlantic Council.
00:01:08:09 – 00:01:20:23
And before recording, you told me that you’ve recently got back from a visit from DC, where you met with a range of officials and analysts. So, we’re really looking forward to your insights today. Perhaps we can start with kind of the big picture.
00:01:21:02 – 00:01:28:06
How has President Trump, in his first year in power and in his second term, changed the geopolitics of the Middle East?
00:01:28:08 – 00:01:52:05
Yes. I’m glad you asked that. Last year, when we did the recording and when I was at the King David Hotel, it was already clear to me that things were on the upswing from Israel’s strategic position in the region. You could see Syria had just fallen the week before. You could see, Hezbollah has lost its leader.
00:01:52:05 – 00:02:22:06
And we had entered into a ceasefire. A lot of good things were happening for Israel, in contradistinction to the to the horrible, slogging out of the Hamas war. So already there was a tone of optimism. But since Trump come in, it’s kind of accelerated that trend. He has a personal style of diplomacy. He loves one on ones.
00:02:22:11 – 00:02:56:09
He whether it’s with Ahmed Shara of Syria, Erdogan of Turkey, of course, Bibi members of Saudi Arabia is one of his, like a ten-year-old bromance. And the Qatari emir, they, they really get on well. He also had trusted his negotiators to do negotiation. In other words, he’s got these businessmen like Steve Wyckoff and Tom barrack who basically handle the Gaza the, the Iran and Syria, respectively, portfolios.
00:02:56:11 – 00:03:28:00
And he kind of bypasses the State Department. The peace process. There’s the traditional way of doing national security issues. It’s quite interesting. And finally, I would say he’s transactional, as in any real estate negotiation. He looks at everything as a negotiation. You understand where the other guy’s coming from. You figure out what the other guy’s interests are, and you apply any leverage that you have, whether it’s through threats or threatened, threatening to walk away, or worse.
00:03:28:02 – 00:03:32:09
Bottom line for him, nothing is fixed. Everything is negotiable.
00:03:32:11 – 00:03:47:03
Just as another as a follow up, there’s a debate in Israel here over which Middle East ally is the most important to Trump. And who brings the most to American, to the to the to the table for Trump’s, benefit.
00:03:47:06 – 00:04:18:14
How would you rank the countries and their leaders? You know, with Trump, he likes them all. It depends on the event or the moment or the mood music. But I would have to say, putting aside his special relationship with, is Israel’s leader, Bibi Netanyahu. I would have to say that he has a very strong relationship, almost a mentoring relationship with the young crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman.
00:04:18:17 – 00:04:46:09
I would say that’s number one. Perhaps that is because Saudi Arabia looms so large in, in, in, in what’s important, particularly to people in Jerusalem. A close second would be, would be Erdogan of, Turkey. They have a style that they get on very well. It’s, its, turkey turkey’s leader, is very authoritarian.
00:04:46:09 – 00:05:15:03
And the way he, he has operated politically is something that I think Trump can relate to. And Erdogan is very, very shrewd. So, I would say he’s up there too. And then I would put the Qatar emir, and the Qatar prime minister as well. They have developed a very good relationship, not only with Trump, but with Trump’s people, with Wyckoff and, Jared Kushner and others.
00:05:15:05 – 00:05:18:02
So again, we’ll come on to some of those. But if we can start
00:05:18:02 – 00:05:33:11
with MBS. Of course, the watchword for the last, well, a few years now has been all Israel looking to get, normalization with Saudi, which would be the game, the game changer. But on the recent visit to Washington, that didn’t seem on the cards.
00:05:33:11 – 00:05:58:16
And they seem to be focusing on the bilateral relationship and the defence, support that the US is giving Saudi Arabia. How do you assess that, triangulation of that, that those relations look, even before Trump? Biden was pushing very hard for normalization. But again, the Saudis were emphasizing bilateral issues that you just mentioned. It’s the same tune.
00:05:58:16 – 00:06:29:12
But now, as a result of October 7th and the changing mood in the Arab street, the Saudis, the Saudi demands have been much stronger on what is required before Saudi Arabia will normalize relations or join the Abraham Accords. It’s just it’s quite striking how much more they want now. They don’t insist on a Palestinian state, but they certainly insist on a credible pathway to a Palestinian state.
00:06:29:16 – 00:07:01:04
And also, I noticed their emissary in Doha was quite strident in saying it’s Israel that has to reform, not the Palestinian Authority. You know, it’s Israel. That’s, that’s kind of dysfunctional. And I think you get the feeling that, these leaders that I mentioned, these Arab and Turkish leaders, they can have a good relationship with Trump without having to soften their rhetoric on Israel.
00:07:01:05 – 00:07:25:23
You can be a buddy of Trump, and he doesn’t care what you say about Israel. And there’s a disconnect there that that I find, paradoxical and somewhat worrisome, right? I mean, and I mean, similar perhaps even more concerning, by the way, for the listeners to the whole kind of element of Israeli change. We will we’re on the cusp of 2026, which is an election year in Israel.
00:07:25:24 – 00:07:45:24
So, we will be dealing with that in due course. But that’s not the, the focus for today. Another high-profile visitor that visited, Washington recently was the new president of Syria, Al Shara. And they seem to be also quite a, a bromance between Trump and, and this young leader as well.
00:07:46:01 – 00:08:18:17
But again, what, what do you make of the, the rapprochement between, the, the Syrian regime and America? Yeah, there’s two visits coming up. One is, Tom barrack, who really? The guy who’s been pushing, he’s Trump’s emissary to Syria. He’s the guy who’s been pushing, Shah, with Trump and saying, we’ve got to really support this country, even if we have some doubts about their, their, their, dark side, if you will.
00:08:18:19 – 00:08:42:14
But the other thing of course, you mention is, Bibi’s visit at the end of the month. Here’s what I would say about Syria. He’s only been there. His name, Ahmad Al Shara, has only been there for one year. He’s tall. If you saw their anniversary rally a few days ago, he had him standing with a group of, say, 6 or 7 senior leaders.
00:08:42:16 – 00:09:04:02
Like the Russian, like the Soviet Politburo on their, Victory Day parades. They just stand. But the difference is he’s about a foot taller than everybody else. You know, he’s got the presence. And of course, Trump is also kind of a looming figure. So, they kind of they kind of physically, are a good match. For some reason they’ve connected.
00:09:04:04 – 00:09:38:18
I think it’s partly because Shara finds it a lot easier to say the nice words to foreigners than he then he does to deal with the really hard problems of Syria. I mean, let’s face it, Syria is not a monolithic country. It’s a kaleidoscope of it’s an ethnic and religious mosaic. You’ve got Kurds, you’ve got Alawites, you’ve got Druze, and you’ve got these hard-core Sunnis, Arabs, and you’ve got the more secular, traditional, Syrians.
00:09:38:20 – 00:10:01:03
And you don’t know which side is going to prevail if the secular side prevails in Damascus. If that’s the ear that that Ahmed, Shara listens to, I think, the Trump Baroque plan for Syria will go well. I think they’ll enter into a security agreement with Israel. The question is, how much will Israel give up?
00:10:01:06 – 00:10:30:04
But I think that’s doable. But if they kind of stay in there and the, Islamist camp and if the, you know, the Syrian villagers in the south start, you know, getting antagonistic against Israelis, you’re going to have friction, and we’re going to go back to the scenario where, a Syrian populist leader plays the anti-Israel card, and then we won’t go back to Assad.
00:10:30:10 – 00:10:50:20
We won’t have Iran, but we could have, a kind of hostility. So, it could go either way. What do you make of the Israeli, the current demand that they’ll pull out of the, of the outpost within the buffer zone, but they want to keep the highest peak on the, on the Hermon mountain range.
00:10:50:23 – 00:11:30:10
Do you think that’s realistic? You think the US would back Israel’s position there? Richard, I’m glad you mentioned that, because I just saw that in becomes Bulletin 20s ago and maybe 20 minutes, and I’m thinking about it. I piece because the same article, the reason I’m sceptical about Israel withdrawing even to the point you mentioned, is there the article mentioned they’re afraid of a surprise attack, ala October 7th, where you have jeeps, truckloads of jihadis piling on and then just racing down across toward, Golan.
00:11:30:12 – 00:11:54:10
And so now they’re building, the Israeli defence Forces in the buffer zone, the extended buffer zone, the buffer zone that they took hours after Assad fell a year ago. They’re making, trenches to make it less easy for these trucks to surprise them. But the head of the IDF is doing a drill precisely to.
00:11:54:10 – 00:12:37:18
How would you deal with a surprise attack from southern Syria into Golan? So, there is this sort of paranoia, fear of another October 7th using that kind of same technique. And it’s not clear to me how you square that with a security agreement between two states. Right? I mean, I think the for me, my, my assessment be that the, the presence on these on the, Amman mountain range is not about the, the, the October 7th style surprise attack, but a broader piece about, strategic monitoring, whether the Turks kind of move forces down there, whether the future, force placement, even in the demilitarized zone, gives Israel the ability to monitor and that much
00:12:37:21 – 00:12:56:09
forward, forward warning. That’s the elements of the of the Heights. And I wonder how you, I wonder, once you’re there, how Israel kind of can come withdraw unless Trump I mean, it’s it seems to be that they will be the in the gift of Trump to decide whether Israel is allowed to stay there or not.
00:12:56:11 – 00:13:20:24
Well, I think Israel has a big say in that. To my new countries, do agree to changes in borders. Germany agreed, to change its border after World War two. You don’t and again, at the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were some changes in borders. So, you can have these kinds of understandings over time.
00:13:20:24 – 00:13:49:19
So, I think the Carmel idea of Israel having that listening post on, on the side facing Damascus is not, unreachable. I think it’s it is doable, but and I, I and I happen to like the fact that Gideon Saar, the foreign minister of Israel, is a pretty, he’s a pretty calm and clever negotiator. So, I think he could do a good job in pushing that view.
00:13:50:00 – 00:14:10:10
But we’ll have to see. I don’t think it’s going to happen anytime soon. I mean, it’s also interesting that the, the lead driver of this on the Israeli side was Ron Dermer the, the close confidant of the Prime minister. And he’s now gone. And it’s a wider question on all these issues of who replaces him as the, as the strategic thing.
00:14:10:10 – 00:14:32:13
I mean, Netanyahu has lost now almost all of his closest, allies. But that’s, that’s just I might also think that my friends tell Tel Aviv for 7 or 8 years now that Gideon Saar is has got the ability to do to do the job that Dermer has been doing. So, I’m hoping that he’ll pick up some of the slack.
00:14:32:13 – 00:14:58:13
But you’re right. It’s a very thin bench right now. And, just moving to another front, kind of, obviously we saw over the some of the, the Israeli and American supported attacks on Iran. Where do you see the, the Iranian threat, both in terms of the, the nuclear program and there, that their regional posture and, and they’re and the proxies, which has pretty much collapsed.
00:14:58:18 – 00:15:00:22
Or is it too soon to say that?
00:15:00:24 – 00:15:26:05
We cannot underestimate the significance of the defeat of, of Iran by the United States and Israel in the June War, for the United States, it told Iran. And it also told the rest of the world, including China and Russia, that, that the United States sticks by its words when it says we will not allow a nuclear weapon.
00:15:26:07 – 00:15:57:00
It takes military action. That was always the big question mark. Second, it showed the Iran war showed Israel not only do they their enemies underestimate Israel’s military strength, but I think Israel itself underestimated its own military strength. And that very, very convincing combination of Intel and missile accuracy and total surprise. All right, so that’s the past.
00:15:57:02 – 00:16:38:03
The way I would analyse, where are we going to go with, with Iran, I would say is, look, look what made June 12th possible. 60% of what made it possible was there was a window of opportunity. Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s leader was out of the picture. So, there wasn’t any deterred from the proxies like Hezbollah. Syria was no longer a conduit for Iranian weapons to, to, the Golan and, and just, you know, Iranians self-Iranians anti-air defence was shown to be totally vulnerable.
00:16:38:03 – 00:17:21:24
So, you had that window of opportunity. Do you have the window of opportunity now? Not really, because now Trump has pivoted the region from war, war to peace. Peace from, you know, the axis. We’re in that kind of twilight zone between, military to diplomacy. And I think, while Bibi might want to mow the grass, that is to hit any signs of nuclear, testing or nuclear production, if you will, centrifuges, new kind of mountains where they’re building the next Fordow.
00:17:22:05 – 00:17:42:20
He might take action there, but it’s important that Israel have the pretext to do it. I mean, look, you and I have been talking about, Israel attacking around for years and years, but it can’t just happen out of the blue. There has to be, a pretext that Iran has to do something naughty in order for that to happen.
00:17:42:20 – 00:18:13:13
And let’s face it, in 2024 and an early this year, Israel launched hundreds of missiles at Israel. Iran launched hundreds of missiles at Israel and, you know, destroyed that taboo of direct military confrontation. So, there was a pretext. I don’t see that there. The other two reasons why June 12th was possible was there was, significant progress in the weapons development by Iran.
00:18:13:15 – 00:18:43:00
And finally, there was just the sheer number of ballistic missiles had gotten to such a number that they could overwhelm Israel’s anti, anti-air, missile defences. So, I would say on that score, weapons development, nuclear development. Israel’s got its eyes open. So does the U.S. the intelligence is watching. And the assessment now is there’s been no decision on the Iranian part to break out.
00:18:43:02 – 00:19:06:18
They’re being strategically patient right now on the missile side. That’s where I’m most nervous, because Iran is already back to where they were at the beginning of the June War, and now they’re really ramping up. And again, you’re going to have that same problem when you have 2 to 3000 missiles. Looking at Israel, that’s kind of hard to defend.
00:19:06:23 – 00:19:35:06
So that’s how I look at it in kind of a technical way. I’d just like to make a larger point, though, which is Trump when he has three more years, and whether it’s J.D. Vance or a Republican, another Republican or a Democrat, it’s not going to be Trump. And you’re probably not going to be an activist foreign policy, and certainly not going to be somebody as engaged in the Middle East and with Iran as Trump has been.
00:19:35:06 – 00:20:14:16
So, Iran could just decide to wait it out. Why not wait it out? Because by that time you won’t have these sort of, you can criticize Netanyahu about a lot of things, but certainly in the Iranian view, he’s not weak. You can criticize Trump for a lot of things, but he’s not weak. The prospect of a weaker perception, perception wise now a weaker, successor to, Netanyahu and to Trump must give Iranians some not the people, but the regime, some kind of feeling.
00:20:14:16 – 00:20:36:23
Well, if we can wait this out, then we can give up on our strategic patience. If we don’t get the deal we want at the at the table, which allows us to enrich, we will go for the breakout. That’s my fear. But so, you got three years. We have three years for Trump to get Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations.
00:20:37:01 – 00:21:03:05
And you have three years for, for either to get Iran to make an agreement that gives up at least in practical terms, nuclear enrichment, or there’s a regime change. If I move on to another front, which will also be on the agenda, I on the agenda when, when this and Yahoo and Trump meet, he’s obviously the, the next step in Gaza.
00:21:03:07 – 00:21:22:21
Aside, if we park the issue, which is obviously pertinent here in Israel over the remaining, body of the last hostage that needs to be returned before moving to phase two. Obviously, we understand that Trump will be very keen to make some announcements regarding phase two pretty soon, which involves the disarming
00:21:22:24 – 00:21:23:15
of Hamas,
00:21:23:17 – 00:21:46:10
And the and the overall demilitarization of the strip. I how realistic do you see that and be kind of the vehicle that is proposed to do that the ISF the International Stabilization Force so far has no volunteers of any country that’s willing to send an activist force into Gaza to confront Hamas. So how do you see that playing out?
00:21:46:12 – 00:22:17:17
Well, Richard, I mean, I have to be a little modest here because that’s the 60, $64,000 question and nobody really knows the answer to any of those. But doing my best. Okay. Where to begin? I would say this; it’s no surprise that they don’t have the Board of Peace. You know, arrange. It was always going to be, a push to get it done by, by Christmas.
00:22:17:19 – 00:22:45:08
I think it’s nice to see that there’s an operational committee underneath the board. So, the board will have MBS. And Trump at the top. It reminds me of the Mena summit that, happened between the Clinton and Yeltsin co convened during the Oslo peace process that I was very involved with that took place in Casablanca, Amman, at Cairo and Doha.
00:22:45:10 – 00:23:10:06
You have this sort of the board at the top, but the real, heavy work is done at the operational level. And there you have Wyckoff and Kushner. You’d have, Mladenov, who was part of the, with Blair, was part of that, diplomatic channel. The quartet. Yeah, yeah. Yes. You probably know him and of course, Blair himself.
00:23:10:08 – 00:23:49:01
So, they could do a good job, I think, in trying to transition an ISF and urgent international stabilization force and transition the Palestinian Authority into a place where kind of Hamas goes away softly. A big analogy to softly is how the Yemen civil war ended in the 60s. Most people don’t know that it didn’t end. It just kind of faded away when Egypt lost the 67 war, and Saudi Arabia, even though they lost, they actually, ended up, there actually ended up controlling Yemen.
00:23:49:01 – 00:24:12:12
In other words, you don’t you’re not going to have a clear-cut disarming by Hamas, but you will have them slowly. Get pushed into the background as a result of these other things. These positive things happen on the ground. Now, how do you get an ISF going? You got to get somebody to step up. I’m always keen on the Indonesians.
00:24:12:14 – 00:24:51:10
The Azerbaijan is it’s kind of a mixed bag for Israel. They’re a close ally in a way of Israel. But you don’t want the last thing you want is Azerbaijani soldiers being shot up. And, you know, Israel is somehow implicated in it. That would it has downside there. That’s a difficult issue. The bottom line, though, is will Hamas give up its weapons or put it differently, what how far will Trump go and how will he get Turkey and Qatar and Egypt to persuade Hamas to go into the background?
00:24:51:12 – 00:25:25:17
That’s why I focus on doing what you can do to find a better substitute for Hamas, and then you have an easier time dealing with Hamas. It’s a tricky subject. Very tricky and mean related to that kind of looming over this other role of Turkey and Qatar. Obviously, we’re not, obviously, but it’s most the conventional understanding that one needed those essential allies of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in order to get the deal done back, back a couple of months ago.
00:25:25:23 – 00:25:58:07
But now they are kind of they have an interest in perpetuating the role of Hamas. And as you mentioned before, both the Qatari leaders and the Turks are close to Trump personally. How much influence do they have over Trump and over the Gaza and over the Gaza policy going forward? I can tell you something that three weeks after October 7th, I was sitting next to, an acquaintance of mine who’s been working in Doha for years and years and very close to the Qatar’s three weeks after October 7th.
00:25:58:13 – 00:26:28:18
And we talked about the future of Hamas and Qatar, he told me, would always seek some role for Hamas. Some he didn’t say whether they would be armed or not, but he would say they would have a political role. That’s very important to Qatar. Why? Because Qatar, as is Turkey, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, was created out of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
00:26:28:20 – 00:26:51:12
So, so I guess what I’m saying is that we know that Qatar is going to get a representation somewhere on this Board of peace or on the operational committee, and we know that Turkey is going to have a lot of say, no matter what Netanyahu says, about no role for them in Gaza because of their relationship with Trump.
00:26:51:14 – 00:27:11:13
I go back to my point. You can have a good relationship with Trump and ignore Israel’s demands. Trump could ignore Israel’s demands and give Turkey and Qatar a role. Why? Because Trump trust the Amir, Trump trust Erdogan. But when it comes to Hamas, I wouldn’t trust them.
00:27:11:15 – 00:27:35:03
Just one final front in the region and kind of all of this paints a picture that as we enter 2026, all the fronts are unresolved and, and still in play. The last front is Yemen, which has gone relatively quiet recently, but still, we saw from early this year how much of a threat they pose, both to, to Israel with the long-range missiles and drones and to the, to the shipping lanes as well.
00:27:35:08 – 00:28:06:15
What’s your assessment of what the American approach is there and what to expect going forward? I want to do two things. If this is the final comment. One is I want to say something. Just picking up on Hamas and how key the disarmament issue is. Is Lebanon real? Just really quickly, December 31st and just two weeks, you have the deadline by which, Hezbollah is supposed to disarm to the, to the Lebanese authorities and Lebanese army.
00:28:06:17 – 00:28:44:07
And it’s enormously important how that goes, because if as well as does disarm, it creates a lot more credibility for has for Hamas also disarming. If, on the other hand, Hezbollah holds out, Iran comes to the rescue. The Lebanese authorities are feckless. Then you could have a resumption of a war and, and you and you could have a bad, model for the Hamas disarming scenario, but just wanted to get that out of the way on Yemen.
00:28:44:09 – 00:29:12:12
It’s I call it an enigma because the Hutus are so insular. They’re run by a charismatic leader who lives in the mountains. I would say that Israel has done a pretty good job in deterring them. But the best thing that’s happened, aside from Israel taking up much of their leadership and one of those air raids, about four months ago or so, the best thing that’s happened is the Gaza ceasefire.
00:29:12:14 – 00:29:41:17
Because if you notice, whenever there was an interim ceasefire, in the last two and a half years in, in, two years in Gaza, the Houthis stopped their, aggressive actions in the red sea. And thus far they have as well. However, there’s still a threat to Israel. And so many ways, they’re not really controlled by Iran, but they’re heavily, supported by Iran.
00:29:41:19 – 00:30:11:12
And so, they, they, they could be a real problem in, in and for Israel in, in the future because they’re so difficult to deal with and they’re so far away. And, you know, it’s not like a normal state that there’s just a few people in the mountains. The good news is that the, the, the southern, military, the antiquities supported by the UAE, who control the south of Yemen, are gaining traction in the south.
00:30:11:12 – 00:30:25:08
And so, it’s possible that the whole cheese could be threatened from the, their rivals in Yemen, as in regime change in Iran. It’s probably not going to come from the outside. It’s going to come from inside in Yemen.
00:30:25:10 – 00:30:53:00
And thank you. And just one final question, slightly, slightly, of theme, but the other kind of strategic threat that Israel faces or broadly of the global Jewry, is the rise of anti-Semitism both in Europe and the US, just as a, as someone living in the Europe and a close contact to the US, I wondered what comparison you would make and how concerned you are over that comparison between Europe and the US.
00:30:53:00 – 00:31:27:21
Yeah, that’s. Yeah. Well, first of all, it’s just one of the paradoxes that just as Israel has kind of, knocked down this ten foot giant of, of Iran, which was the king of anti-Israel ism, the only country in the world that called for the elimination of Israel just as they were defeated. You have at the same time, this rise of global anti-Israel ism, namely on the campuses, in the United States and on the streets of London and other European capitals, it’s kind of worrisome.
00:31:28:01 – 00:32:03:17
I think the Diaspora Jews, are in a less field, feel less safe than any time since the 30s. And I’m trying to figure it out as we speak. But I, I do think that one of the concerns about Europe is they’re being hammered in so many directions that people are beginning to wonder whether they even have the societal or military or police forces to maintain their own state’s security.
00:32:03:23 – 00:32:31:17
I mean, you sometimes wonder about the police in the London streets. You also wonder about they’re their initiatives to create an alternative to the American support and the war against, Putin, whether Europe can truly defend itself. You wonder where and given the public moods in these countries, in Europe, and, and the UK, whether anybody would volunteer to fight such a war.
00:32:31:23 – 00:33:03:21
And that leaves open the possibility of when, when Trump’s, national security strategy report that came out last week, worries about the erasing of European civilization, you have to wonder what is going to be replaced with. They didn’t say in any place I could find, you know, this fear of, a kind of jihadi Muslim takeover of Europe that was sort of the stuff you used to read in the early 2000, in the wake of nine, 11 and 77.
00:33:03:23 – 00:33:47:17
But there is this feeling that, that that the, the weakening of the traditional Europe civilizations or states or identities gives room for this violently anti-Israel element, particularly from Muslim communities in Europe. And that’s worrisome on the United States. I would say you have the same phenomenon, like in New York, where Mamdani, ran, on an anti-Israel ticket, among other things, anti-French people, anti-Israel, ticket, to win an election in a city that has the largest concentration of Jews in the world.
00:33:47:19 – 00:34:14:04
That was pretty shocking, but I think more shocking is the civil war going on in the Christian right in America, the Republican side, the MAGA side led by, the new Patrick Buchanan. For those who are old enough to remember, he was an Israel baiter, back in the 80s. But this guy, Tucker Carlson, is a very charismatic, podcaster, like you, Richard.
00:34:14:06 – 00:34:47:11
And he foments this, this very, anti-Israel, jargon that says we need to take care of America and not the world. We need to focus on us and not allow Jews to promote this globalist agenda that gets us involved in these forever wars in the Middle East. That resonates a lot with young Christians, who don’t know anything about what’s going on in the rest of the world and couldn’t care less.
00:34:47:13 – 00:35:07:13
And I’m worried about that. But on the other hand, in the Christian right, you do have the Zionist Christians, you have evangelicals like Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador in Israel, whom, you know, who do espouse a much different line on Israel and who wins that battle. That civilizational battle is something Israel has to, to pay attention to.
00:35:07:13 – 00:35:18:20
One suggestion I have there is Israel. Pay attention to Christian communities, in the Middle East, and what it can do to help foster, relations with those communities.
00:35:18:22 – 00:35:29:10
Jonathan, thank you so much for talking to me. Today was a fantastic, wide-ranging conversation, which was, I enjoyed it. And thank you for your time as ever. As always. It was it was a pleasure.
00:35:29:10 – 00:35:30:12
And thank you for having me.