What’s happened: At the end of last week, President Trump announced that Hamas had accepted a proposal to disarm in Gaza.

• Some of the key principles of the published plan state that:
  • Israel shall fully complete, without delay, all remaining commitments under the Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, particularly the cessation of military operations.
  • Hamas and the Palestinian factions shall complete the cessation of all military operations in accordance with the Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol and the Peace Plan.
  • A process to decommission and store heavy weapons, military production sites, weapons depots, and tunnels shall begin after completion of the remaining commitments under the Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, the entry of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), and the deployment of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF).
  • Progression from one phase to the next will depend on verified completion of the commitments of the previous phase. Verification will be carried out by the International Verification Committee (IVC), which will also monitor any violations by either party through an enhanced monitoring mechanism.
  • Palestinian factions shall participate in this process, and no weapons shall be transferred or handed to Israel or any non-Palestinian parties.
• Implementation of the roadmap, including the issue of weapons and other aspects of the comprehensive peace plan, is intended to create conditions for a credible pathway towards Palestinian self-determination and statehood.
• On Friday, President Trump said Israel was “very happy” about the disarmament agreement. He added: “Most people said that would be a deal that would be undoable. Will it go through its ups and downs? It’s a very complex situation over there… But it’s a great breakthrough. Nobody’s ever thought that it would be possible to disarm Hamas.”
• A senior US official and officials on the Board of Peace warned that Trump would be “very disappointed” if Israel blocked the plan.
• However, statements from Israeli officials over the past few days appear to reject the proposal. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office said Israel demands “the full disarmament of Hamas, including removal of the weaponry from Gaza and the complete demilitarisation of the Strip as a condition for any process” of withdrawal. The statement added that the agreement does not provide “a sufficient response to those demands.”
• Another Israeli statement said: “Israel has reiterated that there will be no IDF withdrawal from the current Yellow Line without the genuine disarmament of Hamas.”
• Israeli opposition parties also criticised the proposal. Yisrael Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Liberman said: “Any agreement with Hamas is a return to the same preconception that led Israel to the October 7 massacre. Instead of reaching understandings with Hamas, Hamas must be eliminated.”
• British Foreign Minister Ed Miliband welcomed the announcement, adding: “The focus must now be on implementing the 20-point plan in full. This includes the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza, and respect for the ceasefire from all parties.”
• Meanwhile, the IDF has continued striking terrorist targets in Gaza, including the destruction of five weapons warehouses and Hamas weapons caches. Three militants who were preparing attacks on Israeli troops were also killed in recent strikes. Targeted killings included:
  • Salem Jamal Abdel Rahman Abu Labad – commander of a Nukhba squad linked to the 7 October attack on Kibbutz Nir Oz.
  • Muhammad Abdel Nasser Muhammad Khatib – commander in Hamas’s Maghazi Battalion in central Gaza.
  • Alaa Imad Khamis Taramsi – member of the Army of Islam.
  • Hassan Ibrahim Shehadeh Qahman – member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
• Ahmad Hadri – member of Hamas’s Jabaliya Battalion in northern Gaza.
• American officials criticised the Israeli strikes, which also caused civilian casualties, saying they “further isolate Israel in the Middle East.” They argued that the agreement represented “the fruits of eight months of negotiations that were meant to bring about the demilitarization of Gaza,” and warned that Israeli actions could give Hamas “an excuse to withdraw” from the agreement.
• Board of Peace Gaza envoy Mladenov said the strikes came “after intense efforts by the Board of Peace and the mediators (Egypt, Turkiye, Qatar and the US) to bring the Palestinian factions in Gaza to agree to a roadmap on the full implementation of President Trump’s plan, to hand over civilian governance and to decommission their weapons.”

Context: On paper, Hamas agreeing for the first time to transfer all civilian and security governance responsibilities in Gaza to another Palestinian authority, to refrain from interfering in its operations, and to accept the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon” is highly significant.

• Israel is demanding the surrender of rifles, rockets and explosives, as well as the continued destruction of tunnels. It insists that the disarmament process be completed before the IDF fully withdraws from Gaza.
• Israel remains deeply sceptical of Hamas’s intentions. Israeli intelligence assesses that Hamas remains committed to rebuilding its military capabilities rather than genuinely demilitarising. A spokesperson from the Prime Minister’s Office said: “If we redeploy before Hamas is truly disarmed, it will quickly expand its presence throughout Gaza, rebuild its terrorist infrastructure, once again threaten Israeli communities, and seek to carry out another October 7-style attack… Disarming means physically giving up the weapons. Nothing less.”
• One criticism of the agreement is that Hamas will not allow its weapons to be destroyed immediately, but only stored. The weapons will neither leave Gaza nor be handed to Israel, but instead transferred to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. Writing in Israel Hayom, Nadav Shragai argued that Hamas “is not disarming, but simply becoming a partner in managing its own arsenal, and this is only the beginning.” Many Israelis believe the agreement simply gives Hamas time to rebuild. The document also contains no requirement for senior Hamas leaders or personnel to leave Gaza.
• A senior Board of Peace official told I24 News that Hamas’s surrendered weapons will remain inside Gaza at a secure location before eventually being dismantled and melted down.
• The organisations responsible for supporting implementation are the International Stabilisation Force, currently consisting of around 200 soldiers from Uganda and Morocco, together with the Palestinian police. The Board of Peace has said it will verify Hamas’s compliance using Israeli intelligence, including information from the IDF and Shin Bet.
• There is also disagreement over continued Israeli military operations in Gaza. Although the Board of Peace has announced understandings with Hamas on voluntary disarmament and Palestinian officials claim there is an agreement to halt IDF operations, Israeli officials insist there has been no change in policy. “We will continue to respond to threats.”
• A further challenge for Israel is that, while it argues Hamas’s disarmament and Gaza’s demilitarisation are prerequisites for any withdrawal, journalist Ronen Bergman notes that the agreement begins by outlining Israel’s obligations under the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement.
• These obligations include halting military operations and targeted killings, returning to the agreed Yellow Line, and reactivating the humanitarian protocol. This requires allowing at least 600 aid trucks per day, including 50 fuel trucks, ensuring free movement between northern and southern Gaza, reopening the Rafah crossing in both directions, and permitting the entry of debris-clearing equipment.
• Another political challenge for the current Israeli government is that the framework explicitly links implementation to a “credible political pathway” towards a Palestinian state, although this was already part of President Trump’s original 20-point peace plan that led to the hostage release and Gaza ceasefire.
• The composition of the International Verification Committee remains unclear, with Israeli concerns about any significant role for Qatar or Turkey.

Looking ahead: Several unresolved issues remain, including the timetable for future phases, the mandate of the International Stabilisation Force, the vetting procedures for local police authorised to perform security duties, and the screening of officials appointed to Gaza’s technocratic committee.

• It also remains unclear whether implementation will proceed simultaneously with the collection of Hamas’s weapons, or whether any Israeli withdrawal will begin only after the weapons have been surrendered.
• Talks are continuing in Cairo under Egyptian intelligence, with Qatari and Turkish mediation, as negotiators seek agreement on several remaining technical clauses.

What’s happened: Talks continue in Egypt to reach an agreement on Hamas disarmament, in line with the comprehensive plan which ended two years of war in Gaza last October. Israel is not a participant in the talks, which are also mediated by Qatar and Turkey, along with Egypt.

• According to Arab sources, Hamas has shown some willingness to give up its “heavy weapons,” but not its “light weapons. The former category includes the missiles and rockets it uses to attack Israel. The latter category includes the rifles and other munitions it needs to maintain its domestic control of Gaza.
• The Israeli assessment is that Hamas has almost no heavy weapons left anyway, so this is at most a symbolic concession. Though Israel is not a party to the talks, it is unlikely to permit the entry into the Gaza Strip from Egypt of the so-called “technocratic committee” which is supposed to handle governance of Gaza unless there is an agreed disarmament that meets Israel’s minimal conditions.
• Without disarmament, the progress of the comprehensive agreement is stalled, and the renewal of combat becomes more likely. This is especially the case as the major international actors involved have been laying the blame for the failure on Hamas and not on Israel, and as Israel will not, in any renewed hostilities, need to avoid operating in the Hamas redoubts of the refugee camps in the centre of the Strip for fear of harming Israeli hostages — because Hamas no longer holds any.

What’s happened: Over the weekend the IDF eliminated Ez al-Dine al-Haddad, Hamas’s military wing commander and one of the last surviving architects of the October 7 massacre.

• Israel says Haddad was responsible for the treatment of the hostages, used some of them as human shields, and was working to rebuild Hamas’s military capabilities and plan attacks.
• In response to al-Haddad’s death, and as a reaction to the Knesset’s new law on the death penalty for convicted terrorist murderers, the IDF is warning that Hamas has instructed its operatives in the Gaza Strip to prepare to kidnap IDF soldiers. The instructions were issued by means of an internal memo that Hamas’s leadership disseminated among its ranks.
• The Israel Navy continued overnight to intercept the latest Gaza bound flotilla. As of last night, IDF naval commandos had reportedly intercepted more than 30 of the 57 vessels that set sail from Turkey. Roughly 250 activists were arrested.
• According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, no humanitarian aid has so far been found on board any of the vessels.
• The Foreign Ministry wrote on X, “The purpose of this provocation is to serve Hamas, to divert attention from Hamas’s refusal to disarm, and to obstruct progress on President Trump’s peace plan. As the Board of Peace—which oversees humanitarian activities in Gaza under UNSC Resolution 2803—made clear: this flotilla is only about publicity. The Gaza Strip is flooded with aid. Since October 2025 alone, more than 1.58 million tons of humanitarian aid and thousands of tons of medical supplies have entered Gaza. Israel will not allow any breach of the lawful naval blockade on Gaza. Israel calls on all participants in this provocation to change course and turn back immediately.”

Context: This latest targeted strike against Hamas’s leadership is being presented in Israel as another significant operational success, but not a strategic game changer.

• Haddad’s death removes a senior figure who combined combat experience, organisational authority, and symbolic weight inside Hamas’s war structure. Haddad was Hamas’s fourth military commander since October 7. He follows:
  • Mohammed Deif, the long-time commander of Hamas’s military wing who was eliminated by Israel in July 2024.
  • Marwan Issa, Deif’s deputy and a senior military commander, who was eliminated by Israel in March 2024.
  • Mohammad Sinwar (Yahya Sinwar’s brother) and a senior military figure, was eliminated in May 2025.
  • The overall leader Yahya Sinwar himself was eliminated by Israel in October 2024.
• Despite these tactical achievements, military planners are wary of Hamas’s ability to regenerate leadership.  According to Arab media, Haddad will be replaced by his close associate Mohammad Odeh. Odeh was apparently offered the role after the elimination of Mohammad Sinwar, but he declined, and Haddad took it on instead.
• Odeh served as the head of Hamas’s intelligence headquarters. He is considered the natural successor, being the most senior figure in Hamas’s military wing and the last core member of Hamas’s military council who took part in planning and executing the October 7 massacre – including the significant intelligence gathering on Israel and IDF bases in the home front, which served as the basis for the operation.
• Odeh was born in the Jabaliya refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip and served as commander of Hamas’s northern brigade from 2017-2019. Odeh has already survived several assassination attempts, including during the war.          
• Meanwhile, Hamas has reportedly been blocking reconstruction activity in Gaza, including preventing contractors from working on a planned new Palestinian city in Rafah. A group of Palestinian contractors were recently held up at gunpoint by Hamas and prevented from crossing into the Israel-controlled sector, despite the work having been coordinated by the CMCC and the Board of Peace.
• It has been widely speculated that Hamas views any reconstruction, particularly outside its zone of control, as a threat to its continued rule in the Strip. The move comes against the backdrop of new polling data indicating a dramatic drop in Gazans’ support for Hamas.
• Despite international hopes to start the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip, the Trump plan remains frozen as Hamas refuses to give up its weapons and demilitarise.
• It is now over half a year since the deadline for Hamas’s disarmament passed. Israel has changed its deployment in the Strip by establishing an “orange line,” which has expanded the size of the Israeli security zone in the enclave by an additional 34 square km.  The IDF now controls 64 per cent of the territory.  This move was taken with the knowledge and apparent approval of the Board of Peace after it became evident that Hamas had violated its commitment and had failed to meet the timetable for its disarmament.
• Israel decided to deploy the IDF along the “orange line” after talks, led by Egypt and Turkey over the last 6 months regarding Hamas demilitarisation, have broken down. According to assessments the Palestinian “technocratic government” continues to face significant challenges in establishing its rule and authority in Gaza.
• According to the Israel’s Coordination for Government Activity in the Territories (COGAT), aid continues to flow into Gaza at a rate of 600 trucks a day. In addition to food and sanitation supplies, 440 tons of medical equipment entered Gaza last week.          
• Similar to the flotilla that was intercepted three weeks ago the latest interception is part of a broader effort to enforce the UN backed maritime control around Gaza.

Looking ahead: There are more flotilla vessels still at sea, of greatest concern are larger boats from two Turkish organisations, Mavi Marmara and IHH. IHH is a designated as a terrorist organisation so the IDF will be taking extra precautions given the troops might be met with resistance.

• A regional consensus exists that serious reconstruction in Gaza cannot take place while Hamas remains an armed force with residual sovereignty. Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to invest heavily in Gaza only for the same infrastructure to be destroyed again in a few years. That makes Hamas’s military dismantling not just an Israeli demand but a prerequisite for regional partners.
• Whilst Israel and its international partners continue to explore how to implement the post-war framework, including demilitarisation, transitional technocratic governance, and an international stabilisation force, there is still no agreed mechanism for removing Hamas’s military power.
• Israeli reports suggest Hamas is rebuilding its military capacity by producing improvised explosive devices, mortar shells and anti-tank rockets, gathering intelligence on IDF deployments and training inside Gaza despite the Israeli presence.

What’s happened: A new report by the Civil Commission provides the most detailed account to date of sexual and gender-based violence committed during the 7 October 2023 attacks and in subsequent hostage captivity.

• The report concludes that such violence was not incidental but systematic, organised, and integral to the assault.
• Based on a two-year independent investigation and a purpose-built war crimes archive, the report documents patterns of abuse across multiple locations and phases, from the initial attacks to prolonged captivity in Gaza, supported by extensive testimonial, visual, and forensic evidence.
• Drawing on over 1,800 hours of footage, more than 10,000 images, and over 430 testimonies, the Commission identifies 13 recurring forms of sexual violence, including rape, sexual torture, mutilation, forced nudity, and abuse carried out in front of family members. It also highlights what it terms “kinocidal sexual violence”, acts designed to destroy family structures through coercion and humiliation within familial settings. Victims span 52 nationalities, underscoring the international dimension of the crimes.
• Dr. Cochav Elkayam-Levy, who headed the commission, told Army Radio this morning: “This was one of the worst, darkest and brutal crimes humanity has ever seen. The report effectively proves that sexual violence was a systematic strategy. It [the report] has been disseminated to hundreds around the world and has been endorsed by senior jurists.”
• A distinctive feature of the findings is the role of digital dissemination. Perpetrators recorded and circulated sexualised violence via social media and direct messaging, including to victims’ families, amplifying psychological harm and extending the impact beyond the immediate acts.
• The report argues that this transforms such acts into continuing crimes, with enduring consequences for victims and their rehabilitation.
• The Commission concludes that the scale, coordination, and repetition of these acts meet the legal thresholds for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal acts. It frames the report as both an evidentiary archive and a legal roadmap, intended to support future prosecutions and counter denial.
• The full report is available here. 
• In parallel, on Monday, the Knesset passed, with 93 votes in favour and none opposed a law establishing a special military tribunal to prosecute approximately 300 captured perpetrators of the 7 October attacks.
• The tribunal will be empowered to try defendants on charges including genocide, terrorism, and offences against state sovereignty, with potential capital punishment for the most serious crimes.

Context: The Civil Commission was founded following Hamas’s brutal October 7, 2023 attack, which left over 1,200 dead and more than 250 kidnapped. In response to the widespread murder, torture, rape, and abduction and ensuing denial, this independent non-profit was established to document, research, and raise global awareness of the war crimes and gender-based violence committed by Hamas and its collaborators. Led by human rights and international law expert Dr. Cochav Elkayam-Levy, the 2024 Israel Prize laureate, the Commission works to amplify victims’ voices and confront denial.

• Previous documentation of 7 October atrocities established the occurrence of sexual violence; this report seeks to demonstrate pattern, intent, and systematisation. By identifying recurring “modes of operation,” it strengthens the argument that such acts were not opportunistic but formed part of a broader strategy of terror. This distinction is central in international law, where proving systematic conduct can elevate crimes to the level of crimes against humanity or genocide.
• The introduction of “kinocidal sexual violence” is also notable. While not yet a recognised legal category, it attempts to capture a specific dimension of the violence, targeting familial bonds as a means of collective destruction. If taken up in legal or academic discourse, it could influence how conflict-related sexual violence is conceptualised in future cases.
• The emphasis on digital dissemination reflects an evolution in the character of mass violence. The weaponisation of visibility, through filming, livestreaming, and direct messaging, extends harm temporally and geographically, blurring the line between physical and psychological warfare. This aspect may complicate legal accountability, particularly regarding those who facilitated or amplified dissemination rather than directly perpetrating violence.
• The parallel move by the Knesset to establish a special tribunal suggests an effort to translate documentation into judicial outcomes. The tribunal’s design, dedicated infrastructure, mixed judicial panels, and public proceedings, indicates recognition of the scale and complexity of the caseload. It also reflects a desire to create a historically visible process, potentially analogous in intent (if not structure) to past war crimes tribunals.
• Under the new law, the tribunal will be able to charge the assailants with all relevant crimes, including genocide under the terms of Israel’s 1950 Law for the Prevention of Genocide, harming Israeli sovereignty, causing war, assisting an enemy during a time of war, and terror charges under Israel’s 2016 law for combating terrorism.
• The law was also a rare consensual issue uniting both government and opposition.
• Taken together, the report and the tribunal legislation signal an emerging phase focused on legal codification and historical record-building.

Looking ahead: Families of victims and survivors continue to call for a state commission of enquiry to fully investigate the events of October 7.

• The law calls for the establishment of a dedicated judicial compound and a staff of around 400 soldiers as well as civilian staffers and 15 judges. The judges would come from the Supreme Court or government approved international jurists.
• An individual case would be heard by three judges, while a five-judge panel would hear proceedings involving multiple defendants. Appeals would be heard by all 15 judges.
• Proceedings are expected to be public and broadcast, reflecting an effort to combine judicial process with public documentation and transparency.

What’s happened: Overnight, IDF troops began to intercept the pro-Palestinian flotilla to Gaza. The operation was carried out near Crete, hundreds of kilometres from the Israeli coast.

• According to Israeli officials there is no shortage of aid in Gaza, with around 600 trucks entering Gaza daily since the October 2025 hostage release and ceasefire. Since then more than 1.5 million tons of humanitarian aid and thousands of tonnes of medical equipment has entered the strip.
• This was the first stage of  interceptions which focused on the 20 larger vessels holding one hundred seventy-five activists. No unusual incidents, violence or injuries were reported. There are still around 40 smaller vessels that are still sailing towards Israel that are expected to be stopped too. In addition, another flotilla of dozens of vessels is expected to set sail from Turkey soon.
• Activist Greta Thunberg was involved in the organisation but reportedly stepped down from her steering role in mid-September 2025 and was not listed among the participants aboard the vessels intercepted
• The flotilla comprises roughly 100 vessels that have around 1,000 activists from across the world on board. In the initial stage of the operation, the Israel Navy contacted the vessels participating in the flotilla over the radio and informed them that any effort to breach the maritime security blockade on the Gaza Strip was a violation of international law.
• An Israel Navy officer declared in English, “Please change your course and return to your port of origin. If you are carrying humanitarian aid, you are invited to proceed to the port of Ashdod.” The aid will undergo a security inspection, after which it will be delivered to the Gaza Strip, added the officer.
• “You are required to change your course,” the message continued, “Any further attempt to sail toward Gaza places your safety at risk and leaves the IDF no choice but to take all necessary measures at its disposal to enforce a lawful maritime security blockade. It is dangerous to remain on your current course. If you continue your attempt to breach the maritime blockade, we will stop your vessel and act to seize it through legal proceedings in court. You bear full responsibility for your actions.”
• Earlier on Wednesday, Prime Minister Netanyahu cut short his testimony in his ongoing corruption trial, saying he had to attend a meeting at the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv. It later emerged that the meeting concerned the flotilla.
• The flotilla, called the “Global Sumud Flotilla” by its organisers, say their goal is to break the naval blockade of Gaza, but was also part of “a broad global movement at sea and on land” working to dismantle systems that enable “apartheid, occupation, ethnic cleansing and genocide.”
• Israel’s Foreign Ministry said Wednesday evening that “the driving force behind the flotilla provocation is Hamas – joining hands with professional provocateurs – with the aim of sabotaging President Trump’s peace plan transition to its second phase and intended to divert attention from Hamas’s refusal to disarm….Like previous provocations, this is nothing but a PR stunt: a provocation without humanitarian aid…As international media have exposed, these are professional provocateurs on pleasure cruises, addicted to self-promotion.”
• Beyond the legal and security questions surrounding the flotilla, its organisers have also faced uncomfortable scrutiny over allegations of sexual misconduct involving one of its senior figures.
• Following the interceptions, Israel’s Foreign Ministry posted on X video footage of drugs and contraceptives that were found on board one of the boats and wrote: “This is the ‘medical aid’ found aboard the PR stunt flotilla: condoms and drugs.” They later posted activists doing cartwheels and “enjoying themselves” on board an Israeli naval vessel.

What’s happening: Addressing the annual Conference of Presidents of Major American ⁠Jewish Organisations, Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday reiterated the importance he places on Hamas disarmament which meant that the group “must give up its weapons, not [just] its main weapons.”

• Netanyahu elaborated that discussions around Hamas’s use of “heavy weapons” was disingenuous as there were practically none of them in Gaza.
• Instead, he asserted that the priority for disarmament should be assault rifles, specifically AK-47s given their prominent usage in the 7th October attacks. He claimed that some 60,000 rifles were in Hamas’s hands, and had to “go outside” along with RPGs and rockets.
• Netanyahu added that Israel has already dismantled 150 km of an estimated 500 km and still needs to “complete the job” of destroying Hamas’s remaining 350 kilometres of tunnels and any weapons factories.
• The IDF alleges that Hamas continues to breach the ceasefire terms, including “an identification of several armed terrorists who took cover under debris east of the Yellow Line and adjacent to IDF troops, likely after exiting underground infrastructure in the area” in Beit Hanoun yesterday.
• The Israeli Air Force has since confirmed that in airstrikes across Gaza it struck a terrorist that infiltrated Re’im military base on 7th October and a Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander.
• Concurrently, the IDF has also increased the number of troops deployed in the West Bank in anticipation of tensions in the run-up to and during the festival of Ramadan which is expected to begin this week.

Context: Netanyahu’s comments come as the Trump Administration pushes to advance Phase 2 of the Trump Peace Plan for Gaza.

• The administration continues to seemingly support the demilitarisation of Hamas, a key component of the plan. In a post on Truth Social yesterday, the President wrote that “Very importantly, Hamas must uphold its commitment to full and immediate demilitarisation.”
• At the same time, the New York Times last week reported that the US is working on a proposal for the disarmament of Hamas that would allow Hamas to keep small arms it uses to maintain power in the Strip  – those same arms that Netanyahu discussed in his own speech. According to the plan, Hamas would only be required to give up weapons that can be used to strike Israel, mainly rockets and launchers, in order for it be considered to have fulfilled its obligations.
• Allowing Hamas to retain small arms would leave intact the key instruments it uses both to threaten Israel and to enforce its authoritarian rule over Gazans.
• Another component of Phase Two, the international stabilisation force was given a boost yesterday with an announcement by Indonesia’s military yesterday that up to 8,000 troops are expected to be ready to deploy to Gaza. Spokesperson of the the Indonesian National Armed Forces Donny Pramono said “Our troops are fully prepared and can be dispatched at short notice once the government gives formal approval.”
• Ramadan has been relatively quiet over the last two years in the West Bank, but has historically seen higher numbers of attempted terrorist attacks, often linked to access restrictions at Al Aqsa Mosque the Temple Mount.
• This year concerns are amplified by the prospect of an imminent potential escalation between the US, Israel, and Iran in the event of nuclear negotiations breaking down, as well as very high levels of unemployment in the West Bank (29% compared to 13% pre-7/10).
• Last week the President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority ordered the drafting of a new constitution.
• Ostensibly released in draft form to “expand community participation in drafting”, it has been criticised for committing to preserve Jerusalem’s “religious character and protecting its Islamic and Christian sanctuaries” while omitting any mention of the city’s Jewish identity, history, or population.
• Article XXIV also confirms that the Pay for Slay stipend scheme which financially rewards and incentivises terrorism against Israelis would continue, seemingly with a level of constitutional formalisation.
• Article XVII calls for “free and fair periodic elections and transparency as a constitutional right and the basis of democratic representation and free power”, despite legislative elections repeatedly being suspended or postponed.
• The PA’s intent to enshrine its ‘Pay for Slay’ stipend scheme in a supposedly ‘reformed’ constitution comes as a backlash to the UK government’s unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state this autumn. Sir Keir Starmer demanded that the PA abandon the scheme, but critics argued that recognition without conditions would only embolden both Hamas and the PA to pursue a more radical course.

Looking ahead: President Trump’s Board of Peace is due to hold its inaugural meeting next week, most likely on Thursday. Israel will be represented by its Foreign Minister, Gideon Saar.

• This meeting is expected to prioritise funding Gaza’s reconstruction, and it is understood that all 28 member countries will be represented, some by their heads of state.
• Trump has said that more than $5 billion has been pledged towards Gaza humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. It is hoped that the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait will make significant donations of $1.25 billion each, but Saudi Arabia has indicated that it must first consider Israel’s full withdrawal from Gaza as well as Hamas’s disarmament before donating.