What’s happened: US Secretary of State Rubio said yesterday that Iran could be allowed a civil nuclear programme but emphasised that it must refrain from enriching uranium.

• In an interview on Bari Weiss’s podcast Rubio said, “If Iran wants a civil nuclear programme, they can have one just like many other countries in the world have one. That is, they import enriched material.”
• Rubio also reiterated President Trump’s longstanding position that diplomacy was preferable to military action, while praising Special Envoy Witkoff’s efforts in negotiating with Iran.
• With US-Iranian talks ongoing, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke by phone on Tuesday, with Trump later saying that they were “on the same side of every issue.”
• The call follows a second round of talks between the US and Iran hosted at the Omani Embassy in Rome where the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, said that he and Witkoff had “managed to reach a better understanding on a series of principles and goals.”
• Witkoff had previously stated that the US would accept a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment. However, a day later, he U-turned and asserted that all enrichment would have to end.
• In parallel, Mohammed Eslami, the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, has confirmed that Iran has begun fortifying tunnel systems linked to its nuclear project, explaining that “efforts are ongoing…[to] expand protective facilities.”

Context: While the US seemingly open to Iran developing and maintaining a civil nuclear energy programme if it refrains from enriching its own uranium, Israel is taking a less compromising position.

• In parallel to the negotiations Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei laid out his country’s red lines for negotiations that include:
  • Not dismantling any of their centrifuges.
  • Not lowering uranium enrichment below 3.67% (the level agreed in the JCPOA 2015 nuclear agreement).
  • Not ceasing missile programmes (that currently remain outside the scope of the JCPOA).
  • Guarantees that the US will not withdraw from a future deal (as President Trump did in 2018).
• Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that the only diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis with Iran is the ‘Libya option’ in which all existing infrastructure in Iran will be dismantled or is shipped out of the country.
• A recent New York Times article claimed Trump had blocked an Israeli military attack on nuclear facilities, with the administration wanting to give more time for diplomacy.
• In the context of these military threats, evidence that Tehran has begun fortifying tunnel systems linked to its main nuclear facility – that could potentially store highly enriched uranium, and other undeclared nuclear materials, or advanced centrifuges – is pertinent. 
• The evidence was taken from commercial satellite imagery taken over Iran at the end of March 2025, and published in a report by the Institute for Science and International Security. The Institute’s President, David Albright, has suggested that the new tunnels could become operational relatively soon, and that it was highly unlikely that UN nuclear inspectors would be granted access to them.
• Israel has long attempted to undermine and weaken Iran’s nuclear programme, primarily through covert and deniable means including cyber-attacks, sabotaging facilities, and targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and officials.
• All these efforts are assumed to be paused while Israel closely follows US efforts to reach a diplomatic solution.
• Although not party to the talks, Israel will be hoping that Netanyahu’s personal ties – along with those of Minister Dermer – will be able to influence the US position.

Looking ahead: A third round of US-Iran nuclear talks will take place on Saturday, this time returning to Muscat in Oman.

• This upcoming round has been described as both “technical” and “high-level”, and is understood to focus on agreeing a framework for a potential nuclear deal which would not be dissimilar to the JCPOA.

New BICOM research: Ahead of the highly anticipated second round of US–Iran talks in Rome this Saturday, BICOM’s latest paper examines the US position and the strategic implications of a potential deal for Israel and the wider Middle East.

Key points:

1. For the first time in a decade, the US has opened direct talks with Iran over its nuclear programme, while simultaneously threatening military action if an agreement acceptable to the Trump administration is not reached within sixty days.
2. In parallel, American military action in Yemen – together with the ostentatious forward deployment of naval assets in striking distance of Iran – is intended to signal that the US will not hesitate to use force if negotiations over a nuclear deal with Iran fail to achieve an agreement.
3. The US is demanding improvements over the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) on four major issues of contention:
   • time limits on nuclear activities,
   • weaponisation capabilities,
   • international inspections,
   • ballistic missile programme.
4. While the basic points of contention between the sides remain unchanged from a decade ago, the larger geostrategic environment is dramatically different. So too is Iran’s bargaining position. On the one hand, it is at a far more advanced stage in its nuclear development. At the same time, it has seen its proxy forces in the region degraded and under pressure in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Yemen. And it has seen its own air defences largely rendered useless by Israeli strikes.
5. President Trump seems determined to reach a deal, one that he can convince himself and his constituents is better than the one achieved by President Obama signed in 2015. His choice of real estate mogul Steve Witkoff, a trusted non-ideological dealmaker that he has relied on in other foreign policy crises, as his envoy is further evidence that Trump is keen to make a deal, even – as seen in discussions over the future of Ukraine – at the cost of alienating allies or sacrificing long-held principles.
6. Israel is most directly affected by the outcome of these negotiations, but not a part of them. While Israeli action against Iranian capabilities and proxies has been leveraged to bolster the American negotiating position, it will ultimately be American, not Israeli, interests that determine the talks’ outcome.

What’s happened: Negotiations are due to take place between the US and Iran in Oman over the weekend. “We have a very big meeting on Saturday, and we’re dealing with them directly,” Trump told reporters on Monday after his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

• The Iranian delegation will be led by its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, and the US delegation by Steven Witkoff.
• Yesterday, President Trump told reporters that he had a deadline in mind for when the talks must culminate in an agreed-upon solution, but did not go into details about the nature of the timeline. Trump also threatened “great danger” if the two sides fail to come to an agreement.
• “We have a little time, but we don’t have much time, because we’re not going to let them have a nuclear weapon. We can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.” Trump said.
• Trump added that the military option was very much on the table, suggesting that Israel might take the lead on any attack. “If it requires military, we’re going to have military,” Trump told reporters. “Israel will obviously be very much involved in that. They’ll be the leader of that. But nobody leads us. We do what we want to do.”
• The U.S. Treasury Department yesterday said it had imposed sanctions on five Iran-based entities and one person based in Iran for their support of Iran’s nuclear programme with the aim of denying Tehran a nuclear weapon. “The Iranian regime’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons remains a grave threat to the United States and a menace to regional stability and global security,” Treasury Secretary Bessent said. “Treasury will continue to leverage our tools and authorities to disrupt any attempt by Iran to advance its nuclear programme and its broader destabilising agenda.”
• CIA Director Ratcliffe arrived in Israel last night and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and his counterpart, Mossad Director Barnea. 
• Israeli officials have confirmed that they intend to monitor their progress for any perceived “erosion” of Washington’s position on nuclear development, missiles, and its use of proxies across the region.
• Iranian officials have said the Islamic Republic is approaching the weekend talks ‘warily’ with little confidence in progress and suspicions over US intentions.
• The talks come as The Times reports that Iran is transferring long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to its proxy militias in Iraq for the first time. These missiles can reportedly reach targets as far away as Europe. 

Context: 

• Several major gaps exist between the US and Iran:
  • The nature of the talks: While the US has stated that negotiations will be direct, Iran maintains that they will be indirect and moderated by Omani mediators. 
  • Sanctions on the Islamic Republic: Iran has previously indicated that it would only engage in negotiations if sanctions were gradually lifted, not merely at their conclusion once an agreement had been reached. While it had previously indicated that sanction relief was a precondition for participation, it has since dropped this demand.
  • Iran’s nuclear programme: America demands a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and missile programmes. Tehran insists that despite uranium enrichment reaching military levels, its nuclear purposes is only for peaceful civilian purposes, repeatedly denying that it intends to develop nuclear weapons citing a fatwa by Ayatollah Khamenei which bans them. 
  • Iran’s missile programme: Iran has reportedly refused to negotiate on the status of its missile programme following reports that Israel had requested the US directly address this particular issue.
  • Regional proxies: The US is also expected to seek to push Iran to address its network of terrorist proxy groups which act on its behalf across the region. The Houthis and Iraq’s Shia militias continue to represent a particular security threat to Israel and the US which is unlikely to abate given Tehran’s insistence that they act as independent agents rather than proxies or clients. The Houthis have continued to launch missiles at Israel since military operations in the Gaza Strip resumed, with the US conducting a large number of air strikes against the group in an attempt to deter their ongoing aggression.
• While Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq have refrained from attacking Israel since December 2024, they have previously targeted and killed both American and Israeli troops since escalating their activities in the aftermath of 7th October 2023, which has included jointly claimed missile and drone attacks with the Houthis.
• An article in Israel Hayom suggests that the US and Israel are aligned and that Trump and Netanyahu “had reached clear agreements on the issue”. It also details that negotiations would be time-limited, only giving Iran two months “to exhaust the option of negotiations”. The article adds that Israeli officials were grateful to have been notified of these developments ahead of time, and that the US had learned lessons from Adam Boehler’s unilateral attempts to engage with Hamas earlier in the year. In that case, Israel had not been advised that they would be taking place.
• Netanyahu has described two options to prevent Iran going nuclear. This week he said that a deal would only be acceptable if it were similar to the one with Libya: “We go in, blow up the facilities, and dismantle all the equipment, under American supervision and execution. That’s the ideal scenario…The second option, which we don’t want, is that they’ll simply drag out the negotiations, and in that case, the military option becomes the only choice.” 
• While often discrete in doing so, Oman has historically acted as a regional broker, mediator, and backchannel for sensitive negotiations, especially between the US, Iran, and conservative US-aligned Sunni states. In 2013, Oman hosted the initial US-Iranian talks which resulted in the JCPOA being signed two years later. Oman also helped facilitate 2023’s Iran-Saudi normalisation agreement with Iraqi assistance, and has acted as a diplomatic touchpoint for Bahrain to positively engage with both Iran and Qatar.

Looking ahead: With so many substantive gaps between the sides, and still disagreement as to whether talks will be direct or indirect, there is little optimism of a breakthrough in the short-term.

• It has also been reported that Witkoff may not travel to Oman if Iran continues to refuse to hold direct talks with him.

What’s happened: Described by CENTCOM as “powerful and decisive,” US air strikes continued overnight, expanding from Sanaa to the Al Jaouf and Hudaydah areas.

• The Houthis have said that the current death toll stands at 53.
• President Trump also warned Iran to “immediately” withdraw its support for the Houthis. His National Security Advisor Walz confirmed that the main target was the Houthi leadership.
• US Defence Secretary Hesgeth pledged that America’s response would be “unrelenting” until the Houthis ceased their attacks, adding that “this campaign is about freedom of navigation and restoring deterrence”.
• While denying that Tehran supported the Houthis, Major General Hossein Salami, a commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), threatened a “decisive” response if Iran was threatened, and referred to the Houthis as “the representatives of the Yemenis”.
• The Houthis claim to have retaliated with a series of their own strikes against the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman with up to 18 missiles and a drone. The US has not commented on this matter, but it is a likely that – as in the past – the Houthis grossly exaggerated the impact of their attacks.
• One missile fired from Yemen landed in Egypt close to the Sharm el-Sheikh resort in the Sinai Peninsula. No injuries, fatalities, or damage has been reported, and the IDF is currently investigating as to whether it was aimed at Israel. 

Context: The US attacks follow Houthi threats to resume their longstanding attacks on what the group claims is “Israel-linked” shipping in and around the Red Sea in the event that the fragile ceasefire in Gaza did not hold.

• These attacks began in November 2023, ostensibly in solidarity with Hamas and the people of Gaza during Operation Swords of Iron. 
• The Houthis claimed that they were maintaining what amounted to a naval blockade on Israel. Yet in practice, they were indiscriminately targeting almost all international shipping in and around the Red Sea, often under pretence that a particular vessel was “Israel-linked”.
• In November 2023, the Houthis boarded and seized a British-owned cargo ship (the Galaxy Leader), and held its crew prisoner until January 2025. Its parent company is co-owned by an Israeli businessman.
• Since then, the Houthis have attacked US warships 174 times, and commercial vessels 145 times. Approximately 12% of global shipping passes through the affected area, much of which was suspended for insurance reasons. This has caused significant disruptions, forcing shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope causing increased transit times and associated costs.
• Concurrently, the Houthis launched over 40 ballistic missiles and 320 drones at Israel, sometimes in what was claimed as a joint operation with Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias.
• These attacks caused limited casualties and damage, but had a significant impact on the Israeli economy, especially Eilat where they have forced the city’s port to close and declare bankruptcy in July 2024.  
• The strikes over the weekend mark the first US strikes on Yemen since President Trump took office in January, and follow his threats that “hell will rain down on you” unless the ceased their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. 
• Despite Tehran’s denials, the Houthis are widely viewed as Iran’s most important proxy in the Arabian Peninsula, and have benefited from training and weaponry from the Islamic Republic. They are an established part of the “Axis of Resistance”, and a key mechanism for Tehran to project influence against rival Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
• While the Biden Administration took some military action against the Houthis, it was limited and predominantly defensive. Those few US and US-led air strikes had little deterring effect, and failed to prevent attacks on international shipping or Israel. 

Looking ahead: While Israel has conducted its own sporadic air strikes in Yemen, it is hoped that the US will establish robust deterrence against the Houthis, thus preventing further attacks against Israel and international shipping in and around the Red Sea.

• The Israeli Air Force has raised its readiness levels in anticipation of further Houthi drone or missile attacks against Israel in coming days. In the event of a significant attack, independent Israeli or joint US-Israeli strikes on Yemen are a realistic possibility.
• Prior to the autumn of 2023, Israel’s intelligence collection efforts were predominantly focused on the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Attacks by more distance enemies in Yemen and Iraq may refocus these priorities, and result in more direct collection efforts by the Israeli intelligence community rather than relying on products from CENTCOM.