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Peace Partners, Normalisation and Coexistence

Key background
  • Israel’s Declaration of Independence from May 1948 included the paragraph, “We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.”
  • Egypt was the first Arab state to make peace with Israel, concluding a peace treaty in 1979, signed between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat.
  • In 1993 Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn and launched the Oslo peace process.
  • Israel returned to Washington a year later when Israel and Jordan signing of a peace agreement.  The treaty was signed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein and established formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.
  • In 2020 Prime Minister Netanyahu signed the Abraham Accords.  These are a series of US-brokered normalisation agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. While it was originally hoped that Sudan would also join the Accords, these ambitions have been delayed by the country’s civil war.
Humanitarian aid enters Gaza through the Rafah border crossing from Egypt, in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 1, 2026.
Humanitarian aid enters Gaza through the Rafah border crossing from Egypt, in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 1, 2026. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90

Updated February 2, 2026

The Rafah Crossing opens

What’s happened: The Rafah Crossing opened on Sunday for a final set of technical tests and a limited number of pedestrians are expected to cross the border today.

  • The crossing will be operated by Egypt, with European Union oversight and approved Palestinian officials. According to the agreement, the Egyptians are expected to share details of those crossing in advance with Israel. Outgoing Gazans will not undergo Israeli security checks, but those entering the Strip will be required to pass through an IDF inspection point. Everyone who enters the Strip will be taken by bus to an Israeli inspection point, where they will undergo physical inspection and facial recognition software will be used to verify their identity.
  • At this initial stage 150 people will leave Gaza daily, 50 people who require medical treatment, plus two companions. 50 Gazans (who left during the war) will be allowed to return to Gaza daily. 
  • Over the weekend the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of air strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad targets.
  • The strikes came in response to several incidents of ceasefire violations including an attempted attack by Hamas terrorists on IDF soldiers in the Rafah area and other incidents along the yellow line.
  • The upturn in violence began on Thursday evening when eight heavily armed Nukhba Force terrorists emerged from a tunnel in eastern Rafah into an area that is controlled by the IDF. IDF observers spotted the terrorists in real-time and called in a strike. At least three terrorists were eliminated, and others appear to have been wounded. Two Hamas commanders were captured. One was captured by the IDF and the other by members of the Abu Shabab militia. According to the IDF, the apprehended terrorist is a key commander in Hamas’ Eastern Rafah Battalion.
  • The targets that were struck included a Hamas police station in central Gaza and a Hamas outpost in Al-Mawasi. The IDF also attacked an arms storehouse, an arms production site and two rocket launching sites in the central Gaza Strip. Among the targets were four commanders from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas sources in the Strip reported that at least 31 people were killed in the strikes.
  • The IDF released a statement noting, “The terrorist organisations in the Strip have been systematically violating international law amid the cruel exploitation of civilian institutions and by acting among the [civilian] population in the area.”

Context: The airstrikes over the week were the most intense since the ceasefire came into effect 3 months ago. The intensity is both a factor of continued Hamas violations and the IDF’s new found freedom of action in no longer having to factor in the status of any hostages.

  • Hamas has been using guerrilla tactics in a bid to challenge Israel and to inflict casualties among the IDF troops deployed in the area of the yellow line. The string of incidents in recent days appears to illustrate that Hamas has no intention of giving up its weapons and that its operatives remain motivated to fight and to attack the IDF.
  • The Hamas police station targeted represents a deliberate strike on a symbol of Hamas control over their side of the Strip, and points to a wider concern that whilst no disarmament is taking place, Hamas are in fact rehabilitating their forces and reinforcing their control.
  • There is domestic criticism in Israel that the opening of the Rafah Crossing before Hamas’ disarmament and the demilitarisation of the Strip is a failure of the Israeli Government policy. This adds to what is perceived as a wider failure – the internationalisation of the ‘day after’ – that might lead to a situation where Israel no longer has complete freedom of action.
  • The government argues that not only does it maintain complete freedom of action, but the new mechanism at the Civil Military Coordination Center allows Israel to share intel with the international partners and ensure a degree of transparency over Hamas violations and subsequent Israeli actions that has never happened before.
  • Longer term, Israel is insisting that the Philadelphi Corridor, that separates Gaza from Sinai, will remain in Israeli control even after further withdrawals from the yellow line. This is viewed by government supporters as a major achievement.
  • The opening of Rafah Crossing constitutes the first time since the 2005 Gaza Disengagement that Israel has formal oversight of the Gaza-Egypt border. Since then, the Rafah Crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor were the main source of Hamas income (through taxation) and smuggling of weapons both through the Egyptian border crossing and through their tunnels network.
  • Last week COGAT revealed the extent of aid entering Gaza over the last three months. This has included over 60,000 aid trucks, 900,000 tons of food, 9,600 tons of medical equipment and around 610,000 tents.

Looking ahead: With the reopening of Rafah, the Palestinian technocratic body, known as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) led by Ali Shaath, is soon expected to enter Gaza.

  • If the monitoring mechanism at the Rafah Crossing will be successful, it will expand its operations.

January 27, 2026

Last hostage returned home

People pay their respects as a convoy carrying the body of slain hostage Ran Gvili drives near the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, January 26, 2026.
People pay their respects as a convoy carrying the body of slain hostage Ran Gvili drives near the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, January 26, 2026. Photo by Tsafrir Abayov/Flash90

What’s happened: The body of Ran Gvili, the 24-year-old police sergeant who set out on October 7 to protect Israel from the Hamas invaders and fell in the successful defence of Kibbutz Alumim, was returned to Israel yesterday.

  • Gvili’s was the last Israeli hostage remaining in Gaza out of 251 who were abducted on October 7, together with another four, two living and two dead, held there before the massacre. With Gvili’s return, there are officially no Israeli hostages in Gaza — the first time this has been the case in fourteen years.
  • The discovery and recovery of Gvili’s body was the culmination of a complicated intelligence and forensic operation. His abductors had moved and reburied his body. Ultimately, the IDF was able to focus on a Muslim cemetery in the northern Gaza Strip. In Operation Brave Heart, soldiers recovered remains and inspected dental findings until a possible match for Gvili was found and brought back to Israel where a positive identification was confirmed.
  • Speaking at the Second International Conference on Combating Antisemitism, Prime Minister Netanyahu hailed the formal end of the hostage crisis: “Rani Gvili, from the special unit in the police who fought not only with a broken arm, he was shot twice, and he kept fighting, and he killed fourteen terrorists alone. And then he died. And we said we’d bring him back. He was the first to come in. He’s the last to leave, a hero of Israel. Rani is back. There are no more hostages in Gaza. Tremendous achievement for our heroic forces, our soldiers, our commanders, none like them.”
  • President Herzog also described his relief at the news at an event at the President’s Residence in Jerusalem with US Ambassador Mike Huckabee. “Finally, 834 days later, Staff Sgt. Ran Gvili, who ran at first call to the front lines to save others, has come home: home to his country, home to his family, home at last. An entire nation is breathing an enormous sigh of relief tonight, as all of our hearts are with Ran’s family—especially his parents, Talik and Itzik—who fought heroically and with remarkable courage to bring their son home.”
  • Huckabee, too, spoke at the event, and referenced the ubiquitous yellow hostage pin which many Israelis and supporters of Israel had worn on their lapels since October 7. ““It is an extraordinary privilege to take this pin, to remove it from my lapel,” he said. “I have said on many occasions, since I was posted here as ambassador, that the happiest day of my tenure was going to be the day when I could remove this pin, because it meant that the last hostage would have been freed and home with his family.”

Context: The return of the last deceased hostage definitively puts an end to the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire, which has been in effect since last October.

  • The first major achievement of the second phase will be the partial reopening of the Rafah Crossing between Gaza and Egypt later this week. The crossing will be open to two-way traffic of people only (not vehicles). European and Palestinian officials will be on site, and those passing through will receive a Palestinian Authority stamp on their passports. Egyptian officials will pass to Israeli officials a complete list of all those passing through ahead of time, and only those approved by Israel will be allowed to cross into or out of Gaza. Israel will remotely inspect the crossing. The mix of Egyptian, European, Israeli, and Palestinian actors strongly resembles the Movement and Access arrangement that was briefly in place for the crossing’s operation between 2005 and 2007, following Israel’s withdrawal from the Strip and before the coup which put Hamas in control of territory enclave.
  • The second phase of the ceasefire stipulates not only the reopening of the Rafah Crossing, but also several other significant measures, including Hamas disarmament, a technocratic Palestinian transitional government in Gaza, the deployment of a multinational force inside the Strip, and a further Israeli territorial withdrawal.
  • Today, the IDF controls roughly 53% of the Gaza Strip, with the so-called Yellow Line separating the Israeli-held zone from the roughly half of the Strip still under Hamas control, where the overwhelming majority of Gaza’s civilians are concentrated. The second phase of the ceasefire, if fully implemented, would see the IDF leave much of the territory it currently hold, but not return to the pre-war border. Instead, the IDF would hold a perimeter zone inside the Strip with a depth of about 1 km.
  • Before that could happen, the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip would need to be effected. Israeli officials remain very pessimistic about the prospects of this happening peacefully, though US and other international actors in the region believe that with the right mix of pressures and incentives, the Strip’s technocratic governance committee can force Hamas to turn over its weapons.
  • A senior American official quoted anonymously in Israeli media yesterday said that the US would “make sure to enforce the agreement. Hamas has no choice but to disarm. They signed the agreement. We’ll work to see that happen, and if they decide to play games, Trump will take the necessary measures.”
  • Unspoken in these assessments is the assumption that what held the IDF back from fully conquering the Strip and destroying Hamas during two years of war was concern about the fate of the hostages Hamas was holding. With no more hostages of any kind in Hamas’ possession, there is nothing to stop the IDF from destroying what remains of Hamas military capabilities should the ceasefire collapse and combat resume.
  • Reconstruction is also supposed to begin in the second phase of the ceasefire, with initial efforts focused on the southernmost sections of the Strip in Rafah and Khan Younis. The US and Israel have agreed that Israel would be responsible for removing the rubble from these areas, reportedly so that unexploded ordnance could not fall into Hamas hands and be repurposed for offensive capabilities.

Looking ahead: The US and Egypt are expected to announce the formal appointment of a Reconstruction Committee sometime in the next two weeks. This is in line with US efforts to begin some limited reconstruction early in the second phase, especially in more peripheral areas of the Strip, including those parts currently on the Israeli side of the Yellow Line. Israel is opposed to any large scale reconstruction beginning before the full disarmament of Hamas is achieved.

  • Parallel to the US-Egypt understandings on reconstruction, the US is reportedly drafting a document to be submitted to Israel on the issue of disarmament.
  • According to Israeli media reports, the document will stipulate that Hamas will have a set number of weeks to disarm, and that if the terrorist organisation fails to meet the deadline, Israel have a free hand to act militarily.
  • A firm commitment from the US on disarmament and an explicit support for Israeli action to back it up is intended, from the US perspective, to secure Israeli flexibility on the issue of early reconstruction.

January 26, 2026

Israel’s security cabinet agrees to reopen the Rafah Crossing

Rafah border crossing with Egypt.
A Palestinian security officer sits at the gate under Palestinian control at the Rafah border crossing with Egypt in the southern Gaza Strip October 25, 2014.

What’s happened: The security cabinet convened on Sunday night and according to the Prime Minister’s Office agreed to a “limited reopening of the Rafah Crossing for pedestrian passage only, subject to a full Israeli inspection mechanism.”

  • The statement added that, “The reopening of the crossing was conditioned upon the return of all living hostages and a 100% effort by Hamas to locate and return all deceased hostages.”
  • “The IDF is currently conducting a focused operation to exhaust all of the intelligence that has been gathered in the effort to locate and return the fallen hostage, Master-Sgt. Ran Gvili… Upon completion of this operation, and in accordance with what has been agreed upon with the US, Israel will open the Rafah Crossing.”
  • Searches for Gvili’s body, dubbed Operation Brave Heart, began at the end of last week based on recently refined intelligence, and are focused on a cemetery in Gaza City. There are hundreds of bodies buried in the cemetery, and the troops are opening the graves one by one and reviewing their contents. The troops are conducting meticulous searches using mobile X-ray machines to check dental x-rays, as there are no available fingerprints. After that, DNA tests will be conducted.
  • Also over the weekend, US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Cooper met with Chief of Staff Zamir to discuss coordinating the defence for Israel in the event of an American attack on Iran that prompts Iranian missile fire.

Context: The decision to open the Rafah Crossing follows pressure by the US mediators Witkoff and Kushner who met with senior Israeli leaders over the weekend to push for the continued implementation of President Trump’s 20-point plan.

  • According to the Trump plan, Gvili’s body is supposed to be returned to Israel before proceeding to the second stage of the ceasefire agreement.
  • As it currently stands, it appears that even if Gvili’s body is not found, the Rafah crossing will be reopened as a result of strong US pressure in a bid to begin the second stage.
  • Despite pushback from the Egyptians, Israel insists on retaining the ability to remotely monitor the crossing via cameras. The border itself is expected to be supervised by a European team. In addition, due to Israel maintaining control of the yellow line, all the traffic will pass through an area under Israeli control.
  • Israel is most concerned over attempts to use the crossing to smuggle weapons as well as preventing Hamas terrorists who previously left Gaza from returning to the Strip.  Israel is willing to allow anyone to leave who has an invitation or a visa to a third country or for humanitarian and medical cases, and will only insist on inspecting those who enter Gaza from Egypt. The Egyptians are concerned that masses will try to leave and remain in Egypt, whilst they want unlimited access for those that want to return to Gaza.        
  • Only those whose names are submitted to Israel by the Egyptians and go through security vetting will be able to cross into Gaza. It is estimated that 42,000 Palestinians left Gaza since the start of the war although not all will want to return.
  • Despite optimism in some quarters following the grand unveiling of the Board of Peace at Davos last week, Israel remains concerned that Hamas will seek to integrate itself into the technocratic administrative committee led by Ali Shaath. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are wary of Hamas and are strongly opposed to this.
  • Israel believes that Hamas is trying to integrate into Gaza’s future security framework without truly disarming which would create a “Hezbollah model” in Gaza. Although politically unpopular within the right wing government, it may prefer concessions to the PA over Hamas rule or renewed war. The US denies agreeing to let Hamas retain political power or integrate into Gaza’s security forces, although Arab diplomats have suggested that in negotiations Hamas has vowed not to disarm without concessions.
  • The technocratic committee meant to govern Gaza lacks real authority and is largely staffed by former PA officials. They are wary of integrating Hamas officials following the harsh experience of 2007, when Hamas violently took full control of the Strip.
  • The decision to reopen Rafah was met with harsh criticism from right-wing coalition partners, although the decision ultimately passed.
  • Israel remains concerned over the role of Qatar and Turkey (as Hamas’s patrons) who also joined the Board of Peace. As such there was a question over whether Israel should also take a seat on the committee. In the end, Israeli officials argued that it’s better to participate than be excluded from decision-making.

Looking ahead: The search for Ran Gvili’s body in the cemetery in Gaza City is expected to continue for the next few days before moving onto other possible burial sites.  

  • The director of the Board of Peace Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov is expected to visit Israel soon and finalise the details regarding the Rafah Crossing and the establishment of the multi-national force that is supposed to be tasked with disarming Hamas. The Rafah Crossing is expected to reopen towards the end of this week.  
  • The US military is due to deploy more troops to the Middle East in the next few days, but it remains unclear what Trump will decide to do vis-à-vis Iran.

January 22, 2026

More Muslim states join Trump’s Board of Peace

President Donald Trump speaking at the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 21, 2025.
President Donald Trump speaking at the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 21, 2025. Photo credit: The White House / X.

What’s happened: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Qatar issued a joint statement on Wednesday confirming they are joining the Gaza ‘Peace Council.’

  • The announcement follows several days of uncertainty, particularly regarding Saudi Arabia, which had remained publicly non-committal despite sustained pressure from Washington.
  • Egypt, Pakistan and the UAE had already signalled their intention to join, while the remaining states had been weighing the political and legal implications.
  • Trump revealed that Russian President Putin has also accepted an invitation to join the board, describing him as  “controversial” but effective actor with real power. Putin’s involvement also prompted the UK to reject its participation, while Sir Tony Blair is involved in a personal capacity.
  • Several European countries have declined participation, over concerns that the board undermines the UN-based international order. Trump has openly suggested that the board could replace the United Nations, stating when asked: “It might.”
  • Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Trump issued a blunt warning to Hamas, stating that if the group does not agree to disarm, “they will be blown away” adding that Hamas had already agreed in principle to relinquish its weapons.

Context: Trump’s Board of Peace appears to be the main diplomatic driver towards a postwar resolution for Gaza, despite no agreed mechanism for governance, security or reconstruction.

  • Central to these deliberations is the question of Hamas’s future role. In their latest statements Hamas has signalled conditional willingness to disarm but has attached a series of far-reaching demands:
    • Retaining Hamas-affiliated civil servants within a future Gaza administration, including integrating hundreds of Hamas police into a new Palestinian security force.
    • Recognition of Hamas as a legitimate political party eligible for future elections, and immunity guarantees for senior leaders.
    • Hamas has also demanded permission for a limited number of armed operatives to remain in Gaza to provide personal protection for its leadership over an extended period.
  • These proposals have been conveyed both to mediators and to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has thus far rejected them outright, viewing them as incompatible with restoring PA’s authority in Gaza and with broader security sector reform.
  • Turkish mediators have played a prominent role in advocating a pragmatic approach to Hamas’s leadership, arguing that addressing personal security concerns is necessary to unlock progress. The US has not yet publicly articulated its position on these specific demands.
  • Israeli intelligence assessments indicate that Hamas retains significant residual military capabilities, including tens of thousands of small arms, anti-tank weapons, mortars and a limited number of rockets — underscoring the scale of the disarmament challenge. They remain wary of the ‘Hezbollarisation’ of a militarised Hamas operating under the control of a new civilian leadership, as happened in Lebanon for many years.
  • In addition there are reports suggesting senior Hamas figures are preparing to leave Gaza as part of a broader second-stage arrangement. Turkey has been cited as a potential destination, though not all commanders are reportedly willing to leave.
  • On the ground, Israel remains vigilant over small scale but almost daily attempts of Hamas fighters to cross the yellow line and attack IDF forces. In response the IDF have continued to target Hamas fighters and terror infrastructure.    
  • On Wednesday several Palestinians were killed and wounded in a strike on a car reportedly belonging to the Egyptian Committee for Gaza Relief near the American Hospital in the central Gaza Strip. Egyptian officials fiercely protested the incident and demanded clarifications. According to an IDF statement, the troops spotted several suspects who were operating a Hamas drone in central Gaza in a way that threatened the troops. Given the threat, the “IDF precisely struck the suspects who activated the drone. The strike was conducted in accordance with the required approvals by the chain of command.”
  • Earlier in the day, five other people were reportedly killed in an artillery strike and by IDF gunfire in Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis in Gaza.
  • Meanwhile the US has reinforced pressure on Hamas through expanded sanctions, targeting organisations and individuals accused of providing financial and organisational support under the guise of humanitarian activity. This signals a coordinated effort to combine diplomatic incentives with economic coercion.
  • These developments are occurring alongside intensified US sanctions targeting Hamas-linked charities and individuals, including a UK-based activist Zahir Birawi, reinforcing financial and organisational pressure on the group.

Looking ahead: Trump is today expected to host a signing ceremony for the Board of Peace in Davos. Representatives of the countries that have agreed to join the board will go on stage in Davos one after another to sign the charter, with Israel going last. President Herzog is in attendance but as he does not represent the government it is unclear who will sign the charter on Israel’s behalf.

  • It has been 839 days since the war began, and Israeli officials hope for a breakthrough in the efforts to locate the remains of the last deceased hostage, Master Sgt. Ran Gvili. There was cautious but renewed optimism following President Trump’s comments earlier this week that Gvili’s location was known. While no real progress has been made, Israeli officials hope that a breakthrough will arrive once the technocratic government that is to administer the Gaza Strip’s affairs is formed.

January 21, 2026

Netanyahu to join Trump’s Board of Peace

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a 40 signatures debate, at the plenum hall of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, on January 19, 2026.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a 40 signatures debate, at the plenum hall of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, on January 19, 2026. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

What’s happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu announced this morning that Israel would accede to President Trump’s invitation to join his Board of Peace.

  • Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam have also said they would join. It was not clear from the Prime Minister’s announcement if Israel would be paying $1 billion for a permanent membership.
  • President Trump told reporters yesterday that “we think we know” where the body of the last Israeli hostage in Gaza is. Referring to Ran Gvili, who was killed in the October 7 attacks and whose body has been held ever since in Gaza, the President said, “They have one left that we think we know where it is, amazing, it looked like we weren’t going to get anywhere near that, now they’ve gotten that almost.”
  • Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will meet President Trump today on the sidelines of the Davos. The two are due to discuss Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire and to coordinate their moves before a bruited American ultimatum on Hamas disarmament and the possible entry of Egyptian-trained Palestinian forces into Gaza.
  • In Jerusalem, the Israel Lands Authority took possession of a large UNRWA facility in Jerusalem and began demolishing parts of it. This was in accordance with the new law from last year which bans all UNRWA activity inside Israel and severely limits any official interaction between Israel and UNRWA in territories Israel controls.
  • UNRWA vacated the facility six months ago, and the ILA proceeded with the demolition yesterday to stop other illegal activities taking place at the site as well as to advance plans for its redevelopment.

Context: According to various media sources, President Trump is expected to deliver an ultimatum to Hamas regarding the terrorist organisation’s disarmament in the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire. Reports differ, however, on the content of the ultimatum, its timeline, its proposed methods of decommissioning, and the threats which back it up.

  • A Palestinian police force presently being trained in Egypt is reportedly ready to carry out the disarmament, should Hamas accept the conditions of Trump’s ultimatum. This force reports directly to the Palestinian committee of technocrats whose appointments were announced last week. They would be tasked not only with collecting rockets and IEDs, but also the rifles and small arms with which Hamas enforces its domestic rule.
  • Notably, this would mean that disarmament is an internal Palestinian affair, and not an endeavour achieved by the International Stabilisation Force, which has not yet come into being and does not have pledged commitments from enough countries to be viable.
  • The Egyptian-trained force would, if Hamas agrees to Trump’s ultimatum, hope to enter Gaza sometime in February or March and seek to complete its task rapidly. Despite whatever enthusiasm both Egyptian and US officials express (in anonymous leaks) regarding both the ultimatum and the police force, both Israeli and Palestinian officials remain sceptical about the entire plan.
  • Palestinian officials are concerned that an under-equipped police force seen, accurately or not, as aligned with the PA could quickly find itself a target of superior Hamas weapons (as happened in 2007). Israeli officials share that concern while also opposing any role for the PA in Gaza.
  • In the meantime, few in Israel believe Hamas will agree to Trump’s ultimatum anyway. As such, the IDF continues to prepare itself for a possible military offensive in February or March to disarm Hamas by force.
  • An Israeli operation following a Hamas refusal to carry out the conditions of the ceasefire, it is believed, would have a measure of international legitimacy. And a ground offensive into central Gaza unencumbered by the presence of Israeli hostages and the implied threat to their wellbeing, it is further believed, could be more effective than anything tried in two years of warfare following the October 7 attack.

Looking ahead: President Trump is scheduled to make a major prime time address tonight. In the background are at least four major international crises: the Gaza ceasefire and the formation of the new Board of Peace, the violent crackdown on anti-regime protesters in Iran and the possibility of US military action there, and the US threats on Greenland and the attendant tensions in the NATO alliance and the transition in Venezuela following the US capture of Nicolas Maduro.

  • With international attention focused on Venezuela and Greenland, US forces continue to move to the Persian Gulf region.
  • The eruption of violence in Iran in late December caught the US  Navy without a carrier group in the Gulf. As of yesterday, the USS Lincoln Carrier Strike Group transited through the Strait of Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal. It is expected to continue west to the Persian Gulf.
  • Circumventing the globe in the opposite direction were the F-15Es which had served to intercept drone attacks from Iran in previous rounds of fighting in 2024 and 2025. These reportedly left bases in the UK for bases in Jordan yesterday, accompanied by KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refuelling jets.

January 19, 2026

US announces makeup of new governance for Gaza

Palestinians shop at a market in Khan Yunis
Palestinians shop at a market in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on November 21, 2025. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** הפסקת אש עזה פלסטיני פלשתיני שוק קניות חאן יונס

What’s happened: Over the weekend, the Trump administration announced the composition of the Gaza Board of Peace and an executive committee that will liaise between the board and the newly-formed government of Palestinian technocrats.

  • The Board of Peace will be led by President Trump and include Secretary of State Rubio, US envoys Witkoff and Kushner, Former Prime Minister Blair, Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan, World Bank President Ajay Banga and deputy US National Security Adviser Robert Gabriel.  
  • The executive committee members will include the envoys Kushner and Witkoff, Blair, Rowan, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Qatari diplomat Ali Thawadi, Egyptian General Intelligence Director Hassan Rashad, UAE Minister of International Cooperation Reem Al-Hashimy, former UN humanitarian coordinator Sigrid Kaag, Israeli-Cypriot businessman Yakir Gabay and former UN envoy to the Mideast Nickolay Mladenov.
  • Dr. Ali Shaath will be the Chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the main Palestinian technocratic body on the ground. Committee members will include a range of Palestinian technocrats, some of whom were previously affiliated to the Palestinian Authority (PA).
  • The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement noting that the US announcement “was not coordinated with Israel and runs contrary to its policy.” Israeli officials are concerned the board includes senior representatives from Turkey and Qatar.
  • Leader of the Opposition Lapid said, “For the past year I’ve been telling the government: ‘If you don’t advance the Egyptian solution with the United States and the world, you’ll end up with Turkey and Qatar in Gaza.’ Last night, the composition of the ‘Board of Peace’ was announced—Turkey is in, Qatar is in and, according to the IDF, Hamas has 30,000 armed men in Gaza. That is a complete political failure of the Netanyahu government after the courage and endless sacrifice made by IDF soldiers and commanders.”
  • Former Prime Minister Bennett commented, “Two years after it massacred us, Hamas is still alive, in control and growing stronger. The entry into Gaza by Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’s supporters and financiers, gives Hamas a reward for the October 7 massacre, endangers Israeli citizens’ security and sends a grave message to the peoples in the region that for massacring Jews one receives political and military achievements.”
  • Following the signing of committee’s mission statement Shaath said that the NCAG will act to entrench security, to repair vital infrastructure and to advance stability in the Gaza Strip. Shaath said that the top priority at present was to reopen the Rafah crossing in both directions.
  • Speaking at a rally on Saturday night, the parents of the last deceased hostage held in Gaza, Ran Gvili said, “While we are here, still waiting for Rani’s return, a Board of Peace for the second stage is being established. How can anyone think about a second stage, and what peace are they talking about at all? Peace with people who have refused to return our son, despite having consented to that in an agreement?”

Context: Israel has consistently stated that there can be no practical implementation of Phase 2 before the body of the final fallen hostage is returned and Hamas is disarmed.    

  • The decision to include Turkish and Qatari representatives on the Gaza executive committee has caused alarm across the political spectrum is Israel, though the decision is not a surprise. Those countries were key actors in persuading Hamas to agree to the ceasefire in October and are considered key allies by Trump. The major concern is that Hamas will receive a renewed influx of funds allowing it to pay fighters and consolidate its control.  
  • In parallel to the announcements, the US led Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat continues to coordinate aid into Gaza and to develop plans to build new residential neighbourhoods for Gazans, (initially on the Israeli side of the yellow line).
  • Currently, around 800 trucks of supplies enter into Gaza every day, but once they pass the yellow line, Hamas is able to place a tax on every delivery which it then uses to replenish their accounts and rehabilitate their practical control over the Strip.  
  • Israel is further concerned that Hamas attacks on its troops along the yellow line have increased.
  • The announcement over the weekend is largely driven by Trump’s desire to showcase progress, even if concrete changes on the ground remain mostly symbolic for now.
  • Despite formal denials the NCAG appears closely connected to the PA, as is reflected in its leadership, composition, and Ramallah’s clear endorsement.
  • Hamas welcomes the committee because it poses no real threat to its power, serving as civilian cover while Hamas retains security control. This worryingly resembles the classic model of Hezbollah, operating as the main military force under a weak civilian leadership.
  • Although thousands of Hamas fighters were killed during the two year war, the latest assessment suggests every fighter killed has been replaced, (albeit younger, less experienced, less skilled) and that the combined forces of Hamas and Islamic Jihad once more stands at around 40,000.
  • The IDF significantly degraded their rocket arsenal, with about 90% of it destroyed, but military officials believe that hundreds of rockets still remain in the Strip, mostly short-range.

Looking ahead: In an effort to avoid a clash with the US administration Prime Minister Netanyahu has instructed Foreign Minister Saar to liaise with US Secretary of State Rubio.

  • According to Israel Hayom, Trump will use the platform of the World Economic Forum in Davos this week to condemn Hamas for its delay in handing over its weapons.
  • After Davos, all of the countries involved, including Turkey and Qatar, will present Hamas with a categorical demand to disarm. If Hamas rejects the demand to hand over its weapons, President Trump could give a green light to an Israeli military operation, as he said publicly in their last meeting with Netanyahu.
  • It’s understood that Donald Trump has invited other world leaders to join the Board of Peace, including Prime Minister Starmer. 

January 8, 2026

Israel’s foreign minister completes historic visit to Somaliland

Gideon Saar with the President of Somaliland Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
Gideon Saar with the President of Somaliland Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. Hargeisa, Somaliland. January 6, 2026). Photo credit: Shlomi Amsalem, GPO

What’s happened: Earlier this week, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar visited Somaliland. Making it the first official visit by a senior Israeli leader.

  • Saar visited Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, at the invitation of Somaliland’s President  Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
  • During the trip, Saar met with the president and a range of senior government officials, including Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adam and Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Nimcan Yusuf Osman.
  • In his formal address Saar noted that relations between the two countries had developed over the last year, stating, “We had an ongoing and extensive dialogue for many months. The relations that we built are based on trust and mutual respect.”
  • Saar added, “Israel is truly honoured to be the first UN member-state to recognise the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. This is the moral thing to do and this is what we did.”
  • According to Saar, “the Foreign Ministry is working hard to build our ties across a wide range of fields: economy, agriculture,” with an emphasis on Israeli expertise on water supply and management. In addition, “In recent years, 49 children from Somaliland have undergone life-saving heart surgery in Israel. We’re eager to help in medicine too and also in education.”
  • It was also reported that he toured the port of Berbera, a strategic site on the Red Sea coast just across from Yemen.

Context: The visit followed the announcement on December 26th, that Israel and Somaliland had signed an agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

  • Beyond assistance in humanitarian issues, there is also an expectation that the two states will now cooperate on security issues, particularly given Somaliland’s strategic location in the Horn of Africa, proximity to the Red Sea and Yemen.
  • Israeli security officials have stressed an alliance with Somaliland holds significant security implications. The Berbera port, in particular, is of strategic interest to Israel, given its proximity to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. As Israel contends with threats from Yemen as well as Iranian activity in the Red Sea, this relationship has strategic significance.
  • Saar’s visit comes as part of broader shift in Israeli foreign policy, focused on forging new partnerships in Africa and the Muslim world based on security and economic cooperation.
  • Somaliland first gained its independence in 1960 from British Colonial rule. Israel was then among the 35 countries to recognise an independent Somaliland. However five days later, Somaliland’s government chose to unify with the former Italian colony to form Somalia. Following civil war in the 1980s. Somaliland once more declared independence in 1991. Since then it has functioned as de facto state, but not recognised by most of the international community. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was a major diplomatic breakthrough for the country.  
  • Unlike Somalia, Somaliland is considered calm and stable, over the last 20 years it has maintained a  functioning multi-party democratic system with regular elections. Its closest international partners are Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates.
  • Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was condemned and even triggered an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. The move was chiefly criticised by China and Turkey, whilst the EU said Somalia’s sovereignty should be respected.
  • Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon describing their reaction as a clear case of double standards and hypocrisy. Danon pointed out the inconsistency when countries unilaterally recognise a Palestinian state, it is accepted without discussion or objection. But when Israel exercises its sovereign right to recognise Somaliland, a stable, democratic entity that has functioned independently for over three decades—the Council rushes to convene an emergency session. This reveals the persistent bias and hypocrisy of certain members.
  • Israel’s Foreign Ministry noted, “Unlike ‘Palestine’, Somaliland is not a virtual state. It’s a functioning state. Somaliland is a fully-functioning country based on the principles of international law. Somaliland is – and has been – a stable democracy for nearly 35 years. It has democratic elections – most recently in November 2024 – and peaceful transitions of power. It’s pro-Western and friendly to Israel.”  
  • The US defended Israel’s stance, while clarifying that there had been no change in its own policy toward Somaliland.

Looking ahead: Somaliland’s President is expected to soon visit Israel and meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

  • The counties are also expected to soon make mutual appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies. Somaliland could also soon join the Abraham Accords.  
  • In the coming months, professionals from Somaliland’s water sector are expected to visit Israel for training.
  • In the future, Somaliland could serve as a forward base for a range of security orientated tasks including intelligence monitoring or military operations against the Houthis, as well as augmenting protection of the international shipping lanes.  

December 18, 2025

Israel announces massive gas deal with Egypt

View of the Israeli Leviathan gas field gas processing rig as it seen from Dor Habonim Beach Nature Reserve, on January 1, 2020.
View of the Israeli Leviathan gas field gas processing rig as it seen from Dor Habonim Beach Nature Reserve, on January 1, 2020. Photo by Flash90

What’s happened: Israel has concluded a £26 billion gas export deal with Egypt. It is the largest energy export deal in Israel’s history. It will see the export of 130 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Israel’s offshore Leviathan field to Egypt through the year 2040.

  • In announcing the deal, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “This deal with the American company Chevron involves Israeli partners, and they will supply gas to Egypt. I approved the deal after ensuring our security interests and other vital interests, which I will not detail here in full. This deal greatly strengthens Israel’s status as a regional energy power and contributes to stability in our region. It encourages other companies to invest in gas exploration in Israel’s economic waters. More gas will be found, but first and foremost, this deal obligates the companies to sell gas at a good price to you, the citizens of Israel.”
  • Energy Minister Eli Cohen spoke about the gas deal as well. In his remarks, he references obliquely concerns that had been raised by opponents of the deal that it would put Israel’s domestic gas supply at risk. “This is the first export approval that guarantees priority for the local market, and mechanisms were agreed upon that will improve the price of gas for the Israeli market.” He echoed the Prime Minister’s bullishness on the economic and strategic implications of the deal, declaring that it “establishes our status as a regional energy power and a leader that its neighbours rely upon.”
  • It is estimated that the direct windfall to the public treasure from the gas export deal will amount to 58 billion shekels (roughly £13 billion). In the first four years, Israel expects to take in roughly half a billion shekels each year, with this figure gradually rising to 6 billion shekels annually following infrastructure investments and increased capacity.
  • Leader of the Opposition Lapid welcomed the deal, but noted critically that it was “a shame that the Americans are forcing us to do the right things.” Of the expected tax windfall, he said that “by 2040, 58 billion shekels will accumulate if the entire deal materialises. This year alone the government is paying 60 billion shekels to ultra-Orthodox draft dodgers, so I’m less impressed.”

Context: The deal is widely seen as a win for the Trump administration which had been pushing both Israel and Egypt, key regional allies of the US, to sign the deal with the US firm Chevron.

  • The administration was keen to use the pressure to make a deal as a lever to push both countries into resolving a host of differences that have emerged in recent years, mostly related to Gaza, as well as to schedule a summit meeting of leaders from the US, Egypt, and Israel. Ultimately, no summit meeting has been scheduled.
  • With the conclusion of the gas export deal, Israel two largest land borders (with Egypt and Jordan) are with countries that both have signed peace treaties with it, that both are firmly in the US strategic orbit, and that both now depend on Israel for their energy needs.
  • In 2016, Israel signed a £7.5 billion gas export deal with Jordan which supplies the kingdom with 15 years of Israeli gas at a substantial discount from prevailing market rates. Israeli officials believe that both gas deals give Israel real leverage in diplomacy with both of its large Arab neighbours.
  • In the lead up to the deal, several outstanding issues of dispute were raised by both the Israelis and the Egyptians. Egypt demanded that Israel withdraw from two key corridors in the Gaza Strip before it would proceed with the gas deal. The Netzarim Corridor that bisects the Strip, and the Philadelphi Corridor that runs along the Gaza-Egypt border. Israel did not agree to make any withdrawal beyond what is called for in the ceasefire agreement which ended the war in October. Ultimately, the Egyptians dropped this demand.
  • Israel too had several demands in the negotiations that weren’t directly connected to gas export. Israel wanted to see the Egyptians crack down on arms smuggling into Gaza, which Israeli officials allege is made possible by bribes to Egyptian military personnel, something the Egyptians deny, and a lack of urgency on the matter from Cairo.
  • Israel  would also like assurances from Egypt that it will withdraw forces, especially armoured forces, currently deployed in the Sinai in numbers that are beyond what is permissible according the military annex of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement from 1979. Based on media reports, such assurances do not appear to have been made.
  • The US for its part, was also interested in an Egyptian commitment to participate in the International Stabilisation Force which is due to enter Gaza in the second phase of the ceasefire’s implementation. This too does not appear to have been achieved. Also unachieved was the US plan to bring the leaders of Israel and Egypt together for a summit meeting in Florida, with Egypt flatly refusing to participate in such an event.
  • Israeli officials are satisfied that, despite not bringing the Egyptians to agree immediately on some of Israel’s major policy priorities, Israel has firmly entered Egypt into a long-term arrangement tying it to Israel and the US, and that this will be the basis for future agreements that will move the Egyptian position closer to Israel’s.
  • This is especially the case in light of the obvious alternative path which Egypt could have taken instead of signing a gas deal with Israel, namely signing a gas deal with Qatar. In such a situation, Israel would have no real energy-related leverage over Egypt on future concerns regarding Sinai and Gaza.
  • In Israel there was some domestic opposition to the deal — and reportedly, some reluctance on the part of the Energy Ministry and minister Eli Cohen himself — due to fears that by its very size it would endanger domestic gas capacity and lead to higher energy prices for the Israeli home market. Ultimately, in the final deal, there is a measure which might allow Israel to reduce the export quantity in order to maintain a competitively priced domestic supply.

Looking ahead: In order to implement the deal, Israel will build a new pipeline from the industrial site in Ramat Hovav (south of Beersheva) to the Nitzana Crossing, the only crossing into Egypt between Rafah in Gaza and Eilat-Taba on the Gulf of Aqaba.

  • Egypt will use the Israeli gas both for its domestic energy consumption and for liquifying at its two LNG terminals in Idku and Damietta for export to Europe, something that will bolster Egypt’s flailing economy.
  • The non-energy related issues that have soured relations between Israel and Egypt since the October 7 war began remain unresolved, and with no summit meeting scheduled, they are likely to remain so at least until a second phase of the ceasefire begins.

December 8, 2025

Netanyahu says Israel close to moving to Phase 2 in Gaza

Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz holds a joint press conference with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, December 7, 2025.
Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz holds a joint press conference with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, December 7, 2025. Photo by Alex Kolomoisky/POOL

What’s happened: On Sunday, Prime Minister Netanyahu hosted German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for a visit to Israel, during which he reiterated his commitment to the Trump Plan.

  • During a joint press conference Netanyahu related to developments in Gaza saying, “We finished the first part… Phase one, we’re almost there. We have one more deceased hostage, Ran Gvili, a hero of Israel, to return here. And then we very shortly expect to move into the second phase.”
  • He said the second phase was, “no less daunting, and that is to achieve the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarisation of Gaza. And as I mentioned to the Chancellor, there is a third phase, and that is to de-radicalise Gaza, something that also people believed was impossible. But it was done in Germany. It was done in Japan. It’s done in the Gulf states. It can be done in Gaza, too. But, of course, Hamas has to be dismantled. These are challenges in front of us, but we do not shirk from them. We think we have great opportunities.”  
  • Over the weekend there were continued small scale clashes. According to the IDF, there were another two incidents on Sunday where the IDF identified, “several terrorists who crossed the yellow line and posed an immediate threat.”  
  • Also on Sunday, IDF Chief of Staff Zamir met with reservists in northern Gaza. He told them, “We will not allow Hamas to reestablish itself. We have operational control over extensive parts of the Gaza Strip and we will remain on those defence lines. The Yellow Line is a new border line — serving as a forward defensive line for our communities and a line of operational activity.”
  • “The overwhelming majority of our hostages have returned, but our mission will not be complete until the last fallen hostage… Ran Gvili, is brought home.”
  • Also over the weekend Kan News reported that about a week ago Prime Minister Netanyahu met secretly with former prime minister Tony Blair. According to the report Blair has been working with Netanyahu and several Arab countries on an initiative to allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) to receive control over certain areas in the Gaza Strip. This effort will start as a temporary initiative and, if successful, will become permanent. The initiative is contingent on PA reforms.

Context: The visit of the German Chancellor, the latest senior world stateman to visit Israel, can be viewed as part of the international communities efforts to see the diplomatic efforts bear fruit in Gaza.

  • Israel has always been more receptive to advice from international partners when they express clear support for Israel’s security concerns, this is true with the US, Germany and Tony Blair.
  • Germany is now Israel’s closest ally in Europe. Israel has recently supplied Germany with the advanced Arrow 3, the long range missile defence system. According to Israeli media the sides have expanded the depth and breadth of their security cooperation including the signing of various agreements also said to include a classified security annex. Netanyahu hinted at this in their press conference when he related to military and technological cooperation in the fields of “high tech, deep tech, AI, [and] quantum.”
  • For many in the international community the PA is a crucial component for the future governance of the Strip without Hamas, however the current Israeli government is concerned this will lead to the formation of a Palestinian State.      
  • In  order to allow the PA a role in Gaza, Israel is insisting on fundamental reforms including ending incitement and antisemitism and cancelling the ‘pay to slay’ policy that incentives killing Israelis. They are also demanding an end the refugee status currently granted to Palestinians both in the West Bank and Gaza and replacing UNRWA, which is seen as a vehicle that perpetuates the conflict.
  • Specifically in Gaza, Israel expects Hamas to disarm while maintaining overall security control and freedom of military action.  
  • Striking a more optimistic tone, Netanyahu also told Chancellor Merz, “We believe there’s a path to advance a broader peace with the Arab states and a path also to establish a workable peace with our Palestinian neighbours. But we’re not going to create a state that will be committed to our destruction at our doorstep.”
  • As part of Trump’s diplomatic efforts a trilateral meeting took place in Washington between Mossad Director Barnea, US Envoy Witkoff and a senior Qatari official. This was a first meeting held as part of a thawing process that began with the telephone conversation between Netanyahu and Qatari Prime Minister Al Thani during Netanyahu’s meeting with Trump at the White House in late September.
  • This was the first meeting to deal with outstanding disagreements including Qataris ongoing support for Hamas officials in Doha, and pro-Hamas reporting on Al-Jazeera.  
  • Meanwhile in Doha, the Qatari prime minister told a conference that the expectation from Israel is that it will allow the deal to advance into its second stage, even if Hamas is not disarmed.
  • Zamir’s comments (above – relating to maintaining control of the Yellow Line) were in response to Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s assertion that Hamas would only hand over its weapons to the president of a Palestinian state. Mashal said that those were the terms that Hamas had accepted and, until that happens, Hamas would not disarm.

Looking ahead: Israel is waiting to receive any news on the retrieval of  remains of the last hostage, Ran Gvili, still held in Gaza. The new head of the Shin Bet David Zini met Egyptian officials in Cario to discuss intelligence over where the remains are located. Searches have been renewed in Gaza City’s Zeitoun neighbourhood.

  • Any formal announcement of Phase 2 is most likely to only come, once the final hostage is released or  following the next meeting of Trump and Netanyahu later this month.
  • An important component of the next stage will include building a new city in Rafah, which is supposed to house tens of thousands of Gazans. The rubble will need to be cleared before thousands of mobile housing units can be delivered.
  • A second crucial component will be the formation and deployment of the International Stabilisation Force tasked with the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarisation of Gaza.
  • The US are also working to convene another trilateral summit including Netanyahu and Egyptian President Sisi.    

November 19, 2025

Israel-Saudi normalisation still distant while US-Saudi ties deepen

Mohammed bin Salman, Donald Trump and JD Vance in the Oval Office, White House, Washington, DC
Mohammed bin Salman, Donald Trump and JD Vance in the Oval Office, White House, Washington, DC, September 18, 2025. Photo credit: JD Vance/X

What’s happened: The US and Saudi Arabia signed “landmark agreements” that according to the White House will “deepen the US-Saudi strategic partnership.”

  • Among the key elements of “The Strategic Defence Agreement” is the affirmation that Saudi Arabia views the US as its primary strategic ally, and includes cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy.
  • According to the White House, “President Trump approved a major defence sale package, including future F-35 deliveries…The President secured an agreement for Saudi Arabia to purchase nearly 300 American tanks, enabling Saudi Arabia to build up its own defence capabilities.”
  • US President Trump said before his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) at the White House that Saudi Arabia and Israel are both great American allies.
  • For his part MBS reiterated that normalising Saudi ties with Israel was contingent on a clear path to establishing a Palestinian state. He said, “We believe having good relations with all Middle Eastern countries is a good thing, and we want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we want also to be sure that we secure a clear path of a two-state solution.”
  • A retired Saudi army general Hassan al-Shahri, who is an official from the royal family, told Kan News that the talks between the crown prince and President Trump could jumpstart a future Israeli-Saudi dialogue about normalisation. However, he clarified that relations would not be normalised until a breakthrough is made on the Palestinian issue.

Context: The Israeli government had hoped that the US-Saudi security pact and the sale of F-35s would have been contingent on Israeli-Saudi normalisation.  

  • The Saudis have not ruled out normalisation in the future, but their current posture suggests that they will be only be willing to start holding talks after the second stage of Trump’s plan is completed. The concern with this approach is that the Saudis are giving Hamas a veto on normalisation. Currently Hamas is refusing to make progress on disarmament.
  • Hamas is receiving backing for its stance from Iran, who are wary that normalisation would strengthen the regional alliance against it.  
  • A second Saudi demand is for Israel to publicly endorse the Trump 20 Point Plan and the UN Security Council resolution regarding the pathway for the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. This remains highly unlikely while Netanyahu continues to reiterate his opposition to a Palestinian state (and while the government is dependent on the support of Smotrich and Ben Gvir).
  • The Saudis do not rule out talks on civilian and economic matters, but will stop short of normalisation without the progress on the Palestinian front.  
  • A senior Saudi adviser told Yediot Ahronot, MBS “wanted to give Trump and Netanyahu a glimmer of hope, but made no commitment. You have to understand from what he said that the crown prince is willing, but wants something in return on the Palestinian matter. The future of the Palestinians in the West Bank is of great interest to him. Don’t forget that bin Salman loathes Hamas and refuses to take in Palestinians from Gaza to Saudi Arabia.”
  • On the issue of the F-35s, Israel is not opposed in principle, but reportedly asked for two conditions. These include excluding the plane’s most advanced systems and for the US to supply Israeli with other advanced military technology that has yet to be sold to Israel.
  • The F-35 are considered the world’s most technologically advanced stealth jets. The advanced systems of sensors, cameras and radars allow the planes to monitor any aerial movement in the region and have the ability to provide targets to planes and to ground systems.
  • In the end it could be that Saudi Arabia and Israel will receive the same systems. This is acceptable for some within the Israeli security establishment as they are confident that the additional Israeli built technology and the skill of Israel’s pilots will help maintain Israel’s qualitative edge.  
  • Others are alarmed that the long-term threat could creating future vulnerability and limit Israel’s regional operational freedom.
  • It remains unclear whether Israel is a coordinated partner in a larger US–Saudi strategy or being marginalised as Washington and Riyadh advance bilaterally that Israel may just have to accept.

Looking ahead: It is expected to take several years to manufacture and deliver the jets to the Saudis, in which time the onus will be on Israel to continue to make further technological breakthroughs.  

  • Although Israel certainly views MBS as a future partner, the longer term political stability of Saudi Arabia remains a concern, which is sharpened if they possess advanced military and civilian nuclear capacity.

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