In this episode, Richard Pater speaks with Dr Ilan Berman about the war with Iran, the ceasefire talks, and how Washington is thinking about what comes next. He examines the unresolved question of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, and the implications for Gulf allies, NATO, and the UK-US relationship.
Dr Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC, and an expert on regional security in the Middle East. In the past he has consulted for the CIA as well as the US Departments of State and Defence.
Transcript
(This transcript has been automatically generated by AI — please excuse any potential errors.)
00:00:08:04 – 00:00:31:09
Richard Pater
Hello everybody, and welcome to this latest BICOM briefing and podcast recording. I’m Richard Pater, the director of BICOM. And today is Wednesday the 15th of April. Our focus today is on the US Iran conflict, the ceasefire talks and the impact in the region. And I’m delighted to welcome back our guest, Doctor Ilan Berman. Ilan, thank you very much indeed for joining us.
00:00:31:10 – 00:00:32:10
Ilan Berman
Oh, my pleasure.
00:00:32:10 – 00:01:03:11
Richard Pater
So, for introduction, Doctor Ilan Berman is a senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council. He’s also a former consultant to several US government agencies, including the CIA, Department of State and Department of Defense. And he is considered an expert in foreign policy and national security issues. So, Doctor Ilan. If I could start just by asking if you could open up with your overall assessment of the war and how you assess the prospect of the talks.
00:01:03:13 – 00:01:30:02
Ilan Berman
Oh, so thank you. And apologies again. I can’t be with you guys on video, but audio is better than nothing at all. So, the this is frankly, this is the only thing people here in Washington are talking about. And the way I would describe the situation right now is that it’s profoundly unsettled, because we’re really looking at 2 or 3 separate conflicts.
00:01:30:04 – 00:02:00:16
Ilan Berman
If you get rethinks, as I have and do from Israeli military officials and U.S. military officials, it’s there’s quite clearly a coordinated, methodical, multi-phase plan. And it’s proceeding apace. And it was proceeding apace before the cease fire. And so began on February 28th with the sort of leadership decapitation strikes that we saw that eliminated the supreme leader, Ali.
00:02:00:18 – 00:02:38:09
Ilan Berman
And something like 40%, 40 senior officials in Iran. And from there, we proceeded to a phase that focused on targeting Iran’s offensive capabilities. And there’s I think there’s some serious questions about how effective that has been, because Iran, until the cease fire, was continuing to fire missiles and drones at Israel as well as at its Gulf neighbours. But it was clear that some significant percentage of its ballistic missile and drone arsenal had been traded, as well as the targeting of ancillary nuclear sites.
00:02:38:09 – 00:03:09:05
Ilan Berman
And then the phase after that which we were in when the cease fire took hold, was the question of Iran’s defence industrial base. And the reason that’s so significant is because Iran’s defence industrial base is necessary for Iran to be able to reconstitute all those offensive capabilities. So, and that’s sort of where we were in the sort of the thick of the conversation that we were in when the cease fire kicked in about a week ago.
00:03:09:09 – 00:03:35:23
Ilan Berman
And the military plan. Right. Not without its challenges, but very clearly was proceeding apace where there is this cognitive dissonance and this fog of war is in the shifting objectives, the shifting political messaging that’s coming out of the white House. President Trump has been, I think, very variable in terms of what he’s talking about with regard to the conflict.
00:03:36:00 – 00:04:01:07
Ilan Berman
And he’s also looking at, I think, some very significant shifting objectives. And so back in January, when you saw that revolt in Iran, that month long revolt in which the regime responded by killing something like 36,000 opposition protesters. You heard from the white House that America was there, and help was on the way. America was going to help Iranians liberate their country.
00:04:01:08 – 00:04:33:15
Ilan Berman
We are long past that conversation. In fact, the president is doubling down on the idea that regime change has already occurred, which, charitably, it has not. Right, because the system is still intact. And you may have replaced a few leaders at the top, but the sort of the overarching system of these republics still remains the same. But where the political conversation is right now is whether or not the current leadership is prepared to do a deal with regard to.
00:04:33:17 – 00:05:00:23
Ilan Berman
We are not even now, at this point, talking about a permanent cessation of Iran’s uranium enrichment, although there are voices in Congress that are very heavily leaning on that as a red line. The administration, though, is increasingly talking about a time delay of something like 20 years. The Iranians have countered with five years. I think we know where they’re going to settle is somewhere between 10 and 15 years.
00:05:01:00 – 00:05:25:01
Ilan Berman
And also, a rollback of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and Iran’s proxy network. The political problem that you have, right, because all politics are local is the fact that, first of all, this sort of settlement looks an awful lot like the 2015 nuclear deal hammered out by President Obama, which President Trump in his first term abrogated because he said it was the worst deal ever.
00:05:25:01 – 00:05:49:24
Ilan Berman
So, it creates political problems for him. And also, because we are, you know, pretty close to the US midterm elections this fall. And so, if the president if energy prices remain unstable, if the president hammers out a deal in which America looks like a loser, I think it rebounds very poorly for him at the ballot box. And so, these are sort of the this is a conversation that’s still in motion.
00:05:49:24 – 00:05:53:16
Ilan Berman
But these are the contours that people here in Washington are thinking about.
00:05:53:18 – 00:06:17:07
Richard Pater
Thank you. I just wanted to ask and follow up. I mean, one of the big issues is the, the stockpile of enriched uranium that obviously hasn’t been successfully captured or diluted or destroyed. And just as you mentioned, kind of with other issues, that there is a fear, at least from an Israeli perspective, that the US could also Trump can brush this under the carpet and claim that away.
00:06:17:08 – 00:06:30:07
Richard Pater
Also, presumably politically, he’s been such a staunch critic of the JCPoA and insistent that they remove it. How does that how do they square that circle, and how does it play out with the uranium stockpiles?
00:06:30:08 – 00:07:05:07
Ilan Berman
Well, so I personally I think this is a critical issue. I’ve heard competing and contrasting views that say that it’s less urgent or it’s less immediate, because it will require a pretty heavy excavation of the, you know, what the president now calls uranium dust. And so it may be, you know, I have friends who say, you know, what’s critical is not getting physical custody of it, but it’s monitoring what happens to it, because if it remains buried in Iran, it still remains inaccessible to the Iranian regime.
00:07:05:09 – 00:07:32:04
Ilan Berman
Personally, I would feel a lot better if we had custody over it. But this is where the problem comes in. Because it’s buried under 2 or 3 nuclear facilities that we know about in Iran, it’s very hard to access. It will require American boots on the ground to get custody of it. And if that’s going to be an operation, it’s going to be a comparatively lengthy one, which means that those forces are going to need overwatch.
00:07:32:04 – 00:07:55:19
Ilan Berman
They’re going to need an aerial campaign so that the skies are secure so that the planes can look down and make sure that nobody sneaks up on American troops. That’s not in the cards. Given the cease fire and given the fact that the administration is now talking with the Islamic Republic. So, I think that’s why the white House is increasingly de-emphasizing the question of the uranium.
00:07:55:19 – 00:07:59:02
Ilan Berman
But that doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s not a critical issue.
00:07:59:04 – 00:08:06:15
Richard Pater
Absolutely. And what do you think are the ramifications for Israeli and US allies in the region and the GCC?
00:08:06:17 – 00:08:36:00
Ilan Berman
What I, what I think is interesting is that this, you know, the mask has really come off. It’s not that Iran’s neighbours did not understand that Iran was a bad neighbour or a predatory actor. It’s the fact that they have now understood, because Iran has responded to the US’s Reilly campaign with a barrage of missiles against the Emirates Barrage, the missiles against Bahrain and drones against Bahrain.
00:08:36:03 – 00:09:04:16
Ilan Berman
In fact, you know, as significant as the Iranian targeting of Israel was during those 40 days, the quantity of missiles and drones that were fired at the at the United Arab Emirates was actually an order of magnitude higher. So, what you have is really a sea change, an emerging sea change in public opinion with regard to Iran in the neighbourhood, because these countries aren’t separated from Iran by a large ocean.
00:09:04:16 – 00:09:36:11
Ilan Berman
And they figured out that, you know, the current status quo is untenable. So, this creates both crisis and opportunity for the US and for Israel. On the one hand, you have more consensus about the need to contain Iran. In fact, before the cease fire. You heard voices from Saudi Arabia and from the United Arab Emirates urging the white House to continue, not to halt military operations, to degrade Iranian capabilities further, because they would be more secure if we did.
00:09:36:13 – 00:10:22:15
Ilan Berman
But you also have a quest for security among regional allies. And this is where the crisis part comes in, because what the United States has not done, at least not so far, is build a durable architecture to reassure regional allies, because whatever the sort of the final outcome of the conflict is, I think it’s clear that we’re not at least foreseeable looking at a wholesale regime change in Iran that really makes Iran a good neighbour, and that means that those countries require greater defences, air defences, greater defence capabilities, and greater a more durable alliance structure in the best of all possible worlds.
00:10:22:16 – 00:10:47:17
Ilan Berman
What that looks like is greater partnership with countries like Ukraine, which you’re seeing now, right? Ukraine is, I think, very, very shrewdly activating this part of its foreign policy as a way to, first of all, to remain on the global agenda, but also to show that this is all a common fight and to present itself as a solution, at least partially, to regional defence problems.
00:10:47:17 – 00:11:13:01
Ilan Berman
But it could also, I think, look very much less constructive in the context of giving greater opportunity for Russia, giving greater opportunity for China to enter this sort of this empty political space and reinforce their partnerships with Gulf nations in a way that I think is very detrimental to the United States and would be very detrimental to Israel as well.
00:11:13:03 – 00:11:23:09
Richard Pater
And what do you make of the latest move by the US in terms of the trying to control the Straits of Hormuz? How does that play out in your view?
00:11:23:10 – 00:11:52:14
Ilan Berman
Well, it’s interesting because, you know, very predictably, as soon as President Trump announced it, you know, the sort of the critics of the war writ large, the critics of the administration said that this is a last-ditch effort. This is a desperation play. I tend to look at that a little bit differently. And the reason for that is, you know, a decade and a half ago, I mean, I’ve spent a lot of time down in Tampa, Florida, where U.S. Central Command is located.
00:11:52:14 – 00:12:25:10
Ilan Berman
And this, you know, a decade and a half ago, before the JCPoA, I remember very distinctly having a conversation with a senior official who was dealing with Iran. And what he told me was very eye opening. And he said, you know, our nightmare scenario here in is if Iran narrows this great information, not closes it entirely, but narrows it creates obstacles that reduce the flow of containers and flow of oil coming out of the strait.
00:12:25:10 – 00:12:45:19
Ilan Berman
And by doing that, they would have the effect of driving up the marginal price of World war. And then we would it would give us some hard choices. Right? It would put some hard choices in front of us about how we would respond. The antidote, right, as it was portrayed to me, was if Iran starts narrowing the strait, we close it.
00:12:45:20 – 00:13:15:22
Ilan Berman
We close it. Because you do two things. First of all, you strip the Iranian regime of revenue from energy exports, which is something like 90% of their total income and the total GDP. And you also make everybody that’s reliant on Gulf energy that can’t get it now because this rate is closed, a stakeholder in some sort of formula to contain the Iranian regime.
00:13:15:23 – 00:13:38:15
Ilan Berman
And so, I think that’s actually what’s playing out right now, or at least that’s the idea that’s behind what President Trump is trying to do. The question is how quickly this can be effectuated, because you haven’t seen many countries say that they’re interested in participating in any way in this venture, which means that at least for the near future, the immediate future, this is going to be an American project.
00:13:38:15 – 00:13:52:19
Ilan Berman
And the question is, can we inflict sufficient economic pain on Iran in the short enough period of time that everybody understands that this is the way things are trending and they want to join?
00:13:52:21 – 00:14:11:12
Richard Pater
I wonder if you could just game out some scenarios of what kind of what happens next. Obviously, all the US troops are very heavy, contingent, are still based and poised in the in the Gulf. Is there a chance that the fighting will be resumed, or do you see these talks resuming and being successful?
00:14:11:14 – 00:14:34:17
Ilan Berman
I think there’s a chance there’s a chance for the aerial campaign to resume in some fashion, but I think it’s probably not likely. I think what’s much more likely is that the Iranians I mean, the talks are still ongoing. Now, it’s not that Vice President Vance went to Islamabad and he had a, you know, a few hours of meetings, and now everything is sort of back on the table.
00:14:34:19 – 00:15:02:22
Ilan Berman
They’re talking now, they’re having backchannel talks now, and there’s likely going to be another round of official talks between Washington and Tehran. And so, I think the Iranians are going to use that engagement as a way to forestall the full reactivation of the conflict. The thing that I worry about that I’m watching is what you’re already seeing is that global energy and global supply chains have shifted in response to the conflict.
00:15:02:23 – 00:15:34:15
Ilan Berman
So, for example, Saudi Arabia was exporting something like seven, 7.5 million barrels of oil a day. And they were doing that through the Strait of Hormuz when Iran basically, you know, narrowed the strait, blockaded this rate on its own, you know, forbade ships from coming out. The Saudis activated something called the East West pipeline, which is a pipeline that runs across Saudi territory and dumps out into the Red sea, into the great and all that.
00:15:34:21 – 00:15:56:03
Ilan Berman
So, if you look at a map and if you Google a map, you’ll see tanker traffic has been pretty significantly diverted away from the Strait of Hormuz towards this other maritime choke point. But here’s the problem. The that maritime choke point also is where Yemen is located is where the Iranian supported Yemen, the Yemeni Houthis are located.
00:15:56:04 – 00:16:25:03
Ilan Berman
And so, we saw what the Houthis did during the, you know, to Israel in terms of threatening with missile and drone strikes. We saw what the Houthis did post October 7th with regard to threatening maritime traffic. And so, if you’re Iran and you understand that, you know, the Americans are trying to take away your trump card in terms of leverage, what you’ll be looking for is additional leverage.
00:16:25:03 – 00:16:36:21
Ilan Berman
So, I actually expect the houses to become a bigger problem, potentially in the future, that are going to require a more resolute response than we’ve seen up until this point.
00:16:36:23 – 00:16:52:12
Richard Pater
And just one more from me. There’s obviously concern in London, in other capitals in Europe about the long-term strength of NATO. What’s your assessment and the kind of the view from Washington with regard to the Alliance.
00:16:52:14 – 00:17:14:20
Ilan Berman
Oh, well, I mean, the sort of the state of the alliance is not, not good, I would say coming from here for a couple of reasons. Right? I mean, I think it’s very clear that with this administration, it’s no longer feasible to rest the alliance on the shared commitment to global security and things like that. President Trump is much more transactional.
00:17:14:20 – 00:17:49:13
Ilan Berman
He thinks very clearly about who is contributing what and when. He sees the United States as the tip of the spear in preventing a nuclear Iran in trying to defend the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. And he doesn’t have any takers in terms of assisting him. It makes him angry. And so, a lot of the dust off and remember that relations with NATO countries restrained anyway because of the whole Greenland issue, which feels like forever ago.
00:17:49:13 – 00:18:14:07
Ilan Berman
But it was actually very recently, right recently in the fall of last year. And so, I think there is a lot of scepticism in Washington about NATO, and there was scepticism heading into the current conflict. And now there is even more scepticism. And by the way, the scepticism is growing by the day because there are countries in NATO that are doing very, very constructive things.
00:18:14:07 – 00:18:49:11
Ilan Berman
So, for example, you know, just yesterday, you know, in terms of when we’re recording this, just yesterday, the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, went to Beijing to hammer out all sorts of new strategic partnership accords with the PRC and Jinping. And, you know, there was all this, all this blatt handing. But the way displayed in Washington, I think, was very telling because it provided fuel to all those critics of NATO who say that NATO as an alliance is fundamentally at variance.
00:18:49:11 – 00:19:08:12
Ilan Berman
It’s fundamentally weak, and it’s fundamentally at variance with the types of priorities that America should be pursuing. So, Sanchez is not helping the cause in any way. But I think the fundamental problems that you now see emerging between the Alliance and Washington is about burden sharing, but it’s also about vision.
00:19:08:15 – 00:19:16:11
Richard Pater
And, sorry, just one more follow up. If you can give an assessment of the UK ties with the with the current US administration.
00:19:16:12 – 00:19:47:04
Ilan Berman
Well, it’s interesting because things are sort of things are changing very rapidly and they’re evolving in real time. I think the President Trump doesn’t have much love for Prime Minister Starmer in particular, because Starmer made that declaratory statement that the UK was not going to be involved in the Iran campaign in any way, only to revise it somewhat after British bases in Cyprus were hit.
00:19:47:05 – 00:20:11:24
Ilan Berman
Right. So, there was a there was a sense that, you know, reality is intruding upon this position of neutrality. I think there is a generalized sense on the part of the administration that the current British government is weak, but there’s not necessarily a as much focus as there should be among folks who work for the white House in terms of how do you improve that relationship?
00:20:12:00 – 00:20:45:13
Ilan Berman
You know, is there somebody who would be better? Yes, I think I think there’s a generalized sense, but I think we’re far short of having the white House put its finger on the scale in terms of backing a leader here or a leader there. And I think that’s likely not going to happen because we have the teachable moment that happened this weekend in which in Hungary, in which President Trump and his children spent a lot of time advocating for the re-election of Viktor Orban, only to have Orban be handily defeated by his opposition.
00:20:45:14 – 00:21:05:06
Ilan Berman
So, I think that there is a sense that a more methodical, less publicity seeking approach is probably better. But this is these remains on the to do list. I think there isn’t as much contact or conversation about the special relationship between Washington and London as there should be.
00:21:05:07 – 00:21:06:04
Richard Pater
Indeed.