In this episode recorded during a media briefing, Richard Pater speaks with Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion about the fallout from the US-Iran MOU. Orion assesses Israel’s concerns over premature sanctions relief, the absence of restrictions on Iran’s missile programme and proxy network, and the inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement. He also discusses Israel’s campaign in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s degraded but persistent threat, and the challenge of turning operational success into strategic victory.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion is an international fellow at the Washington Institute and a senior researcher at INSS. He previously served as head of the Strategic Division in the IDF Planning Directorate. He led the IDF team in the tripartite mechanism in Lebanon with UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, took part in the US-Israel Security Dialogue, and represented the IDF in negotiations with the Palestinians.
Transcript
(This transcript has been automatically generated by AI — please excuse any potential errors.)
00:00:07:00 – 00:00:31:01
Richard Pater
Hello and welcome to the BICOM Briefing and podcast recording. I’m Richard Pater, the Director of BICOM, and today is the 25th of June as we continue to discuss the fallout of the US Iran MOU and the regional ramifications. Our guest today is Assaf Orion, who is now a brigadier general in the reserves, as well as an international fellow at the Washington Institute and a senior researcher at the INSS.
00:00:31:03 – 00:00:59:01
Richard Pater
I’m privileged to say that I’ve known Assaf since the time he was in uniform, serving in his final post as the head of strategic division in the IDF Planning Directorate, where he was responsible for strategy and policy planning, international cooperation, military diplomacy and liaison with neighbouring militaries and peacekeeping forces. Of note, he led the IDF team in what was then the tripartite mechanism in Lebanon, along with UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army Forces.
00:00:59:02 – 00:01:09:21
Richard Pater
He was also part of the US-Israel Security Dialog and represented the IDF in negotiations with the Palestinians. Assaf, thank you very much indeed for joining us today.
00:01:09:22 – 00:01:11:07
Assaf Orion
Thank you for hosting.
00:01:11:08 – 00:01:33:17
Richard Pater
So perhaps we can start and you can share the concerns that many of us have in Israel over the MoU, particularly the premature sanctions relief, the absence of any mention of the Iranian missile program and the support for proxies around the region. And perhaps the greatest concern is the perpetuation of the linkage with the Iranian influence over the Lebanese theatre.
00:01:33:18 – 00:01:37:02
Richard Pater
Perhaps we can start and you can share your assessments.
00:01:37:04 – 00:02:19:20
Assaf Orion
Yeah, I think basically looking at. Let’s say, the ending mechanisms of, of conflicts usually justifies going back to the goals and the objectives set at the outset. So, we remember that it was about preventing a nuclear option from Iran, degrading its force projection capabilities, mostly the ballistic depriving it from resource of resources that allow it to operate the proxy network.
00:02:20:00 – 00:03:08:15
Assaf Orion
And in general, I think degrading its, its economy in a way that will be detrimental to their continued maligned influence over, over the, over the region or across the region within, I would say, unhindered hope for regime change and some even actions towards that end. So, at the at the end of the day, Iran was military beaten and I think it couldn’t stop any of the, the action that, that the US and Israel brought upon it.
00:03:08:17 – 00:03:47:12
Assaf Orion
Although at the same time, since this was like a parallel campaign, the allies couldn’t prevent Iran from doing what it does best, or second best is hostage taking. So, it took the world economy through hormones, and it took the regional neighbours hostage in pounced their energy installations and so on. And so, when, when, when we come to the bottom line of how this MOU looks.
00:03:47:14 – 00:04:20:06
Assaf Orion
So, you started with, with the contents. Well nuclear will be dealt with later. We’ll see. All the rest of the items are not on the agenda. There is money flowing into Iran as we speak even before it did anything. And so, when you think about this paper as a conduit to the next level of negotiations, because it opened a window of 60 days to discuss details.
00:04:20:08 – 00:05:05:07
Assaf Orion
Well, when you approach negotiation analysis, you ask, okay, where’s the leverage? Who has the pressure? Who can push what? So, I think there’s not enough leverage. There the military option is almost off the table. Although President Trump says I can do this. I can do that. Yeah, but if you want to shoot, shoot. If you keep on saying how you are not interested in using force, but you can do you can do you know, you I think when Iran is staring into the barrel and when dirty Harry asked, is it a lucky day?
00:05:05:09 – 00:05:35:04
Assaf Orion
Well, they say, yes, it’s a lucky day. You’re not going to pull the trigger. So, this is one thing, and the second is the is the flow of money. If you spend so much effort in degrading industries in general, not just the, you know, steel and so on, not just the military, it was about depriving Iran of the financial resources.
00:05:35:06 – 00:06:23:20
Assaf Orion
So, when you open up for export of all and then you discuss the freezing of, of funds and so on, and the, the option of almost both as a financial source, although protested and contested by the US and the leverages it allows, you know continued grip on this choke point. So, Iran for its own reasons I think believes it has won and it, it behaves triumphant in many ways.
00:06:23:22 – 00:06:51:04
Assaf Orion
And the strategy is much about reputation and about image and so on. I don’t think that many people around the, the region and beyond believe that this MOU, this document looks like an American victory.
00:06:51:06 – 00:07:25:19
Assaf Orion
Because, well, let alone the irony of signing it in Versailles and not on the one on the battle on the US battleship. The fact that, you know, just asking who’s paying reparations tells you something about, you know, who’s dictating which terms and so on. And yes, let’s caveat is too early to say it’s not the end of the film.
00:07:25:19 – 00:08:11:02
Assaf Orion
There is an encore after this. But I think the gist is, is pretty obvious. And, and the combination of the details and the impression are not so positive. And add into that that Israel is not really being considered after a very intimate cooperation and very close, unprecedented military cooperation, it’s been demoted to a very junior partner, not really being consulted.
00:08:11:04 – 00:08:51:03
Assaf Orion
So, I think that’s a problem. And then we can segway into to Lebanon and Iran’s success in introducing Lebanon three times into the first article of this MOU and saying, yes, it must end, you know, simultaneously. So, the whole question of Israel against Hezbollah and Hezbollah against Israel is subordinated to the US Iran conflict and resolution.
00:08:51:07 – 00:09:11:18
Assaf Orion
And add to that the agreement on a deconfliction mechanism in Lebanon, of course, without Israel, but with Iran inside. Well, how can I give it to you? Simply, it doesn’t look good.
00:09:11:19 – 00:09:32:09
Richard Pater
Okay. I mean, how do you explain that kind of the discrepancy between well, first of all, share your assessment of kind of the 40-day war in between Israel and Iran and the achievements that were made there. And how do you explain the juxtaposition between what reads like a surrender document by the US in the MOU?
00:09:32:11 – 00:10:18:24
Assaf Orion
You know, it’s like in one word, good in two words, not good. When you, when you look at it operationally. Fantastic campaign. Really beautiful precision strike smashing gambit of the opening, superb level of impacts in Iran. The ratio of losses very, very low. This has been I think the Allied campaign included something like two 20,000 strikes in Iran.
00:10:19:01 – 00:10:26:02
Assaf Orion
I think operationally it’s very, very impressive, but.
00:10:26:04 – 00:11:23:23
Assaf Orion
Wars are not operations. There is this mixture of political, you know, the continuation of policy by other means. They are there to serve strategic purposes. They also depend on it’s a contest of will. And in my profession and you mentioned my tenure as the strategic planner, you look for ends, ways and means alignment. Now some of the ends I think were delirious, like regime change by an airstrike or by air campaign with a half-baked operation by the Kurdish insurgency which was aborted and so on.
00:11:24:00 – 00:12:01:20
Assaf Orion
This is the part where ambitious and ambitions and fantasy are in. I, you know, defined as objectives for war and are unattainable. So, they’re doomed to fail to begin with. And of course, there was also efforts. There were also efforts spent in squandered to advance this hope. I don’t believe that hopes are good compasses for military campaigns.
00:12:01:22 – 00:12:34:22
Assaf Orion
Then, as President Trump once said, and it came to bite him. Well, he ran, never won a war and never lost a negotiation. When you come to negotiate with Iran, you better do your homework. They are going to sell you out. You know, these are not merchants. They are the bazaar makers, and they know their stuff and they give you things that you don’t.
00:12:34:23 – 00:13:12:12
Assaf Orion
You know, you look at the whole orchestrating thing, the negotiation doesn’t look good. What you pay for what, and so on. So, I think this whole chapter of going from very successful military operations to, to the negotiation, this whole chapter was missing. The link is missing. But what did we see on the connecting link we see homos.
00:13:12:14 – 00:13:56:19
Assaf Orion
Homos is the most predictable surprise that came in this in the like. It’s only 40 years that it was expected. So, the fact that that the parties were surprised by this and equipped to confront it immediately. You can look at a lot of things at what if and what if, but. Well, I think it’s pretty basic to expect that once homos are it was closed immediately, a blockade should have been laid.
00:13:56:21 – 00:14:32:11
Assaf Orion
And if their means were not there, well, it probably shows some mismatch, or some disconnect between the strategic part and the operational part. So, I think and that’s a recurring model or motive in in what we see since October 7th, you can have fantastic victories in battle and still struggle with how to bring victory to the war.
00:14:32:13 – 00:14:58:00
Richard Pater
Let me ask you another question about Israel’s approach in Lebanon. We see now the establishment of the of the yellow line and security zone, in other words. But someone that has served you served for over three decades in the in the IDF, and you’ll be familiar with the quagmire that Israel found itself after the 80s and 90s adopting a not dissimilar approach of a security zone.
00:14:58:00 – 00:15:08:16
Richard Pater
But what do you how do you square that circle, and what would your recommendations be to how to disarm effectively and protect these ready citizens in the North?
00:15:08:18 – 00:15:53:12
Assaf Orion
Well, Israel’s war goal in Lebanon. Although the war started on October 8th 23, Israel Israel’s war goal for Lebanon has actually been defined only in August or September 24th. Until then, you know, the marching orders were that Lebanon was the secondary theatre. And don’t let it interfere with the main theatre, which is Gaza. So, they put on the door of our northern commander.
00:15:53:12 – 00:16:49:10
Assaf Orion
They put a please do not disturb sign like in, in most of the hotels we know. Then so it, it was something like 11 months of, of on the defensive exchanging blows with Hezbollah. Then the war goal was defined as allowing or safely returning the northern communities to their homes. And when we are saying safely returning, that’s not really a military objective, but it meant to push away Hezbollah from the blue line because Hezbollah was it was and is threatening Israel by several means.
00:16:49:15 – 00:17:29:10
Assaf Orion
One is the direct contact able or capable of doing a land invasion, as we saw in the Negev on October 7th. So, it was actually they’re designed to invade and to do all this. And this is by the forward deployment of the Radwan special units, thousands of fighters and of course, all the armaments that come with it and tunnelling that allows subterranean infiltration and so on and so forth.
00:17:29:10 – 00:18:07:18
Assaf Orion
And of course, the fire. The fire threat by rockets, by missiles and so on, which were many tens of thousands. And sometimes you hear 150,000. But I think that mixes up mortars and other things. So basically, what Israel was trying to do is push back and remove the threat from its northern border communities. And.
00:18:07:20 – 00:18:52:12
Assaf Orion
In this sense, in September, Israel went to the to the pager operation, to the walkie talkie operation, to a massive precision strike and very shallow invasion of about three kilometres, eradicating all the forward deployment of, of and it went on like that until November 24th. So, it was like two months of good fighting, degrading about 80% of, of their arsenal, decapitating most of their command.
00:18:52:14 – 00:19:30:15
Assaf Orion
It was a devastating military blow. But since then, Israel didn’t go and said, okay, now let’s have a political or diplomatic process we will continue to enforce. And indeed, Israel struck, I think, every day in in Lebanon since November 24th until March 26th, without Hezbollah responding, which was important. But and it also gave some illusion that that it’s okay.
00:19:30:17 – 00:20:16:21
Assaf Orion
But since early March, we were fighting the IDF went in beyond the three kilometres. They said, okay, technically we will try to push away the effective and the effective fires that harassed and attacked our border communities. And that’s up to ten kilometres. The anti-tank range. I think about six years ago, I, I wrote a piece about how the most lethal aspects come from up close, you know, close to the border, sniping, IEDs, ATMs and so on.
00:20:16:23 – 00:20:58:03
Assaf Orion
And that was the situation. Israel, I think. And when it launched the last campaign, it said, okay, we now have a new concept, the yellow lines. We did it in Gaza. We did it in Syria. Now we’ll do it in Lebanon. Copy pasting in in defence business is a tricky business. Well, if you pay attention to the facts, the size of Gaza is 365km².
00:20:58:05 – 00:21:48:09
Assaf Orion
Let’s say 70% of that is a bit above, I don’t know, 220 square where Lebanon border is about 140km. Now take ten kilo, ten kilometres deep. You get 1400 if you’re, you know, going geometrically. Also, Gaza is a flat place, flat, naturally and flattened later on. Lebanon is a hilly country. Gaza was left with an enclave of Hamas with a very limited arm capability.
00:21:48:11 – 00:22:13:00
Assaf Orion
Hezbollah is deployed throughout Lebanon with okay, they have only 20% of their arsenal left. But it’s still significant. And when the when the IDF went in, we were introduced to another predictable surprise with the first person the view.
00:22:13:02 – 00:22:58:03
Assaf Orion
Optic fibre guided drones. And since this early March campaign we lost 37 people there. Some of them do draw some of them to IEDs and so on. Just the fatalities are, quite high. And Hezbollah can’t stop us anywhere. But we cannot coerce disarmament in parallel. We have a diplomatic channel which started.
00:22:58:05 – 00:23:46:22
Assaf Orion
Well into the campaign. The Lebanese come to see us withdrawal and stop striking. We insist on disarming Hezbollah. Hezbollah resists even more so after the MoU because, well, it came back from the dead. Some kind of a Lazarus Hezbollah. The Lebanese government said, well, we want to we’re committed, but it’s difficult for us. We lack we need somebody to pay the wages of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces are playing, I would say a brazen game of trying, but not totally.
00:23:46:22 – 00:24:14:18
Assaf Orion
They already said the south of the litany, where Hezbollah, agreed for this armament was mission accomplished. But then, lo and behold, when the IDF is writing in, there’s quite a lot of findings there, and you can always see it in the media. So, there’s again, a question of can they will they do they agree to do it?
00:24:14:18 – 00:25:02:23
Assaf Orion
And in the last days we also saw that in Washington in the diplomatic channel, the Lebanese officers got up from the table not to be photographed on the opening picture. And that is the question of do they really answer their government? This is not some dog and pony show. It’s an official diplomatic venue in the State Department. What does it mean when uniformed officers answering the commander in chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces is the president?
00:25:03:00 – 00:25:45:01
Assaf Orion
What does it mean that they get up from the table and walk away? In this sense and in the in the last days, we heard that there was some haggling about what will be the pilot areas in which the Lebanese Armed Forces is supposed to clear and hold and prevent the return of, of militia. So, I think what Israel is now facing is a combined challenge when the military effort is subdued but not relinquished, it’s still it’s still there.
00:25:45:01 – 00:26:21:23
Assaf Orion
So, Hezbollah is down but not out. There are additional constraints laid by Iran through Washington that is expecting Israel to play. So, it doesn’t undermine the MOU. And of course, you can hear in Israel a lot of disgruntled about the IDF forces being in Lebanon, but being constrained and tied, hand tied, you know, that they can’t defend themselves fully.
00:26:21:23 – 00:27:01:03
Assaf Orion
And so, on last days we saw some mixing signalling. But you can see that in general, the volume of IDF attacks has subsided seriously. And it now has to go in between those. And we go back to what is our purpose there? You want to remove the threat from Lebanon in order to be able to reach peace with Lebanon, as long many, many are talking about, reinstating Lebanese sovereignty.
00:27:01:05 – 00:27:21:12
Assaf Orion
The first element to tread on, on and violate Lebanese sovereignty is an Iranian occupation through the operation of Hezbollah. I think that’s pretty clear. But globally, it’s usually easier to say, oh, it’s the Israeli occupation and so on.
00:27:21:16 – 00:27:23:01
Richard Pater
Thank you very much.