Israel, the UK and the world

Updated April 24, 2025

US Secretary of State Rubio reiterates Iran cannot enrich uranium

What’s happened: US Secretary of State Rubio said yesterday that Iran could be allowed a civil nuclear programme but emphasised that it must refrain from enriching uranium.

In an interview on Bari Weiss’s podcast Rubio said, “If Iran wants a civil nuclear programme, they can have one just like many other countries in the world have one. That is, they import enriched material.”
Rubio also reiterated President Trump’s longstanding position that diplomacy was preferable to military action, while praising Special Envoy Witkoff’s efforts in negotiating with Iran.
With US-Iranian talks ongoing, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke by phone on Tuesday, with Trump later saying that they were “on the same side of every issue.”
The call follows a second round of talks between the US and Iran hosted at the Omani Embassy in Rome where the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, said that he and Witkoff had “managed to reach a better understanding on a series of principles and goals.”
Witkoff had previously stated that the US would accept a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment. However, a day later, he U-turned and asserted that all enrichment would have to end.
In parallel, Mohammed Eslami, the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, has confirmed that Iran has begun fortifying tunnel systems linked to its nuclear project, explaining that “efforts are ongoing…[to] expand protective facilities.”

Context: While the US seemingly open to Iran developing and maintaining a civil nuclear energy programme if it refrains from enriching its own uranium, Israel is taking a less compromising position.

In parallel to the negotiations Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei laid out his country’s red lines for negotiations that include:
- Not dismantling any of their centrifuges.
- Not lowering uranium enrichment below 3.67% (the level agreed in the JCPOA 2015 nuclear agreement).
- Not ceasing missile programmes (that currently remain outside the scope of the JCPOA).
- Guarantees that the US will not withdraw from a future deal (as President Trump did in 2018).
Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that the only diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis with Iran is the ‘Libya option’ in which all existing infrastructure in Iran will be dismantled or is shipped out of the country.
A recent New York Times article claimed Trump had blocked an Israeli military attack on nuclear facilities, with the administration wanting to give more time for diplomacy.
In the context of these military threats, evidence that Tehran has begun fortifying tunnel systems linked to its main nuclear facility – that could potentially store highly enriched uranium, and other undeclared nuclear materials, or advanced centrifuges – is pertinent.
The evidence was taken from commercial satellite imagery taken over Iran at the end of March 2025, and published in a report by the Institute for Science and International Security. The Institute’s President, David Albright, has suggested that the new tunnels could become operational relatively soon, and that it was highly unlikely that UN nuclear inspectors would be granted access to them.
Israel has long attempted to undermine and weaken Iran’s nuclear programme, primarily through covert and deniable means including cyber-attacks, sabotaging facilities, and targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and officials.
All these efforts are assumed to be paused while Israel closely follows US efforts to reach a diplomatic solution.
Although not party to the talks, Israel will be hoping that Netanyahu’s personal ties – along with those of Minister Dermer – will be able to influence the US position.

Looking ahead: A third round of US-Iran nuclear talks will take place on Saturday, this time returning to Muscat in Oman.

This upcoming round has been described as both “technical” and “high-level”, and is understood to focus on agreeing a framework for a potential nuclear deal which would not be dissimilar to the JCPOA.

April 17, 2025

Trump and the Iranian nuclear project

New BICOM research: Ahead of the highly anticipated second round of US–Iran talks in Rome this Saturday, BICOM’s latest paper examines the US position and the strategic implications of a potential deal for Israel and the wider Middle East.

Key points:

For the first time in a decade, the US has opened direct talks with Iran over its nuclear programme, while simultaneously threatening military action if an agreement acceptable to the Trump administration is not reached within sixty days.
In parallel, American military action in Yemen – together with the ostentatious forward deployment of naval assets in striking distance of Iran – is intended to signal that the US will not hesitate to use force if negotiations over a nuclear deal with Iran fail to achieve an agreement.
The US is demanding improvements over the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) on four major issues of contention:
- time limits on nuclear activities,
- weaponisation capabilities,
- international inspections,
- ballistic missile programme.
While the basic points of contention between the sides remain unchanged from a decade ago, the larger geostrategic environment is dramatically different. So too is Iran’s bargaining position. On the one hand, it is at a far more advanced stage in its nuclear development. At the same time, it has seen its proxy forces in the region degraded and under pressure in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Yemen. And it has seen its own air defences largely rendered useless by Israeli strikes.
President Trump seems determined to reach a deal, one that he can convince himself and his constituents is better than the one achieved by President Obama signed in 2015. His choice of real estate mogul Steve Witkoff, a trusted non-ideological dealmaker that he has relied on in other foreign policy crises, as his envoy is further evidence that Trump is keen to make a deal, even – as seen in discussions over the future of Ukraine – at the cost of alienating allies or sacrificing long-held principles.
Israel is most directly affected by the outcome of these negotiations, but not a part of them. While Israeli action against Iranian capabilities and proxies has been leveraged to bolster the American negotiating position, it will ultimately be American, not Israeli, interests that determine the talks’ outcome.

Read the FULL analysis

April 10, 2025

Oman to host US-Iran nuclear negotiations this weekend

What’s happened: Negotiations are due to take place between the US and Iran in Oman over the weekend. “We have a very big meeting on Saturday, and we’re dealing with them directly,” Trump told reporters on Monday after his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

The Iranian delegation will be led by its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, and the US delegation by Steven Witkoff.
Yesterday, President Trump told reporters that he had a deadline in mind for when the talks must culminate in an agreed-upon solution, but did not go into details about the nature of the timeline. Trump also threatened “great danger” if the two sides fail to come to an agreement.
“We have a little time, but we don’t have much time, because we’re not going to let them have a nuclear weapon. We can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.” Trump said.
Trump added that the military option was very much on the table, suggesting that Israel might take the lead on any attack. “If it requires military, we’re going to have military,” Trump told reporters. “Israel will obviously be very much involved in that. They’ll be the leader of that. But nobody leads us. We do what we want to do.”
The U.S. Treasury Department yesterday said it had imposed sanctions on five Iran-based entities and one person based in Iran for their support of Iran’s nuclear programme with the aim of denying Tehran a nuclear weapon. “The Iranian regime’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons remains a grave threat to the United States and a menace to regional stability and global security,” Treasury Secretary Bessent said. “Treasury will continue to leverage our tools and authorities to disrupt any attempt by Iran to advance its nuclear programme and its broader destabilising agenda.”
CIA Director Ratcliffe arrived in Israel last night and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and his counterpart, Mossad Director Barnea.
Israeli officials have confirmed that they intend to monitor their progress for any perceived “erosion” of Washington’s position on nuclear development, missiles, and its use of proxies across the region.
Iranian officials have said the Islamic Republic is approaching the weekend talks ‘warily’ with little confidence in progress and suspicions over US intentions.
The talks come as The Times reports that Iran is transferring long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to its proxy militias in Iraq for the first time. These missiles can reportedly reach targets as far away as Europe.

Context:

Several major gaps exist between the US and Iran:
- The nature of the talks: While the US has stated that negotiations will be direct, Iran maintains that they will be indirect and moderated by Omani mediators.
- Sanctions on the Islamic Republic: Iran has previously indicated that it would only engage in negotiations if sanctions were gradually lifted, not merely at their conclusion once an agreement had been reached. While it had previously indicated that sanction relief was a precondition for participation, it has since dropped this demand.
- Iran’s nuclear programme: America demands a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and missile programmes. Tehran insists that despite uranium enrichment reaching military levels, its nuclear purposes is only for peaceful civilian purposes, repeatedly denying that it intends to develop nuclear weapons citing a fatwa by Ayatollah Khamenei which bans them.
- Iran’s missile programme: Iran has reportedly refused to negotiate on the status of its missile programme following reports that Israel had requested the US directly address this particular issue.
- Regional proxies: The US is also expected to seek to push Iran to address its network of terrorist proxy groups which act on its behalf across the region. The Houthis and Iraq’s Shia militias continue to represent a particular security threat to Israel and the US which is unlikely to abate given Tehran’s insistence that they act as independent agents rather than proxies or clients. The Houthis have continued to launch missiles at Israel since military operations in the Gaza Strip resumed, with the US conducting a large number of air strikes against the group in an attempt to deter their ongoing aggression.
While Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq have refrained from attacking Israel since December 2024, they have previously targeted and killed both American and Israeli troops since escalating their activities in the aftermath of 7th October 2023, which has included jointly claimed missile and drone attacks with the Houthis.
An article in Israel Hayom suggests that the US and Israel are aligned and that Trump and Netanyahu “had reached clear agreements on the issue”. It also details that negotiations would be time-limited, only giving Iran two months “to exhaust the option of negotiations”. The article adds that Israeli officials were grateful to have been notified of these developments ahead of time, and that the US had learned lessons from Adam Boehler’s unilateral attempts to engage with Hamas earlier in the year. In that case, Israel had not been advised that they would be taking place.
Netanyahu has described two options to prevent Iran going nuclear. This week he said that a deal would only be acceptable if it were similar to the one with Libya: “We go in, blow up the facilities, and dismantle all the equipment, under American supervision and execution. That’s the ideal scenario…The second option, which we don’t want, is that they’ll simply drag out the negotiations, and in that case, the military option becomes the only choice.”
While often discrete in doing so, Oman has historically acted as a regional broker, mediator, and backchannel for sensitive negotiations, especially between the US, Iran, and conservative US-aligned Sunni states. In 2013, Oman hosted the initial US-Iranian talks which resulted in the JCPOA being signed two years later. Oman also helped facilitate 2023’s Iran-Saudi normalisation agreement with Iraqi assistance, and has acted as a diplomatic touchpoint for Bahrain to positively engage with both Iran and Qatar.

Looking ahead: With so many substantive gaps between the sides, and still disagreement as to whether talks will be direct or indirect, there is little optimism of a breakthrough in the short-term.

It has also been reported that Witkoff may not travel to Oman if Iran continues to refuse to hold direct talks with him.

April 8, 2025

Netanyahu meets Trump as US eyes Iran talks

What’s happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu met President Trump at the White House yesterday (7th April) in a hastily arranged meeting that reportedly focused on tariffs and Iran, with some attention also given to the war in Gaza and the hostages still held there by Hamas.

Trump announced that the US will be holding direct talks with Iran in an attempt to reach a new deal on the Iranian nuclear programme. Talks are due to begin this Saturday in Oman, where an American delegation led by Steve Witkoff will meet the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.
This will be the first such high-level contact between the sides in ten years. Failure to reach an agreement would place Tehran “in great danger,” in Trump’s words.
Netanyahu had hoped to secure an American cancellation of tariffs imposed on Israel last week. This was not forthcoming, though President Trump did commend Israel for eliminating duties on American goods last week. Referring to Israeli efforts to eliminate any remaining barriers to US imports in Israel, Netanyahu said “I think Israel can serve as a model for many countries who ought to do the same.”

Context: The 2015 agreement between Iran and six leading states, known as the JCPOA, limiting Iran’s nuclear programme for a period of fifteen years was deeply opposed by Israel as well as hawkish element in domestic American politics and elsewhere. Disagreement over the JCPOA was the high point of tensions between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

In 2018, President Trump withdrew from the agreement, but the other countries who were part of it — the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China — did not.
It has been ten years since the last time the US and Iran engaged in direct talks over Iran’s nuclear programme, and the implied threat hovering over the talks of US-led military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities hasn’t changed. But at least three aspects of the threat and incentive structure are dramatically different in 2025 compared to 2015:
- Iran appears to have enriched significantly more uranium than was the case in 2015.
- Iran’s ability to defend itself from aerial attacks is greatly degraded as a result of the Israeli operation in 2024 which destroyed its air defences as well as its missile fuel production facility.
- Iran’s array of regional proxies threatening Israel and American interests in the region has been even more severely degraded than its air defence system. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been almost entirely taken out of a commission since a rapid Israeli offensive last autumn. And Hamas in Gaza has been pinned down by the destructive war it launched on October 7, 2023.
An additional Iranian proxy, the Houthis in Yemen, have also experienced strikes from the US. Following the Trump-Netanyahu meeting US Secretary of Defense Hegseth told reporters “It’s been a bad three weeks for the Houthis, and it’s about to get worse.” He described the campaign as “devastating,” targeting underground facilities, weapons manufacturing bunkers, Houthi fighters, and air defence systems. Hegseth also criticised Iran for its continued support warning that “We have a lot more options and a lot more pressure to apply.”
Israel’s strategic posture vis-à-vis a negotiated process it is not a direct party to is also significantly different from what it was in 2015. On the one hand, it is much less threatened by Iranian deterrent assets on its borders. On the other, if it opposes whatever deal the Trump administration reaches with the Iranians, it has no one in domestic American politics with whom it can make a common cause over such opposition.
Despite the less festive tone (in comparison to the previous Netanyahu Oval Office visit earlier this year) and the obvious areas of disagreement, both Israel and American officials were keen to emphasise the ideological and personal alignment of the two countries’ leaders.

Looking Ahead: As negotiations get underway, the positions staked out by the US and Iran on the most contentious issues are very far apart. Israel, which is not a party to the talks, insists on a “Libya model,” alluding to the 2003 agreement which saw Libya dismantle entirely its nascent nuclear facilities and ship them out of the country.

The announcement of direct US-Iran talks shuts the window, for now, on an Israeli military offensive against Iranian nuclear assets. Israel cannot launch an attack while the US is negotiating with Iran without angering the American administration. And if talks succeed in reaching an agreement, Israel cannot realistically launch an attack either. If talks fail, it will be up to the US to carry out its threats against the Iranians, or find itself in a weaker position in any future diplomatic confrontation. Referencing just such a threat, President Trump said, “I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious.”
Both the Prime Minister and the President addressed the question of Turkey’s role in Syria in particularly delicate terms. The implication of both men’s comments was that the US will seek to mediate discreet understandings between Turkey and Israel regarding each side’s most vital interests in post-Assad Syria. Israel is very concerned about a jihadist government on its doorstep backed by Turkey, a hostile regional power that is also a member of NATO.
President Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next month, and it is widely speculated that he would like a new ceasefire in Gaza in place in time for that visit, and that he is particularly keen to see the last remaining living hostage with US citizenship, Edan Alexander, among those released.

April 7, 2025

Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington, D.C.

Prime Minister Netanyahu landed in the US on the night of Sunday, 6th April, and is scheduled to meet with President Trump on the evening of Monday, 7th April.

On arrival, Netanyahu met with US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer at the Blair House.
The visit was only arranged last week in what Maariv newspaper described as a “most unconventional and improvised way possible,” following a phone call with US President Trump.
The first order of business is to try and cancel (or reduce) the 17 per cent tariff the Trump administration has imposed on Israeli goods.
There are then a range of diplomatic issues on the agenda. Foremost among them is a hostages deal and to that end the President’s envoy Witkoff will also join the meeting.
Also on the agenda are Israel-Turkey relations, the Iranian threat, and efforts to neuter decisions of the International Criminal Court.
Netanyahu and Trump are first expected to talk in private, before expanding the meeting to include senior officials. The two leaders will then answer reporters’ questions.
Back in Israel, in response to a motion that was filed by Netanyahu, the judges in his trial agreed to cancel his court appearance today, but have stated he is expected to appear in court on Wednesday.

March 17, 2025

Weekend US air strikes in Yemen killed dozens

What’s happened: Described by CENTCOM as “powerful and decisive,” US air strikes continued overnight, expanding from Sanaa to the Al Jaouf and Hudaydah areas.

The Houthis have said that the current death toll stands at 53.
President Trump also warned Iran to “immediately” withdraw its support for the Houthis. His National Security Advisor Walz confirmed that the main target was the Houthi leadership.
US Defence Secretary Hesgeth pledged that America’s response would be “unrelenting” until the Houthis ceased their attacks, adding that “this campaign is about freedom of navigation and restoring deterrence”.
While denying that Tehran supported the Houthis, Major General Hossein Salami, a commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), threatened a “decisive” response if Iran was threatened, and referred to the Houthis as “the representatives of the Yemenis”.
The Houthis claim to have retaliated with a series of their own strikes against the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman with up to 18 missiles and a drone. The US has not commented on this matter, but it is a likely that – as in the past – the Houthis grossly exaggerated the impact of their attacks.
One missile fired from Yemen landed in Egypt close to the Sharm el-Sheikh resort in the Sinai Peninsula. No injuries, fatalities, or damage has been reported, and the IDF is currently investigating as to whether it was aimed at Israel.

Context: The US attacks follow Houthi threats to resume their longstanding attacks on what the group claims is “Israel-linked” shipping in and around the Red Sea in the event that the fragile ceasefire in Gaza did not hold.

These attacks began in November 2023, ostensibly in solidarity with Hamas and the people of Gaza during Operation Swords of Iron.
The Houthis claimed that they were maintaining what amounted to a naval blockade on Israel. Yet in practice, they were indiscriminately targeting almost all international shipping in and around the Red Sea, often under pretence that a particular vessel was “Israel-linked”.
In November 2023, the Houthis boarded and seized a British-owned cargo ship (the Galaxy Leader), and held its crew prisoner until January 2025. Its parent company is co-owned by an Israeli businessman.
Since then, the Houthis have attacked US warships 174 times, and commercial vessels 145 times. Approximately 12% of global shipping passes through the affected area, much of which was suspended for insurance reasons. This has caused significant disruptions, forcing shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope causing increased transit times and associated costs.
Concurrently, the Houthis launched over 40 ballistic missiles and 320 drones at Israel, sometimes in what was claimed as a joint operation with Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias.
These attacks caused limited casualties and damage, but had a significant impact on the Israeli economy, especially Eilat where they have forced the city’s port to close and declare bankruptcy in July 2024.
The strikes over the weekend mark the first US strikes on Yemen since President Trump took office in January, and follow his threats that “hell will rain down on you” unless the ceased their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
Despite Tehran’s denials, the Houthis are widely viewed as Iran’s most important proxy in the Arabian Peninsula, and have benefited from training and weaponry from the Islamic Republic. They are an established part of the “Axis of Resistance”, and a key mechanism for Tehran to project influence against rival Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
While the Biden Administration took some military action against the Houthis, it was limited and predominantly defensive. Those few US and US-led air strikes had little deterring effect, and failed to prevent attacks on international shipping or Israel.

Looking ahead: While Israel has conducted its own sporadic air strikes in Yemen, it is hoped that the US will establish robust deterrence against the Houthis, thus preventing further attacks against Israel and international shipping in and around the Red Sea.

The Israeli Air Force has raised its readiness levels in anticipation of further Houthi drone or missile attacks against Israel in coming days. In the event of a significant attack, independent Israeli or joint US-Israeli strikes on Yemen are a realistic possibility.
Prior to the autumn of 2023, Israel’s intelligence collection efforts were predominantly focused on the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Attacks by more distance enemies in Yemen and Iraq may refocus these priorities, and result in more direct collection efforts by the Israeli intelligence community rather than relying on products from CENTCOM.

March 13, 2025

Efforts continue in Doha to reach hostage deal extension

What’s happening: White House envoy to the Middle East Witkoff has joined the talks in Qatar to try and secure a deal to release more hostages.

The talks are being held with the Israeli delegation alongside the Egyptian, Jordanian, Qatari and UAE foreign ministers.
According to reports, the focus of the negotiations is a version of the ‘Witkoff Plan’ that includes:
- Hamas releasing ten hostages (presumably all will be alive).
- In exchange Israel will release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners (at a higher ratio than earlier deals) including convicted terrorists serving long sentences.
- Israel will resume the entrance of humanitarian aid and amenities, potentially at a greater volume than before.
- The ceasefire will be extended for a couple of months that will include Passover and Israel’s Independence Day (1^st May).
On Wednesday, Prime Minister Netanyahu held consultations with the Israeli negotiators to coordinate their stance ahead of the Doha talks.
He also held a meeting with senior security officials to approve military plans for the Gaza Strip if the negotiations fail.
Israel media reported that despite the publicised tension with the prime minister, head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar attended both meetings.
In Washington President Trump appeared to backtrack on his plan to resettle Gazans outside of the Strip, saying, “nobody’s expelling any Palestinians.”

Context: There remains a high level of anguish in Israeli society to secure the release of all the remaining hostages.

This has been compounded by the accounts of recently released hostages that describe horrific conditions of their captivity, including being kept underground, beaten and tortured, and fed morsels of sometimes rotten food.
59 hostages remain in captivity now for 524 days. Of them only 24 are alive, with 35 thought to have been killed.
As a result of information garnered from released hostages, the family of Avinatan Or received their first indication that he is still alive, but being held in horrific conditions.
In the absence of the agreement, there has not yet been a return to fighting, but the IDF has presented a plan to the government as a contingency. The credibility of the military threat, which may be more intense that previous fighting, is intended to pressure Hamas into a deal.
Alongside military action, the new IDF Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Zamir is proposing that the IDF will take over the delivery of aid to Gazans as the only way to ensure Hamas does not profit from the aid. The previous chief of staff was reluctant to take this on, out of concern that it be perceived as military responsibility for the civilian population.
Hamas appear to be particularly satisfied with the revelation that they held direct talks with a US officials, as this broke the long held diplomatic veto by western liberal members of the international community. However US officials played down its significance with Secretary of State Rubio referring to it as a “one-off” that “hasn’t borne fruit.”
There remains residual concerns that if no agreement is reached the US will do a side deal to secure the remaining hostages with US citizenship (Edan Alexander and the bodies of four murdered hostages). It is also possible that they could be released by Hamas as a goodwill gesture, that could further appeal to President Trump.
Overall, it appears US and Israel remain well coordinated. During a meeting in Jeddah earlier this week, Secretary Rubio told Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, that the US insists that Hamas have no role in any solution for postwar Gaza. Similarly Israeli Foreign Minister Saar has again emphasised that “the war in Gaza will not end without the demilitarisation of Gaza Strip.”
Israel is caught in a bind regarding the Witkoff framework. On one hand, the release of ten more living hostages is highly sought. On the other, it calls into question the fate of those who remain. From Hamas’s perspective, they could agree to this deal, as long as they retain some of the captives as an insurance policy to ensure their survival.

Looking ahead: Despite no breakthrough yet, the fact that the Israeli delegation has not been recalled gives hope that there is still hope a deal can be reached. The next few days are once more seen as critical.

Later today the IDF will present their latest internal investigation, this time focusing on kibbutz Nir Oz.
According to consistent polling, there remains a large majority of the Israeli public in favour of forming an independent state commission of inquiry into October 7th. Last night President Herzog once more endorsed his support for such a commission. So far the government has been unwilling to sanction it.

March 12, 2025

US initiates Israel-Lebanon talks

12/03/2025

What’s happening: Representatives of Israel, Lebanon, US, and France met yesterday in Naqoura, just on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border to launch a negotiated process to resolve outstanding disputes.

The meeting was aimed to ensure the war that was effectively ended by a November 2024 ceasefire cannot restart.
The initiative is led by US Deputy Middle East Envoy Morgan Ortagus, who issued a statement yesterday from the State Department describing the talks as “military to military,” presumably to ensure that no Lebanese party can be accused of “normalisation.”
Israel Prime Minister’s Office added: “In coordination with the US and as a gesture to the new President of Lebanon, Israel has agreed to release five Lebanese detainees.”

Context: The ceasefire on the Israeli-Lebanese border has been in effect since November 2024. It was brokered by the outgoing Biden administration, and its implementation followed an intense escalation in the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel.

Fighting between the two sides erupted on October 8^th 2023, when Hezbollah began launching rockets on Israeli cities and military bases in a show of solidarity with Hamas which had carried out a massacre in southern Israel the day before.
The Israeli response intensified last summer, including Israel’s beeper operation, the destruction of most of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and an Israeli land invasion of southern Lebanon.
The terms of the ceasefire allowed Israel to carry out offensive military action against Hezbollah where the latter is violating the ceasefire or operating in southern Lebanon inside the areas where it committed to evacuating.
The IDF’s strikes against Hezbollah rocket launchers and weapons depots in the Bint Jbeil area this week, for example, were carried out within the terms of the ceasefire agreement. The March 4^th airstrike which killed a Hezbollah naval force commander close to the Israeli border was also in keeping with the terms of the ceasefire.
Last week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun spoke at the Arab Summit in Cairo, where he stressed “resistance through diplomacy,” implicitly committing to keep Lebanon inside the Arab consensus against Israel while not letting foreign actors (Iran) drag Lebanon into war with Israel.
This followed his first foreign visit as President to Saudi Arabia, where he was keen to reorient Lebanese foreign policy in general to Saudi priorities, a stark contrast to its role in recent years as the front line in Iranian and Syrian regional priorities. In a much noted speech in Riyadh, Aoun alluded to the negative influence Iranian dominance has had on the Arab world: “When one occupies Beirut, destroys Damascus, threatens Amman, makes Baghdad suffer or takes Sanaa … it is impossible for anyone to claim that this serves Palestine.” He continued, still without naming Iran, “Lebanon has suffered a lot, but it has learned from its sufferings.”
Yesterday’s meeting was the latest example (the first under President Trump) of US-mediated diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon. In 2022, the US led an effort to delineate the maritime boundaries of each country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for the purposes of natural gas extraction.

Looking Ahead: Following yesterday’s talks, three working groups will be established for ironing out differences on three principal issues: the border, prisoners, and IDF outposts in Lebanon.

Each group will comprise representatives from Lebanon, Israel, and the US.
- Borders: the UN confirmed in 2000 that Israel had completely withdrawn to the Blue Line. Despite this, there are 13 points along the border where tiny differences exist between Lebanese and Israeli claims. The goal of this working group’s negotiations is to determine an exact and agreed border in order to remove any excuse for future provocations.
- Prisoners: there are a small number of prisoners held by Israel who have Lebanese citizenship. Five of these, including one Hezbollah member, were released yesterday in what Israel termed a “goodwill gesture”.
- Outposts: When withdrawing from Lebanon earlier this year, Israel held on to five outposts in Lebanese territory in order to secure its border and monitor possible violations by Hezbollah. The working group will discuss Israel’s conditions for leaving those outposts, with the goal of reaching an agreement that can facilitate a complete withdrawal.
The trilateral working groups exclude France (although they did attend the Naqoura talks yesterday) and UNIFIL (they did host the meeting) that traditionally held of arbitration role since 2006.
A Lebanon-Israel agreement on outstanding issues of dispute would go much farther than previous ceasefires (1993, 1996, 2006) to securing the border for both sides.
A reorientation of Lebanese foreign policy in the more pragmatic Arab camp rather than the Iranian one would be a coup for US regional diplomacy.

March 10, 2025

US confirm direct talks with Hamas as Israeli negotiators return to Qatar

What’s happening: Following a Security Cabinet meeting last night, Israel has sent a negotiating team to Doha.

The delegation is being led by ‘M’ from the Shin Bet, along with Coordinator for the Captives and Missing Brig. Gen. (ret) Gal Hirsch, Dr. Ophir Falk, the prime minister’s diplomatic adviser, and other security officials.
Amid the current deadlock in talks, Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen announced that Israel was cutting off the electricity supply in a bid to force Hamas to release hostages. Cohen said, “We will use all the tools at our disposal to bring back the hostages and ensure that Hamas is no longer in Gaza the day after.”
Over the weekend Trump’s envoy for hostage affairs, Adam Boehler, gave a series of interviews to both Israel and US media, where he confirmed he had been in direct talks with Hamas, in parallel to the indirect negotiations mediated by Qatar and Egypt.
It is thought Boehler had initially focused on releasing the remaining hostages with dual US citizenship (Edan Alexander, along with the bodies of four US hostages). However, Boehler stressed that the talks were meant to lead to a wider deal for all the hostages.
Aware of Israeli concerns, Boehler confirmed he discussed it with Minister Dermer. He told CNN, “I understand the consternation and the concern. I wasn’t upset. At the same time, we’re the United States. We’re not an agent of Israel. We have specific interests at play. We did communicate back and forth. We had very specific parameters.”
Later, Boehler told Kan News, “My actions were coordinated with Israel, even though maybe there were some that said they weren’t. My job isn’t to move Israel aside, Israel is a major ally.”
Boehler also said that “some progress” had been made in the talks. He said that Hamas had proposed “a ceasefire that would last between five and ten years in which Hamas would lay down its arms and would not initiate any military action and would not take part in any political activity. I thought that this was an opening proposal that was not at all bad.”
Boehler later commented on X: “Hamas is a terrorist organization that has murdered thousands of innocent people. They are BY DEFINITION BAD people.”

Context: The revelation that the US has been in direct talks with Hamas is unprecedented and has shocked as Israeli officials, with its main interlocutor, Minister Dermer, incredulous.

Hamas was designated a terrorist organisation by the US in 1997, following its campaign of suicide bus bombings in the mid-90s aimed at disrupting the peace process.
Since 2005 the consensus approach of the international community has been to have no direct contact with Hamas until it abides by the three criteria laid out by the Tony Blair‘s led Quartet:
- Disavow violence.
- Recognise Israel’s right to exist.
- Respect previously signed agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.
Boehler’s latest interviews confirm that he was not acting along, but in full coordination with Witkoff and the White House.
Writing in Yediot Ahronot, Itamar Eichner suggests, “It seems that neither Dermer nor Netanyahu understood whom they are dealing with. Trump has a plan, and that is to win a Nobel Prize. In another month and a half, he plans to visit Saudi Arabia, and he needs to resolve the hostage issue by that point. The Nobel Prize is so important to the American president that if he reaches the conclusion that Netanyahu is an obstacle, he will do a Zelensky on him. Trump isn’t there yet, for now.”
With the Israeli delegation returning to Doha, it is not clear which deal they are negotiating.
- The Boehler plan is focused on the release of ten living hostages, (almost half of all the living hostages) in exchange for a 60-day ceasefire and the renewed flow of humanitarian aid.
- Similarly, the Witkoff plan calls for the ceasefire to be extended for the duration of Ramadan and Passover. Half of the hostages (living and dead) are to be released on the first day of the agreement. The other half are to be released as a single group on the last day.
- Israel has consented to the Witkoff plan but it also open to an extension of the first stage along similar formulation as before.
- Or the original plan of stage two, which would include Hamas demilitarising and leaving Gaza (an Israeli demand), a comprehensive hostage-prisoner exchange, as well as a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the reopening of border crossings, and a permanent ceasefire (a Hamas demand).
One of the ideas that came up in Boehler’s interview was the concept of a “Hudna” that would last between five and ten years in exchange for the release of all the prisoners. This sparked grave concern for Israelis that understand Hamas’s meaning of this term as a temporary refrain until they are strong enough to carry out their next attack.
Even without a Hudna, the IDF has detected signs that Hamas is already preparing for a resumption of fighting, placing explosives and planning ambushes.
Whilst negotiations fail to produce a breakthrough, Hamas is essentially getting a ceasefire with no cost, hence the Israeli decision to stop the aid and electricity as a means to pressure Hamas into releasing more hostages. Israeli officials are also threatening to disconnect the water pipes into Gaza.
According to the latest assessment, Hamas is still holding 59 hostages, 24 of whom are believed to be alive and at least 35 of whom have been killed, for 521 days.

Looking ahead: Witkoff, the president’s envoy, is expected to arrive in Doha tomorrow and join the negotiations.

If there is no progress Israel will consider placing further restrictions on Gaza in an effort to assert more pressure on Hamas.
The political leadership has instructed the IDF to prepare for a resumption of fighting. However the prevailing assessment is that Israel will give the mediators more time to reach an agreement.

March 6, 2025

Trump’s warning to Hamas

What’s happened: President Trump hosted released Israeli hostages in the Oval Office yesterday.

One of the hostages at the meeting was Eli Sharabi, whose hour-long interview on Israeli TV last week shocked the Israeli public with his descriptions of Hamas brutality. Trump posed for a picture with Sharabi, still thin and emaciated more than a month after his release, while holding a cartoon explicitly comparing the released Israeli hostages to concentration camp survivors.
After the meeting with the released Israeli hostages, President Trump took to his social media platform to issue a stark warning to Hamas. “Release all of the Hostages now, not later, and immediately return all of the dead bodies of the people you murdered, or it is OVER for you,” he wrote. “This is your last warning! For the leadership, now is the time to leave Gaza, while you still have a chance.”
Secretary of State Rubio added hours later in an interview on Fox News that Trump had lost his patience with Hamas, and was particularly incensed by the hostage release “ceremonies” and the mix-up with the body of murdered hostage Shiri Bibas.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gidon Saar and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy spoke by telephone yesterday about the situation in Gaza. The UK objects to Israel’s suspension of aid deliveries to Gaza, and it issued a joint statement with France and Germany to that effect.
Saar reiterated Israel’s acceptance of the proposal by American special envoy Steve Witkoff to extend the first phase of the ceasefire through the Ramadan and Passover holidays in exchange for more hostage releases. In a tweet after the call, Saar added that “during the 42-day phase one, 25,000 aid trucks entered Gaza – half of Hamas’ budget in Gaza comes from these trucks! Hamas is restoring its military capabilities and recruiting new, young terrorists. This cannot continue!”
Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office had declared that that if Hamas were to change its mind, Israel would immediately commence negotiations about all the details.

Context: The first phase of the ceasefire agreement, scheduled to last 42 days, has come to an end. The deadline for a negotiated agreement for the second phase has come and passed. The status of the ceasefire is, as of now, indeterminate.

Several Arab states have endorsed the Egyptian’s plan as a “counterproposal” to President Trump’s plan for Gaza.
The most important part of the plan is the $53 billion Egyptian proposal to rebuild Gaza without moving its inhabitants out of the Strip. This is in contrast to Trump’s idea to resettle Gaza’s population elsewhere.
The Arab plan calls for Gaza to be governed temporarily by a committee of technocrats not affiliated with Hamas, and for it eventually to be merged with the Palestinian Authority.
Israel primarily objects to the plans ambiguity on Hamas disarmament. The Arab plan calls for Hamas to be left out of governance, but doesn’t fully rule out that Hamas could keep its weapons and still influence Gaza politics in a manner reminiscent of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the last 25 years. Israel insists on a full decommissioning of Hamas weapons.
Israeli officials have cautiously supported Trump’s plan but emphasised any resettlement must be voluntary.
The Arab plan doesn’t demand immediate Palestinian statehood, but it does insist on some kind of long-term plan for a single Palestinian state encompassing the West Bank and Gaza.
While the Trump administration has repeatedly signalled that it is open to compromises on the President’s Gaza plan, it criticised the Arab plan’s insistence on keeping all Gazans inside the Strip even during reconstruction as unrealistic, saying the Arab plan “does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable.”
The Egyptian reconstruction plan would depend in funding from the wealthy Gulf monarchies, but notably only two, Bahrain and Qatar, sent heads of state to the Cairo Summit this week where the plan was unveiled.
Writing about both the American and Israeli rejection of the Arab plan, Haaretz’s Amir Tibon notes that “the administration keeps saying it is committed to bringing back all of the hostages and removing Hamas from power. Renewing the war could perhaps achieve the second goal, but at the price of giving up on the first one.”
It has also emerged that the Trump administration has been holding direct talks with Hamas over the release of US hostages held in Gaza. Of the remaining hostages, five have US citizenship, including 21 year old Edan Alexander, who is believed to be alive.
There remains 59 hostages held by Hamas for 517 days. Israel has confirmation that 35 of them are dead, with the hope that the remaining 24 are alive.

Looking Ahead: Despite the current absence of negotiations it is thought that Israel will wait at least another week before relaunching a military assault on Hamas.

All the sides are waiting for Witkoff. His visit has been delayed due to a stalemate in negotiations.
An Israeli official told Maariv newspaper, “Witkoff won’t be coming here as long as there isn’t any progress in the negotiations. He will only come to close a deal. For the time being, that isn’t the situation. There isn’t any progress and, for now, Hamas hasn’t budged from its position. Israel is prepared to give that effort a few days, and it has means for exerting pressure on Hamas before a resumption of war.”

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