In this episode, Richard Pater speaks with Edmund Fitton-Brown about Israel’s recent strikes on the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas leaders in Doha. They discuss the effectiveness of Israel’s operations, the role of Iran, and the reaction across the Gulf. Edmund also assesses the UK’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state at the UN, its implications for counter-terrorism, and the wider diplomatic fallout.
Edmund Fitton-Brown is a veteran British diplomat who served at numerous postings in the Middle East culminating as the UK’s Ambassador to Yemen from 2015 to 2017 and later coordinated UN expert panels on counterterrorism. He is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
Transcript
(This transcript has been automatically generated by AI — please excuse any potential errors.)
00:00:00:00 – 00:00:23:02
Hello and welcome to the BICOM’s podcast. I’m Richard Pater, the Director of BICOM. And today is the 11th of September. We are witnessing here in the region another crazy chaotic couple of weeks. And this episode will try to make sense of recent developments. I’m delighted that I’m joined by Edmund Fitton-Brown to help explain and understand some of these latest developments.
00:00:23:05 – 00:00:48:17
Edmund, thank you very much indeed for joining me. Thanks, Richard. Good to be here. So for background, Edmund is a veteran senior British diplomat with a great deal of experience in the region, serving in a range of countries including Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and culminating as the UK’s ambassador to Yemen from 2015 to 17. He was then working specifically on counter-terrorism issues within the UN.
00:00:48:18 – 00:01:09:17
So he’s incredibly well-placed to comment on these regional developments as well as the as the dynamics coming up in the UN. And I should add, he is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, based in Washington, DC. So, Edward, if we can start and move on to your your your last posting in the region and your patch in Yemen.
00:01:09:19 – 00:01:41:21
What did you make of the Israeli strikes targeting the leadership there? And what does that mean for the for the future of the of the who’s your leadership? Well, it was a obviously an audacious and very ambitious strike that the Israelis, carried out. And I suppose we shouldn’t have been surprised because the, the sort of flash to bang that you see with Israeli intelligence and kinetic action, was very much on display in previous, engagements in the Middle East region over the last two years.
00:01:41:23 – 00:02:03:23
But, you know, we should remember that Yemen and the houses were not a preoccupation for Israel until recently. They would have been, you know, number ten or number 20 on, on a on a very, very long, intelligence, target list, you know, for Israel feeling that it, for existential purposes needed to know about groups.
00:02:03:24 – 00:02:32:07
And then the Houthis, of course, stepped up as an adversary of Israel. From about, well, from nearly two years ago. And, the speed at which the Israelis, pivoted their intelligence focus and were able to learn about what the Houthi leadership was doing, who they were, where they were, and to deploy military forces is a staggering thing.
00:02:32:10 – 00:02:53:02
So I think we shouldn’t forget that this is, a remarkable achievement. On one level. Now, the important thing to say, though, about the Houthis is that they’re not a particularly easy target. And this is one of the reasons that they frustrated the Americans and the British and the Saudis and others. It’s because they first of all, they have very high pain threshold.
00:02:53:04 – 00:03:27:02
And so they don’t mind taking casualties. And secondly, because their targets tend to be fairly dispersed and in many cases, you know, one of the most frustrating aspects of the, of the, last year of the Biden administration, was that sort of attempt to play whac-a-mole with the Houthis in the Red sea, which, you know, deployed a lot of expensive hardware but didn’t, achieve a great deal in terms of either deterrence or or even, you know, real sort of strategic degradation of Houthi capabilities.
00:03:27:04 – 00:03:51:22
So, I would say that the Trump administration, was more effective in, during the, campaign that they waged from late March to early May this year. That’s partly because they had more relaxed rules of engagement. And they really went after the Houthis, in places where the Houthis, found it more painful, more difficult to sustain that damage.
00:03:51:24 – 00:04:12:19
And certainly the Houthis were seeking to say that the ceasefire that, that, kicked in at the beginning of May, and that would also have been to do with the fact the, the Iranians also would have been worried about, the, implications if the Americans chose to hold Iran responsible for what the Houthis were doing as well.
00:04:12:21 – 00:04:46:23
I think that the Israelis have taken it to another level with this, this decapitation strike. Now. I say decapitation, we have to, qualify that comment. One of the problems with terms like, quote, prime minister, unquote, who is the most if you like, the figure who was eliminated, whom people referred to the most, is that in Western terms, prime minister usually means the most important political figure in the country, in the Houthi de-facto administration in Sanaa.
00:04:47:00 – 00:05:11:15
That was not true by a very long shot. That man was not a particularly significant figure. But even so, you know, this was this was the killing of a very, very large number of senior Houthi and also, the allied, Congress party, figures, who were in senior positions in the de facto government. And the Houthis were in shock afterwards.
00:05:11:15 – 00:05:38:19
That was quite clear. It took them a long time to know what to say in response. Now that I think has had an effect, it hasn’t stopped the Houthis because their whole mantra is that they, you know, that they will just carry on regardless, no matter what pain is inflicted on them. But I think we could see from the fact that they were unable to issue a coherent statement for a long time after the attack, that the attack really hurt them.
00:05:38:21 – 00:06:23:13
And there were very significant figures who were killed, but their, their ostensible roles may have looked as if they were less important than, for example, the de facto prime minister who people talked about. The last thing I will say on this, though, is that it’s going to be difficult to defeat the Houthis from a sort of stand off position, because they probably will be able to, effectively grow new heads, and, and carry on as they were, unless Israel was a target, the supreme leader of the Houthis, the, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the guide, the successor of the founder of the Houthi movement, who has been running the movement for the last
00:06:23:13 – 00:07:01:06
20 years. And so my first thought when the, attack happened was, had they targeted Abdulmalik, and if so, had they targeted him successfully? And clearly he was not the target. He was not, he was not affected directly by the strike. And the reason I mention this is because after 20 years in charge, he has a level of authority and charisma and also strategic and tactical skill that is arguably analogous to Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah.
00:07:01:08 – 00:07:30:22
And so anyone below that level is going to be replaced relatively easily, but somebody of that stature, would not be easy to replace. And it’s not certain whether the person that was chosen to replace, abdulmalik would be of similar caliber would be of similar capability, would have the determination, the vision to do what Abdulmalik has done.
00:07:31:02 – 00:07:52:04
So I was looking for that. And of course, that, if it is on the Israeli radar screen, that has not yet happened. And I’m just, just checking that there actually reports I mean, we’re talking about the strikes of a couple of weeks ago, but there were further reports of strikes this morning. I don’t know if you’ve had a chance to, to to see what they were up to posting about.
00:07:52:04 – 00:08:15:06
I mean, this is I would stress that at the time of recording, the information doesn’t appear available, but I just to three or sources, whether you have any any insights on that. Well I’ve seen 1 or 2 tentative reports, and these do seem to me to be more in the nature of previous Israeli strikes on the Houthis, you know, against, against sort of, infrastructure type targets.
00:08:15:08 – 00:08:53:16
So I, you know, I think, I think that attack in which they eliminated that, you know, significant portion of the Houthi in Congress party leadership, stands on its own as a remain or moment and one that shook that Houthis. I don’t think that anything that’s happened since is in that league. Having said that, I mean, what I’ve seen I’ve experienced it firsthand in Israel over the last week or two that, that, missile attacks and, and, and drones continue to be fired at Israel kind of clearly, clearly, they may be they may be hurting, but they’re not completely deterred.
00:08:53:16 – 00:09:12:22
And they they maintain command and control capacity, etc.. What kind of apart from the targeting of the, of the leader, which again, we’ll talk about in the Qatari context later on. But apart from supporting the Supreme leader, what are the other levers that Israel could go for that can kind of bring about, kind of decisive victory?
00:09:12:24 – 00:09:33:11
Yeah. Your caution is absolutely right. So the Houthis are not deterred and they still have capability. And you will have seen, of course, a number of incidents recently of the interception of resupply to the Houthis. So we’re in a world where and, you know, let’s not forget let’s let’s state explicitly that Iran is a big part of this equation.
00:09:33:13 – 00:10:00:20
It doesn’t exactly control the Houthis. You can’t call the Houthis an arm of the Iranian state, but they are, and enthusiastic ally of the Iranians. They have been heavily trained and supplied by the Iranians. They have obligations to the Iranians. They are, religiously and politically loyal to the Iranians. And so, Iran is is hugely important to this.
00:10:00:22 – 00:10:30:13
And so, in my view, there are really only two lasting solutions to the Houthi problem. Now, I will say that these these potential solutions are ultimately not really, within Israel’s, gift, Israel. Israel, you know, has great capabilities, but, you know, to, to make decisive strategic engagement. So in remote Arab countries, that’s a big ask.
00:10:30:15 – 00:11:02:11
So, Israel will continue to retaliate against the Houthi, attacks as it should, as it must. I mean, you know, if you’re the Israeli government and, you’re being attacked, well, you could ignore it if everything is being shot down. But if some of it’s getting through, even if it’s having only minor impact, then you are going to have to retaliate regularly to show to your people that you will not tolerate people attacking them and that there will be consequences.
00:11:02:17 – 00:11:25:12
And for that reason, Israel is right to do what it’s doing. It was right to raise its game and make that major, attack on the Houthi and Congress leadership, and it will be right to continue to do so. And again, going back to what I said about the dynamism of Israel, I would expect Israel to, mount attacks of increasing, quality and incisiveness.
00:11:25:12 – 00:11:50:21
And the Houthis will worry about that because they have seen that the Israelis raise their game very quickly, and that the Israelis are entirely uninhibited by the sort of considerations that inhibited the the Biden, and, British response initially in the Red sea. But coming back to your your core question here, what are the things that would actually reestablish deterrence or would actually lead to the strategic defeat of the Houthis?
00:11:50:23 – 00:12:19:14
And there are two one of them, of course, is literally to do what Donald Trump, threatened to do, which was to hold Iran accountable for what the Who these do. So, in other words, if the Iranians think that there is an existential threat to the Islamic Republic from the Americans here, and I won’t say from the Americans, because I don’t think it is reasonable to expect Israel to resume what was a an extraordinarily successful campaign in Iran.
00:12:19:14 – 00:12:50:18
But still, you know, it was high risk. And, it will be high risk again if they’re drawn back into it. So to do that, because of these pinpricks from Yemen would be, a would be maybe a disproportionate, risk to take. But the Americans can do it. And if the Americans, make it clear to the Iranians, to the point where the Iranians believe it, that there is an existential threat to their regime from, allowing the Houthis to continue on this current path and continue to resupply the Houthis.
00:12:50:20 – 00:13:19:00
That could make a difference. That could they who things won’t necessarily obey Iranian instructions, but they’re bound to take Iranian, wishes seriously. And then the second, which is a more complicated but in my view, arguably, a better approach under international law. You know, we had the perfect solution to the Houthi problem, and we gave it up.
00:13:19:02 – 00:14:08:01
The West had that solution and was pursuing it when it backed the Saudi Emirati campaign to support the government of Yemen. And let’s not forget, the Houthis are illegal to, authority in parts of. Yeah, but not all of Yemen. And there is an internationally recognized government of Yemen in Aden in the south. And nothing in that respect has changed since 2014, 2015, when I became ambassador, when the international community was absolutely clear that what the Houthis had done was illegal and must not stand, and what the Saudis were doing to back the internationally recognized government was both legal and internationally supported.
00:14:08:03 – 00:14:34:21
And somehow we lost focus on that. And this is a most extraordinary story, which I could tell at much more length. Perhaps in another podcast. But, the fact is that with people’s, you know, there’s a sort of a Western squeamishness about Saudi Arabia, which I think was a big part of this. And there’s also a sort of soft underbelly in the West that is that is a sucker for any kind of resistance narrative.
00:14:34:21 – 00:14:57:22
And they looked at the houses and said, oh, you know, plucky little houses, fighting the evil, mighty Saudis. And and they got this thing completely the wrong one, wrong way round. They instead of seeing the, internationally recognized government as the injured party and the Houthis as the aggressors, they started to see the Saudis as the aggressors and the Houthis as the injured party.
00:14:57:24 – 00:15:23:10
And this, extended to, a lot of the, nongovernmental organizations and pressure groups in the West. And to some degree it extended to, large parts of the United Nations as well. And I even saw it in some of the, European officials who were posted to Yemen, but who, you know, had an ambivalence about, about understanding who was the aggressor in this conflict.
00:15:23:12 – 00:15:55:03
And so you had people like Oxfam and, amnesty and a whole range of these kind of people, just, constantly lobbying against the Saudis and against the British relationship with the Saudis, the American relationship with the Saudis. Until, the Saudis, you know, started to lose the will to fight any longer because they felt that they were losing so much in terms of international public opinion that they just couldn’t, continue.
00:15:55:07 – 00:16:17:17
So they started to effectively sue for peace. The peace talks that I was involved in, in Kuwait in 2016. Then there was a change that was caused by the, election of the first Trump administration, where the Saudis started to feel that they reliably had the backing of the Americans, and that gave them a new lease of life.
00:16:17:19 – 00:16:42:13
And at that point, there was no doubt that the internationally recognized government of Yemen and its Saudi and Emirati and its other Arab allies was making progress in pushing the the Houthis back inside Yemen. It was painstaking, it was slow progress, but it was happening. And they were at the gates of Hodeidah. And of course, the data was was not so much spoken of in in sort of, you know, the mass media in the West in those days as it is now.
00:16:42:15 – 00:17:10:03
But they were at the gates of Hodeidah, and then fatefully, of course, the, killing of Jamal for Shoji happened in late in late 2018. And that cut away the Trump administration’s support for the Saudis and the Saudis suddenly felt very isolated internationally. And that put them back into this. Okay, we’ve got to get out of this Yemen conflict because it’s it’s contributing to the destruction of our international reputation.
00:17:10:05 – 00:17:46:15
And they, were strong armed into signing up to the, Stockholm Agreement, in December 2018, which, said that the, that the, internationally recognized government of Yemen and its allies would no longer seek to take Hodeidah port. And in theory, had the port would, come under UN supervision as a pipeline for humanitarian supply to the Houthi controlled interior in northern Yemen, where the majority of the population lives and the majority, perhaps, of the humanitarian crisis, resided.
00:17:46:17 – 00:18:19:13
And this, in my view, although at the time it was widely celebrated and the United Nations, was very pleased with it. In my view, this was an absolutely unconscionable betrayal of the government of Yemen, which was simply trying to retake the territory that it legally possesses. And instead of having a, an approach that says, you know, this entire humanitarian crisis and this entire political and security crisis has been created by the Houthis, and the best way to defeat it is to defeat the Houthis.
00:18:19:15 – 00:18:47:03
The international community lost its moral bearings and lost its nerve. And we then entered this phase that we’ve been in now for the last, 6 to 7 years. Where, the whole policy, international policy in Yemen has been entirely terminated, determined by the humanitarian community and the NGO community and what they claim is necessary in terms of getting, humanitarian supplies into Yemen.
00:18:47:05 – 00:19:15:05
And, so coming to, you know, to very long answer and my apologies for that. But, my point is that it falls to the United States as the leader of the Western world and as a country that has already acknowledged and addressed the illegal behavior of the Houthis and the chronic destabilizing effect that the Houthis are having now, not just on Yemen, but on the region and on global shipping.
00:19:15:07 – 00:19:39:03
It falls to the United States to reconstruct that alliance and provide the internationally recognized government of Yemen and its forces and allied forces, with the wherewithal to defeat the Houthis on the ground and especially to drive them away from the Red sea coast. Thank you. Thank you for that. And I it was actually you got there without my prompting.
00:19:39:03 – 00:20:08:14
But I wanted to draw on your experience to talk about that, the duality of the governance, as you said. Thank you. Thank you very much for that. I wonder if we could just pivot now in kind of again, as I mentioned in the opening, so much going on in this week, the other kind of audacious Israeli strike was on the UN on Doha, where the, Hamas external leadership were, were kind of being held out in, in luxury as opposed to kind of in complete contradiction to the rest of the the Palestinian population in, in Gaza.
00:20:08:20 – 00:20:41:08
I wonder just if your your comments on that strike and also perhaps kind of knowing you’re involved in the kind of the regional security architecture, how much involvement there must have been presumably by Centcom as well, that they would have they would they would have had to have been aware of of such an Israeli action. Yeah. I mean, this is obviously a very different, case from the Houthi case in Yemen and actually is very different case from the Iran, the Iranian case or from the Hezbollah case in Lebanon.
00:20:41:10 – 00:21:09:23
So Israel, I think, has done something here that is, it’s a new development, qualitatively new development, and attacking Hamas in Doha. And that is that contains a good deal of complexity that we need to unpack. And of course, it is being unpacked, by, commentators newspapers, and indeed by, policymakers around the world.
00:21:10:00 – 00:21:42:05
And it isn’t entirely clear, where this is leading. But there are a number of principles that I want to, mention concerning this. One of them is that there is a history to Qatar’s involvement with various extremist groups, including the Taliban, of course, in Afghanistan and Hezbollah, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Kashmiris who have managed to, to position themselves as mediators.
00:21:42:07 – 00:22:12:23
And of course, that is something that has often been cited in response to criticism of Kantar for its, hosting of Hamas and its involvement with other extremist groups. So we have to bear that in mind, because the United States has used Qatar in that capacity, and the United States remains the single most important country in international affairs, and it also remains the indispensable ally of Israel.
00:22:13:00 – 00:22:40:22
So this is not something that can be ignored on the other hand, there is, a duplicity, and an insincere insincerity to the Doha role in all of these negotiations that has troubled me for a long time and troubles many people and clearly has troubled the, Israel and various friends of Israel. Big time. Yeah, exactly.
00:22:40:24 – 00:23:23:01
So let’s let’s unpack a few of these. One of them is that it’s one thing to be, a mediator with Hamas, but that could be done in a discreet way. It doesn’t have to involve Hamas living in ostentatious, high profile luxury in Doha. It doesn’t have to involve Hamas conducting effectively media operations from Doha. It doesn’t have to involve, Hamas meeting with Iranian officials and celebrating the worst massacre of modern times.
00:23:23:03 – 00:23:58:04
After the 7th of October 2023, on television in Doha, it doesn’t have to involve, Hamas, visibly celebrating attacks in Jerusalem, as they were doing, after the, after the, Monday attack, in Jerusalem. And so what I’ve, what I my conclusion from this is that Hamas is courting the reputation of a state sponsor of terrorism.
00:23:58:06 – 00:24:23:13
And by the way, sorry, before I continue this thought, I want to add also the role of, Al Jazeera as a, an arm of Hamas propaganda. And, you know, Al Jazeera has achieved a completely undeserved reputation for being a serious media channel. But it is, of course, working, on the soil of a Gulf autocracy.
00:24:23:19 – 00:24:50:23
It doesn’t have journalistic freedom. And it will never criticize Qatar. It will never criticize any of, Qatar’s key interests. And of course, Al Jazeera journalists have been, you know, either moonlighting as Hamas terrorists or in some cases, Hamas terrorists have been moonlighting as Al Jazeera journalists on the ground in, Gaza over the past, year and a half.
00:24:50:23 – 00:25:15:16
You know, not all of them, but there have been enough instances of this for it to be, for for Qatar to be, part of this conflict and to be absolutely party pre anything but an honest broker, anything but a neutral mediator. So Qatar is courting the reputation of a state sponsor of terrorism, and they’re up to now.
00:25:15:17 – 00:25:36:11
They felt that they’ve been clever enough to get away with that because they’ve made themselves useful to the international community, and they’ve made themselves useful to the United States of America. But if you caught that reputation, then you risk taking on the jeopardy of a state sponsor of terrorism. So clearly, what Israel was seeking to do, I think, was twofold.
00:25:36:11 – 00:26:10:07
One was it was an attempt to decapitate the Hamas leadership. Now, I don’t know how successful that was. And that does matter because, it also matters reputationally in Washington, because the way that the Americans view the Doha operation will partly depend upon whether the Doha operation seems to have been a brilliant success, in the nature of the, of the attack on the Houthis, or whether it looks as if it was, you know, based on incomplete intelligence or for other reasons, was unsuccessful.
00:26:10:09 – 00:26:37:24
So that’s it that that that is, important. You can’t, ignore that. The other point, of course, is that, it’s it’s important. It’s vital of what the American knowledge of this was. And, you know, that was part of your question. You know what what was the American knowledge of this? Well, we know for with absolute certainty that the Americans were informed of it in advance.
00:26:37:24 – 00:27:12:18
It’s not there’s a question about that, because not least because the categories have complained that by the time the Americans got around to, informing them of what was happening, it was already happening. And so I think we can assume that, that the Americans knew in advance they had to know in France also, because if you’re conducting a military operation in proximity to, one of the most important American military bases, and obviously there are, as you said, there are Centcom dimensions to that.
00:27:12:20 – 00:27:35:14
And, and, you know, military deconfliction dimensions to that this if you just ask it to add about the, the British role, whether you think that they were also cited on this, I would be very surprised if the British were cited. I think, I mean, the level of trust that exists between Israel and America is higher than that that exists between Israel and the United Kingdom.
00:27:35:16 – 00:28:09:18
The United Kingdom has been historically a good ally of Israel. But, you know, it’s been pretty wobbly recently, and we’ve had we’ve got the that would probably come to the issue of Palestine recognition later in this discussion. And the other point is that the UK is so much the junior partner, with the Americans, wherever there is co basing or UK presence in you and US bases and there’s no question that anything could happen, initiated by the UK, that would not be, entirely, under the control of the Americans.
00:28:09:20 – 00:28:53:03
So even for operational necessity, you just wouldn’t need to tell the British. What? Why would you? And all of this, in the end, comes back to the extent to which Israel was confident that it had a green light from the United States, and I guess it had a green light, at least in the sense that the United States clearly did not mount, forceful objections to what Israel was proposing to do, where I do see a bit of complexity and a bit of difficulty here, is that you should not underestimate the fact that the United States has crucial alliances in the Arabian Peninsula and crucial equities in the Arabian Peninsula.
00:28:53:05 – 00:29:28:23
And that includes, of course, personal equities that the president feels that he has in the Arabian Peninsula. So that means that the if you look at President Trump’s statements after the Israeli attack, you know, they they’re a little uncomfortable there that there is sort of an attempt to express, both understanding of why Israel did what it did and also, an enduring commitment, to, you know, our Kashmiri friends, as, as the Americans, put it.
00:29:29:00 – 00:29:56:02
So that is something Israel should take seriously. You know, how absolutely certain is Israel that this particular escalation was, well judged? And, the other side of this that needs to be mentioned, of course, is the Abraham Accords. And, this sort of signature achievement of the first Trump administration, this major step forward in, in Israel’s international and regional security.
00:29:56:04 – 00:30:17:20
So then you must take seriously how the United Arab Emirates reacts to this. And also, even though it’s not a member of the Abraham Accords, of course, there is a there’s a long standing aspiration for Saudi Arabia to become part of the Abraham Accords. Now, I’ve lived, as you mentioned earlier, for many, many years in the Arabian Peninsula.
00:30:17:20 – 00:30:57:19
I’m very familiar with GCC, Gulf, Gulf Cooperation, Council dynamics. They are complicated. The Kashmiris have been, naughty children in the GCC for a very long time. They have really angered the Saudis at many points. The Emirati is frankly loathe them. They absolutely hate the categories. They find them objectionable both on a personal basis because they are stakeouts at strident, discordant positions, which the Emiratis consider to be inconsistent with the, you know, with the sort of loyalty to Saudi Arabia and loyalty to the GCC.
00:30:57:21 – 00:31:20:13
But, but also they’re, very much, supporters of, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Muslim Brotherhood. And Hamas are regarded by the United Arab Emirates as mortal enemies. You know, we’re not talking about a distaste here. We’re talking about these people being regarded by the UAE leadership as, their most dangerous political enemies.
00:31:20:15 – 00:31:53:10
So there is real bad blood between the UAE and the, categories. And I’m sure that was a calculation that was in Israel’s minds, at the time of the strike in Doha. That said, the UAE is part of the GCC, and, the UAE has reacted very sharply to this attack and is not comfortable with it. And, you know, there is that any GCC country will look at this and say, well, is there a precedent here that I should worry about?
00:31:53:12 – 00:32:31:09
And of course, the Saudis have reacted very sharply as well. And ultimately, the Saudis are the leaders of the GCC, and they are the single most important, power in a region in which Israel has very, very strong strategic interests. So these are sort of warning signs to watch. You can make the argument I’m sure Israeli analysts will make the argument that the GCC has, if you like, face saving obligations for what it has to say and that all that it’s done so far really is to, fulfill those face saving obligations.
00:32:31:11 – 00:32:59:12
And that may be below the surface. The, Emiratis are saying, well, the Kashmiris really have this coming and we don’t care. And maybe below the surface, the Saudis are also saying, you know, this is this is this is tricky to handle. But, you know, we actually understand why it was necessary. I don’t know that I don’t I haven’t spoken to the kind of people who would have that level of leadership insight in Riyadh or in Abu Dhabi.
00:32:59:14 – 00:33:19:01
But presumably realpolitik. They may take a similar approach. You mentioned with the Americans that, that if it was done properly and it achieved its goals, that would be one thing. But if it’s, if we’re left in this status yet to be determined of, of, of its success, then that puts in a different complexion. Yes. Unfortunately, this is often the way in the Middle East.
00:33:19:06 – 00:33:43:04
A lot depends not on principle, but on outcome and success. And if you remember, you know, when the Israelis had a very difficult, earlier conflict with, Hezbollah in Lebanon, because it because it went badly, and because it dragged on, there was an initial burst of enthusiasm amongst the Gulf countries. And this is long before the Abraham Accords.
00:33:43:06 – 00:34:06:05
But because the leadership hates Hezbollah, hates the Iranian influence in the region. And, you know, there was already quite good, covert security cooperation that existed at that time, between Israel and Saudi Arabia, between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. And I remember vividly because, of course, I was deeply involved in, Arab affairs at that time.
00:34:06:07 – 00:34:32:19
I remember vividly that that initial enthusiasm, tacit support for Israel gradually crumbled because Israel was unsuccessful and popular anger across the Middle East had time to gather and to start to make those, friend the Gulf regimes feel threatened by the, by the public reaction to what Israel was doing. And so that’s that’s the worry here.
00:34:32:22 – 00:35:18:23
But the very last thing I will say on this is, all of these things that I’m saying are political and tactical and strategic considerations. So I’m sure Israel has thought of them. Doesn’t mean to say Israel is necessarily calculated them correctly, but without a doubt, Israel has talked these through in detail. If we’re talking on an ethical or moral level, it may be that what Israel has done has successfully changed the game in terms of saying to the countries and anyone else who’s like minded with the countries, that after the 7th of October 2023, this kind of high price profile of hosting of terrorists with blood on their hands all the way
00:35:18:23 – 00:36:02:09
up to their shoulders is not acceptable. And if you carry on doing it, you may face these kind of unexpected or previously unexpected kinetic consequences. So I’m not going to take issue with Israel morally or ethically on this. I do worry, whether the, whether the tactical political calculations will turn out to have been sound. Thanks. I want to pivot to, to another topic, if I may, and again, drawing on your experience of your time in the UN, we’re expecting kind of a diplomatic crescendo to be reached in the next week or two, when countries presumably are going to use the opportunity of the UN General Assembly to declare their support for a
00:36:02:09 – 00:36:28:01
Palestinian state, unilateral recognition. I wonder if you could just give us your thoughts on the, on the principle. And then, as is a second question, bearing in mind your expertise in counter-terrorism, a lot of the concerns for Israel is that the, the although the practical implication of such statements change nothing on the ground, it creates a disparity of, of expectation on the ground that could lead to fuel and further terrorism.
00:36:28:01 – 00:36:54:12
And I wondered if both your thoughts on the principle and also if that theory, chimes with your assessment. Yes. So first of all, on the question of is this the right thing to do? Absolutely not. It’s a dreadful, dreadful decision by the British government is a dreadful decision by the French government. And, you know, the Australians, the Canadians and all the other people who are piling on in this particular, wave of folly.
00:36:54:14 – 00:37:11:13
I had already looked at this move earlier, you know, I was it earlier this year or late last year, I can’t remember. And I think it was earlier this year that Spain and Ireland and Norway went down this track. And I was very dismissive of what they were doing. But I also said, you know, these are countries that are not serious.
00:37:11:13 – 00:37:40:18
They they basically courting public popularity in their electorates, but nobody actually cares what Spain or Norway or Ireland do. And so it was a sort of, you know, it was one of those just disappointing but ultimately unimportant, developments for two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to go down this track in company with to, core, Five Eyes intelligence allies.
00:37:40:20 – 00:38:19:13
This is really, really troubling to me. It’s absolutely in the face of us, policy and us objections which have been expressed very clearly by, Marco Rubio and others. And, it feels to me as if it is, the beginning of a, fracture in, the, unity of purpose of, you know, NATO, the Five Eyes, the, the Western Bloc and on the Security Council, all of which, to my mind, is highly problematic.
00:38:19:15 – 00:38:50:06
And, as I said, that might be worth still considering doing if you thought that you were doing the right thing. But this is not the right thing for any reason. It’s, first of all, what is Palestine? You’re not recognizing anything within, known or established borders. The most serious addressing of the potential two state solution in Israel and Palestine, took place, you know, 25 years ago.
00:38:50:08 – 00:39:12:17
And at that time, there were developed discussions about what would be the borders if you had a two state solution. And that stuff is all still, up in the ether and up for negotiation in, in some future situation, potentially, if indeed that two state solution is still alive. So, what are you recognizing?
00:39:12:17 – 00:39:34:19
You’re recognizing a state that doesn’t have recognize borders. You’re recognizing, an entity that is politically, hopelessly divided because you’ve got Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and you’ve got Gaza, which apart from being in a state of war, is it as much as it’s been under any kind of control? It’s under the control of Hamas.
00:39:34:21 – 00:40:06:22
Hamas, by the way, which of course, absolutely rejects the right of the state of Israel to exist. So, again, what what are you recognizing geographically? What are you recognizing politically? And, out. And then the final thing that compounds the folly of this, of this move, is that, it is done at a time when Hamas is holding hostages and the Americans are actively engaged in the process to try to secure a ceasefire and the release of those hostages.
00:40:06:24 – 00:40:27:11
And it has been publicized. Now, there’s been feeble efforts by the British government to correct this impression. But it was absolutely clear when this was announced that the conditions that were being imposed, for this to go ahead or not to go ahead were entirely fell entirely upon Israel. It was about whether Israel would agree to a ceasefire.
00:40:27:11 – 00:40:52:13
It was not whether Hamas would release hostages. And so it it is a it is a policy which has been which has been handed to Hamas as an incentive not to release the hostages so as to perpetuate the conditions that will cause this recognition to go ahead. And of course, Hamas wants the recognition to go ahead because they recognize that it is, it is it weakens international consensus against them.
00:40:52:15 – 00:41:13:13
And it is undesirable to Israel and the United States. So this is, probably the single worst piece of policymaking in the Middle East that, in my, in my experience as a British diplomat. And and yet they it looks to me as if they’re going to go ahead with it. It looks I have not seen anything up to now.
00:41:13:15 – 00:41:43:10
That suggests that this will change. I did wonder vaguely about the change in British Foreign Secretary. I think David Lammy was a catastrophically bad British foreign secretary. I think that Cooper will be a better foreign secretary. But, ultimately, you know, this is Keir Starmer’s considered decision, and it’s a bad one. So, going to New York, and to the General Assembly, you know, this has been lined up, obviously, as something that was going to be done during the General Assembly.
00:41:43:12 – 00:42:06:11
And I suppose that the sort of the clowns who were, advocating this policy probably had some idea of, you know, cocktail parties with Mahmoud Abbas, and press opportunities with the Palestinian delegation and all of that sort of stuff. But of course, the Americans have spiked that because they’ve, refused to allow the Palestinians to attend the General Assembly.
00:42:06:13 – 00:42:38:12
And, you know, no doubt that’s partly one of the, one of the unlooked for achievements of this policy, to, for the to provoke the Americans to, to use their prerogative to prevent the Palestinians from traveling. You know, nevertheless, I suspect it, you know, the intention is certainly that it’s going to go ahead anyway. Now, this is against the backdrop of a US administration that is not just skeptical of the UN, but virtually hostile to the UN.
00:42:38:14 – 00:43:07:17
You know, Donald Trump has no time for the United Nations. Marco Rubio is, vociferously critical of the United Nations. I don’t think there’s any doubt that Tim Wolf’s, excuse me, that, Mike Waltz will, will become, you know, a, a thorn in the side of the UN leadership, when he takes over as the, as the US, permanent representative.
00:43:07:19 – 00:43:30:22
So, also, there are a number of other things that have been bubbling between the UN and, the US. One of them was the reappointment, the outrageous reappointment of, Francesca Albanese, as the, special, special envoy, earlier this year, in the teeth of American opposition that also in the teeth of Western opposition.
00:43:30:22 – 00:43:58:04
This was something, that that all of the leading European countries had concluded that she was, unsuitable for the role and that her profile was unhelpful to the role. And yet, Qatar has persisted with this. And he didn’t just persist. He actually you could almost say that it was a slap in the face for everybody who expressed legitimate reservations, and opposition to Francesca Albanese.
00:43:58:06 – 00:44:25:07
Also, completely inadequate, un handling of, Israeli and American concerns about unwra, completely inadequate un handling of, us and Israeli aspirations to, to produce an aid mechanism in Gaza independent of Unwra. So the reason I set out all of these, and this this is, by the way, this is not a comprehensive list.
00:44:25:09 – 00:44:48:12
You know, we could we could mention Unifil or a whole range of other issues relating to Israeli and American confidence in the United Nations. But we might just be, in for a perfect storm in New York because, you’re going to have people coming into New York and adopting provocative positions from the point of view of the United States.
00:44:48:14 – 00:45:13:24
And, the United States is already in no mood to tolerate, you know, sort of more, lecturing or, posturing, from the United Nations. So this could turn out to be, one of the most, maybe the most fractious, anger’s on record, and your and your thoughts of kind of the the ramifications on the ground and kind of the the.
00:45:13:24 – 00:45:50:07
And I suppose there’s a conceptual question about how much do these big picture grand kind of gesture politics, diplomacy acts filter down and act as a motivator for, the terrorism on the ground? Yeah. I mean, I already mentioned the effect on Hamas, and the fact that they’ve been handed a card that they’re clearly playing, which is that, you know, they absolutely want no progress on a ceasefire or on the release of hostages, at least until after this particular, event has taken place, this month.
00:45:50:09 – 00:46:29:24
So there’s that. Does it, does it sort of radicalize people? Does it motivate terrorists? That’s not quite so clear to me. I mean, it’s it’s you know, I think it’s true that in general terms, Western and especially European, Western European feebleness over, over the sort of issue of confronting terrorism that is used by Palestinian and other actors against Israel.
00:46:30:01 – 00:46:55:23
It certainly doesn’t help, you know, and so when there’s a statement like this, it kind of tell, it tells the terrorists that, you know, hey, what you’re doing is working. You know, you carry out this unprecedented, unconscionable massacre. And less than two years later, you’re presented with this kind of reward. So I think on that level, yes, I think it does incentivize terrorism.
00:46:56:00 – 00:47:14:12
I’m not convinced that it’s a sort of a radicalizing impact. You know, I don’t think that any Palestinian, who wasn’t previously minded to, get involved in, you know, risk their lives in some form of terrorist enterprise. I don’t think they’re going to do it just because, you know, just because Keir Starmer has recognized Palestine.
00:47:14:14 – 00:47:41:20
Fair enough. And I know we’re running. We’re running late. But if I can, I just ask one last question on another. Theme entirely. But connected to the UN is that we saw the announcement, earlier, earlier, about a month ago now almost from the E3. With regard to, snapback sanctions against the Iranian nuclear project. You mentioned before in the context of Yemen, kind of the nefarious role that Iran plays regionally, arming, supporters.
00:47:41:20 – 00:48:01:10
But obviously of similar concern is that nuclear program. Do you think that this diplomatic solution has, is credible and could could persuade them to give up the stockpiles? I mean, I think it’s the right thing to do. There’s no doubt that it’s the right thing to do. Of course they should. They should they should, activate the snapback.
00:48:01:12 – 00:48:30:16
And it’s also what, the United States wants them to do. And, so I, you know, I’m glad to see that happen. It’s, it’s interesting, isn’t it, that, you know, what’s what Israel has done successfully over the last year or so is to change the terms of the debate on Iran and also to change the terms of the debate on Hezbollah, and they actually to change Syria in itself.
00:48:30:16 – 00:49:02:21
Syria has changed. You know, where that’s going is at, perhaps, and again, a subject for another podcast. So these are brilliant achievements and completely unexpected achievements. You know, nobody thought two years ago that there was any real likelihood that Lebanese Hezbollah would be, you know, largely disarmed and defeated and that the Lebanese state would be reasserting its control, or at least sort of, you know, trying to figure out how to reassert its control over parts of Lebanon that it didn’t control.
00:49:02:23 – 00:49:40:13
And nobody two years ago, seriously imagined that the, Iranian nuclear program would be, you know, both, massively set back, by kinetic action and also that there would be discussions about, you know, where the Iranians really their own the option and the and the option that being given not just by the Americans and the Israelis, but also by the Western Europeans, is either to negotiate in good faith about how to make sure that there is never a future, Iranian nuclear threat, or, you know, pretty much to expect more of the same at some point in the future.
00:49:40:15 – 00:50:18:16
In terms of kinetic action against it. And people don’t talk enough about this, that Israel changed the terms of debate. The EU, the EU, and the UK were pretty weak. I mean, the EU much worse than the UK, actually. But but, you know, I would say the Europeans in general were pretty weak on real consequences for Iran of just endlessly, you know, engaging in bad faith, debate whilst pursuing a nuclear program and, you know, sort of cheating on its obligations and blindsiding the IAEA and all of that.
00:50:18:18 – 00:50:46:24
And, and I would have said that you know, that obviously there’s always a serious debate in Israel, always a serious debate in America about when, if and when, kinetic action would become inevitable. But that was not a serious debate in Europe at all. And the Europeans first reaction when, when, when it looked, when it became clear that there was the prospect of war between Israel and Iran, was of extreme caution.
00:50:46:24 – 00:51:11:19
Oh my goodness, don’t escalate. You know, there could be untold dreadful consequences of this. And of course, the brilliant success of the June War, has absolutely silenced those voices in Europe. And it’s an interesting question as to why it silenced those voices on Iran. But of course, it has failed to bring the Europeans into line with the Americans on Palestine and Gaza.
00:51:11:19 – 00:51:37:06
And, of course, you know, you can sort of see why because Iran is not a popular cause in in the West, the Western countries are slightly afraid of Iran or were slightly afraid of Iran. I don’t think they are any more. But, they were slightly afraid of it, but they didn’t really sympathize with it because you have got a very large groundswell of, opinion, popular opinion in, Western Europe and in the United Kingdom and in Canada and Australia.
00:51:37:08 – 00:52:02:23
That is pro-Palestinian. And, and in that respect, anti-Israeli. So, that’s a that’s an important distinction, but still, going back to the, Iran point, I think this is really healthy. I think the Iranians are in a dreadful bind because they have no diplomatic support from anyone who actually matters. Yeah, they get plenty of diplomatic support from the Russians and others.
00:52:02:23 – 00:52:39:04
But but you know what that was worth? Was laid bare in June, wasn’t it? You know, it was worth absolutely nothing. Nobody feels they owe the Iranians anything. Nobody is ever coming to their defense, even their own proxies. Really didn’t rise to the challenge of defending Iran in June. And so the Iranians are in a really desperate position because they either ultimately compromise with the international community and agree to a level of, monitoring and restriction that they never agreed to before that didn’t even exist under the JCPoA.
00:52:39:06 – 00:53:05:17
In which case they’re effectively admitting that they lost the war and that they, overreached and, failed in their policy. The problem, of course, is that’s a huge risk to the, stability of the Islamic Republic, which is already under threat from massive popular discontent and, popular hostility in Iran. So many people in Iran are sick to death of the, regime and would love to get rid of it.
00:53:05:19 – 00:53:38:12
And if the regime admits defeat to Israel and America, that is going to strip away some of that veneer of, invulnerability that, you know, that intimidates people and keeps them off the streets, from challenging the Islamic Republic. So that option is highly unattractive to the Iranians. The alternative option, of course, is to double down and to use whatever levers you have to, you know, to sustain and maybe even increase your aggression against Israel and the West.
00:53:38:14 – 00:53:59:09
And so, you know, the question arises, then, you know, what shape that would take? Do we see more, assassination attempts on people in, Western countries in, do we see, more use of the remaining proxies, particularly the Houthis? The evidence of Resupplies that would suggest that that is the path that the Iranians are going down.
00:53:59:11 – 00:54:31:09
The fact that Iran continues to host the leadership of al Qaeda would suggest that that is probably the path that they’re going down. I would not be surprised to see an Iranian sponsored attack sponsored, financed and facilitated by the Iranians, but carried out by al-Qaida, in the West at some point in the near future. So but that is also not an attractive policy option for the Iranians, because it will bring, you know, in a sense, the dam has already been breached.
00:54:31:09 – 00:54:57:18
The inhibition is already gone in terms of kinetic action against Iran. And Trump has said in terms that, you know, if the proxies do things, against American interests, that he will hold Iran responsible. So the Iranians really are between a rock and a hard place. They’re neither of these policy options is palatable. Neither of them is likely to be successful, but both are likely to fail in different ways.
00:54:57:22 – 00:55:18:21
And the fact that the EU, activates the snapback just highlights Iran’s isolation and weakness. Ambassador, thank you so much for your time today. Very generous and a tour de force across the region. And I will take you up on your offer of re revisiting other re other regional issues in the future with you. It was absolutely fascinating.
00:55:18:22 – 00:55:22:12
Thank you very much indeed. Thanks, Richard. It’s been a pleasure.