In this episode, recorded during a media briefing, Daniel J. Levy speaks with Dr. Arash Azizi about the ongoing US–Israel campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Azizi examines the impact of leadership decapitation, including the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and why the regime has so far maintained cohesion. He also explores the limits of military pressure and the role of Iran’s security apparatus in sustaining internal control.
Dr. Arash Azizi is an Iranian American historian, journalist, and author specialising in Iranian politics and society. He is the author of The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions and What Iranians Want, and is a frequent commentator on Iranian affairs across international media.
Transcript
(This transcript has been automatically generated by AI — please excuse any potential errors.)
00:00:07:02 – 00:00:32:08
Daniel J. Levy
Hello. Good afternoon. My name is Daniel J. Levy. I am programs manager at the BICOM think tank and today is 17th of March 2026. So just over two weeks into the latest joint US Israeli joint operation against the Iranian regime. Today we’re being joined by Doctor Arash Azizi to discuss what could become next for Iran. Doctor as easy as an American Iranian writer, journalist and historian.
00:00:32:10 – 00:01:02:06
Daniel J. Levy
And he’s recently been doing farmhouse media, commenting on ongoing developments in Iran. He’s also the author of two recent books on Iran, one of them a fantastic history of Crossing Soleimani. I strongly recommend and the other on what Iranians want. So, Doctor Azizi, again, thank you for joining us. Just to kick off with the first question, how did we get to where we are now, sort of tracking from Operation Rising Line in June last year through to the mass protests and now the current conflict.
00:01:02:08 – 00:01:31:04
Arash Azizi
But the 12-day war last year ended really inconclusively, which means that, you know, the U.S. and Israel were able to kill a significant number of Iran’s military leaders. They were able to decrease Iran’s nuclear capabilities. But obviously, the regime, you know, remained intact. As a whole, it carried on. It also didn’t really change its policies to domestic or foreign after the war, as some had called upon it to do.
00:01:31:06 – 00:01:54:19
Arash Azizi
As you know, it was negotiating with the US before the war, but they continued the negotiations and in, you know, in the new year. And actually, I’ll explain how they got to those locations. But so, the war ended rather inconclusively. Iran was in a real kind of a limbo situation. It was clear that, you know, something needed to change, but there was not initiative enough from inside the regime, a sort of, you know, diplomatic initiative to change things.
00:01:54:21 – 00:02:20:06
Arash Azizi
Then in actually starting from December, we had, a series of protests in Iran, which soon mushroomed into the fourth wave of, mass protest since 2017. The call by Reza Pahlavi, son of the last show of Iran, who was a major opposition figure, helped mushroomed the protests on January 8th and nine, which led also to their massacre in unprecedented numbers by the regime.
00:02:20:08 – 00:02:44:12
Arash Azizi
Now, the Trump administration and President Trump himself had from the very beginning, already in, in on January 1st, I think, a few days before the massacres, he had told the people help is on the way. He’d, in the days after he would ask Iranians to take the streets, would ask them to seize their government, seize their institutions with calls on like this.
00:02:44:14 – 00:03:03:11
Arash Azizi
So, there was a very much a direct participation by the U.S., if you will, in this, in this round, in this, process. And while Iran was able to suppress the protests, Iran and the US also started talking to a new round of negotiations mediated by Oman as had been the previous rounds before the 12-day war started.
00:03:03:13 – 00:03:24:13
Arash Azizi
They were going on the last round, the last day of such talks, held on the Iranian side by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas, are often on the US side, but it’s still a video of US envoy was held on February 26th. But once again in the middle of the negotiations or at the, when it concluded the ongoing negotiations are not ongoing where it wants to.
00:03:24:13 – 00:03:49:12
Arash Azizi
Us and Israel this time jointly launched a war on February 28th. The 12 they were of course, Israel had attacked us, had joined at the very end. The US had actually initially said that it wasn’t part of the attacks. So, this was obviously different. On February 28th, they launched this new war on Iran. Its opening salvo was killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had been in charge of Iran, as is the premier since 1989.
00:03:49:14 – 00:04:22:00
Arash Azizi
So obviously was a massive, development to kill him. And his family members in his compound. The war has then continued, to this day. Now, you know, we can discuss different aspects of it. The war has been able to significantly militarily degrade Iranian capabilities. Its latest, action was killing and yet unconfirmed by Iran of Ali Larijani, the national security advisor, which happened this, this morning as we woke up in, in, in eastern coast of the United States.
00:04:22:05 – 00:04:43:19
Arash Azizi
So, I would say in terms of how the war is going, basically for both sides, the regime has been able to keep its cohesion again so far, something that is continue going to continue to be the case unless, you know, my assessment is they killed 20 or 30 more Larijani. It’s a different but so it has been able to give us cohesion.
00:04:43:21 – 00:05:03:09
Arash Azizi
It picked the son of Khamenei, more stable Khamenei as the new supreme leader who is known to be injured, according to the regime itself, in the war. But has not really appeared in public. And we can now talk about that succession and what it means, but only just let me just wrap it up by a summary of, of where we are at the war.
00:05:03:09 – 00:05:26:08
Arash Azizi
So, as I said, the U.S. and Israel’s achievement have been the military degradation of Iran. Regime’s main achievement has been that it has survived, and the goals of the war have also sort of been shifting. And Netanyahu and Trump at the beginning were spoken about a political change of regime change. Increasingly, they seem to put it out there that, no, that’s actually not actually the war goal.
00:05:26:10 – 00:05:44:23
Arash Azizi
But that, you know, it’s sort of weakening the regime and all that. In short, they appear to realize that the getting rid of the Islamic Republic or, or, you know, or regime change is not something that is possible in the short or there or it doesn’t appear to be sort of a short-term goal of this war.
00:05:45:00 – 00:05:50:10
Arash Azizi
Imam, although that could end, that could change. Anyway, there are different aspects to. But let me leave it at that for now.
00:05:50:12 – 00:06:13:19
Daniel J. Levy
Thank you. And pivoting back to your comments on how sort of your point about how the first salvo was the assassination of Ali Khamenei. And then overnight, allegedly, Ali Larijani has been assassinated. We tend to view these individuals as being prominent, influential, important, particularly within Western policy circles, but within Iran itself. How much genuine power do these people have?
00:06:13:21 – 00:06:31:03
Daniel J. Levy
And I think, yeah, that’s probably a good starting point. How much power do the likes of Khamenei and Larijani have, and how has the regime been able to continue causing so much damage, and seemingly surviving intact despite his assassination? And what impact do you think large on his assassination might have?
00:06:31:05 – 00:06:52:16
Arash Azizi
Well, if you kill a powerful official, even if they are very powerful. And Ali Khamenei was very powerful. Larijani was very powerful in different ways. Obviously not as powerful as Harmony, but, I mean, killing them automatically won’t change the functions of the regime. They’re obviously. And like any other regime, they have plans for succession, if even if not for their violent killings, their plans for.
00:06:52:18 – 00:07:21:16
Arash Azizi
And what happens if someone dies? And the institutions of the Islamic Republic have proved pretty resilient. For example, when Ali Khamenei was killed, everything worked according to the Constitution. There was no chaos. There were no different sides attacking each other. There was no panic, power grabs, you know, the temporary leadership Committee came to be as the law, as the Constitution stipulates that, this is a three-person leadership committee.
00:07:21:18 – 00:07:45:08
Arash Azizi
And after a week, the assembly of experts, Khamenei. Now, there, you know, there were all irregularities. It is thought that security elements, particularly those in the Revolutionary Guards, pressured the Assembly of Experts, which is sort of a bunch of old mullahs to pick the new, supreme leader. But, but yeah, nevertheless, the institution is very resilient.
00:07:45:09 – 00:07:58:08
Arash Azizi
I don’t know if that answers the question, I think so, I mean, the military command and control, the, the capabilities of, of the Islamic Republic, you know, these sort of regime capabilities don’t stop because, you know, because you kill the top officials.
00:07:58:08 – 00:08:10:18
Daniel J. Levy
And apart from institutional resilience, where else do you think there’s a gap between the understanding in Western and Israeli policy circles and the reality on the ground in Iran, be that doctrinally, structurally, or even just socially?
00:08:10:21 – 00:08:29:24
Arash Azizi
Well, I mean, I think Western and Israeli policy analysts are often very smart than they have a right. I mean, it’s not like, you know, I have like a special fountain of knowledge that, you know, others can’t get, you know, because they’re Western Israeli people, like regime, for example, Israel’s top Iran analyst, I think, understands Iran very well.
00:08:29:24 – 00:08:50:05
Arash Azizi
I look up myself to him in his work and there are others. So, the problem is not, that well, the first of all, there’s no policy process as such in the US. So, the president and others who make this decision necessarily don’t put, you know, much emphasis on the works of this policy analyst and experts and all that.
00:08:50:07 – 00:09:15:03
Arash Azizi
And the in Israel is the same. I mean, it, you know, Israeli politicians and leadership have never shown any, impressive knowledge of, of, of Iran or in the UN and regime in their public talking about the matter or in decision making. As I said, people like regime they want, they’re always like, you know, and regime is not you know, he’s in you know, he’s not some guy in his office, you know, in his basement.
00:09:15:03 – 00:09:38:00
Arash Azizi
He he’s a top Iran analyst in, in the top think tank in Jerusalem. So, you know, he’s someone that obviously they, you know, they hear of, I guess if there is a gap, it’s the question of, you know what I mean? What are the political goals of the war, for example? And how is it how our military actions to be followed by, by political processes?
00:09:38:02 – 00:09:59:07
Arash Azizi
You know, this is true in hitting the militias of the axis of resistance. Also, true about, hitting of the Iranian regime. I mean, for example, Trump, Netanyahu kept saying that people of Iran would rise up, this is what they call them, who to rise up in the middle of the war. But no serious analyst of Iran thought that this is something that’s going to happen.
00:09:59:09 – 00:10:15:01
Arash Azizi
Really no serious analyst of Iran, I would say if they asked any of us, do you think that the people of Iran will rise up and bring down the regime in the midst of this war? I mean, I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but it would be extremely unlikely.
00:10:15:03 – 00:10:35:08
Daniel J. Levy
And if we and if we sort of sort of take that approach, that an uprising in a Western, or rather us, an Israeli supported regime change campaign will not be possible and not be happening. If we look at who has allegedly been assassinated, Basij commanders targeting of the IRGC Ministry of Intelligence and Security, allegedly Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
00:10:35:10 – 00:10:45:16
Daniel J. Levy
Could that be a possibility of a reformist, Dawn, as it were, off the back of this war? Or is that sort of too structurally so, too much structural? And so, you were saying.
00:10:45:16 – 00:10:48:10
Arash Azizi
Because they kill these other guys, reformist will come on.
00:10:48:10 – 00:10:49:15
Daniel J. Levy
Top, potentially.
00:10:49:17 – 00:11:15:14
Arash Azizi
Well, that’s not how it works usually. I mean, because you know, how will the how would that happen. The reformist it came to power usually on the basis of mass movements and sort of mass pressure. You know, so when you militarized an atmosphere like where, you know, when, when it’s all about killing the major leaders, it’s the military kind of figures, the military institutions that, gain the initiative.
00:11:15:16 – 00:11:37:03
Arash Azizi
Now, it is possible that at some point, under foreign pressure, the regime will the leadership might pass on not to reformist elements per se, but those who are more centrist and more amenable to deals with the rest of sorts. I mean, it’s scenario like that because everyone needs to end in some sort of peace. So, a scenario like that is not hard to see.
00:11:37:08 – 00:11:40:14
Daniel J. Levy
And who could those more centrist figures be that you alluded to?
00:11:40:14 – 00:11:59:07
Arash Azizi
Well, well, the leader of the Iran’s centrist West facing faction is Hassan Rouhani, the former president, although, you know, he’s in 70s at least doing very well. I mean, he’s not like unhealthy. And I think the question is if he can muster enough support in the security forces to come back for a leadership position. I mean, I don’t see it as impossible.
00:11:59:07 – 00:12:20:14
Arash Azizi
It might be that at some point, the strategic thinking in the collective institutions of the regime would be that we need someone like Rouhani because he knows how to deal with the West. So, the leader of Iran’s centrist west facing section faction, would be Rouhani. Others might just change their tune. People like Caleb off, who’s effectively running the war effort.
00:12:20:14 – 00:12:41:10
Arash Azizi
He’s an old IRGC hand. He’s the head of the he’s the speaker of the Iranian parliament. You know, he might change his tune. I mean, he might be interested in dealing, you know, I mean, he has shown signs to be interested in dealing with the West and his political ambitions also means that he thinks maybe he can make those dealings with the West his sort of escalator to power.
00:12:41:14 – 00:13:02:08
Daniel J. Levy
Thank you. And now turning to writing, society, etc. but a lot of the reporting analysis that we’ve seen is very much been oriented towards the military or securitized aspects as an Iranian sort of what kind of information are you seeing coming from grassroots Iranian sources or channels, and how much of an impact is this for having on Iranian society and in what way?
00:13:02:10 – 00:13:20:04
Arash Azizi
Yeah. I mean, so, you know, all of us are in touch with the Iranians in different ways in terms of impacts. I mean, so, you know, the war is obviously horrendous for Iranian civilians to have to live through it. Hundreds of them have been killed. And, you know, cities like Tehran, the capital city, are effectively warzone under bombardment.
00:13:20:04 – 00:13:43:04
Arash Azizi
And people and conditions like this will survive. But also politically, people see that the main drivers of their fate, Israel, United States and different factions of the Iranian regime are, are not them, right? They don’t. They not neither of these three parties have shown any sign that they have the interests of Iranian people at heart at all, not even as their first priority.
00:13:43:06 – 00:14:12:09
Arash Azizi
So, I Iranians feel helpless, basically, because they feel like their destiny and their fate is decided by others. They try to be cautious. They hopeful they’ve taken different positions on the war at different stages of it, according to who they are. But there is a sort of a historical helplessness because the Iranian society is not organized enough, does not have enough organized forces to be able to put his stamp on the situation, if you will, and be able to, be in the driving seat of deciding its own fate.
00:14:12:09 – 00:14:15:09
Arash Azizi
So that’s what it has to live through in the war.
00:14:15:15 – 00:14:23:19
Daniel J. Levy
And even though there isn’t enough organization within Iranian society, do you foresee a repeat of December, January’s mass protests?
00:14:23:21 – 00:14:44:14
Arash Azizi
Do I see a repeat of the mass protests? So, I mean, it appears unlikely at the moment because first of all, because there’s a sort of a strategic dead end to the protest. I mean, protests for what? I mean, it’s not impossible that there would be a mass uprising of some sort spontaneously. First of all, it has to be spontaneous because there are not enough organized networks that could make it happen.
00:14:44:16 – 00:15:09:16
Arash Azizi
The other reason that makes it unlikely or difficult is that the regime has really counter mobilized. So, the regime is really mobilizing its forces, arming them. Tonight, for example, is the last it’s the last evening before the last Wednesday of the year, which is the Iranian tradition of a fire festival charge anniversary, on which Pahlavi has called on people to mobilize.
00:15:09:18 – 00:15:35:19
Arash Azizi
And the regime expects it’ll be confrontation with potential confrontation. So, it’s really organizing its forces, the security forces, the police forces. I mean, it’s really organizing them. This makes it quite difficult for people to come out because the organized forces of the Islamic Republic, are in a better position than even ten times bigger masses of the people who come out to lack that organization coordination.
00:15:35:19 – 00:15:45:22
Arash Azizi
And, you know, the kind of organizing initiative that it takes to confront the regime like that. So, it’s not impossible. It’s not impossible that we will all be surprised, but it’s on the unlikely side.
00:15:45:24 – 00:16:09:12
Daniel J. Levy
Thank you. And pivoting back to the security forces overnight, we’ve had reports, that the commander of the Basij was assassinated, and some 300 Basij operators were also killed in airstrikes. And then towards the end of last week, we saw, swarming drones being used to target Basij roadblocks in Tehran. So very, very granular, very tactical deployment of, drones.
00:16:09:14 – 00:16:19:20
Daniel J. Levy
Where are the Iranian security forces holding? As far as we know, how capable are they? And in terms of internal repression, in particular, how capable of at this time?
00:16:19:22 – 00:16:47:11
Arash Azizi
Well, the thing is, they’re quite capable because it’s like, how many roadblocks can you hit, you know. So yes, they killed the checkpoints. Basically, they killed people at the stake. How many can you give? How many military commanders can you kill? You know, the regime has 1 million uniformed security forces, security and armed forces, right? They can organize, they can gather a different mosques around the country.
00:16:47:11 – 00:17:06:07
Arash Azizi
They can have different centres. So, the idea that you can hit them enough with airstrikes, for sure. Maybe people will be afraid of it, you know, as a result, you know, and they will be sort of intimidated to go out and join these checkpoints. But there’s already a war going on, and they know that their commanders could be killed, and a lot of other people could be killed.
00:17:06:09 – 00:17:40:18
Arash Azizi
So, I haven’t seen a serious cent any the war would have seen. If the war can do something is to degrade Iran’s capability to, to project power beyond these borders. But in terms of domestic security, I’ve never quite understood this. Like strategically, how can you know terror regime’s ability for domestic crackdown by killing? It’s how many uniformed forces can you kill?
00:17:40:20 – 00:18:00:23
Arash Azizi
By an airstrike? Like, what’s that number? Right. If you kill, like, 5000, they have a million, as I said, you know. So yeah. So, I don’t see how I could see a potential, you know, if there was a mass organized movement on the other side, then these attacks could, like, weaken the ability and then the rising up.
00:18:01:03 – 00:18:09:22
Arash Azizi
But there is no mass movement organized on the other side. And I don’t see the sort of tactic of intimidation and, and pushing the regime like that, working.
00:18:09:24 – 00:18:24:21
Daniel J. Levy
Thank you. Final question for me before we pause the recording and open up to the floor, what do you anticipate the social effect of this war being once some kind of resolution has been reached? That’s probably most likely an American imposed ceasefire.
00:18:24:23 – 00:18:44:15
Arash Azizi
I’m not sure that it’s most likely an American imposed ceasefire, actually. But, I mean, I guess it would be some sort of a ceasefire, the social impact. It’s a good question. I think the opponents of the regime will be demoralized in many ways because they’ll see the Islamic Republic lasted another war. There is no its shown, considerable cohesion.
00:18:44:17 – 00:19:06:17
Arash Azizi
For example, most of us supported by all, all different factions of the regime, like even someone like Mohammad Khatami, former reformist President Rouhani himself, you know, position with the reformist president, you know, everyone. Hassan Khomeini, who it was the arrival of Khomeini, if you will, as the grandson of the founder of the revolution. They all paid allegiance to him immediately, right?
00:19:06:23 – 00:19:30:16
Arash Azizi
So, the regime was able to keep cohesion. So, I think there would be a demoralization of supporters of the war because I’m sorry of opponents of the regime. Because if you’re the average person in Tehran who really hates the regime, you’ll think, okay, great. What happened? The regime stayed in power. Now has a supreme leader who is, you know, the same as the old one, effectively, if not worse.
00:19:30:18 – 00:19:48:03
Arash Azizi
Meanwhile, our lives, the lives of ordinary Iranians, keeps getting worse because, you know, there was damage in the war. Economically, the country is ruined even further. So, they feel demoralized. I think I mean, I think they will feel demoralized, even some who might have been supportive of the war at the beginning, thinking that it is the regime.
00:19:48:03 – 00:20:11:02
Arash Azizi
I think they’ll be demoralized. I think that’s one social consequence. But I mean, so social psychology works in, very strange ways, because it might also be a further push people to think they have nothing to lose. And, you know, they can come out and they can find new ways of fighting against the regime. That anger might translate into action like that.