In this episode, Richard Pater speaks with Dr Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky about the UK’s recent announcement on recognising a Palestinian state, the dynamics around the humanitarian aid, and the prospects for a hostage deal. Michal assesses the role of Egypt as a mediator and the challenges posed by Hamas.
Dr Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky is a senior adviser and programme director at Mind Israel, an adjunct lecturer at Tel Aviv University, and one of the founding members of the Forum Dvorah. She holds a PhD in political science from Tel Aviv University.
Transcript
(This transcript has been automatically generated by AI — please excuse any potential errors.)
00:00:06:24 – 00:00:29:10
Hello and welcome to the BICOM Podcast. I’m Richard Pater, the director of BICOM. And today is the 14th of August. Sadly, the Gaza war rumbles on now into its 22nd month. And at the same time, there seems little prospect right now of any imminent hostage deal. And in parallel, Israel is facing increasing international pressure, even from among its allies.
00:00:29:12 – 00:00:56:22
To discuss these issues, I’m delighted to welcome back to the podcast, Doctor Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky. Michal, thank you very much indeed for joining me here for hosting me, Richard. So by way of introduction, Michal is a senior advisor and program director at Mind Israel. She’s also an adjunct lecturer at Tel Aviv University, where she gained her PhD in political science and one of the founding members of the Forum Dvorah.
00:00:56:24 – 00:01:26:08
In her academic research. She is focused on Israel standing in the international arena. International civil society institutions with a particular emphasis on the UN. So I think you ideally placed to discuss some of the issues that I mentioned in the introduction. But why don’t we start with the international arena and perhaps with the UK focus? What do you make of the UK announcement, to, the prospect of unilateral recognition of a state of Palestine?
00:01:26:10 – 00:01:53:13
Right. So thanks, Richard. I think it’s an interesting place to begin. Specifically with everything that’s happening to Israel nowadays. And we are seeing the different developments around us. So the first thing that perhaps comes to mind when we when we think of, Keir Starmer’s declaration that he will recognize a Palestinian state. I think we can.
00:01:53:15 – 00:02:20:22
The first thing that comes to my mind is actually Britain’s weight as a normative player in Europe, but also in the international arena. And I say this because although France declared in advance, write a few months, it’s been in the pipeline for a few months where President Macron has spoken about he will recognize a Palestinian state, and it will be it was supposed to be in July in the summit.
00:02:20:22 – 00:02:53:05
And then he said in September. But this was ongoing for quite a while. But when Keir Starmer of Britain declared that he will recognize a Palestinian state overnight, almost, we saw almost ten states join. The most important of which to Israel are Canada and Australia, but also other European countries. So I think that’s the first thing that I immediately noticed is we can see again Britain’s weight as a normative and important player in the international arena.
00:02:53:07 – 00:03:22:05
The second thing that struck me is that language, perhaps that, that Prime Minister Starmer used. So he spoke about children that are too weak to stand. He said, we don’t want to see any more Palestinian children who are too weak to stand. It was heartbreaking. And it’s highlighted for me the gap between what we see in Israel and what others see.
00:03:22:07 – 00:03:46:00
So these images that are flowing out of Gaza are actually images that most Israelis don’t see. And then that what’s the follow up to this is what’s happening in the media and why why are we seeing such different narratives? So maybe that’s a different topic. Maybe we’ll get into it later. I don’t want to I don’t want to sidetrack.
00:03:46:00 – 00:04:14:12
I’ll go back to to again to to this declaration. Keir Starmer actually gave Israel a chance right when he said unless there is substantial change regarding the humanitarian situation, then we will recognize a Palestinian state in September at the General Assembly.
00:04:14:14 – 00:04:51:18
This gives Hamas an incentive right to continue and prolong the current situation because, as long as the humanitarian disaster persists, then it comes September and there’s no change. Then, you know, Britain will declare its recognition of a Palestinian state. So that’s that’s maybe the downside. Also the reference to 500 trucks a day. So we know that there’s a lot of there’s like this international narrative about 900 trucks or more.
00:04:51:22 – 00:05:28:10
We are on the sidelines of Gaza just waiting to come in and and Israel’s not letting us come in. Where on the other side of all of this, we see UN data that the problem isn’t the tracks coming in. The problem is what happens once they come in and we see that, tons of humanitarian aid is left at the crossing by all these trucks that actually do come in and are allowed to come in and and dismantle their goods at the crossing, at the trucks from inside the Gaza Strip need to come and collect that humanitarian aid.
00:05:28:10 – 00:06:03:11
And, and much of the aid is actually left in the crossings at the crossings. And then we see that the aid that does go in is often more than often right, between 80 to 90% of it is actually intercepted or which is a nice word for looted. So, so it’s fine to say 500 trucks a day, but I think it also shows that there’s not necessarily a deep understanding of what is really happening in Gaza and where the lacuna with this whole humanitarian infrastructure actually lie.
00:06:03:13 – 00:06:35:06
So need to just make a long story short, if we look again and recap at the, at the British declaration, we see that the certainly the significance of Britain’s, weight in the international arena. Second, the importance of images that actually led, I presume, had a specific role in leading to to this declaration at this point in time and also as a policy that, it’s it’s not only strings at the end of the day.
00:06:35:06 – 00:07:07:01
Right? Israelis have got the upper hand militarily, but we are seeing asymmetrical, asymmetrical conflict, and we’re seeing the importance of soft power, of recognition of a Palestinian state as opposed to the conventional hard power gains. So maybe that’s a long answer to a short question. Well thank you. I do want to come back to the issue of, of aid shortly, but just to press you on the issue of recognition and perhaps deal with the, the, the substance or the principle of it.
00:07:07:05 – 00:07:11:03
What’s your what’s your positioning kind of in terms of kind of
00:07:11:03 – 00:07:29:19
moving the story forward and trying to achieve peace one day. Does you just unilateral recognition help us. What do you think of the actual the the principle behind the decision? That’s a good question. And there’s actually a lot of moving parts here and a lot depends on the players as well.
00:07:29:21 – 00:07:50:01
So we can expect to see at the UN General Assembly, you know, we always are used to these images of the Marvel world green Marvel wall behind the speakers. And they speak and we’ll see one by one coming up, at least if they follow through on their declarations and they will recognize a Palestinian state, there’ll be a lot of, a lot of space.
00:07:50:01 – 00:08:19:21
There’ll be a lot of media around it. And then the question is what happens, right? Is Israel going to now say, okay, so it says, recognize the Palestinians that we are going to annex, territories or what we saw today. We’re going to build an E1 very sensitive area, which will deteriorate Israel’s situation. International, the Israel’s international standing further, or are we going to see Israel brush this off?
00:08:19:21 – 00:08:45:19
And then it becomes, I don’t want to say not important because obviously there’s way to to these recognitions, but but it’s, it’s it stays more in the symbolic realm. Palestine cannot be admitted to the UN as a member state without UN Security Council approval. And to do that, we need the United States. And that’s not in the cards at the moment.
00:08:45:21 – 00:09:16:11
So, so, so that’s Israel’s part. But also we need to see what will happen with Hamas. So, you know, Israel can very much want to do. But at the end of the day, if Hamas has no incentive to go towards a deal, then the situation will persist and then Israel will be forced to use military force. Or, I don’t know, these other, options on the table, but, but that, that will actually lead to, obviously to a deterioration.
00:09:16:13 – 00:09:40:11
So, so again, I don’t have a yes or no answer to, to this question. And we’ll have to see how it all plays out as the months move on, of course. And beyond the, the role that the Security Council plays, are there any other mechanisms within the UN that, the countries can, can trigger with regard to, to recognizing a Palestinian state?
00:09:40:13 – 00:10:07:03
Yes, sure. So they will be. So the General Assembly. Okay. I’ll, I’ll back up. They need to be for basic conditions that need to be met for the recognition of a state into, to be recognized by international law. One is you need a permanent population. Two, you need a defined territory, you need a recognized government, and you need the capacity to enter into your relations with other states.
00:10:07:05 – 00:11:11:18
So the Palestinians don’t meet all these terms. But there have been cases where there has been, compromises in some of these, four terms. Right. So it’s not a no go with there is a possibility and also worth looking into. This is, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2334 from the end of 2016, at the end of, Obama’s term, where the ICC, the International Criminal Court in weighing, it its stance vis-a-vis Israel actually referred to to to some of those, to to the language in the Security Council resolution to determine if it has, jurisdiction and authority over the cases that were submitted to it.
00:11:11:20 – 00:11:44:16
So, again, it it’s not irrelevant. It’s not, only, symbolic. It depends how it will be used and utilized and leveraged. And it will very much depend on Israel’s actions and what Israel will do with this declaration and can use beyond the UN, any other international 4G throughput. Do you predict any other repercussions for this, for these this recognition?
00:11:44:18 – 00:12:19:20
I think it’s endless scenarios. So it’s quite difficult to to think and consider the, you know, these open processes. Against Israel, both in the ICC and in the ICJ, the International Court of Justice, it could influence, some of these open procedures. It could ignite additional procedures, it could, incentivize additional players to, to to try and open new files against Israel.
00:12:19:23 – 00:12:41:06
So I can’t give you anything more specific than that. That’s okay. But on the ground, I mean, I mean, presumably, as you mentioned the beginning, Hamas will see this as a, as a win for them. What do you think? What kind of message you think it sends to the, to what’s left of the, the pragmatic or the moderate Palestinian camp?
00:12:41:08 – 00:13:28:01
It’s a good question. It’s, And again, this is why I think it’s really up to Israel and to the international community and here maybe, you know, I’ll, I’ll you to ask your question to, to kind of maybe highlight the silver lining here and that is that in these various declarations. Right. The French declaration. But that much more specifically the British declaration, the Canadian declaration, these states, firstly referred to the hostages, of course, to our hostages and the need to take them out, of Gaza, of the Gaza Strip immediately, but also to the demilitarization of a potential Palestinian state, which is super important.
00:13:28:07 – 00:14:16:23
Absolutely. The importance of of the Palestinian state fully recognizing Israel. And in the Canadian case, and also the British case, a very clear words about not wanting to see or not accepting, Hamas as a, as a, as governing the future Palestinian state. I think Israel can capitalize on that. So I think that’s definitely a silver lining worth kind of considering and, and leveraging because at the end of the day, when we when we talk about a potential deal to end the current war, Israel wants to see all the hostages out and wants to see Hamas dismantled.
00:14:17:00 – 00:14:41:01
So, you know, if it’s not worth word the same. But at the end of the day, when you look at the meaning demilitarized Palestinian state and Hamas not having the capacity to govern, you know that that’s exactly what we are opting for now. I think that’s a really good point. Thank you. Just to go back to or to pivot slightly in regard to the hostages, what do you make of the latest efforts?
00:14:41:03 – 00:15:10:21
Now on the, Egypt’s auspices, apparently, to reach a deal. How did you write those prospects? So I think it’s very difficult for us, assessing the public who are, you know, who we read the newspapers. We don’t know what’s happening in the ruins. For me personally, I think it’s very encouraging, as an Israeli citizen, to know that there are talks going on and that, you know, we, you know, we in Israel, we read the paper and we see the news and there’s so much internal strife here.
00:15:10:23 – 00:15:35:19
So to see that there’s also some important and very relevant things that, that are happening and it’s fine that it’s behind closed doors, it’s probably best that it’s behind closed doors. We obviously don’t have all the details. In my opinion, the fact that Egypt is involved is super important. And I think that we should, you know, opt for Egyptian involvement.
00:15:35:21 – 00:16:03:04
Definitely. If we have to choose between Egyptian and Qatar involvement, I think Egypt plays a more constructive role. And I think we need to do everything we can to safeguard our, peace treaty with Egypt. And and part of it is, you know, looking to make Egypt a relevant player in, in the mediating player, in, kind of emerging out of this awful deadlock that we were in.
00:16:03:06 – 00:16:26:04
I quite agree. And we know that the Israel Egyptian, security cooperation is kind of one of the anchors of the, of the of the peace agreement that’s, 40 plus years, and is held held strong. However, there’s also criticism of the, of the Egyptians that for a decade and a half under their noses allowed all the smuggling to go through under the wrath of crossing.
00:16:26:06 – 00:16:55:00
And since this conflict’s been going since, the 22 months they’ve refused, even for on humanitarian cases, to allow even temporary absorption of any of any refugees there. So, what do you make of that criticism on the security and on the humanitarian policy? I think that the criticism is, is that it looks at the very complex situation in a very superficial way.
00:16:55:02 – 00:17:24:04
The Egyptian regime is a is against the Muslim Brotherhood. It’s, it’s a political faction that, that works against, the, the current regime. And the Hamas in the Gaza Strip is part of Muslim Brotherhood. They have absolutely no incentive to bring them inside, the Sinai into, Egyptian territory. There is no, you know, we don’t know what will happen once they cross the border.
00:17:24:04 – 00:18:03:15
There is no guarantees that they’ll want to come back into the Gaza Strip. I can completely understand Egyptian, wariness. So that’s in terms of letting, letting, and, Palestinian refugee refugees or Palestinian, Gaza Strip, citizens, into Egypt. I can understand that again, it would be easier for us were there exceptions? But it’s also in Israel’s interest for the Egyptian regime to be stable and not to seem was when brotherhood, penetrate, Egypt.
00:18:03:17 – 00:18:30:08
So so that’s one aspect. And in terms of humanitarian aid, I think trying to find a lot of humanitarian aid actually passed, through the, Kerem Shalom through the, Egyptian border. In terms of the thing you said was arms, I want to say that we were very I mean, no one was, you know, no one was taken aback, but we knew that they were tunnels.
00:18:30:10 – 00:18:59:07
They were not. We knew that, with or without Egypt, we knew that Hamas was arming, and, you know, was arming, with, Qatar money with, Iranian, weapons. We knew that this was all happening. And, you know, we were of course, surprised on October 7th. But the big failure is why were we surprised when we knew that they were tunnels?
00:18:59:09 – 00:19:22:07
A lot of the things we knew. So I don’t think, it’s easy to blame Egypt, but I think we need to to, you know, we deserve more introspection than that. Fair enough. I want you to come back on the on the issue of humanitarian aid. We mentioned briefly earlier. First of all, I’d love to take your view on the for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
00:19:22:07 – 00:19:51:13
It’s it’s controversial in some quarters of the scene doing kind of only work bringing the food and alleviating the suffering. What’s your what’s your take on there? Their operation. Thanks for the question. It’s an important question. I think the guest, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which is very much criticized these days, if I had to sum it up, probably in one sentence, is that it’s a very well intentioned initiative and very poorly played out.
00:19:51:15 – 00:20:17:01
I think that if we look at why it’s well intentioned, the idea of bypassing the UN system, which is flawed and which is penetrated by Hamas, we need to say that not all U.N. agencies are flawed and, of course, that, U.N. agencies know how to do this work. But there was a rationale in trying to bypass them.
00:20:17:07 – 00:20:39:24
And even I wouldn’t even say bypass them, but maybe just offer an alternative because. Because when the GFF was being established, there was a call and the idea was for the UN agencies to cooperate and work alongside the gates. But at the end of the day, the politics here played out. And this is why, part of the part of the failure.
00:20:39:24 – 00:21:07:06
So, so the fact that the GCC was, was actually added alone and had to establish a whole new humanitarian infrastructure without the expertise and, and the knowledge of and the cooperation of the relevant players that do have experience on the ground. And why did I say poorly played out? Because I think the operation has, probably three significant shortcomings.
00:21:07:08 – 00:21:25:21
One is that there’s not enough centers at the end of the day, there’s just not enough centers. There’s not enough distribution points to is that there’s not enough material, there’s not enough aid supply. So we hear of a center that was opened and within two hours, you know, it was emptied out. And three is, of course, not enough security.
00:21:25:23 – 00:21:55:05
And here we see people that are that it’s, it’s awful to to even, you know, imagine hungry Palestinian civilians who are waiting in line and being shot at and being terrorized. And and again, we could have predicted this in advance, because when you’re trying to separate the humanitarian infrastructure from Hamas, Hamas will rebel and Hamas tries to do everything in its power for these Palestinians not to receive the food from Gaza.
00:21:55:07 – 00:22:17:20
And then you have stories of people being shot. And then some, of course, were related to the Israeli military. I’m saying, of course not, because we know that the Israeli military shot people, but because the immediate, suspect is the Israeli military. And then, of course, it takes quite a while for the military to investigate itself and then come out with a negative report and so forth.
00:22:17:22 – 00:22:44:18
So, like I said, well-intentioned, poorly played out. And with your expertise on the UN, I mean, there’s been lots of criticism that the UN system has also just perpetuated the Hamas, the Hamas rules. But what would you give what advice would you give to the UN to improve their, that their mechanism for aid delivery? So I think this like I said earlier, I refer to this.
00:22:44:18 – 00:23:08:08
There’s two main lacuna vets that the UN needs to address in the way that it distributes the aid. And that is on top of, of course, Hamas infiltration into the UN system. And, and maybe it’s this is like one in the same thing. But again, so the first is when the aid is delivered to the crossings, it needs to be collected.
00:23:08:08 – 00:23:39:20
It needs to be better. Managed, arranged, coordinated that the trucks inside come that they are. If they not the same size, then you have to coordinate more trucks from the inside that will come in. You know, you have to. I can think of a number of different reasons why some of this, humanitarian aid is left crossing, but then the UN needs to, you know, they need to to to figure out what to do with this and not just accept it.
00:23:39:20 – 00:24:03:22
The 30% of the aid is left at the crossing. So if we need better infrastructure, the UN must help in developing better infrastructure. Or if it’s fuel or whatever it is. I don’t know what the reasons are, but that the aid needs to be collected. That’s one. And then the second is of course, the, the UN’s. And the fact that the that the humanitarian aid is looted.
00:24:03:22 – 00:24:34:01
So you need to have some kind of a security arrangement and I think that often the UN says that, you know, because they’re humanitarian organizations and they have to work under humanitarian principles. It’s a problem for the Israeli military to safeguard these convoys because the Israeli, military is a party to the conflict. And so but someone needs to, you know, someone needs to, to protect these, these convoys.
00:24:34:03 – 00:25:08:14
And I think this has to be addressed. Even I don’t know that there needs to be some flexibility here. And and again, just putting the Palestinian population ahead of political considerations, you know, the idea and we are not going to cooperate with the gas because that guy is bypassing us. Is is, I think, erroneous? I think that, at the end of the day, if you’re a humanitarian organization and you want the best for the citizens of Gaza, then please work with whoever’s there.
00:25:08:18 – 00:25:45:15
And whoever can, you know, is mandated to supply the goods, work alongside them. Indeed. And so right now, I mean, we’ve got a, we’ve got this, this kind of hybrid situation where we’ve got the GPS, we’ve got the UN, the UN mechanism. We’ve even seen the, the airdrops as well. And a fourth component is this new phenomenon of this, I call it a quasi autonomous zone in, in, in southern Gaza, where the under the leadership of Yasir AbuShaban and his bean tribe have basically with the protection of the IDF, have some form of local autonomy.
00:25:45:16 – 00:26:08:09
We saw social media images yesterday of, of a school opening and making an emphasis that they’re using, kind of unlike the Palestinian curricula, using, curricula, which is far more tolerant of Jews and Christians. But what do you make of the the prospects of kind of the, the longevity of this type of project? I’m very hesitant about, developments like these.
00:26:08:15 – 00:26:42:07
I think that we need a central backbone, leadership, you know, if you’re going to have a demilitarized Palestinian state as Prime Minister Khan’s donor opted for, then you need to have a central command and you need to have, yeah, monitoring. And you need to have, in my opinion, at least initially, an international force. And not these clans and tribes, trying to merge in different places.
00:26:42:09 – 00:27:12:23
You know, with Israel, there’ll be one clan in one area and another clan in another area. And we’ve seen these kind of, in intra fighting in states like Syria. And this is really on our border. I think it poses, if you have internal chaos and you don’t have one recognized leadership in the Gaza Strip. At the end of the day, if this is on Israel’s doorstep and it’s going to spill over, and I think it poses a threat to Israel’s southern communities.
00:27:13:00 – 00:27:38:02
So this is not something that I can say I’m I recommend or that I am a support. Obviously, it’s better than having Hamas and having Hamas curricula. But, I think, you know, if we are trying to has a political solution and outline a political horizon, it’s not one where you have different clans that are in charge of different areas.
00:27:38:04 – 00:27:40:00
In the Gaza Strip.
00:27:41:14 – 00:28:04:10
I mean, if I can ask you just one last question. We saw in Geneva earlier this week, the family of hostages appealing once more to the international Red cross to do whatever they could to visit the hostages to make sure that they were getting food and medicine. What more can be done? I should be done under international law by the Red cross.
00:28:04:10 – 00:28:41:18
And what more pressure can be brought to bear to see that, implemented. So I think that in Israel at least, there’s a bit of a misunderstanding about the power and abilities of these humanitarian organizers actions to to sanction in a war zone. At the end of the day, the ICRC is humanitarian organization. It’s a it needs to operate in a conflict zone with its humanitarian principles, which mean neutrality and independence and impartiality.
00:28:41:20 – 00:29:04:19
And they need access. So they can’t bang on Hamas table and say, you know, give us access to the hostages. Take us now. Thank you. If Hamas won’t let them visit the hostages, then they can’t visit the hostages. And of course, they need to do everything in their power to to visit the hostages and bring medicines and bring reports.
00:29:04:19 – 00:29:29:20
And of course, that’s international law. They need to be able they need to have access to these hostages, but they don’t have the power. And certainly not against an armed militia. So they can’t force their way into a location. They can only operate with the explicit consent and security guarantees of Hamas. So the pressure should be made on Hamas, not on the ICRC.
00:29:29:20 – 00:29:56:09
I’m sure the ICRC has the capability, the, the, the knowledge, the know how and the desire to help, but they need access to Hamas. Indeed. Michal, thank you so much. Just before we go, is there anything else you’d like to add or, or point to the you think we haven’t we haven’t covered. You’d like to make? I don’t know if you want to refer to, funeral.
00:29:56:11 – 00:30:30:22
There was, so regarding funeral, there was a report that was. It’s not public, but there was a report that, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, head of, head of the U.N. commission, regarding reviewing what, you know, what the alternatives for a funeral are. Maybe it’s just worth saying that, you know, mandate is renewed every three years, and the next, this the current mandate is, will be voted on again in December of this year.
00:30:30:24 – 00:31:00:04
So the current mandate is until June 2026. And then in December, it will be voted in the General Assembly to extend the mandate by an additional three years. So we’re really in kind of a junction because Enron is, it’s kind of defunct and, Israel won’t work with Enron. So, for example, when I spoke of, of the trucks coming inside of the Gaza Strip to collect the, the humanitarian goods at the crossings.
00:31:00:10 – 00:31:26:06
So Boomerang can’t coordinate these trucks. Right? So there’s a lot of things that you can’t do right now. And, and this is interesting to see, you know, the the results of this report or review, were for different alternatives, for potential scenarios for UNRWA in the future. One is is they determined is that given inaction, you know, will just collapse.
00:31:26:06 – 00:31:54:21
So the current situation is actually unsustainable. The second alternative is a reduction of services, which means that some of the services will simply just be cut and others services will be transformed to other actors. A third alternative is to create an executive board to advise. UNRWA. Here. I think that, there the idea is to give advice and to support unions.
00:31:54:21 – 00:32:50:15
Commissioner in general. Who is his name is Philip Villas Rini. To enhance the accountability and to take responsibility for securing multi-year funding. To UNRWA, I think that potentially, if we do go to this kind of model, it could expose a greater number of people to the the extent to which Hamas has penetrated the organization to the crippling of UNRWA, for example, by its workers union, because we’ve heard from other secretary generals who have tried to, insert reforms or greater transparency or efficiency acts that the union has blocked and, and sometimes even ousted, say, commissioner generals, for trying to, to, initiate reforms.
00:32:50:17 – 00:32:59:21
So, so perhaps this could be an interesting, way to expose, UNRWA, to expose Hamas’s penetration of UNRWA.
00:32:59:21 – 00:33:36:22
the fourth alternative that they suggest is to transfer the services that UNRWA provides Palestinian refugees to host governments and the Palestinian Authority as well, which means that funeral will maintain its function as custodian of Palestinian refugee rights for their registration and advocacy for refugee access to services, for example, that, simultaneously, some of the services will be progressively shifting, to host governments and to the Palestinian Authority, which
00:33:36:22 – 00:34:00:07
for, you know, for the resolution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. And the core issue of refugees is within that. I think that’s a very constructive solution indeed. Michal, thank you so much indeed for your time today. Most appreciate it. Thank you. Richard, it was a pleasure to be here.