What’s happened: The Houthis, an Iran-backed jihadist militia that has controlled parts of Yemen for much of the last decade, launched at least two ballistic missiles at Israel over the weekend, joining the war after waiting on the sidelines for four weeks. Both missiles were intercepted.

• The Houthis began attacking Israel on October 19, 2023, twelve days after the Hamas invasion and massacre in southern Israel, and continued firing missiles on Israel until the ceasefire which ended the Gaza war came into effect in October 2025.
• Earlier in 2025 there was a short US-led bombing campaign against the Houthis that ended in a ceasefire which did not include Israel, which has been in effect since May 2025. This ceasefire resulted in the reopening of the Red Sea to most shipping traffic.
• There is growing concern that the Houthis will once more endeavour to block shipping in the Red Sea and through to the Suez Canal by blockading the Bab al Mandab Strait.
• President Trump’s ceasefire with the Houthis in May 2025 left Israel alone in fighting them for the next five months. Similarly, the regional effort to contain the Houthis led to a fierce division between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who backed different factions inside Yemen that were fighting the Iran-backed militia.
• The IDF continued to operate in both Iran and Lebanon over the weekend. Overnight, the IDF  conducted 140 air strikes in Iran on targets connected to weapons production. These included facilities used for the production of anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, and ballistic missile engines.
• The IDF also struck targets in Lebanon, including Hezbollah positions in Beirut. An air strike eliminated Ali Hassan Shaib, a senior operative in Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force. Three Israeli soldiers were seriously wounded in combat with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
• Foreign Minister Saar informed this morning that he spoke with Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper. They’ve discussed:
  • The latest incidents in the UK, including the arson attacks on Hatzalah ambulance.
  • The rise of antisemitism in the West and the delegitimisation of the State of Israel. 
  • The situation in Lebanon, where according Saar “the Lebanese Foreign Ministry’s decision to expel the Iranian ambassador has remained on paper only. Just as the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah has also remained on paper only. Just as the Lebanese army’s statement three months ago claiming it had achieved ‘operational control’ in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River – was baseless.”
• Over the weekend Sgt. Moshe Yitzchak Hacohen Katz, a 22-year-old from New Haven, Connecticut, was killed in action in southern Lebanon. Three other soldiers were moderately wounded in the same incident, in which the soldiers came under rocket fire.
• This morning the army announced that Sgt, Litan Ben Zion, 19 from Holon, from the 401st Armoured Brigade was also killed by an anti-tank missile fired at his tank. An officer was seriously wounded in the same incident.    
• In Tel Aviv, Viacheslav Vidment, a 52-year-old resident of Ashdod, was killed by an Iranian missile. Vidment worked as a security guard at a site that had been struck early in the war by an Iranian missile. Vidment did not enter a bomb shelter in response to the air raid siren, and was killed by missile debris that struck him in the head.
• Yesterday, Knesset passed the budget bill for the current fiscal year in a 62 to 55 vote. Failure to pass a budget by March 31 would have led to automatic dissolving of parliament and early elections. Elections are currently scheduled for October of this year. The 850 billion shekel (£203bn)  budget includes 30 billion shekels (£7bn) in supplementary funding for defence, bringing the total defence budget to 142 billion shekels (£34bn).
  • Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich boasted yesterday that “for the first time since 1988, the government will complete its term and has passed four annual budgets, and all that while at war.”
  • Opposition leader Yair Lapid blasted the roughly 6 billion shekels (£1.4bn) of “coalition funds,” mostly sectoral earmarks, in the budget. As an example, he pointed to 49 million shekels (£11.7m) set aside ostensibly to prevent dropouts from yeshiva programmes. “We aren’t stupid,” he said. “We know what a program to prevent dropouts from yeshivas is. It’s a program designed to prevent young Haredi men from enlisting in the IDF.  This isn’t money for security. This is 49 million shekels to damage security (£11.7m).”

Context: Gulf diplomacy had, in the years immediately before the current war, been seen to be moving away from a dependence only on the United States. China and Russia had made inroads, and the Saudis had even concluded a bilateral defence pact with a nearby declared nuclear power, Pakistan. But so far in the current war, that pact hasn’t had any material impact, and in fact Pakistan has positioned itself as a neutral mediator between the US and Iran.

• The UAE is in a particularly tight spot between Israel, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran.
• According to the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, only 17 percent of Iranian missiles and drones have been aimed at Israel in the current war, with the rest targeting Gulf countries. And of the 4,391 targeting the Gulf, 2,156 (nearly half) have targeted the UAE.The Emiratis  have quietly frozen Iranian assets in their country. More than 8,000 Iranian firms have operations in the UAE, something which until the current war effectively helped Iran circumvent sanctions.
• In the months leading up to the war, the UAE was involved in a bitter clash with Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen, with the two countries backing different forces in the effort to contain the Iran-backed Houthis.
• As far as the Pakistani-sponsored mediation, little is known publicly about the progress of diplomatic negotiations.
  • Multiple media reports suggest that the Iranian position, to the extent there is a coherent Iranian position, is more open to compromise than what was suggested by the Iranian proposal for ending the war last week, which was an effective rejection of the US 15-point plan.
  • Internal divisions between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on the one hand, and more radical figures from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the other, are widely seen as contributing to the delayed Iranian response.
  • Reportedly, Iran conveyed a willingness for a significant, but not full, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an immediate US-Israeli ceasefire while negotiations were conducted on other outstanding issues. This proposal was rejected by the Trump administration.
• US officials believe that the mounting economic damage to Iran will exert a pressure on Tehran far greater than the accumulating economic damage Iran has been able to impose on the rest of the world.
• In Iran itself, civil servants have not been paid since the war began, ATM’s have run out of cash, and inflation has risen to 120% on an annualised basis. Even Iran’s much hyped ability to sell oil to neutral countries at imported prices has only yielded about $2 billion in revenue, significantly less than what Iran was able to make from selling oil beforehand at the lower prewar prices.

Looking ahead: The various diplomatic initiatives are taking place on the backdrop of a new US deadline for an agreement and an implied threat for a limited ground operation. The latest extension of President Trump’s ultimatum runs to April 6.

• But the gradual buildup of US marine and airborne forces in the region has led analysts to speculate that an entirely different operation is under consideration.
• The four possibilities most discussed include:
  • Invading and occupying Kharg Island, from which nearly all of Iran’s oil is exported. This would cripple the Iranian economy even further, but it is not clear if this would actually force Tehran to back down. Facilities on the island could be destroyed either in battle or by retreating Iranian forces themselves.
  • Reopening by force the Strait of Hormuz, possibly including a small littoral offensive on the Iranian coast.
  • Taking several disputed islands in the Gulf that have been occupied by Iran since the 1970s, possibly in cooperation with Gulf countries who claim them, most notably the UAE.
  • A complex operation to seize the estimated 450 kg of highly enriched uranium believed to still be in Iran’s possession. The HEU is believed to be buried under two Iranian nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Natanz that were heavily damaged by US air strikes in last June’s war.

What’s happened: Missile attacks from Iran and rocket attacks from Lebanon continued to strike Israeli cities and towns overnight and this morning. Injuries were reported in Kafr Qassem, a large Arab town in central Israel northeast of Tel Aviv, as well as in Shaar Shomron, a small West Bank settlement, and Kiryat Bialik, a suburb of Haifa, from Iranian illegal cluster munitions.

• In the past 24 hours  Hezbollah launched approximately 600 rockets, drones, and mortars toward Israel and IDF soldiers operating  in southern Lebanon.
• Israel’s offensive in Lebanon and Iran continued, even as diplomatic developments lead to changing target priorities on both fronts.
  • An IDF soldier was killed and another was wounded in a firefight in southern Lebanon. Staff Sgt. Ori Greenberg, 21, of the Golani Brigade’s Reconnaissance Unit was killed in an exchange of fire with Hezbollah guerrillas in southern Lebanon early this morning.
  • The IDF reports that several Hezbollah fighters were killed in the operation without giving an exact number. The IDF also released footage this morning of the demolition of a Hezbollah command centre as well as a weapons depot that were both destroyed in an operation by carried out by the Golani Brigade.
  • The IDF also reported this morning that it had successfully eliminated the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, Alireza Tangsiri in Bandar Abbas, the Iranian port on the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz. Tangsiri was the man responsible for the closure of the Strait, which has been the one significant Iranian tactical success in the war so far.
  • The IDF also struck major naval and aerial weapons development sites in Iran yesterday, with particular emphasis on sites in Isfahan. The strikes included Iran’s Underwater Research Centre in Isfahan, the only facility in Iran for the design and development of submarines and support systems for the Iranian Navy.
• The US reported that as of yesterday it had hit 10,000 targets in Iran so far. The number did not include targets hit by Israel.
• Iran publicly rejected the US 15-point plan for ending the war. The proposal was conveyed to Iran by Pakistan, and was believed to offer sanctions relief in exchange for major Iranian concessions on its nuclear programme, ballistic missile programme, support for regional proxies, and the ongoing Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
• In anticipation of a possible US invasion of its strategically important Kharg Island, Iran made several dramatic threats yesterday against the US and its allies. Military officials threatened to target shipping in the Red Sea — something that Iran would be unlikely to pull off on its own, but would indicate the entry into the conflict of its proxy militia in Yemen, the Houthis.
• Iran also claimed that an unnamed Gulf state was planning on joining the US in an invasion of Kharg, and threatened to attack vital infrastructure in that unnamed country if such an invasion were to be launched.
• In Kuwait, six men were arrested over an alleged Hezbollah plot to assassinate Kuwaiti leaders. According to Kuwaiti reports, fourteen more members of the terror cell managed to flee the country before arrest.

Context: Though the positions of the US and Iran are still miles apart, Israeli officials take very seriously the possibility that the US will declare a ceasefire as early as this weekend. This possibility has several implications for how Israel conducts its offensive in the coming days.

• The choice of targets in Iran being hit by the Israeli Air Force has shifted this week to largely military targets, with much less emphasis on regime targets. What this means practically is that Israel is using what might be a limited and closing window of opportunity to degrade as much as possible Iran’s capacity to store, manufacture, or develop weapons that would serve it in future rounds of fighting.
• At the same time, the Israel has scaled back the strikes against Basij and other targets that would weaken the regime and making cracking down on a new uprising after a ceasefire harder. This could either be because of an assessment that the regime is now stable, or that the effort expended on each Basij strike — for example, taking out one checkpoint — is far too high relative to the benefit. If it is really the case that the war could be ending before a decisive blow is delivered to the regime, Israeli decision makers might calculate that it is best to use the time remaining to weaken Iran’s capacity to attack Israel in the future.
• The possibility of a ceasefire also affects Israel’s calculations in Lebanon. Israel has thus far refrained from a large land operation in Lebanon, though it has moved limited forces in and established strongpoints beyond those that were left from the 2024 ceasefire. With most of the Lebanon offensive thus far having been an Air Force operation, and the Air Force needed to put in the final blows in Iran, the Lebanon offensive has been, in the last two days at least, pushed down the priority list.
• There is also a debate in Israel about striking major infrastructure targets in Iran, with serious consideration being given to pushing that before a ceasefire is implemented. The perception in Iran that the Islamic regime has won the war is not just propaganda, but appears to reflect how Iranian officials genuinely believe events have unfolded. To this end, Israeli decision makers, together with many in the Gulf countries too, believe that only significant damage to Iranian energy infrastructure can change that perception, with all the anticipated effects both regionally and domestically.

Looking ahead: Major diplomatic efforts are underway to reach an agreement between Iran and the United States that would bring an end to the current war.

• Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan have positioned themselves as mediators between the two warring parties. Oman, which had mediated talks before the war broke out, has faded somewhat.
• Pakistani efforts have received the most public attention. There were conflicting reports yesterday that US Vice President JD Vance could be headed to Islamabad for indirect talks with the Iranians.
• Meanwhile, Pakistani officials claimed that they conveyed a request to Israel not to eliminate Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and its parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, so that the two men could conduct indirect talks with the US under Pakistani mediation. According to the same Pakistani officials, Israel acceded to the request.

What’s happened: A Hezbollah rocket killed an Israeli woman in northern Israel yesterday. Nuriel Dubin, aged 27, was in her car when a rocket struck the Mahanayim Junction. Her fiancé was injured in the attack. The two had met in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 attack when he was evacuated from his home to a hotel in the Kinneret area where she worked as a teacher.

• Since Hezbollah entered the war on March 2, the Iran-backed terrorist group in Lebanon has been launching an average of 150 rockets a day. Some of its barrages have been timed with Iranian missile attacks on Israel’s north as well. Over the same period, according to official Israeli figures, the IDF has killed 600 Hezbollah combatants, including 220 of the group’s elite Radwan Force.
• In the most significant diplomatic development on Israeli northern border, Lebanon has expelled the Iranian ambassador yesterday and withdrawn their own ambassador from Tehran. This a further escalation of tensions between the two countries, following the expulsion of Iranian military personnel last week.
• Following on the dramatic announcement by President Trump the day before to defer planned attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure, the US yesterday conveyed to Iran a 15-point plan for ending the current war. The text of the plan has not been made public, but according to media reports, it goes far beyond a simple ceasefire and includes details regarding most of the outstanding issues that were being negotiated by the two sides in the weeks prior to the Israeli attacks on Iran in June 2025 and February 2026. These include not just the Iranian nuclear programme, but also the ballistic missile programme and Iran’s support for regional proxies.
• The plan was conveyed through Pakistan, which has emerged as a possible mediator between Iran and the United States, along with Oman, Egypt and Turkey. Notably, there has been no reported mediation role for Qatar, which has found itself on the receiving end of Iranian missile and drone attacks since the current war began.
• President Trump struck an optimistic note regarding the diplomatic process, noting that “we’re talking to the right people,” without revealing who those people were. He alluded cryptically to a significant Iranian concession, without saying what it was. “They gave us a present, and the present arrived today,” Trump said to reporters in the Oval Office. “I’m not going to tell you what that present is, but it was a very significant prize.” Pressed for more details, he would only say that it was “oil- and gas-related.” Other reports during the day indicated that Iran was considering opening the passage through the Straits of Hormuz to non-belligerent countries, something that if implemented would remove a major looming threat to global energy markets.
• With the US threat to attack energy infrastructure off the table until the end of trading this week, oil prices have fallen again to around $90 a barrel on global markets.
• More details were reported today regarding Israel’s air strike on Iran’s Caspian port Bandar Anzali last Wednesday. Satellite images show significant damage to Iran’s naval headquarters and numerous destroyed naval vessels. The IAF hit dozens of targets including warships, a port, a command centre and a shipyard used to repair and maintain vessels. The attack hobbled a smuggling route that was crucial for both Iranian and Russian war efforts and sanctions evasion.
• Meanwhile, the UK has offered to host a security summit about opening the Strait of Hormuz.

Context: The exact text of the American 15-point proposal is unknown.

• However, it  is believed to contain some of the following conditions:
  • Three main nuclear sites in Iran would be dismantled.
  • All enrichment activities in Iran would be banned.
  • The ballistic missile programme would be suspended.
  • Support for regional proxies would be curbed.
  • The Strait of Hormuz would be fully reopened.
  • Sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme would be lifted. Sanctions connected to human rights abuses would stay in place.
  • The United States would provide direct assistance for Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, while also monitoring it.
• It is unclear what the US propose to do with the 450kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and whether they will seek to remove it or dilute it.
• The Iranians have also made a list of demands for an agreement with the US. Some of them would be extraordinary gains for Iran even if the war had been characterised by stunning Iranian military successes, which it decidedly has not been. These demands include:
  • Turning the Strait of Hormuz into an Iranian-managed passageway where Iran would collect fees, similar to the Suez Canal — though of course, the Suez Canal artificial and located inside Egypt and the Strait of Hormuz in an international waterway.
  • Guarantees that neither Israel nor the US could attack Iran again, together with a guarantee that Israel could not attack Lebanon.
  • The lifting of all sanctions on Iran, not just those related to the nuclear programme.
  • Permitting Iran to keep and develop ballistic missiles with no limitations.
• Israeli officials remain sceptical regarding the prospects of an agreement along the lines of either proposal. To the extent one can be reached, Israel is concerned that the implementation will run along the lines of ceasefires with Hamas and Hezbollah, with the major steps called for in the beginning carried out in full, but with the provisions regarding disarmament dragging on to the point where attention lags, urgency fades, and the threat to renew hostilities in light of violations becomes ineffective.

Looking ahead: In the meantime, US continues to move Marines and airborne forces into the theatre of conflict, raising the possibility of a limited land manoeuvre either on Kharg Island or on shore of the Hormuz Strait. 3,000 troops are reported to have arrived already. 2,200 more Marines are due on Friday.

• Even a successful agreement on Iran won’t necessarily end the current fighting in Lebanon where Israel has yet to embark on a large land offensive. Israel destroyed five more bridges of the Litani River over the past 48 hours, and according to Defence Minister Katz, “the IDF will control the remaining bridges and the security zone up to the Litani.”

What’s happened: Two Israelis, an elderly couple in their 70’s, were killed in an Iranian missile attack on Ramat Gan overnight. The couple were at home during the attack, but did not manage to make it to the safe room in their apartment in time. The missile fired at central Israel contained a cluster munition, which splits into multiple small explosives distributed over a broad area. Its use over an urban area, targeting civilians is a war crime.

• An Israeli air strike eliminated Irans’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, who had been functioning as Iran’s de facto wartime leader. He was killed in a strike on a safe house in a suburb of Tehran.
• At the same time, a separate attack targeted a meeting of top commanders of the notorious Basij, the regime’s internal security force largely responsible for the massacre of tens of thousands of Iranian protesters in January. This strike eliminated at least ten senior Basij commanders, including the force’s top commander Gholamreza Reza Soleimani and his deputy, Rasem Qureishi.
• A later strike targeted Iran’s intelligence minister, Esmaeil Khatib. This morning, Israel’s Defence Minister Katz announced that Khatib, whose ministry supported global terrorism as well brutal domestic repression, was eliminated. 
• Hezbollah launched another massive barrage of rockets on northern Israel last night, similar to the one it launched six days before. Like the March 11 attacks, this one involved about 200 rockets, many of which fell short and landed in Lebanon.
• Unlike on March 11, this time the Israeli Home Front Command did not wait until just one hour before to share with the public that an attack was planned. The attacks caused some limited damage but no injuries or deaths in Israel.
• In Gaza, an Israeli air strike killed Yahya Abu Labda, a commander in Hamas’s supply and logistics department who was responsible for advancing Hamas’ “precision missile project,” according the the IDF Spokesperson.

Context: Whilst the targeted eliminations at the beginning of the war demonstrated impressive intelligence penetration, it also relied on the element of surprise. The strikes against the top brass of the Iranian security apparatus yesterday and overnight show the dynamic capability of Israeli intelligence to be able to locate high value targets, even when they know they are being targeted.

• Israeli analysts have noted that the elimination of Ali Larijani may be even more significant than that of the Supreme Leader, as it was Larijani that was a more hands on decision maker and more central both to the war and the repression of Iranian protestors.  
• Israeli officials hold out two metrics for assessing damage to the IRGC in general and the Basij in particular. First, they look to see whether command and control is disrupted. Second, they look for defections.
• On the first measure there appears to be broad success. Giving orders and responding to tactical developments is becoming increasingly impossible for Iranian armed forces of all kinds.
• On the second measure, nothing has moved yet. No prominent defections have been recorded. No senior officials have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. And despite scattered media reports which may themselves be psychological warfare, there are no significant incidents of forces abandoning post or laying down arms.
• A report in The Guardian yesterday suggests that the UK national security adviser Jonathan Powell had attended some of the indirect talks conducted between the US and Iran before the war began on February 28. However, according to Bloomberg, Downing Street has denied that Powell was present at the negotiations.
• The Guardian report aimed to present the Iranian position as moderate, compromising, and “surprisingly” reasonable. However, even the most generous interpretation of the last Iranian offer would have left it with nuclear capabilities far beyond any of the red lines set by the Americans.
• Moreover, the Iranian offer contained nothing regarding the other issues which the US had put down as priorities for any kind of deal: the missile programme, Iran’s network of regional proxies, and its repression of anti-regime protests in January.
• The bit of The Guardian which made the biggest splash (and was used to promote it on social media) was a quote, initially attributed to Powell, that US negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff were “Israeli assets that dragged a president into a war he wants to get out of.” A corrected version of the article removed that attribution and instead attributed the quote to an unnamed diplomat from a Gulf country, the attribution the quote retains in a longer subsequent article the Guardian ran today, which once more prominently featured this assessment of the US negotiators.
• Regardless of the provenance of the quote, this description of Witkoff and Kushner is ironic from an Israeli perspective as throughout the entire lead up to the war, officials in Jerusalem regarded the two as the biggest obstacles to a firmer US line on Iran. Leaks from Israeli officials routinely derided both as desperate to reach a deal, even an inadequate one, with Tehran, while most Israelis were finding a more receptive opening with Secretaries Rubio and Hegseth.
• At the same time, both Kushner and Witkoff are Jewish. That a Gulf official would see two senior US officials who happen to be Jewish as “Israeli assets” driving America to a war it does’t want isn’t terribly surprising. That officials in Whitehall or editors at the Guardian see this not as a window into the prevailing views in the Arab world but rather as a deep revelation about what happened behind the scenes is, to say the least, a cause for concern.
• Insinuations about nefarious influence weren’t limited to the British left yesterday. A senior aide to Tulsi Gabbard, President Trump’s controversial Director of National Intelligence, Joe Kent resigned from the Trump Administration yesterday over his opposition to the war in Iran.
• Joe Kent’s appointment to the position last year was met with a great deal of opposition following his close associations with an assortment of neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other far-right figures. His resignation letter, like the Guardian’s reporting, alleged that the United States were fighting the war in Iran for Israel and not for US interests.
• It further insinuated that both the war in Iraq two decade ago as well as the allied campaign against ISIS in the last decade — in which his wife, a naval intelligence officer, was killed — were both caused by Israel.
• In fact, Israel played no part in the Iraq War in 2003, and Israeli Prime Minister was later revealed to have privately warned the US against the war for fear that it might strengthen Iran. The campaign against ISIS too did not involve Israel in any way. At many points, in fact, Israel’s opposition to pro-Iranian forces in both Iraq and Syria led many commentators to (falsely) accuse Israel of supporting ISIS, making Kent’s accusation not just a lie, but a deeply ironic one.

Looking ahead: Despite a large call-up of reserves and frequent pronouncements by senior Israeli officials about an imminent ground operation in southern Lebanon, there has been so significant movement of the IDF across the border.

• In the background, several countries, including France among others, have floated proposals for negotiations between Jerusalem and Beirut for an agreement that would prevent an expanded war.
• It is unclear if any of these initiatives might lead to serious negotiations, and they are treated, in public at least, with great scepticism. At the same time, the large military offensive that was expected already last week has not been launched. Defence Minister Katz also alluded to more “significant surprises” to come.