Photo by Avi Ohayon (GPO)

• There are a series of intense four-party diplomatic negotiations ongoing to see if normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia can be reached.
• The US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinians each have a list of demands and priorities, with the challenge being to reconcile them.
• The confluence of interests is such that normalisation has become a key priority for all three major parties to the process: US President Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman.
• Unlike their harsh criticism and boycotting of the Abraham Accords process, the Palestinians have engaged with the Saudis to represent their interests.

Israel-US track

• Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met Wednesday with US President Biden. The two spoke for an hour at a hotel in Manhattan. Despite Netanyahu waiting nine months and meeting in a New York hotel and not the White House, nevertheless Biden’s approach appeared warm, in recognition of their long standing friendship of over four decades.
• Biden immediately eased concerns by suggesting that Netanyahu will be invited to the White House before the end of the year.
• In the context of a deal with Saudi Arabia, Israel’s three key objectives are:
  • Building a united front against Iranian aggression.
  • Bringing an end to the century long Arab-Israeli conflict.
  • Securing enhanced US security support whilst maintaining Israeli freedom of action.
• On preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon, Netanyahu said that “that shared goal of ours can be achieved by a credible military threat, crippling sanctions and supporting the brave men and women of Iran who despise that regime and who are our real partners for a better future.”
• On the significance of Israel-Saudi normalisation, Netanyahu said: “I think such a peace would go a long way… to advance the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, achieve reconciliation between the Islamic world and the Jewish state.”
• With both the Saudis and Americans eager for a deal to include a significant gesture to or progress with the Palestinians, Netanyahu appeared open to the idea, saying that normalisation could “advance a genuine peace between Israel and the Palestinians.” He nonetheless clarified that “Palestinians should be part of the process but shouldn’t have a veto over the process.”
• A senior administration official later suggested that Netanyahu knew he would “have to do some very hard things” including “some component related to the fundamental issue between Israelis and Palestinians.”
• On judicial reform, a White House statement suggested that Biden expressed “concern about any fundamental changes to Israel’s democratic system, absent the broadest possible consensus.” He further championed the “democratic values that lie at the heart of our partnership, including checks and balances in our systems.”

The Saudi position

• In his most extensive English language interview ever, released shortly after the Netanyahu-Biden meeting, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) confirmed that “every day we get closer” to a normalisation deal.
• Saudi priorities include:
  • Security guarantees from the US, in the form of a defence pact and the sale of advance weapons, e.g. F-35 fighter jets.
  • US approval of and assistance with a civilian nuclear programme. Including, most controversially, uranium enrichment on Saudi soil.
  • Israeli concessions towards the Palestinians.
• “For us, the Palestinian issue is very important,” he said. “We need to solve that part… And we have a good negotiations strategy til now. We got to see where we go. We hope that will reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians and get Israel as a player in the Middle East.”
• The most striking admission of the interview came when MBS confirmed that an Iranian nuclear weapon would trigger the Saudi pursuit of one, which experts fear would elicit a further nuclear arms race in the region featuring Turkey and Egypt.
• Regarding the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon, MBS warned that “If they get one, we have to get one, for security reasons and the balance of power in the Middle East. But we don’t want to see that.”
• MBS, for his part, sees a deal in the context of his wider ‘2030’ effort to modernise the Saudi kingdom.

Saudi demands on the Palestinians’ behalf

• A senior delegation acting on behalf of Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently visited Riyadh to make explicit their demands. Reports have suggested that in a radical departure from the traditional Palestinian position demanding immediate recognition of a Palestinian state, the PA has indicated a willingness to accept an interim agreement were it to include the following components:
  • Transferring more areas of the West Bank to Palestinian autonomy.
  • A commitment that East Jerusalem will be the capital of a future Palestinian state.
  • An Israeli commitment towards an eventual two-state solution.
  • The reopening of the PLO office in Washington DC, previously closed by President Trump.
  • Approving orderly payments for Palestinian prisoners without Israeli reductions.
  • The reopening of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem.
  • The Palestinians gaining full representation at the United Nations.
  • The freezing of Israeli building in new West Bank settlements.
  • The issuing of Palestinian building permits in Area C (currently under full Israeli control).
  • The strengthening of the PA’s security forces.

The US Agenda

• Normalisation is a huge opportunity for the US to redraw the diplomatic map with historic consequences.
• By bringing Israel and Saudi together, the US reinforces its alliances and influence in the Middle East and thwarts growing Chinese-Russian-Iranian confluence of interests.
• All of which would be a major diplomatic dividend for Biden to take into presidential elections in a year’s time.

There remain weighty challenges to reconciling each side’s demands

• The ability to enrich uranium on Saudi soil is of profound importance to MBS.
• The initial posture of both Israel and the US is one of shared concern over the threat of nuclear proliferation. On Saudi nuclear enrichment, it is understood that US and Israeli concerns are identical. A senior Israeli official said of Washington and Jerusalem’s approach to the nuclear question: “we’ve seen completely eye to eye right from the start. On what we cannot do and what it is we might be able to do,” adding that Israel would insist on “a lot” of safeguards.
• Netanyahu has tasked the Ministry of Defence, Mossad, the IDF, and Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission to fully assess the ramifications of a Saudi civilian nuclear project and present a united position.
• Under what is known as the ‘Begin Doctrine’, the consistent Israeli policy is to oppose the spread of nuclear capability in the region. Even if the current Saudi ruling elite is in earnest in its insistence that its ambitions are purely civilian, it cannot be guaranteed that future regimes will not use the technology to embark on a weapons programme, especially in the event of Iran acquiring this capability.
• In an effort to reach a normalisation agreement, creative options are being pursued, including Saudi collaboration with US counterparts on a potential US-run uranium-enrichment operation in Saudi Arabia. US oversight over enrichment would provide some reassurance on the purely civilian character of the programme.
• Safeguards could include the ability to perform a remote shutdown of enrichment facilities, though this technology is not fool-proof.
• The list of Palestinian demands above is being viewed as a “wish-list”, not all of which can be realistically delivered. For example, the US do not accept the idea of full Palestinian representation at the UN at this point. Israel is also highly unlikely to accept a settlement freeze or the transfer of territory.
• Earlier this week, 12 Likud MKs sent a letter to Netanyahu warning that “We will agree to peace only in exchange for peace,” and that there could be “no concessions on the homeland.”
• Netanyahu’s determination to secure normalisation could find him in conflict with his own party’s right flank and coalition partners Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir who will assuredly oppose any concessions to the White House on either the Palestinian or judicial reform fronts.
• The Biden administration could face opposition from the left flank of the Democratic party which is wary of closer ties with the Saudis (a wariness previously shared with Biden himself) and likely to push for Israeli concessions to the Palestinians more substantial than those sought by the Saudis or even the Palestinian Authority.
• Nor are Biden’s hurdles provided only by to those to his left. The defence alliance also demanded by the Saudis, including the sale of advanced US weapons, will require two-thirds of the Senate to ratify. Thus, even if he succeeds in persuading all Democratic senators to vote in favour, a substantial number of rival Republicans will also have to support it. Knowing that they will be affording Biden a major victory in the leadup to a presidential election, this could be a tough sell. Biden’s estimation is that only Netanyahu (and his close advisor Ron Dermer) can convince sufficient Republicans to cross the aisle.
• All parties to the potential deal are aware that its achievement is likelier under a Democratic administration than a Republican, since Democratic lawmakers are unlikely to set their concerns over both the Saudi regime and the Israeli coalition aside in support of a Republican administration. The window of opportunity is thus ever narrowing.

Looking ahead: At 1415 UK time, Netanyahu will address the UN. He will expound the benefits of ‘widening the circle of peace’ and the necessity of the international community addressing Iranian nuclear ambition, regional destabilisation, and international terrorism.

• Netanyahu may also highlight the economic dividends of an Israel-Saudi agreement, building upon Biden’s G20 announcement of a trade corridor from India, through the Middle East, to Europe, and the opportunities for all parties to expand economic and energy cooperation.
• Due to the Palestinian demands and his own domestic issues, observers will be keenly watching the language the prime minister uses on the Palestinian issue.
• The complexities of the situation described above mean that normalisation negotiations are likely to continue over the next few months.
• The White House confirmed that an invitation to Netanyahu for a formal visit would be forthcoming for some time before January 2024.
• Biden and Netanyahu also agreed to work towards holding a third summit between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the US, Egypt and Jordan in the near future, after those at Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh.
• US comments also referenced “the likely convening soon of a ministerial meeting” of the Negev Forum, which will bring together Israel, the US, Egypt, and Abraham Accord countries. Israeli officials suggested it will be held in Morocco next month.
• Were Israel and Saudi Arabia to reach agreement with the US on a defence pact, it is likely that other regional allies (e.g. Jordan, Egypt, the UAE) will look for similar guarantees.
• In the longer term, achieving normalisation with Saudi Arabia would likely open up Israel to normalised relations with the wider Muslim world, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Photo by Avi Ohayon (GPO)

What happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu held a series of meetings yesterday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

• All the meetings focused on bilateral ties, with most also addressing broader regional issues, including the Iranian threat and the potential normalisation with Saudi Arabia.
• Netanyahu was accompanied by Minster Dermer, National Security Adviser Hanegbi, senior staff and Director of Mossad Barnea.
• Netanyahu was ‘greeted’ by dozens of demonstrators outside their hotel protesting the domestic judicial reform. In addition, hundreds gathered in Times Square to protest.
• Earlier in the trip, Netanyahu was forced to clarify comments that accused the Israeli demonstrators of joining forces with Iran and the PLO. According to Netanyahu’s office, “When the Prime Minister used the term ‘joining forces,’ he was referring to the fact that while the Prime Minister of Israel represents the State of Israel on the UN stage, Israeli citizens, together with supporters of the PLO and the BDS movement, would be protesting outside at the same time, something that has never happened before. One can only hope that the Israeli protesters will take at least a few minutes also to protest against those who deny Israel’s right to exist.”
• Netanyahu first meeting yesterday was with Paraguayan President Santiago Peña, confirming that the Paraguayan Embassy in Jerusalem would reopen, as would the Israeli Embassy in Asunción.
• In parallel yesterday, in Jerusalem the new British Ambassador to Israel Simon Walters presented his credentials to President Herzog. The President noted, “Britain has an important standing in the Middle East. There are many areas for our governments to discuss, chief among them the issue of Iran.”
• The Ambassador responded saying, “Iran is not only a threat to the Middle East, but a threat to the entire world. The British Government’s position regarding Iran has been very firm.”

Meeting Ukrainian President Zelenskyy: This was their first meeting since Russia invaded Ukraine.

• Netanyahu emphasised that Israel would continue to assist Ukraine on humanitarian issues, but due to Israel’s sensitive predicament with Russia’s role in Syria, would not be supplying military aid.
• Zelenskyy is keen for Israel to do more, but said that overall he is satisfied with relations with Israel.
• Israel recently announced that it would extend the financial assistance given to Ukrainian refugees in Israel.
• It was notable that at the photo-op at the beginning of the meeting, after the formal handshakes with the Israeli delegation, Zelenskyy gave Mossad Director Barnea a warm hug, suggesting familiarity.

Meeting Turkish President Erdogan: This was the first time Erdogan and Netanyahu have ever met in person.

• After several years of tension, bilateral relations have improved over the last couple years, particularly in trade and economic ties. The thaw began when Erdogan reached out to President Herzog in summer 2021.
• Last year an Iranian terror cell targeted Israelis in Istanbul. The attack was thwarted in a joint effort between Mossad and Turkish intelligence. Yesterday Netanyahu thanked Erdogan for that security cooperation.
• They also exchanged reciprocal invitations to visit each other’s county. Turkey celebrates the 100^th anniversary of its Independence later this year. Erdogan is understood to be keen to include a visit to Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem to mark the occasion.

Meeting German Chancellor Olaf Scholz:  Netanyahu thanked the chancellor for his commitment to Israel, for Germany’s commitment to the security of Israel, and for preserving the special relationship.

• As Germany is part of the E3, the pair focused on Iran’s belligerent behaviour, most recently preventing the IAEA inspectors from accessing their nuclear installations.
• The two countries enjoy strong bilateral security cooperation. Germany supplies Israel with advanced submarines, whilst Israel recently agreed to supply Germany with the advance Arrow 3 missile defence system, worth £3bn.
• Relating to the prospect of an agreement with Saudi Arabia, Netanyahu told Scholz it would not involve significant concessions to the Palestinians. He compared it to the Abraham Accords, saying, “their significance is the removal of the Palestinian veto on the peace process with the Arab states.” Instead, Netanyahu said that he was prepared to make economic and civilian good will gestures.

Inside the General Assembly: In his remarks, Biden championed “the groundbreaking effort… to connect India to Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel [which] will spur opportunities and investment across two continents.”

• “This is part of our effort,” he continued, “to build a more sustainable, integrated Middle East.  It demonstrates how Israel’s greater normalisation and economic connection with its neighbours is delivering positive and practical impacts even as we continue to work tirelessly to support a just and lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians — two states for two people.”
• During Iranian President Raisi’s speech, Israel’s Ambassador to the UN Gilad Erdan walked through the assembly holding a picture of Mahsa Amini, the Iranian woman whose killing by the regime sparked mass protest last year, with the caption “Iranian women deserve freedom now”. Erdan then walked out of the hall in protest against the UN’s enabling of “the butcher of Tehran”.

Looking ahead: All this is a prelude to Netanyahu’s most important meeting. This afternoon at 1515 UK time, Netanyahu will meet with US President Joe Biden. This is to be their first meeting since Netanyahu’s re-election nine months ago, and is expected to focus on the possibility of a US led deal on Israel-Saudi Arabian normalisation.

• Later today Netanyahu is also due to meet with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.
• Israel’s Foreign Minister Cohen is also in New York and due to meet more than 20 foreign ministers including from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Greece, Singapore, and Azerbaijan.

What happened: Accusations continue to fly in Israel following reports of a secret meeting in Rome that caused major demonstrations in Libya and led to the firing of the Foreign Minister.

• On Sunday evening, following rumours on social media, Israel released a statement confirming that Foreign Minister Eli Cohen last week met with the Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush in Italy “with the aim of studying options of cooperation and ties between both countries, as well as the protection of the Libyan Jewish heritage.”
• Protests subsequently erupted in Libya and Mangoush was fired by the Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh.
• Having fled to Istanbul, she claimed that the Prime Minister authorised her to disclose the meeting and added that she and Cohen met spontaneously at an event at the Italian Foreign Ministry, “It was a casual, unplanned meeting. We did not engage in diplomatic steps or fostering relations.”
• Libya’s Foreign Ministry also emphasised that that the meeting between the two sides was “unplanned and incidental.” It added that the meeting did not include “discussions, agreements, or consultations,” and that Tripoli “outright rejects” normalisation with Israel.
• Cohen was roundly criticised by Israeli politicians and security officials. Opposition Chairman Yair Lapid said: “This is what happens when Eli Cohen, a person with no background in the field, is appointed foreign minister for just a year. The incident with the Libyan foreign minister was amateurish, irresponsible, and a serious failure in judgment. This is a morning of national disgrace and risking human lives for the sake of a headline.”
• Channel 12 News reported officials from Mossad: “The minister’s behaviour caused enormous damage to a relationship that was quietly and cautiously cultivated in recent years. He burned the bridge. That is irreparable.”
• Walla News reported that American sources believe the publication of the meeting caused “great damage to the normalisation”.
• Israeli political officials argued that it had been agreed that the meeting would be publicised. Cohen responded to criticism, saying that “It’s a shame that political rivals who failed to advance any meaningful achievement have rushed to react without knowing the details and have accused [me] of a leak that never happened. The attacks won’t deter the Foreign Ministry and its employees.”
• On Tuesday morning, a statement from the Prime Minister’s Office demanded that cabinet ministers inform PM Netanyahu of any covert diplomatic activity. Two government sources told Haaretz that Netanyahu knew that the Foreign Ministry was in contact with the Libyan government based in Tripoli. They were unable to confirm what was agreed on between him and Cohen regarding the announcement.

Context: Since the Abraham Accords in 2020 between Israel, UAE, Bahrain and later Morocco, Israel has sought to expand its relations in the Arab and Muslim world.

• Libya has largely been at war since a NATO-backed uprising in 2011. It split in 2014 between warring eastern (Benghazi) and western (Tripoli) factions, though open conflict has mostly paused since a ceasefire in 2020.
• In March 2021, a Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli with Dbeibeh as the internationally-recognised prime minister was installed through a UN-backed process in 2021 aimed at holding elections later that year which were cancelled because of disputes over the rules.
• In March 2022 the country was divided again when the eastern-based parliament formed the rival Government of National Stability (GNS) under the leadership of prime minister Fathi Bashagha.
• Israel and Libya have never enjoyed formal ties. However, contacts reportedly took place between the former ruler Muammar Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam and Israeli officials.
• In 2021, the son of Khalifa Haftar, who ruled the eastern part of Libya, reportedly visited Israel for a secret meeting with Israeli officials in which he offered to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries in return for Israeli support.
• In January Dbeibeh reportedly discussed the idea of normalising relations with Israel with CIA Director William Burns. Sources in Libya suggest Dbeibeh was attempting to buy Washington’s backing for his government.
• The Mossad’s Tevel Division is responsible for Israel-Libya relations and has cultivated those ties over a long period of time, behind the scenes and with a great deal of sensitivity.

Looking Ahead: Questions remains as to how the domestic response in Libya will impact attempts to promote normalisation between Israel and other Arab and Muslim countries in the near future.

• Nonetheless, discussions between US, Israeli, and Saudi officials over normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia continue.
• Israeli and American officials fear that given the response to the revelation of the meeting, other countries might be deterred from publicising their covert relations with Israel public.

What happened: US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken completed his visit to the region having first met Egyptian President Sisi in Cairo and then engaged with a range of Israeli figures before travelling to Ramallah to see Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

• During his meeting with Abbas, Blinken expressed “sorrow for the innocent Palestinian civilians who have lost their lives in escalating violence over the last year”, while also condemning Palestinian celebrations of last Friday’s deadly terror attack in Jerusalem.
• Blinken also criticised the PA for its announcement of a suspension of security cooperation with Israel.
• Later, in his final press conference back in Jerusalem, Blinken professed “deep concern about the current trajectory”, with his fears for the prospects for a two-state solution focussed chiefly on Israeli actions and proposals by coalition figures.
• “The United States will continue to oppose anything that puts that goal further from reach,” he said, “including but not limited to settlement expansion, legalisation of illegal outposts, moves toward annexation of the West Bank, disruptions to the historic status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites, demolitions and evictions, and incitement and acquiescence to violence.”
• At their Monday meeting, both Netanyahu and Blinken stressed the closeness of US-Israeli ties and urged the extension of the Abraham Accords, though with the Prime Minister acknowledging Blinken’s reservation that “these efforts are not a substitute for progress between Israelis and Palestinians”. “Expanding the circle of peace,” said Netanyahu, “working to close, finally, the file of the Arab-Israeli conflict I think would also help us achieve a workable solution with our Palestinian neighbours.”
• In his own comments, Blinken hinted at US concerns over the new Israeli government’s policy direction by noting that the bilateral relationship was one which included “holding ourselves to the mutual standards we’ve established; and by speaking frankly and respectfully, as friends do, when we agree and when we do not.”
• He then became more specific, with remarks widely interpreted as urging Israeli caution on judicial reform. Stressing US-Israel shared values, he said: “That includes our support for core democratic principles and institutions, including respect for human rights, the equal administration of justice for all, the equal rights of minority groups, the rule of law, free press, a robust civil society.”
• In an implicit endorsement of the protest movement, Blinken added that “the vibrancy of Israel’s civil society has been on full display of late.” In an unusual move, he also found time to meet with a range of civil society leaders, including representatives of organisations promoting coexistence, ultra-Orthodox employment, and LGBTQ rights.
• In remarks designed to assuage American concerns over judicial reform, Netanyahu referred to the US and Israel as “two strong democracies which will remain, I assure you, two strong democracies.”
• On Iran, while Netanyahu placed the focus on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activity, Blinken was careful to include its arming of Russia in his remarks. Adding, “Russia’s ongoing atrocities only underscore the importance of providing support for all of Ukraine’s needs – humanitarian, economic, and security.”
• Blinken continued this theme in his discussions with Foreign Minister Eli Cohen. “We appreciate Israel’s humanitarian assistance,” said Blinken, adding that “we look forward to discussing what more can we do.”
• In his meeting with Blinken, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant championed the “exceptional” recent joint military exercise, “Juniper Oak”, as emblematic of the close and unbreakable bond of cooperation enjoyed by both nations.

Context: Blinken’s visit came in the wake of Friday’s deadly terror attack; the largest ever US-Israeli joint military exercise; and American concern over the new Israeli government’s judicial reform agenda.

• The visit follows US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s trip two weeks ago and a more recent trip made by CIA director William Burns.
• Blinken’s interventions on democracy and judicial reform came as the government’s proposals continue to prove hugely divisive. Yesterday again saw hi tech workers join protests against the planned changes.
• Blinken’s channelled President Herzog’s recent calls by recognising that “building consensus for new proposals is the most effective way to ensure they’re embraced and that they endure.”
• The PA announced the suspension of security cooperation in the wake of last Thursday’s Israeli raid in Jenin. It has previously withdrawn cooperation while retaining some on the ground cooperation. Indeed, in conversation with CIA director William Burns on Sunday, Abbas hinted for the first time that intelligence sharing with the Israelis was ongoing and that full engagement could be resumed in future.
• Over 180 Palestinians have been killed since the beginning of 2022, though in Israel’s assessment over 90% were members of terror organisations or active combatants.
• Cohen took office promising to “talk less” on Russia-Ukraine, but has recently confirmed that he is shortly to become the first Middle Eastern foreign minister to visit Kyiv since the start of the Russian invasion.
• The Juniper Oak military exercise, widely interpreted as a signal to Iran of US-Israeli preparedness, was the largest joint exercise the two states have conducted. It included close to 8,000 troops combined and tested some of the militaries most advanced technology.
• Also on the Israel – US bilateral agenda is Israel’s access to the US visa waiver programme, with talks ongoing.

Looking ahead: Netanyahu plans to visit the US soon for further bilateral discussions on Iran and other shared security concerns.

• Ahead of Cohen’s Kyiv visit, it remains to be seen whether Israel will respond to Blinken’s urging and alter the careful balance it has struck on Russia-Ukraine. In remarks to CNN immediately after Blinken’s departure, Netanyahu claimed to be “certainly looking into” increased military support to Ukraine, and highlighted Israeli cooperation in transferring a stockpile of Israeli-based US weapons to Kyiv.
• The Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee yesterday continued its discussions on judicial reform proposals.

What happened: An Iranian weapons factory in Isfahan was targeted by quadcopter drones carrying explosives.

• It is unclear how much damage was caused, with videos showing an explosion (and possibly a secondary explosion – suggesting the presence of explosive material) causing a substantial fire.
• According to Iranian officials, they successfully shot down two drones, with a third causing “minor damage” to the factory roof.
• Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, confirmed the attack yesterday but claimed that “a cowardly drone attack on a military site in central Iran will not impede Iran’s progress on its peaceful nuclear programme.”
• Israeli media has reported four quadcopters caused significant damage to the miliary installation which manufactured Shahed-136 drones (the type supplied to Russia) as well as ballistic missiles.
• According to the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, it was Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad who was responsible for the strikes, though no Israeli officials have confirmed this.
• In a separate incident there were reports of a convoy of trucks belonging to the IRGC that was targeted crossing the border into Syria from Iraq.  Al-Arabiya reported that the aircraft fired warning shots to allow the truck drivers to escape.  The Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Mayadeen network reported that the attack targeted three Iranian trucks that were part of a convoy of 25 trucks.

Context: If Israel was responsible, this appears to be Israel’s first attack inside Iran since Prime Minister Netanyahu returned to office.

• Whoever was responsible for the attack exhibited impressive technological ability, precise intelligence and operation by agents on the ground (the quadcopters only have a only a modest range).
• This is understood to be at least the fourth Israeli attack inside Iran since Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the head of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme was assassinated in November 2020.
• Since then advanced centrifuges in Natanz were targeted in April 2021 and in Karaj in June that year.
• In February 2022 Iran’s main manufacturing and storage demo for military drones in Kermanshah was targeted after two armed drones were launched towards Israel (and shot down over Iraq). In that strike it is estimated that hundreds of Iranian drones were destroyed.
• Quadcopters could have been used in that strike and have also been deployed in other attacks, including the targeting of a factory producing precision guided missiles inside Lebanon in August 2019.
• Isfahan is one of Iran’s largest and most advanced missile production, research and development sites. These weapons were designated for Iranian proxies across the region that threaten Israel, as well as to potentially supply Russia to be used in Ukraine.
• The target of the strike near the Iraq- Syria border appears to resemble a similar convoy of weapons smuggling that outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Kochavi claimed was targeted in a preventative Israeli strike in December 2022.
• These strikes took place just days after the largest ever Israel – US military drill. It also coincided with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William J. Burns, visiting Israel.

Looking ahead: US Secretary of State Blinken arrives in Israel today. This afternoon he is expected to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Herzog. Iran, expanding the Abraham Accords, US-Israeli security cooperation, Palestinian violence, and judicial reform are all on the agenda.