What’s happened: Another IDF officer was killed in combat with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon yesterday. Maj. (res.) Itamar Sapir from the settlement Eli was 27 years old. His unit was operating in the Lebanese village of Qouza when a Hezbollah gunman surprised the forces by exiting the village church and opening fire.

• Israeli Navy troops completed the interception of the flotilla to Gaza and placed all 430 activists on board Israeli vessels. Around fifty vessels were boarded and are presently en route to the port of Ashdod, where the activists will be detained before deportation. Israeli officials were keen to point out the absence of actual aid onboard the ships.
• A report in The New York Times based largely on anonymous American claimed that Israel and the United States sought to install former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as leader of Iran in a complex and ultimately unsuccessful effort to topple the Iranian regime in the initial days of the war earlier this year.
• The article detailed how an air strike that appeared to miss Ahmadinejad right after the war broke out on February 28 had in fact successfully taken out the IRGC forces who were enforcing his informal house arrest.
• The article hinted heavily that Ahmadinejad had been in contact with Israeli intelligence before the war broke out, citing an investigation in New Lines magazine, an outlet that is widely seen as a pro-Qatari organ (though not identified as such in The New York Times article).
• Ahmadinejad’s record of anti-Israel provocations and Holocaust denial would make him an astonishing partner, to say the least. And it is always possible (though, again, not mentioned in the article), that such a leak is deliberately designed to scuttle his political standing in Iran and increase regime paranoia about its penetration by Israeli intelligence.

Context: The losses of IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon, particularly in the context of the “ceasefire,” are taking a toll on morale both in public opinion and in the IDF. Soldiers and officers express mounting frustration with the terms of the ceasefire which, informally, restrict offensive Israel action outside of Israel’s zone of control in southern Lebanon, while leaving soldiers there exposed to Hezbollah fire. Hezbollah arms depots and senior leaders are mostly north of the Litani River, where the IDF has largely refrained from action in keeping with US requests not to disrupt the negotiations with Iran.

• Twenty-two Israelis have been killed in Lebanon since the war began on March 2. Eight have been killed since the ceasefire was announced on April 16.
• The Lebanese Health Ministry reported earlier this week that the death toll in Lebanon from the renewed fighting with Israel since March has now topped 3,000. The official figures do not distinguish between combatant and noncombatant casualties, but they do include 292 women and 211 children. With 83% of the reported fatalities comprising adult men. This would indicate a low level of civilian casualties in the war so far. Israeli officials believe the Lebanese figure may be an undercount as not all Hezbollah fatalities are  reported to Lebanese officials.
• The ceasefire which brought an end to high-intensity hostilities on April 16 was originally set to last ten days. It was informally renewed to allow further negotiations, while its scope was also informally narrowed by all sides. The renewed ceasefire was due to expire May 17, but just before that deadline, a US-brokered agreement between Lebanon and Israel formally extended the ceasefire by another 45 days, bringing its scheduled expiration up to July 1. Observers on all sides are sceptical it could hold up if fighting resumes in the Iranian theatre.
• A resumption of active combat in the Iranian theatre will presumably end those restrictions and free Israeli forces to take more aggressive action against Hezbollah targets deep in Lebanon. But there are two countervailing implications to this:
  • First, Israel’s north will presumably once more come under massive Hezbollah rocket fire — and this at a time when Israeli officials are determined not to repeat what is widely seen as the mistake of mass evacuations which happened in 2023-2024.
  • Second, the IAF will be busy hitting targets in Iran and have fewer planes and munitions to set aside for the Lebanese theatre.
• President Trump’s statement on Monday that “a very major attack” had been postponed at the last minute this week at the request of three US Gulf allies — Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia — prompted a renewed interest in the conflicting desires of these countries. The claim itself was met with a mix of confirmation, denial, and some scepticism. Competing explanations  were offered including speculation that data-sharing from Russia and China to Iran meant that much of the attack had to be reconsidered, and that this could have been a bigger reason for the delay.
• Israeli analysts frequently point to the divergent messages Gulf leaders give in public and in private on the Iran issue.
  • Publicly, they all favour continuing the diplomatic track and view any US or Israeli military operation as destabilising.
  • Privately, they are reported to support a decisive blow the Islamist regime.
• Some grumble that the status quo, with no diplomatic settlement and no open conflict, is actually the worst for them as they pay a high economic and political cost for the parallel blockades imposed on either side of the Hormuz Strait by Iran and the United States.
• Among the Gulf countries are competing interests and differing geographies at stake as well. Qatar is in a uniquely difficult position geographically, with no outlet to global shipping that doesn’t go through Hormuz. Both the UAE and the Saudis have alternative sea outlets as well as pipeline infrastructure to serve them. The Emiratis have two ports on the Gulf of Oman, and the Saudis have a massive port on the country’s west coast along the Red Sea.

Looking ahead: Both Israel and the United States appeared making final preparations for a renewal of hostiles in Iran as negotiations through Pakistani mediation showed no sign of a breakthrough.

• Speaking to reporters, President Trump said that Iran had “a limited period of time” to conclude an agreement with the US before he would order renewed attacks. “Two or three days. Maybe Friday, Saturday, Sunday. Maybe early next week,” he said, adding “I hope we don’t have to do the war, but we may have to give them another big hit. I’m not sure yet. You’ll know very soon.”
• In Israel meanwhile, the Prime Minister held an unusually long five-hour meeting with defence and security chiefs on Monday to discuss Israeli preparations for a US-led strike and it implications for Israel. Netanyahu’s testimony in his ongoing corruption trial, scheduled for today, was cancelled without any opposition from the prosecution or judges.
• President Herzog also cancelled a scheduled trip to New York this week. And even the Herzliya Conference, an annual academic event billing many current and former security chiefs that was scheduled to take place has been abruptly postponed.

What’s happened: On Friday evening, the US announced that it had taken custody of and indicted Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, a senior member of the Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah militia on suspicion of collaborating with the IRGC-Quds Force to plot and execute terrorist attacks against global Jewish communities and Iranian dissident media sites on behalf of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (HAYI), which the US Department of Justice specifically identified as a “component of” Kataib Hezbollah.

• The arrest is understood to have taken place in Turkey where Al-Saadi was transiting through from Iraq on his way to Russia, with local authorities subsequently transferring him to the FBI who extradited him to the US.
• Offences Al-Saadi is alleged to have committed that were stated on a criminal complaint filed by the US Department of Justice include conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organisation, conspiracy to provide material support for acts of terrorism, provision of material support for acts of terrorism, conspiracy to bomb a place of public use, and destruction of property by means of fire or explosive.
• Kataib Hezbollah and the IRGC are mentioned in the DoJ’s criminal which alleged that Al-Saadi acted for both organisations. It is also alleged that “Since the onset of the U.S. and Israeli military conflict with Iran that began on or about February 28, 2026 (the “Iranian Military Conflict”), Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, the defendant, has directed and urged others to attack U.S. and Israeli interests, including by killing Americans and Jews, in retaliation for the Iranian Military Conflict and to further the terrorist goals of Kataib Hezbollah and the IRGC. AL-SAADI and his associates have planned, coordinated, and claimed responsibility for at least 18 terrorist attacks in Europe (the “European Terrorist Attacks”) as well as two additional attacks in Canada, in the name of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya, a component of Kataib Hezbollah.”
• While early commentary on HAYI and its attacks against European and British Jewish communal sites acknowledged its logo’s similarity to Iranian-linked Iraqi Shia militias, the DoJ’s criminal complaint is the first time that control of HAYI has been explicitly linked to a particular group or Iranian intelligence agency.
• It is also alleged that on or around 2nd April 2026, Al-Saadi attempted to contract a “Mexican cartel member who had the capability of carrying out a terrorist attack in New York and elsewhere in the United States” to target an unnamed synagogue in New York City, and ”two prominent Jewish centres in Los Angeles, California, and Scottsdale, Arizona”. Al-Saadi allegedly specified that the attacks should be recorded.
• However, the cartel member in question is understood to have been an undercover FBI agent, working to provide evidence that would ultimately be used against Al-Saadi.

Context: Kataib Hezbollah is an Iraqi proxy of the IRGC-Quds Force which works “to establish an Iran-aligned government in Iraq, expel American forces from Iraq, and advance the regional and international interests of Iran in Iraq and the region”. It was designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the US in 2009, and is not currently proscribed by the UK.

• Established by the IRGC-QF in 2003, Kataib Hezbollah is one of the most influential and capable Iranian-linked Shia militias operating in Iraq.
• Closely support by both the Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah fought against British and American troops in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, anti-Assad Syrian rebels, and Islamic State.
• They have also been implicated in war crimes and sectarian atrocities against Iraq’s Sunni population, and abducted and held an Israel journalist and academic hostage from January 2023 to September 2025.
• Shortly after the Popular Mobilisation Units were formed to protect Iraq against the Islamic State in 2014, Kataib Hezbollah’s then Secretary General, Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, was appointed its deputy commander underscoring his militia’s strength and importance in Iraq.
• Al Muhandis was killed in January 2020 in the US drone strike which eliminated IRGC-QF commander, Major General Qassem Soleimani, in Baghdad.
• Kataib Hezbollah are alleged to have been the last group to kill a British soldier in combat when a missile salvo fired at Camp Taji in retaliation for Soleimani and Al Muhandis’s deaths fatally injured Lance Corporal Brodie Gillon of the Royal Army Medical Corps on 12th March 2020.
• Since 7th October 2023, Kataib Hezbollah are understood to have joined the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, a novel coalition of anti-US and Israel Iranian backed Shia militias. IRI subsequently launched dozens of mostly unsuccessful missile and drone attacks against Israel and US bases in the region, sometimes in what was claimed as joint operations with the Houthis.
• In late-January 2024 an IRI drone strike killed three US troops stationed in Jordan. An October 2024 strike on the Golan Heights killed two IDF troops.
• In August 2024, Iran International reported that Kataib Hezbollah was targeting Jewish communities in Central Asia with attempted but ultimately unsuccessful plots in Uzbekistan and Pakistan.
• Attacks linked to HAYI, now identified by the US Department of Justice as a component of Kataib Hezbollah, have included multiple attacks across Europe, with six attacks on targets in London alone. This includes the Golders Green stabbings, for which the group has claimed responsibility, however, in this instance there is no evidence of a direct connection.

Looking ahead: As the trial continues, further disclosure about Kataib Hezbollah, HAYI, and broader Iranian state-sponsored terrorism targeting diaspora Jewish communities is both likely and expected.

• Before Al-Saadi’s arrest and indictment, the British government were viewing and responding to HAYI as an Iranian intelligence service proxy, with policy proposals handrailing the National Security Act which criminalises assisting foreign intelligence services where such conduct is likely “prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
• It is a realistic possibility that recent developments from America may influence the UK to expand its proscription application, specifically to designate Kataib Hezbollah as a terrorist group if Al-Saadi is found guilty of relevant charges.

What’s happened: The IDF announced that it had completed a complex operation in Lebanon that saw its forces go beyond the Litani River into Zawtar El Charqiyeh, roughly 10 kilometres north of the Lebanese-Israeli border.

• According to the IDF, dozens of Hezbollah combatants were eliminated in the operation with a small number of Israeli soldiers lightly injured. The entire operation, though north of the Litani River, was still south of the line that Israel sees as its zone of control following the shaky ceasefire in effect for the last month.
• This morning Lebanese media reported strikes on two vehicles south of Beirut. The IDF also announced it had launched a wave of air strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure sites in several areas of southern Lebanon.
• This followed strikes on Hezbollah launch sites yesterday, while ground forces destroyed a large Hezbollah weapons depot in Rachaf in southern Lebanon. Ground forces operating in the area who came under threat from a Hezbollah contingent engaged them and eliminated 15 Hezbollah fighters with no losses to the IDF force.
• Israel continues to seek an adequate response to the threat of Hezbollah fibre optic, First Person View (FPV) drones. An Israeli reservist, Alexander Glovanyov, 47, from Petah Tikva was killed in a drone attack over the weekend.
• Leaked American intelligence assessments indicate that Iran has retained roughly 70 percent of its pre-war missile stockpile and roughly 70 percent of its mobile missile launchers. Moreover, according to the assessment, Iran restored operational access to 30 out of 33 missile sites it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz. According to a report in the New York Times, the US held back on using bunker-busting bombs on many missile sites in order to preserve them for operational contingencies in east Asia. Instead, missile sites were struck with ordinary munitions which sealed off entrances and caused significant damage, but did not entirely destroy the sites.
• Amidst a resurgence in inflation linked to energy disruptions and looming midterm elections, President Trump denied that economic or electoral considerations would push him to accept a deal with Iran that didn’t meet his minimal demands. “The only thing that matters when I’m talking about Iran — they can’t have a nuclear weapon,” he said.
• A group of Palestinian contractors who were due to begin the work of rebuilding the destroyed city of Rafah in the part of the Gaza Strip under Israeli control were held up at gunpoint by Hamas and prevented from crossing from the Yellow Line from the Hamas-controlled sector into the Israel-controlled sector, despite the work having been coordinated by the CMCC and the Board of Peace.
• It has been widely speculated that Hamas views any reconstruction, particularly outside its zone of control, as a threat to its continued rule in the Strip. The move comes on the backdrop of new polling data indicating a dramatic drop in Gazans’ support for Hamas.

Context: The IDF’s announcement regarding the successful completion of a weeklong secret operation north of the Litani capped several days of tactical successes in Lebanon. The fact that it was the IDF that informed the world about the operation with no word from Hezbollah was a further indication of its success.

• Despite the ceasefire, towns and villages in northern Israel still come under  rocket and drone fire. In incidents this morning and over the weekend, drones were intercepted and sirens were not sounded.
• In the month since the ceasefire went into effect, the IDF has reported eliminating some 350 Hezbollah fighters and striking roughly 1,100 Hezbollah targets.
• Throughout the current round of fighting in Lebanon, which began on March 2 when Hezbollah launched rockets into northern Israel, civilians have not for the most part been evacuated from the north. A massive evacuation of northern communities in the panicked aftermath of the October 7 attack nearly three years ago is widely viewed in Israel as having been a mistake — granting Hezbollah an unearned tactical victory, costing the Treasury dearly, and disrupting families and schooling for tens of thousands.
• The April 26 ceasefire left Israel in control of a small security zone in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces have come under consistent attacks from FPV’s, fibre-optic drones operated by a long cable rather than by remote control, making them impervious to electromagnetic jamming. The IDF has scrambled to find an adequate response to this threat, while reportedly also launching a rapid manufacturing drive for its own FPV’s. Two hundred Haredi soldiers are expected to serve in the new purpose-built factory. Officials have also been studying Ukrainian tactics in meeting a similar threat over the last four years of war there.
• A US-Iran deal that ends the war in the Gulf, if one is reached, is expected to drastically limit Israel’s freedom of action in Lebanon and possibly even lead to a definitive end to the fighting on this front. Israeli officials remain concerned about such a possibility, particularly if a deal does not also end or severely curtail Iran’s support for its network of regional proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Looking ahead: President Trump is expected to stay in China two more days and then return to Washington.

• A renewed US aerial assault on Iran is unlikely to get underway while the President is in China, but the weekend of his return is anticipated as the moment when either a deal is struck — or the war resumes.

What’s happened: An Israeli air strike eliminated Radwan Force Commander Malek Balout. The Radwan force is Hezbollah’s elite strike force.

• Balout has been its commander since January 2024 when the previous commander Wissam al-Tawil was eliminated. Under both men, the Radwan Force has been responsible for rocket fire on Israel and for preparing an October 7-style invasion of Israeli territory from the north.
• Balout was eliminated in his hideout in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut. It was Israel’s first air strike in Beirut since  an informal commitment to the US to refrain from striking Beirut four weeks ago in order not to destabilise the US-Iran ceasefire. It is understood that Israeli officials informed the US about the impending air strike.
• In a separate incident, four IDF soldiers were wounded in a Hezbollah attack last night in southern Lebanon. One of the four is  listed in a serious condition. The attack was carried out by an explosive drone. In an earlier attack, three more soldiers were wounded by an explosive drone, including one who was also listed in a serious condition.
• Gaza was also the scene of an Israeli air strike, though the exact target of it remains unclear, with some media reports suggesting that a senior Hamas terrorist from the Nukhba force, which led the charge in the October 7 massacre, was targeted.
• Local media reports focused on the death in the strike of Azzam al-Haya, a Hamas militant who is also the son of senior Hamas leader Khalil al-Haya, target of Israel’s unsuccessful air strike in Doha last year. Israeli officials indicated, however, that al-Haya was not the target.
• The Israeli security cabinet met last night to discuss President Trump’s fourteen point proposal to conclude the war with Iran, a further indication that a successful conclusion to the negotiation process is considered a realistic possibility, even if not a guaranteed one. Prime Minister Netanyahu was keen to emphasise the high level of coordination between Jerusalem and Washington, saying yesterday, “We have full coordination between us, no surprises. We share common objectives, and the most important objective is the removal of the enriched material from Iran, all of the enriched material, dismantling enrichment capabilities in Iran. President Trump believes that he can achieve that in one way or another. But we are prepared for any scenario.”
• The IDF meanwhile is still preparing for the possibility that the negotiations fail and the war resumes. Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir said yesterday that, “We have an historic opportunity to change the regional reality in the multi-theatre war. Cooperation with the US military and coordination remain constantly ongoing and we are monitoring the situation. We have another series of targets in Iran that are ready for attack. We are on heightened readiness to resume a powerful and broad war that will facilitate deepening our achievements and which will further weaken the Iranian regime.”

Context: The exact details of Trump’s proposal have not been made public, but it was reported that the Iranians were given a one-page memorandum containing fourteen points.

• The memorandum stipulates a 30-day period after the agreement in principle to negotiate a detailed agreement. But already in the points would be included various commitments, such as:
  • the removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Iran, 
  • a moratorium on enrichment for an unknown number of years,
  • a limit on enrichment up to 3.67% after the end of the moratorium,
  • restrictions on weaponisation activities (not just on nuclear technology itself),
  • restrictions on underground facilities,
  • snap inspections, and
  • Iranian pledge never to build a nuclear weapon.
• The proposal also calls for an immediate opening of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, and a declaration of a formal end of US-Iran hostilities.
• Some reporting mentions the inclusion of the ballistic missile programme and Iranian sponsorship of regional proxies and other reporting leaves it out.
• Multiple reports in western media indicate that Iran might agree to the removal of HEU from Iran, which could explain the optimism from the White House. Even in such a case, the Iranians would be still be left with lower-grade enriched uranium which they could rapidly enrich to a higher grade if they wanted to pursue a rapid breakout to a nuclear weapon.
• Overall, Israeli officials appear divided on both the question of whether an agreement is likely and on the question of whether an agreement that hues to these lines is a positive development.
• Sanctions relief without limitations on Iran’s proxy network will be a vital lifeline for Israel’s most violent regional threats at precisely the moment when Israeli military action had finally degraded their capabilities.
• A concession on HEU that leaves Iran with the potential to enrich again on its own might just delay a future reckoning to a less advantageous point, from the Israeli and American standpoint. An Iran that reconstitutes its ballistic missile programme outside the shadow of a rigid sanctions regime could threaten Israel in future conflicts in the region.
• At the same time, there has been no indication that the Israeli-American offensive has put the regime’s grip on power in question, as was hoped by decision-makers in Jerusalem and Washington when the war was first embarked on two months ago.

Looking ahead: Iran has not responded to President Trump’s proposal, though leaks from US officials indicate the US is expecting an answer soon — and that US officials are unusually optimistic about the outcome.

• Trump will be in China next week, and it is widely understood that he will want to successfully conclude the diplomatic process by then. Failing that, a renewed military offensive would likely commence upon his return on May 16.

What’s happened: Iran fired 12 ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and four attack drones at the United Arab Emirates on Monday.

• Emirati officials said one strike caused a large fire and three injuries at its key oil port of Fujairah.
• The attack was condemned internationally, with  Prime Minister Starmer saying the UK would continue to “support the defence of our partners in the Gulf”.
• The UAE is being assisted in defence by Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile defence system, operated in the UAE by IDF personnel, which successfully intercepted one of the missiles. The current war with Iran is the first time that the advanced tech has been deployed and used operationally outside of Israel.  
• This latest Iranian attack came in response to President Trump’s announcing the beginning of “Project Freedom,” which seeks to ensure freedom of navigation for commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
• The US successfully escorted two American-flagged merchant ships that passed through the southern tip of the Straits on Monday. Trump also said yesterday that the US had struck seven Iranian “fast boats.”
• In Israel the IDF is also preparing itself defensively and has kept its air-defence systems on a high state of alert in readiness for a resumption of Iranian attacks.
• In Lebanon, Hezbollah fired several mortars in two incidents on Monday night towards IDF troops in southern Lebanon. There were no reports of casualties.

Context: Israel’s military support for the UAE is the latest example of the strategic significance of the Abraham Accords and highlights the potential of Israel’s future alliances with other Sunni Gulf states.

• According to the UAE Ministry of Defence Iran has now fired 549 ballistic missiles, 29 cruise missiles, and 2,260 attack drones against the UAE since the war began. By comparison, Iran fired around 650 missiles towards Israel, the majority of which being ballistic missiles. Thanks to Israel’s array of missile defence systems about 90 per cent of the missiles were intercepted.
• Israel continues to maintain a high level of coordination with the US including at a political level and among senior military commanders.
• When it comes to the prospect of relaunching attacks on Iran, it appears Israel will follow the US lead. At this point it is unclear whether the US is planning a limited operation in the Strait of Hormuz area or a broader attack. A broader attack could include striking Iranian national infrastructure, including energy facilities, roads, steel factories and gas and oil facilities.
• The working Israeli assumption is that a US attack of any scope would prompt Iran to retaliate against Israel. As part of the preparation for a possible resumption of the war, thousands of aerial components and munitions have recently been flown into Israel on board cargo planes.
• Israeli defence officials see the current volatility, and the potential collapse of the ceasefire that could see the resumption of hostilities. The latest assessment is that a resumption of direct fighting with Iran will lead to the immediate collapse of the fragile ceasefire with Hezbollah too. At that point Israel anticipates Hezbollah will fire missiles deep into Israeli territory.
• There had been hope that the US economic stranglehold over the Straits coupled with military threats would force the Iranians to accept a deal on US terms, but this currently appears less likely. Compounding this are reports of splits within the Iranian leadership, which is also preventing them from reaching an agreement.
• All this suggests a resumption of war with Iran could be inevitable. The only question is whether  Trump favours a short series of harsh strikes or a resumption of a more comprehensive offensive that will continue until the Iranian regime capitulates. In this scenario Israel is thought to have prepared a bank of targets and is once more expected to join the US in striking Iran.
• Fujairah port lies on the UAE’s eastern coast on the Gulf of Oman, beyond the Strait of Hormuz. A pipeline runs from Abu Dhabi’s oil fields to Fujairah, which allows oil to be shipped to international markets despite Hormuz being blockaded.

Looking ahead: In a month’s time the Israeli Air Force is expecting the delivery of the first of six Boeing KC-46 tanker aircraft, a US military aerial refuelling and strategic military transport aircraft. According to Israel’s MOD, the tanker aircraft, designated “Gideon” in Hebrew, will be “equipped with Israeli systems and adapted to the operational requirements of the Israeli Air Force, enabling it to extend operational range and maintain air superiority across all theatres.”

• Israel also announced that it expects to double its fleet of US-made F-35 stealth jets from 50 to 100 and its F-15IA fleet from 25 to 50. The Israeli MOD said that procurement of these jets, “will serve as a cornerstone of the IDF’s long-term force development, addressing evolving regional threats and preserving Israel’s strategic air superiority.”
• On Sunday Prime Minister Netanyahu said Israel will also simultaneously, “develop groundbreaking Israeli-made aircraft. This will change the entire picture.”
• He also related to the ongoing drone threat from Hezbollah, confirming he commissioned a “special project” to thwart the threat, adding, “it will take time, but we are on it.”

What’s happened:  Israel suffered another casualty in southern Lebanon, when an Israeli civilian working as a contractor for the Defence Ministry was killed in a Hezbollah drone attack yesterday.

• Amer Hujirat, 44 years old from Shfaram was operating heavy engineering machinery supporting the IDF near Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon. His 19-year-old son was working with him at the time and was lightly injured in the attack.
• Once more, Hezbollah used a fibre optic-guided drone in the attack, as it did in the attack earlier this week which killed Sgt. Idan Fooks. These drones, also known as FPV’s, cannot be electronically jammed. The only method to defeat to them is to shoot them down, which has proven to be difficult. Hezbollah has made extensive use of this weapon in the last two weeks, which it apparently started using as far back as 2024.
• The IDF destroyed two enormous tunnels in southern Lebanon that had been built by Hezbollah over the course of the last decade. The two tunnels were located about 11 km north of the border with Israel and reached about 26 metres underground. One was 700 metres long and the other 1200 metres long, and they were not connected to each other.
• The two tunnel compounds contained living quarters, staging areas, and access routes to launch sites, as well as large weapons stores. Each could have been used by hundreds of Hezbollah fighters to launch an October 7-style invasion of northern Israel. They were discovered by the IDF during the intense fighting which broke out in March following Hezbollah rocket attacks.
• Captured Hezbollah fighters provided crucial intelligence that allowed the IDF to clear out the tunnels and eventually destroy them yesterday in a massive controlled explosion that used 500 tons of explosives and was so large that it registered on seismographs in northern Israel as an earthquake.

Context: The informal ceasefire, where low-level attacks continue, but where Israel refrains from retaliating in Beirut due to limitations imposed by the US so as not to interfere with the ongoing negotiations in Iran, continues.

• Israeli frustration with this informal ceasefire, which leaves IDF soldiers behind the forward defensive line, but vulnerable to attacks without Israel having the means to exact a price for attacks on its soldiers, has become a source of frustration for the army.
• At the same time, the US continues to push Israel and Lebanon to reach a diplomatic agreement that would exceed the measures of a ceasefire, even if it might fall short of a full peace treaty. Media reports have indicated that Egypt too has taken on a mediator role in the negotiations. European governments too have indicated that they would be willing to help Lebanon carry out a disarmament of Hezbollah, a sentiment echoed publicly by EU Commission President von der Leyen.
• The holding pattern of the Lebanon fighting exists at the insistence of the United States while it pursues a negotiated settlement in the larger conflict with Iran, of which the Lebanon conflict remains a secondary front. On Monday, the Iranians proposed a deal through Pakistani intermediaries that would have seen an immediate end to their blockade of the Straits of Hormuz as well as the American blockade on Iranian ports as a first step to further negotiations on the nuclear programme. It also would have committed the U.S. to  a full end to the war with Iran. The Trump administration appears to have rejected this proposal.
• As the US continues to build up its forces in the region in anticipation of a possible collapse of the ceasefire which has been in effect for more than three weeks now, the administration has begun signalling publicly in the last day that might prefer a long-term economic squeeze on Iran over either of the two options that were until very recently seen as the most likely — a negotiated agreement or a renewal of the war with a massive attack on Iranian infrastructure.
• The negotiations that have taken place have dealt exclusively with the Iranian nuclear programme and not, as far as is publicly known, with either the Iranian ballistic missile programme or with Iran’s support of it proxy network in the region. This has led to a great deal of frustration on the part of Israeli officials, who, in leaks to local media, also indicate that Jerusalem is not always fully updated on the diplomatic developments or American positions regarding Iran.
• The talks included various proposals for moving highly enriched uranium out of Iran, but foundered on the American insistence on a 20-year commitment from Iran not to engage in enrichment activities. The Iranians, according to Pakistanis mediators, were unwilling to commit to more than five years.
• Assuming that gap could be bridged, an agreement along the lines discussed would an unwelcome development from the Israeli perspective. It would leave Iran free to develop more ballistic missiles, and the lifting of sanctions would rescue a regime precisely at its weakest moment, while allowing to further finance its terrorist proxies closer to Israel. At the same time, a new round of fighting without a decisive conclusion or an American “declaration of victory” and departure could be even worse. The possibility of a continued blockade on Iran while a temporary ceasefire remains in place could be the least bad option.
• The US too, appears to coming to that conclusion — or at the very least, wanting to create a public impression that is coming to that conclusion. Multiple reports today in US media quoted Trump administration officials as preparing for an extended blockade of Iran as the US’s best near-term strategy, with officials estimating that the economic costs to Iran of the status quo are much higher than they are to the US or its allies. Iran has apparently taken to “junk storage” of oil surpluses, as unsold oil, blocked in port by the US Navy, has filled its existing storage capacities and left it in a position where it might soon need to halt production altogether.

Looking ahead: Trump has extended the ceasefire indefinitely as long as negotiations are underway.

• At the same time, the US continues its force buildup in the region, with a third carrier strike group arriving this week. The USS George HW Bush joins the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R Ford, already in theatre.
• Some 50,000 ground troops are also stationed across the region in American bases, a significant change from the buildup that presaged the February 28 launch of hostilities.