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Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood

Key background
  • Hamas is an Islamist Palestinian nationalist movement which currently governs the Gaza Strip. It is proscribed by the UK and in the majority of western countries.
  • Its primary state backers are Iran, Turkey, and Qatar. It is also active in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Syria, and Lebanon.
  • Since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has continuously launched attacks against Israel and weaponised civilian infrastructure by embedding itself into schools, mosques, and hospitals.
  • Hamas’s 7th October attacks on southern Israel killed 1200, and over 250 hostages were subsequently taken to the Gaza Strip.
Humanitarian aid enters Gaza through the Rafah border crossing from Egypt, in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 1, 2026.
Humanitarian aid enters Gaza through the Rafah border crossing from Egypt, in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 1, 2026. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90

Updated February 2, 2026

The Rafah Crossing opens

What’s happened: The Rafah Crossing opened on Sunday for a final set of technical tests and a limited number of pedestrians are expected to cross the border today.

  • The crossing will be operated by Egypt, with European Union oversight and approved Palestinian officials. According to the agreement, the Egyptians are expected to share details of those crossing in advance with Israel. Outgoing Gazans will not undergo Israeli security checks, but those entering the Strip will be required to pass through an IDF inspection point. Everyone who enters the Strip will be taken by bus to an Israeli inspection point, where they will undergo physical inspection and facial recognition software will be used to verify their identity.
  • At this initial stage 150 people will leave Gaza daily, 50 people who require medical treatment, plus two companions. 50 Gazans (who left during the war) will be allowed to return to Gaza daily. 
  • Over the weekend the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of air strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad targets.
  • The strikes came in response to several incidents of ceasefire violations including an attempted attack by Hamas terrorists on IDF soldiers in the Rafah area and other incidents along the yellow line.
  • The upturn in violence began on Thursday evening when eight heavily armed Nukhba Force terrorists emerged from a tunnel in eastern Rafah into an area that is controlled by the IDF. IDF observers spotted the terrorists in real-time and called in a strike. At least three terrorists were eliminated, and others appear to have been wounded. Two Hamas commanders were captured. One was captured by the IDF and the other by members of the Abu Shabab militia. According to the IDF, the apprehended terrorist is a key commander in Hamas’ Eastern Rafah Battalion.
  • The targets that were struck included a Hamas police station in central Gaza and a Hamas outpost in Al-Mawasi. The IDF also attacked an arms storehouse, an arms production site and two rocket launching sites in the central Gaza Strip. Among the targets were four commanders from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas sources in the Strip reported that at least 31 people were killed in the strikes.
  • The IDF released a statement noting, “The terrorist organisations in the Strip have been systematically violating international law amid the cruel exploitation of civilian institutions and by acting among the [civilian] population in the area.”

Context: The airstrikes over the week were the most intense since the ceasefire came into effect 3 months ago. The intensity is both a factor of continued Hamas violations and the IDF’s new found freedom of action in no longer having to factor in the status of any hostages.

  • Hamas has been using guerrilla tactics in a bid to challenge Israel and to inflict casualties among the IDF troops deployed in the area of the yellow line. The string of incidents in recent days appears to illustrate that Hamas has no intention of giving up its weapons and that its operatives remain motivated to fight and to attack the IDF.
  • The Hamas police station targeted represents a deliberate strike on a symbol of Hamas control over their side of the Strip, and points to a wider concern that whilst no disarmament is taking place, Hamas are in fact rehabilitating their forces and reinforcing their control.
  • There is domestic criticism in Israel that the opening of the Rafah Crossing before Hamas’ disarmament and the demilitarisation of the Strip is a failure of the Israeli Government policy. This adds to what is perceived as a wider failure – the internationalisation of the ‘day after’ – that might lead to a situation where Israel no longer has complete freedom of action.
  • The government argues that not only does it maintain complete freedom of action, but the new mechanism at the Civil Military Coordination Center allows Israel to share intel with the international partners and ensure a degree of transparency over Hamas violations and subsequent Israeli actions that has never happened before.
  • Longer term, Israel is insisting that the Philadelphi Corridor, that separates Gaza from Sinai, will remain in Israeli control even after further withdrawals from the yellow line. This is viewed by government supporters as a major achievement.
  • The opening of Rafah Crossing constitutes the first time since the 2005 Gaza Disengagement that Israel has formal oversight of the Gaza-Egypt border. Since then, the Rafah Crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor were the main source of Hamas income (through taxation) and smuggling of weapons both through the Egyptian border crossing and through their tunnels network.
  • Last week COGAT revealed the extent of aid entering Gaza over the last three months. This has included over 60,000 aid trucks, 900,000 tons of food, 9,600 tons of medical equipment and around 610,000 tents.

Looking ahead: With the reopening of Rafah, the Palestinian technocratic body, known as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) led by Ali Shaath, is soon expected to enter Gaza.

  • If the monitoring mechanism at the Rafah Crossing will be successful, it will expand its operations.

January 27, 2026

Last hostage returned home

People pay their respects as a convoy carrying the body of slain hostage Ran Gvili drives near the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, January 26, 2026.
People pay their respects as a convoy carrying the body of slain hostage Ran Gvili drives near the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, January 26, 2026. Photo by Tsafrir Abayov/Flash90

What’s happened: The body of Ran Gvili, the 24-year-old police sergeant who set out on October 7 to protect Israel from the Hamas invaders and fell in the successful defence of Kibbutz Alumim, was returned to Israel yesterday.

  • Gvili’s was the last Israeli hostage remaining in Gaza out of 251 who were abducted on October 7, together with another four, two living and two dead, held there before the massacre. With Gvili’s return, there are officially no Israeli hostages in Gaza — the first time this has been the case in fourteen years.
  • The discovery and recovery of Gvili’s body was the culmination of a complicated intelligence and forensic operation. His abductors had moved and reburied his body. Ultimately, the IDF was able to focus on a Muslim cemetery in the northern Gaza Strip. In Operation Brave Heart, soldiers recovered remains and inspected dental findings until a possible match for Gvili was found and brought back to Israel where a positive identification was confirmed.
  • Speaking at the Second International Conference on Combating Antisemitism, Prime Minister Netanyahu hailed the formal end of the hostage crisis: “Rani Gvili, from the special unit in the police who fought not only with a broken arm, he was shot twice, and he kept fighting, and he killed fourteen terrorists alone. And then he died. And we said we’d bring him back. He was the first to come in. He’s the last to leave, a hero of Israel. Rani is back. There are no more hostages in Gaza. Tremendous achievement for our heroic forces, our soldiers, our commanders, none like them.”
  • President Herzog also described his relief at the news at an event at the President’s Residence in Jerusalem with US Ambassador Mike Huckabee. “Finally, 834 days later, Staff Sgt. Ran Gvili, who ran at first call to the front lines to save others, has come home: home to his country, home to his family, home at last. An entire nation is breathing an enormous sigh of relief tonight, as all of our hearts are with Ran’s family—especially his parents, Talik and Itzik—who fought heroically and with remarkable courage to bring their son home.”
  • Huckabee, too, spoke at the event, and referenced the ubiquitous yellow hostage pin which many Israelis and supporters of Israel had worn on their lapels since October 7. ““It is an extraordinary privilege to take this pin, to remove it from my lapel,” he said. “I have said on many occasions, since I was posted here as ambassador, that the happiest day of my tenure was going to be the day when I could remove this pin, because it meant that the last hostage would have been freed and home with his family.”

Context: The return of the last deceased hostage definitively puts an end to the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire, which has been in effect since last October.

  • The first major achievement of the second phase will be the partial reopening of the Rafah Crossing between Gaza and Egypt later this week. The crossing will be open to two-way traffic of people only (not vehicles). European and Palestinian officials will be on site, and those passing through will receive a Palestinian Authority stamp on their passports. Egyptian officials will pass to Israeli officials a complete list of all those passing through ahead of time, and only those approved by Israel will be allowed to cross into or out of Gaza. Israel will remotely inspect the crossing. The mix of Egyptian, European, Israeli, and Palestinian actors strongly resembles the Movement and Access arrangement that was briefly in place for the crossing’s operation between 2005 and 2007, following Israel’s withdrawal from the Strip and before the coup which put Hamas in control of territory enclave.
  • The second phase of the ceasefire stipulates not only the reopening of the Rafah Crossing, but also several other significant measures, including Hamas disarmament, a technocratic Palestinian transitional government in Gaza, the deployment of a multinational force inside the Strip, and a further Israeli territorial withdrawal.
  • Today, the IDF controls roughly 53% of the Gaza Strip, with the so-called Yellow Line separating the Israeli-held zone from the roughly half of the Strip still under Hamas control, where the overwhelming majority of Gaza’s civilians are concentrated. The second phase of the ceasefire, if fully implemented, would see the IDF leave much of the territory it currently hold, but not return to the pre-war border. Instead, the IDF would hold a perimeter zone inside the Strip with a depth of about 1 km.
  • Before that could happen, the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip would need to be effected. Israeli officials remain very pessimistic about the prospects of this happening peacefully, though US and other international actors in the region believe that with the right mix of pressures and incentives, the Strip’s technocratic governance committee can force Hamas to turn over its weapons.
  • A senior American official quoted anonymously in Israeli media yesterday said that the US would “make sure to enforce the agreement. Hamas has no choice but to disarm. They signed the agreement. We’ll work to see that happen, and if they decide to play games, Trump will take the necessary measures.”
  • Unspoken in these assessments is the assumption that what held the IDF back from fully conquering the Strip and destroying Hamas during two years of war was concern about the fate of the hostages Hamas was holding. With no more hostages of any kind in Hamas’ possession, there is nothing to stop the IDF from destroying what remains of Hamas military capabilities should the ceasefire collapse and combat resume.
  • Reconstruction is also supposed to begin in the second phase of the ceasefire, with initial efforts focused on the southernmost sections of the Strip in Rafah and Khan Younis. The US and Israel have agreed that Israel would be responsible for removing the rubble from these areas, reportedly so that unexploded ordnance could not fall into Hamas hands and be repurposed for offensive capabilities.

Looking ahead: The US and Egypt are expected to announce the formal appointment of a Reconstruction Committee sometime in the next two weeks. This is in line with US efforts to begin some limited reconstruction early in the second phase, especially in more peripheral areas of the Strip, including those parts currently on the Israeli side of the Yellow Line. Israel is opposed to any large scale reconstruction beginning before the full disarmament of Hamas is achieved.

  • Parallel to the US-Egypt understandings on reconstruction, the US is reportedly drafting a document to be submitted to Israel on the issue of disarmament.
  • According to Israeli media reports, the document will stipulate that Hamas will have a set number of weeks to disarm, and that if the terrorist organisation fails to meet the deadline, Israel have a free hand to act militarily.
  • A firm commitment from the US on disarmament and an explicit support for Israeli action to back it up is intended, from the US perspective, to secure Israeli flexibility on the issue of early reconstruction.

January 26, 2026

Israel’s security cabinet agrees to reopen the Rafah Crossing

Rafah border crossing with Egypt.
A Palestinian security officer sits at the gate under Palestinian control at the Rafah border crossing with Egypt in the southern Gaza Strip October 25, 2014.

What’s happened: The security cabinet convened on Sunday night and according to the Prime Minister’s Office agreed to a “limited reopening of the Rafah Crossing for pedestrian passage only, subject to a full Israeli inspection mechanism.”

  • The statement added that, “The reopening of the crossing was conditioned upon the return of all living hostages and a 100% effort by Hamas to locate and return all deceased hostages.”
  • “The IDF is currently conducting a focused operation to exhaust all of the intelligence that has been gathered in the effort to locate and return the fallen hostage, Master-Sgt. Ran Gvili… Upon completion of this operation, and in accordance with what has been agreed upon with the US, Israel will open the Rafah Crossing.”
  • Searches for Gvili’s body, dubbed Operation Brave Heart, began at the end of last week based on recently refined intelligence, and are focused on a cemetery in Gaza City. There are hundreds of bodies buried in the cemetery, and the troops are opening the graves one by one and reviewing their contents. The troops are conducting meticulous searches using mobile X-ray machines to check dental x-rays, as there are no available fingerprints. After that, DNA tests will be conducted.
  • Also over the weekend, US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Cooper met with Chief of Staff Zamir to discuss coordinating the defence for Israel in the event of an American attack on Iran that prompts Iranian missile fire.

Context: The decision to open the Rafah Crossing follows pressure by the US mediators Witkoff and Kushner who met with senior Israeli leaders over the weekend to push for the continued implementation of President Trump’s 20-point plan.

  • According to the Trump plan, Gvili’s body is supposed to be returned to Israel before proceeding to the second stage of the ceasefire agreement.
  • As it currently stands, it appears that even if Gvili’s body is not found, the Rafah crossing will be reopened as a result of strong US pressure in a bid to begin the second stage.
  • Despite pushback from the Egyptians, Israel insists on retaining the ability to remotely monitor the crossing via cameras. The border itself is expected to be supervised by a European team. In addition, due to Israel maintaining control of the yellow line, all the traffic will pass through an area under Israeli control.
  • Israel is most concerned over attempts to use the crossing to smuggle weapons as well as preventing Hamas terrorists who previously left Gaza from returning to the Strip.  Israel is willing to allow anyone to leave who has an invitation or a visa to a third country or for humanitarian and medical cases, and will only insist on inspecting those who enter Gaza from Egypt. The Egyptians are concerned that masses will try to leave and remain in Egypt, whilst they want unlimited access for those that want to return to Gaza.        
  • Only those whose names are submitted to Israel by the Egyptians and go through security vetting will be able to cross into Gaza. It is estimated that 42,000 Palestinians left Gaza since the start of the war although not all will want to return.
  • Despite optimism in some quarters following the grand unveiling of the Board of Peace at Davos last week, Israel remains concerned that Hamas will seek to integrate itself into the technocratic administrative committee led by Ali Shaath. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are wary of Hamas and are strongly opposed to this.
  • Israel believes that Hamas is trying to integrate into Gaza’s future security framework without truly disarming which would create a “Hezbollah model” in Gaza. Although politically unpopular within the right wing government, it may prefer concessions to the PA over Hamas rule or renewed war. The US denies agreeing to let Hamas retain political power or integrate into Gaza’s security forces, although Arab diplomats have suggested that in negotiations Hamas has vowed not to disarm without concessions.
  • The technocratic committee meant to govern Gaza lacks real authority and is largely staffed by former PA officials. They are wary of integrating Hamas officials following the harsh experience of 2007, when Hamas violently took full control of the Strip.
  • The decision to reopen Rafah was met with harsh criticism from right-wing coalition partners, although the decision ultimately passed.
  • Israel remains concerned over the role of Qatar and Turkey (as Hamas’s patrons) who also joined the Board of Peace. As such there was a question over whether Israel should also take a seat on the committee. In the end, Israeli officials argued that it’s better to participate than be excluded from decision-making.

Looking ahead: The search for Ran Gvili’s body in the cemetery in Gaza City is expected to continue for the next few days before moving onto other possible burial sites.  

  • The director of the Board of Peace Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov is expected to visit Israel soon and finalise the details regarding the Rafah Crossing and the establishment of the multi-national force that is supposed to be tasked with disarming Hamas. The Rafah Crossing is expected to reopen towards the end of this week.  
  • The US military is due to deploy more troops to the Middle East in the next few days, but it remains unclear what Trump will decide to do vis-à-vis Iran.

January 21, 2026

Netanyahu to join Trump’s Board of Peace

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a 40 signatures debate, at the plenum hall of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, on January 19, 2026.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a 40 signatures debate, at the plenum hall of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, on January 19, 2026. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

What’s happened: Prime Minister Netanyahu announced this morning that Israel would accede to President Trump’s invitation to join his Board of Peace.

  • Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam have also said they would join. It was not clear from the Prime Minister’s announcement if Israel would be paying $1 billion for a permanent membership.
  • President Trump told reporters yesterday that “we think we know” where the body of the last Israeli hostage in Gaza is. Referring to Ran Gvili, who was killed in the October 7 attacks and whose body has been held ever since in Gaza, the President said, “They have one left that we think we know where it is, amazing, it looked like we weren’t going to get anywhere near that, now they’ve gotten that almost.”
  • Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will meet President Trump today on the sidelines of the Davos. The two are due to discuss Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire and to coordinate their moves before a bruited American ultimatum on Hamas disarmament and the possible entry of Egyptian-trained Palestinian forces into Gaza.
  • In Jerusalem, the Israel Lands Authority took possession of a large UNRWA facility in Jerusalem and began demolishing parts of it. This was in accordance with the new law from last year which bans all UNRWA activity inside Israel and severely limits any official interaction between Israel and UNRWA in territories Israel controls.
  • UNRWA vacated the facility six months ago, and the ILA proceeded with the demolition yesterday to stop other illegal activities taking place at the site as well as to advance plans for its redevelopment.

Context: According to various media sources, President Trump is expected to deliver an ultimatum to Hamas regarding the terrorist organisation’s disarmament in the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire. Reports differ, however, on the content of the ultimatum, its timeline, its proposed methods of decommissioning, and the threats which back it up.

  • A Palestinian police force presently being trained in Egypt is reportedly ready to carry out the disarmament, should Hamas accept the conditions of Trump’s ultimatum. This force reports directly to the Palestinian committee of technocrats whose appointments were announced last week. They would be tasked not only with collecting rockets and IEDs, but also the rifles and small arms with which Hamas enforces its domestic rule.
  • Notably, this would mean that disarmament is an internal Palestinian affair, and not an endeavour achieved by the International Stabilisation Force, which has not yet come into being and does not have pledged commitments from enough countries to be viable.
  • The Egyptian-trained force would, if Hamas agrees to Trump’s ultimatum, hope to enter Gaza sometime in February or March and seek to complete its task rapidly. Despite whatever enthusiasm both Egyptian and US officials express (in anonymous leaks) regarding both the ultimatum and the police force, both Israeli and Palestinian officials remain sceptical about the entire plan.
  • Palestinian officials are concerned that an under-equipped police force seen, accurately or not, as aligned with the PA could quickly find itself a target of superior Hamas weapons (as happened in 2007). Israeli officials share that concern while also opposing any role for the PA in Gaza.
  • In the meantime, few in Israel believe Hamas will agree to Trump’s ultimatum anyway. As such, the IDF continues to prepare itself for a possible military offensive in February or March to disarm Hamas by force.
  • An Israeli operation following a Hamas refusal to carry out the conditions of the ceasefire, it is believed, would have a measure of international legitimacy. And a ground offensive into central Gaza unencumbered by the presence of Israeli hostages and the implied threat to their wellbeing, it is further believed, could be more effective than anything tried in two years of warfare following the October 7 attack.

Looking ahead: President Trump is scheduled to make a major prime time address tonight. In the background are at least four major international crises: the Gaza ceasefire and the formation of the new Board of Peace, the violent crackdown on anti-regime protesters in Iran and the possibility of US military action there, and the US threats on Greenland and the attendant tensions in the NATO alliance and the transition in Venezuela following the US capture of Nicolas Maduro.

  • With international attention focused on Venezuela and Greenland, US forces continue to move to the Persian Gulf region.
  • The eruption of violence in Iran in late December caught the US  Navy without a carrier group in the Gulf. As of yesterday, the USS Lincoln Carrier Strike Group transited through the Strait of Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal. It is expected to continue west to the Persian Gulf.
  • Circumventing the globe in the opposite direction were the F-15Es which had served to intercept drone attacks from Iran in previous rounds of fighting in 2024 and 2025. These reportedly left bases in the UK for bases in Jordan yesterday, accompanied by KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refuelling jets.

January 20, 2026

Israel–US tensions surface over Gaza’s future

Relatives, friends and supporters of Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, whose body is held by Hamas, attend a Kabbalat Shabbat ceremony at Hostage Square in Tel Aviv, calling for the return of his body from Hamas captivity, on January 16, 2026.
Relatives, friends and supporters of Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, whose body is held by Hamas, attend a Kabbalat Shabbat ceremony at Hostage Square in Tel Aviv, calling for the return of his body from Hamas captivity, on January 16, 2026. Photo by Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** רן גואילי שוטר חטוף כיכר החטופים קבלת שבת הפגנה אחרון

What’s happened: Amidst growing differences between the Israeli government and the Trump administration, the Israeli government decided yesterday to delay opening of the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt.

  • The opening is one of many measures that are supposed to happen in line with Phase two of the ceasefire agreement, which the US administration announced was underway earlier this week.
  • Israel opposed moving on to phase 2 before the body of the last Israeli hostage, Ran Gvili, was recovered from Gaza, and Israeli officials were particularly unnerved by the inclusion of Qatar and Turkey not just in Trump’s Board of Peace, but also in the Gaza Executive Board which is designated for a direct role in supervising postwar Gaza reconstruction and governance.
  • The Gaze Executive Board is the body which oversees the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the so-called “technocratic” committee of Palestinians responsible for transitional governance of Gaza.
  • Outside of Israel, growing attention has been focused on the charter of President Trump’s Board of Peace.
    • The establishment of the Board was explicitly set out in the Comprehensive Plan which brought the Gaza war to a ceasefire in October 2025 and was endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. Over the past week, the US administration has been sending formal invitations to countries to join the Board together with a detailed charter. The charter indicates a much broader role for the Board than just overseeing transitional governance and reconstruction in Gaza.
    • The charter grants broad personal powers to President Trump, with the language unclear if these powers will last longer than his term in office. It offers countries a “permanent membership” if they contribute $1 billion dollars at the outset, though a three-year membership is free. Its mandate  includes securing “enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict,” not just Gaza.
    • Among US allies, the only vocal scepticism about the Board registered so far has been from France, which has not definitively said whether it will join, and Israel, which is angered about the inclusion of Qatar and Turkey on the subcommittee explicitly tasked with overseeing governance in Gaza, the aforementioned Gaza Executive Board.

Context: The role of Qatar and Turkey in the future governance of Gaza continues to be a cause of concern for Israeli security officials, and a point of contention in domestic Israeli politics.

  • In Knesset, opposition leader Yair Lapid blasted Netanyahu for either failing to block Qatar and Turkey from gaining a foothold in Gaza. “Hamas’s hosts in Istanbul and Doha, Hamas’s ideological partners, have been invited to run Gaza,” he said from the rostrum. Turning to the Prime Minister, he said that Netanyahu either “agreed behind our backs that Turkey, Qatar, and the Palestinian Authority would be in Gaza,” or that he didn’t know that the US had included them, which means “Trump doesn’t give a damn about you.”
  • Netanyahu acknowledged that the US and Israel had “a certain argument” on the issue of Qatari and Turkish involvement, but emphasised that forces from the two countries would not set foot in the Strip.
  • Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, not currently a member of Knesset, took to social media to criticise the Prime Minister on the matter. “Erdogan and the despicable Qatar, the greatest haters of Israel, the most enthusiastic aides of Hamas, are being ushered in through the front door to run Gaza,” he tweeted. “What a terrible diplomatic failure by the Netanyahu-Ben-Gvir-Smotrich government. Soon we will fix this, too.”
  • Disagreement between the US and Israel  is another case of most recent ruptures between the Trump administration and US allies. These rifts are becoming interlinked, as Donald Trump clashed with French President Emmanuel Macron over the potential inclusion of Vladimir Putin in the Board of Peace. 
  • The question of the Rafah Crossing has long been a bone of contention internationally and internally in Israel.
    • When Israel withdrew all its soldiers and civilians from the Gaza Strip in 2005, it signed a multilateral agreement called the Movement and Access Accord which created a complicated mechanism for operating the crossing between Gaza and Egypt by Palestinian and European forces with a remote supervisory role by Israel.
    • The arrangement was abandoned when Hamas took over the Strip following its coup in 2007. Egypt shut the crossing down completely in May 2024 when Israeli forces retook the Philadelphi Corridor, and the ceasefire which ended the war a year and a half later called for the crossing to be reopened, implicitly under an arrangement that would resemble the 2005 Accord.
    • Initially, Israel announced it would reopen the crossing for one-way traffic — from Gaza to Egypt — but eventually under international pressure and despite strong opposition in the Cabinet, it agreed to open it for two-way traffic in Phase 2 of the ceasefire. The decision yesterday to delay the opening further was interpreted by all sides as an expression of Israeli frustration at both the incomplete return of deceased hostages and, most especially, at the last minute inclusion of both Qatar and Turkey in the Gaza Executive Board.

Looking ahead: Lurking behind all the disagreements about the Board of Peace, the Gaza Executive Board, the NCAG, and the ISF is the question of Hamas disarmament. No credible plan for the actually disarming the terrorist organisation has been put forward by any of the various committees and boards.

  • Netanyahu himself, speaking at yesterday’s stormy Knesset debate, alluded to the possibility that the IDF would be forced to carry out the task itself should international efforts to disarm Hamas fail to yield results. “Phase 2 says something simple: Hamas will be disarmed, and Gaza will be demilitarised,” he said in his speech before Parliament, before adding that this “will be achieved either the easy way or the hard way.”
  • Reports in the Israeli media based on leaks from the IDF suggest that such an operation would require four or five reserve divisions to be mobilised. The establishment of internationally backed governing and oversight bodies in the wake of the ceasefire would no doubt complicate such a ground offensive, especially in comparison to previous IDF incursions into Gaza over the past two years of war. But without concern over the fate of living hostages binding Israel’s hands, the IDF would be much freer to act than it was in previous rounds of fighting.

January 19, 2026

US announces makeup of new governance for Gaza

Palestinians shop at a market in Khan Yunis
Palestinians shop at a market in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on November 21, 2025. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** הפסקת אש עזה פלסטיני פלשתיני שוק קניות חאן יונס

What’s happened: Over the weekend, the Trump administration announced the composition of the Gaza Board of Peace and an executive committee that will liaise between the board and the newly-formed government of Palestinian technocrats.

  • The Board of Peace will be led by President Trump and include Secretary of State Rubio, US envoys Witkoff and Kushner, Former Prime Minister Blair, Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan, World Bank President Ajay Banga and deputy US National Security Adviser Robert Gabriel.  
  • The executive committee members will include the envoys Kushner and Witkoff, Blair, Rowan, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Qatari diplomat Ali Thawadi, Egyptian General Intelligence Director Hassan Rashad, UAE Minister of International Cooperation Reem Al-Hashimy, former UN humanitarian coordinator Sigrid Kaag, Israeli-Cypriot businessman Yakir Gabay and former UN envoy to the Mideast Nickolay Mladenov.
  • Dr. Ali Shaath will be the Chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the main Palestinian technocratic body on the ground. Committee members will include a range of Palestinian technocrats, some of whom were previously affiliated to the Palestinian Authority (PA).
  • The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement noting that the US announcement “was not coordinated with Israel and runs contrary to its policy.” Israeli officials are concerned the board includes senior representatives from Turkey and Qatar.
  • Leader of the Opposition Lapid said, “For the past year I’ve been telling the government: ‘If you don’t advance the Egyptian solution with the United States and the world, you’ll end up with Turkey and Qatar in Gaza.’ Last night, the composition of the ‘Board of Peace’ was announced—Turkey is in, Qatar is in and, according to the IDF, Hamas has 30,000 armed men in Gaza. That is a complete political failure of the Netanyahu government after the courage and endless sacrifice made by IDF soldiers and commanders.”
  • Former Prime Minister Bennett commented, “Two years after it massacred us, Hamas is still alive, in control and growing stronger. The entry into Gaza by Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’s supporters and financiers, gives Hamas a reward for the October 7 massacre, endangers Israeli citizens’ security and sends a grave message to the peoples in the region that for massacring Jews one receives political and military achievements.”
  • Following the signing of committee’s mission statement Shaath said that the NCAG will act to entrench security, to repair vital infrastructure and to advance stability in the Gaza Strip. Shaath said that the top priority at present was to reopen the Rafah crossing in both directions.
  • Speaking at a rally on Saturday night, the parents of the last deceased hostage held in Gaza, Ran Gvili said, “While we are here, still waiting for Rani’s return, a Board of Peace for the second stage is being established. How can anyone think about a second stage, and what peace are they talking about at all? Peace with people who have refused to return our son, despite having consented to that in an agreement?”

Context: Israel has consistently stated that there can be no practical implementation of Phase 2 before the body of the final fallen hostage is returned and Hamas is disarmed.    

  • The decision to include Turkish and Qatari representatives on the Gaza executive committee has caused alarm across the political spectrum is Israel, though the decision is not a surprise. Those countries were key actors in persuading Hamas to agree to the ceasefire in October and are considered key allies by Trump. The major concern is that Hamas will receive a renewed influx of funds allowing it to pay fighters and consolidate its control.  
  • In parallel to the announcements, the US led Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat continues to coordinate aid into Gaza and to develop plans to build new residential neighbourhoods for Gazans, (initially on the Israeli side of the yellow line).
  • Currently, around 800 trucks of supplies enter into Gaza every day, but once they pass the yellow line, Hamas is able to place a tax on every delivery which it then uses to replenish their accounts and rehabilitate their practical control over the Strip.  
  • Israel is further concerned that Hamas attacks on its troops along the yellow line have increased.
  • The announcement over the weekend is largely driven by Trump’s desire to showcase progress, even if concrete changes on the ground remain mostly symbolic for now.
  • Despite formal denials the NCAG appears closely connected to the PA, as is reflected in its leadership, composition, and Ramallah’s clear endorsement.
  • Hamas welcomes the committee because it poses no real threat to its power, serving as civilian cover while Hamas retains security control. This worryingly resembles the classic model of Hezbollah, operating as the main military force under a weak civilian leadership.
  • Although thousands of Hamas fighters were killed during the two year war, the latest assessment suggests every fighter killed has been replaced, (albeit younger, less experienced, less skilled) and that the combined forces of Hamas and Islamic Jihad once more stands at around 40,000.
  • The IDF significantly degraded their rocket arsenal, with about 90% of it destroyed, but military officials believe that hundreds of rockets still remain in the Strip, mostly short-range.

Looking ahead: In an effort to avoid a clash with the US administration Prime Minister Netanyahu has instructed Foreign Minister Saar to liaise with US Secretary of State Rubio.

  • According to Israel Hayom, Trump will use the platform of the World Economic Forum in Davos this week to condemn Hamas for its delay in handing over its weapons.
  • After Davos, all of the countries involved, including Turkey and Qatar, will present Hamas with a categorical demand to disarm. If Hamas rejects the demand to hand over its weapons, President Trump could give a green light to an Israeli military operation, as he said publicly in their last meeting with Netanyahu.
  • It’s understood that Donald Trump has invited other world leaders to join the Board of Peace, including Prime Minister Starmer. 

January 16, 2026

Iran unrest exposes regime vulnerability, says Israeli historian

Israeli demonstrators express their solidarity with the Iranian people.
Israeli demonstrators express their solidarity with the Iranian people. Holon, central Israel, January 14, 2026. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

Iran’s ongoing protests represent the most sustained and socially broad challenge to the Islamic Republic in years, but there are still no clear signs the regime is close to collapse, according to Eyal Zisser, Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University.

Speaking with BICOM’s CEO Richard Pater, Professor Zisser said the current wave of unrest differs sharply from previous episodes. “What we are seeing is unprecedented,” he said. “This time the scale and duration are different. The protests are continuing, and more and more segments of Iranian society are joining.”

Unlike earlier demonstrations that were confined to specific groups or cities, the current unrest has drawn in students, women, workers and parts of the urban middle class across the country. “Different social groups are effectively joining hands,” Zisser noted, adding that the protests are affecting day-to-day life well beyond Tehran.

However, he cautioned against overstating their immediate impact. “The regime remains strong,” he said. “It still has powerful instruments of repression, particularly the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, and we do not yet see signs of the regime disintegrating.”

A changed strategic context

What makes this moment distinct, Zisser argued, is the wider strategic environment. Last summer, Israeli actions targeting regime-linked military assets, carefully calibrated to avoid civilian harm, have punctured the perception of Iranian invulnerability.

“This was important psychologically,” he said. “It showed that the regime is not as strong as many people believed, and that can encourage people in Iran to take to the streets.”

The posture of the United States also matters. In contrast to previous administrations that relied largely on rhetoric, Zisser suggested that sustained political and economic pressure could have a real impact. “I don’t expect a military occupation of Iran,” he said, “but the goal is to undermine the regime’s confidence and capacity to rule.”

Concerns that external pressure could backfire by rallying Iranians around the regime are misplaced, he added. “Pressure is not directed against the Iranian people. They are not naïve, they understand where responsibility lies.”

Watching for cracks

Historically, regime collapse in Iran and elsewhere has been preceded by fractures within the security forces. For now, Zisser said, those signs are absent. “We don’t see hesitation or defection within the Revolutionary Guards or Basij yet,” he said. “But this is something to watch very closely. If that happens, it would be a decisive indicator.”

Other warning signs include symbolic acts of dissent. Zisser pointed to instances of Iranian athletes refusing to participate in regime rituals, such as declining to sing the national anthem. “These are small signs, but they matter,” he said. “They show erosion of legitimacy.”

At the same time, he warned that a regime under pressure may seek to externalise the crisis. “When regimes feel they are losing control, they sometimes look for confrontation abroad,” he said, noting that Israel, Arab states and Western interests could all become targets.

Lebanon: Hezbollah unchecked

Turning to Israel’s northern border, Zisser was unsparing in his assessment of Lebanon. “It’s not that the Lebanese government isn’t doing enough, it is doing almost nothing,” he said.

The Lebanese Armed Forces, he argued, are unwilling and unable to confront Hezbollah, whose core military capabilities remain intact despite limited Israeli operations. “Missile stockpiles and production facilities are still there, many of them deep inside Lebanon, not just in the south.”

Israel’s current approach reflects a desire to avoid escalation, but Zisser stressed that the underlying problem remains unresolved. “Israel cannot simply give up,” he said, adding that Hezbollah’s fortunes are inseparable from those of Iran. “If Iran weakens, Hezbollah weakens.”

Syria and the Druze question

On Syria, Zisser said recent US rhetoric about the new leadership reflects a search for stability rather than confidence in long-term change. “Syria remains fragmented, and trust is minimal,” he said. Any meaningful security arrangement involving Israel would require time, confidence-building, and a significant reduction in Iranian influence.

Particular concern remains for the Druze community in southern Syria. While ceasefires exist, Zisser described them as fragile. Israeli proposals for humanitarian corridors are understandable, he said, but “from Damascus’s perspective they are unacceptable.”

Gaza: no rebuilding without demilitarisation                                              

Asked about Gaza, Zisser expressed scepticism about ambitious reconstruction plans absent a fundamental shift in reality on the ground. “Hamas will not disarm voluntarily,” he said, “and Israel will not accept arrangements that leave Hamas militarily intact.”

Past experience, he argued, has shaped Israeli thinking. “Israel has learned that withdrawing without ensuring demilitarisation only leads to renewed conflict.” Without a new political and security framework, reconstruction risks laying the groundwork for the next war rather than lasting stability.

January 15, 2026

US announces beginning of Phase 2 of Trump’s plan for Gaza

Palestinians shop at a market in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip
Palestinians shop at a market in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on November 21, 2025. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** הפסקת אש עזה פלסטיני פלשתיני שוק קניות חאן יונס

What’s happened: Steve Witkoff, the US Special Envoy who has overseen the ceasefire process in Gaza, announced yesterday that the ceasefire had officially entered Phase 2. The sides will now be “moving from ceasefire to demilitarisation, technocratic governance and reconstruction,” according to Witkoff’s statement.

  • Israel did not publicly object to the move, though Israeli officials remain dissatisfied that that a new phase was declared before the return of last Israeli hostage, police Sgt. Ran Gvili, who was killed fighting Hamas invaders on October 7 and whose body has been held in Gaza ever since. Equally unsettling from Israel’s perspective is the move to Phase 2 before Hamas has given up its weapons.
  • Witkoff’s announcement was accompanied by the unveiling of the so-called “technocratic” Palestinian administration which is supposed to govern Gaza for an unspecified transitional period, known formally as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), but did not include any announcement of the membership of the Board of Peace, the international committee that is supposed to oversee the NCAG.
  • The announcement on Gaza comes as attention both in Israel and the United States is focused on Iran and on the possibility of American military action in Iran in support of anti-regime protesters. Israeli officials quoted in the local media believe that if a strike is imminent, Israel will have a short window of advance notice.
  • The US does not presently have a carrier strike group in the Gulf, as forces have been diverted to the Caribbean in recent months in anticipation of potential conflict in Venezuela. A report in the Wall Street Journal explains that “without an aircraft carrier and its associated air wing, including jet fighters, helicopters and electronic-jamming aircraft, the number of military aircraft in the region is also limited to those allowed to deploy to other nations’ bases.” An American carrier should be arriving in the Gulf in the coming fortnight. US defence officials  indicate that a strike is still possible even, however logistically more challenging without a carrier group.
  • Israel’s Home Front Command has issued no directives for now, and schools and businesses are all operating normally.

Context: For three months, Gaza has effectively been under Phase 1 of the ceasefire which was agreed to in early October last year. The twenty remaining living Israeli hostages were returned, as were 27 of the 28 deceased ones.

  • Israeli withdrew its forces behind the “yellow line” which divided the Strip into roughly half under Hamas control and roughly half under Israeli control. A surge of humanitarian aid came into Gaza, which did not include many dual use items that would be necessary for any substantial reconstruction but could also be used by Hamas to rebuild its tunnels and reconstitute its fighting capabilities. 
  • Phase 2 of the ceasefire is supposed to include not just a transitional Palestinian government in Gaza, but also a full disarmament of Hamas and an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Significant gaps exist regarding the terms of both of these measures, with Israel very reluctant to move all the way back to the prewar border, and Hamas giving no indication of a willingness to disarm.
  • The US and its regional allies, mostly Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt, are keen to focus on heavy weaponry, such as launchers and RPG’s, without any urgency on the rifles and guns that Hamas uses to maintain its rule over the Strip. American and Arab officials speak of an ambitious “buy-back” programme for dealing with Hamas weapons, but it is not clear that this will satisfy Israel or that Hamas will actually agree to participate.
  • Another unresolved issue is Hamas tunnels. Even on the Israeli side of the yellow line, locating and destroying tunnels has proven to be an onerous task for the IDF. A detailed investigation in Yediot Ahronot revealed that “IDF officers have a professional argument over whether the tunnels that the IDF discovered in the long fighting were indeed destroyed. The professionals in the Combat Engineering Corps assert that not all the methods that the IDF used to destroy the tunnels did indeed put them out of commission and that they could be re-dug. The army uses different explosives for different tunnels; in some places, it makes do with sealing them; in others, it destroys central intersections of the tunnel network. Hamas invested a great deal of resources to learn how to circumvent the damage caused to the tunnels, to dig them again and to cover their tracks deep underground.”
  • Israel is additionally concerned that in Phase 2, it will face pressure to allow more than humanitarian aid into the Strip. It is widely assumed in Israel that metals, concrete, and heavy building equipment, will be used for manufacturing rockets and rebuilding tunnels. The massive aid convoys of Phase 1 have been “taxed” by Hamas in a manner that has allowed it fully reestablish its prewar administration in the areas beyond the yellow line that it controls.
  • Israel prefers to view this announcement as symbolic rather than clash openly with the US administration.

Looking ahead: With the NCAG staffed, what remains to be established is the BOP (Board of Peace) and the ISF (International Stabilisation Force). The US is expected to make an announcement on the BOP as early as next week. It will include members from the US, Germany, the UK, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and others. Finding countries willing to send armed forces for the ISF has proven more problematic, especially with no actual disarmament of Hamas on the horizon.

  • It is being reported that Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer will take a place in the Board, whilst Sir Tony Blair is suggested for the Executive Board, where he might serve alongside Steve Witkoff or Jared Kushner. 

January 6, 2026

IDF continues to target Hamas and Hezbollah

Forces from the Nahal Brigade’s combat team advanced to conduct a search in the Rafah area.
Forces from the Nahal Brigade’s combat team advanced to conduct a search in the Rafah area. Photo credit: IDF

What’s happened: IDF operations to enforce the ceasefires in both Lebanon and Gaza continue.

  • In Gaza yesterday, the IDF located a rocket launcher loaded with five rockets aimed at Israel in the Beit Hanoun area, in the northern Gaza Strip. The launcher was successfully dismantled.
  • Also in the northern Gaza Strip, near Beit Lahia, the IDF destroyed a two-kilometre Hamas tunnel.
  • In the southern Gaza Strip, there were at least two incidents of Hamas attacks on Israeli positions on the Yellow Line, the line dividing the Gaza Strip into Israel-controlled and Hamas-controlled sectors, that were successfully repulsed by IDF troops.
  • In southern Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force carried out airstrikes against weapons caches and terrorist infrastructure belonging to both Hezbollah and Hamas, including, most notably, a weapons production site belonging to Hamas. Evacuation orders were issued before the air strikes to avoid civilian casualties.

Context: The IDF operations in both the north and the south fall under the rubric of the ceasefire arrangements that permit Israel to continue to target both Hamas and Hezbollah infrastructure.

  • According to Israeli figures, 400 Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated in Israeli air strikes since the ceasefire in Lebanon went into effect nearly 14 months ago. That ceasefire put an end to Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel which began on October 8, 2023, the day after Hamas’ invasion of southern Israel.
  • Following the meeting last week between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, there was no public announcement over moving to phase 2 of the ceasefire agreement, as had been anticipated by many experts and commentators.
  • The US position for the last few weeks has been a preference to move on to the second phase despite incomplete achievements in the first one. Israel has steadfastly resisted any move to phase 2 before all hostages are released and before Hamas is disarmed.
  • One deceased Israeli hostage, Ran Gvili, remains in Gaza.
  • Following the meeting in Florida, Trump made statements that were much closer to the Israeli position on disarmament than what leaks from the administration before the meeting had indicated would be the case. “If they don’t disarm, as they agreed to do, they agreed to it, and then they will be hell to pay for them,” the President said. “And we don’t want that. I’m not concerned about anything that Israel’s doing.”
  • With no realistic move to phase 2 on the horizon, the Yellow Line is becoming a de facto security border for the IDF in Gaza, something the Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir emphasised in recent remarks to soldiers in the Strip. “We are positioned along the Yellow Line and control the dominant terrain overlooking the Gaza Strip – this is a new security boundary,” he said. “The Yellow Line is an enhanced defensive line that supports swift operational responses as required. We will continue operating to weaken Hamas as necessary – the troops must remain alert and prepared for developments.”
  • Following a reform in the registration procedures for international NGOs, Israel announced last week that 37 NGOs operating in Gaza that had refused to comply with the reformed procedures would be deregistered and need to shut down operation by March of this year.
  • The organisations, most notably Doctors Without Borders (also known by its French acronym MSF) have launched a broad public campaign against the Israeli measures, claiming that they threaten medical care and constitute a form of “collective punishment.” A joint statement from the foreign ministers of ten countries, including the UK, also condemned the move and claimed that “one in three healthcare facilities in Gaza” could be closed as a result.
  • Figures released by Israeli authorities showed just how untrue these claims were. The aid provided by the organisations among the 37 that are to be deregistered constituted barely 1 percent of the total volume of aid. Specifically regarding MSF, Israel’s COGAT reports that 5 out of 220 clinics in Gaza are operating by MSF, and 2 out of 33 hospitals are (this figure includes 15 field hospitals in its total). In its PR campaign, MSF repeatedly assert that Israel has provided no evidence that any of its staff were connected to Hamas or other terrorist organisations, though COGAT and others regularly post information about MSF employees implicated in terrorist activities.
  • Just in the last week, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs identified two MSF employees as members of a terrorist organisations. Fadi al-Wadiya was an Islamic Jihad operative working on the organisations’ rocket capabilities and an MSF employees, according to the Ministry, which also published pictures of him in military fatigues. And Nasser Hamdi Abdelatif al-Shalfouh was both an MSF employee and a Hamas sniper, also according to the Ministry.
  • Also last week, the Israeli watchdog NGO Monitor identified four MSF doctors who were also members of Gazan terrorist organisations, including not just Hamas but also the PFLP.
  • According the latest COGAT data, 4,200 humanitarian aid trucks entered Gaza in the last week, carrying food, medical supplies and shelter equipment, based on the prioritisation by the international organisations.
  • On December 29, 160 Gazans in need of medical care crossed into Israel at the Kerem Shalom Crossing and then from there into Jordan via the Allenby Bridge.
  • Since the ceasefire went into effect in October, 600 to 800 trucks of aid have entered Gaza each day carrying humanitarian goods, including food, medical supplies, tents, etc. Roughly 20% of all aid has been handled by the UN. 

Looking ahead: The US deadline for the complete disarmament of Hezbollah came and passed last week on December 31, and neither the US nor Israel are satisfied that anything like a thorough disarmament has taken place.

  • Leaks from Israeli officials to the local media indicate particular frustration with the ambiguous role of the Lebanese Armed Forces. One anonymous defence official was quoted saying, “We won’t allow threats to pile up in Lebanon. If need be, we’ll attack in the Dahiya too. We won’t hesitate.” The Dahiya is a neighbourhood in southern Beirut known as a Hezbollah stronghold, where Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was eliminated by an Israeli air strike in September 2024.

January 5, 2026

Post Trump meeting, Netanyahu declares support for the Iranian people

President Donald Trump hosts a bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
President Donald Trump hosts a bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago. December 29, 2025. Photo credit: The White House.

What’s happened: At the start of Sunday’s weekly cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed support for the Iranian people.

  • Netanyahu told his ministers, “we identify with the struggle of the Iranian people, with their aspirations for freedom, liberty, and justice. It is very possible that we are standing at the moment when the Iranian people are taking their fate into their own hands.”
  • Similarly, President Trump has also expressed support for the protesters in Iran and warned that if Iran, “starts killing people like they have in the past, I think they’re gonna get hit very hard by the United States.”
  • According to the New York Times, senior Iranian officials acknowledged that the Islamic Republic has entered “survival mode.”
  • During the cabinet meeting, Netanyahu also related to the Iranian issue that came up at last week’s meeting with President Trump saying, “We reiterated our joint position of zero enrichment on one hand, and the need to remove the 400 kilograms of enriched material from Iran and oversee the sites with tight and genuine supervision.”
  • Netanyahu also expressed support for the US “determined decision and action” in Venezuela, “to restore freedom and justice to that part of the world.”

Context: The Iranian issue was one of the top priorities for Netanyahu when he met Trump last week. Overall, the top objective for Netanyahu was to consolidate on the military achievements across several fronts including Iran, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The common thread was to reaffirm US support that if necessary Israel will act to prevent Iran and their proxies from rearming and to ensure Israeli military freedom of action to counter any developing threats.

  • Although details of the private meeting between Trump and Netanyahu remain vague, Netanyahu also told ministers on Sunday that Trump was “unequivocal” on Gaza.
  • Netanyahu said, “He repeated this both in our private conversations and to public opinion at the press conference there. He said it: ‘The essential condition is that Hamas disarms.’ There is no other option. This is an essential and fundamental condition for the implementation of his 20-point plan. He made no concessions and showed no flexibility on this issue.”
  • Without continued Israeli action Israeli officials are concerned that the achievements of the last year will be eroded. To ensure the achievements are consolidated Israel is banking on continued close coordination with US defence officials.    
  • In the wake of the October 7th attack Israel is pursuing a new security doctrine, that includes forward and pre-emptive defence. It is further understood Israel’s new defence posture includes:
    • Disarming terrorist armies.
    • Disarming and destroying military infrastructure above and below ground in a way that will make it impossible to renew the fighting, or to carry out surprise attacks on Israel’s borders and civilian communities adjacent to them.
    • Preventing terror groups from restoring their military capabilities.
    • Establishing effective international enforcement mechanisms that will ensure and enforce precise implementation of the disarmament.
    • Secure US support to operate independently, without having to coordinate with the US every time Israel detects violations of the arrangements.
  • Specifically on Gaza, Netanyahu reiterated the Israeli position to secure the return of the body of Ran Gvili, the last remaining hostage who has not been buried in Israel before transitioning to the second phase.
  • When it comes to disarming Hamas the priorities include decommissioning RPG launchers, other rockets, missiles, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and heavy drones.
  • Thirdly, the destruction of the remaining underground infrastructure, especially attack tunnels, as well as  command and control centres and weapons manufacturing sites. Israel is also demanding a complete ban on military training in the Strip.
  • At this point Israel remains insistent on remaining on the Yellow Line to ensure the protection of communities on the Gaza periphery.
  • Similarly in the north, Israel is demanding that Hezbollah be fully stripped of its heavy and long-range arms, including rockets and missiles and drones
  • Regarding Iran, Israel will support an international agreement that removes Iran’s ability to develop its military nuclear programme. In addition, Netanyahu seems to have secured support from Trump that also recognises Iran’s efforts to rebuild its array of conventional military threat of ballistic missiles as another red line.      
  • It appears that Trump was accommodating to most of Israel’s demands. The main area of disagreement appears to be the role of Turkey, both in Gaza and their ambitions to extend their sphere of influence in Syria.
  • According to Nahum Barnea writing in Yediot Ahronot, “There will probably not be Turkish soldiers in the international force whose establishment is unlikely, but Turkish contractors will be included in the [Gaza reconstruction] work, and F-35 jets will be sold to the Turkish air force. Netanyahu was unable to persuade Trump that Erdogan is bad; Erdogan was unable to persuade Trump that Netanyahu is bad. Trump enjoys both of their displays of sycophancy.”    
  • On Venezuela, Israel has been concerned for several years of their alliance and connection to both Iran and Hezbollah.    

Looking ahead: Later today Israeli – Syrian negotiations over a security agreements in southern Syria are expected to be resumed in Paris. The talks have been on hold for the last two months.

  • Israeli defence establishment remains on high alert over concern that the Iranian regime could try and divert domestic attention by launching an attack on Israel.
  • On Sunday, Iran International, a Persian language opposition channel broadcasting from London, reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has conducting further missile launching exercises. The exercise includes tests of air defence systems and is being conducted in several cities including Tehran and Shiraz.
  • The Israeli assessment remains that the Iran remains exposed, and that their air defences have not been reconstituted since the 12 Day War last summer. Nevertheless, there is concern that if the regime fears it will be deposed then an attack on Israel could be its only move left.

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